The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)’s latest interest rate hike comes before the ink of the much-awaited review of the RBA, released on 20 April, has dried. The threat of more increases to come is a clear sign of an emboldened RBA as the government accepts all of the panel’s utterly disappointing 51 recommendations.

Anis Chowdhury

The recommendations of the three-person panel, charged with reviewing the structure, governance, and effectiveness of the RBA, range from creating a separate board to make decisions on interest rates, to giving the Bank a simpler dual mandate to pursue both price stability and full employment.

Utter disappointment
The Review report fails to question the long-held taboos about inflation and Central Bank’s role in a social democracy. While the Review panel leaves the RBA’s 2-3% inflation target unchanged, it outrageously recommends dropping from the RBA’s mandate “economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia” and the removal of government’s power to intervene in the RBA’s decisions.

This will make the RBA more inflation hawkish, and more aggressive in its use of the blunt interest rate tool without much regard for the consequences on jobs, especially when the RBA’s full employment mandate is left vague.

Without the power to intervene in the RBA’s decisions, such hawkish interest rate hikes will force the government to cut its expenditure as it has to pay more on interest for its debts while its tax revenue shrinks when the economy slows.

Thus, the well-being of ordinary citizens, especially those who will lose jobs, will worsen as the government struggles to find money for targeted budget support. No wonder the Treasurer termed the latest RBA interest rate decision as “Pretty brutal”.

Voodoo of 2-3% inflation target
In accepting the RBA’s current 2-3% inflation target, the Review panel ignores the fact that the 2-3% inflation target has become a “global economic gospel” without any empirical or theoretical basis.

The 2-3% target was plucked out of the air and it became a universal mantra after a chance remark by the then Finance Minister of New Zealand in a television interview followed by relentless preaching.

The recommendation ignores the changed circumstance since the 2-3% inflation target was first adopted. In the wake of the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis, many, including the then IMF’s Chief Economist, Olivier Blanchard suggested a 4% inflation target would be more appropriate.

The inflation-unemployment trade-off relationship (i.e., the Phillips curve) has become flatter over the years due to labour market deregulations, off-shoring and other developments. This means trying to dogmatically achieve such a low inflation target would require a much higher unemployment rate as recognised by the former Fed Chair and current US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. That is, the interest rate must rise more steeply inflicting serious damages to the business finances, household spending and government budget.

Full employment, a poor cousin
The Review panel recommends “full employment” mandate along with inflation target. However, while the inflation target has a numerical figure (2-3%), there is no such specific target mentioned for unemployment that may be consistent with the concept of full employment. When asked during a press conference, the Treasurer said, “It’s a contested concept”.

The report mentions full employment 100 times! But does not say what it means; instead, the panel accepts the current RBA’s definition and measure of full employment based on a contestable concept of a “non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” (NAIRU). That is, full employment is consistent with an unemployment rate below which inflation will accelerate.

There is general consensus that models based on NAIRU are basically wrong. An article in the RBA Bulletin acknowledged, “Model estimates of the NAIRU are highly uncertain and can change quite a bit as new data become available”. Thus, James Galbraith argued for ditching the NAIRU. And an op-ed in The Financial Times concluded, “The sooner NAIRU is buried and forgotten, the better”.

Social democracy sacrificed
The panel thinks, there are too many factors that affect prosperity and welfare. So, it recommends removal of the RBA’s third mandate “economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia”, enshrined in the 1959 RBA Act.

Furthermore, the panel seeks to remove the government’s ability to overrule an RBA decision because it “undermines the independent operation of monetary policy”.

With these recommendations implemented, the RBA will not be bound to the commitment to build a fairer society, although economic prosperity and people’s welfare can remain as an “overarching purpose”.

The Winner
A super independent RBA will have all the power it needs to use its sole weapon, interest rate rises, to keep inflation at 2-3%. The emboldened RBA will declare the consequences to its actions on the job markets as consistent with a vaguely defined full employment, and economic prosperity and welfare of the people.

It can simply assert that job and income losses are short-term pains for long-term gains, without having to provide any evidence. There are no such things as short-term pains.

For many, job loss may cause permanent damages to their mental health, self-esteem and social life often leading to suicides. IMF research shows that the scarring effects of recessions can be permanent.

Thus, the clear winner of the recommended reforms, is the RBA, not the ordinary people struggling to find decent jobs to enable them to put a roof over their heads and two square meals on their tables.

Meanwhile, the RBA’s ideological anti-inflationary fight with a blunt interest rate tool benefits the big four banks. They are “tipped to rake in record $33 billion” in profits from rising interest rates when everyday Aussies and small businesses battle rising bankruptcies and job losses.

Anis Chowdhury is Adjunct Professor, School of Business, Western Sydney University. He held senior United Nations positions in the area of Economic and Social Affairs in New York and Bangkok.

IPS UN Bureau

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Australia is set to become the first country or jurisdiction to require large multinational corporations (MNCs), with a global consolidated income of at least AU$1 billion, to publicly report country-by-country (CbC) tax information. The new Labor Government announced on 25 October, 2022 in its budget paper that MNC’s public CbC tax reporting will begin from 1 July, 2023. Australia’s public CbC reporting rules will apply to all companies headquartered in Australia and companies headquartered elsewhere with sufficient nexus in the country.

Kate Lappin

All countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), including Australia and the US, have required large MNCs to privately report CbC tax data under Action 13 of the OECD/G20 project against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). In November 2022, the European Parliament approved a directive to mandate public CbC reporting for large MNCs within the bloc, with a range of limitations discussed below, from 22 June, 2024.

The Australian move comes a month before a new push at the United Nations to convene a global tax body to set international taxation standards, after years of faltering efforts among the world’s richest countries at the OECD.

Losing billions
The Paradise Papers and the Luxembourg Leaks of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalism (ICIJ) shed light on tax manoeuvres of more than 100 MNCs. Apple alone shifted profits around the world to accumulate US$252 billion offshore. A 2021 ICIJ study revealed that, in one year alone, MNCs shifted US$1 trillion offshore, depriving governments of hundreds of billions in revenue.

Anis Chowdhury

Research by the Centre for International Corporate Tax Accountability and Research uncovered tax dodging by MNCs that bled money from public services and workers including in scandal ridden aged care homes in Australia. It exposed how Microsoft receives billions in outsourced government IT Contracts, while lodging over AU$2billion in profits via its Bermuda based subsidiaries where it pays little tax.

Almost 800 large corporations paid no tax in 2020-21, Australian Taxation Office report reveals. The country loses about AU$8 billion a year due to MNCs profit-shifting.

Poor countries bleed most
The 2021 ICIJ study finds African countries the most “vulnerable” to profit-shifting. In 2017, the Tax Justice Network found that low-income countries were the biggest victims of profit shifting.

In some countries such as Zambia and Argentina, losses exceeded 4% of GDP. In Pakistan the losses due to profit shifting were 40% of total tax revenues, and in Chad, the estimated losses were larger than all taxes collected (106.2% of total tax revenue)!

The State of Tax Justice 2021 finds that low-income countries collectively lose the equivalent of 48% of their public health budgets.

Low-income countries rely more heavily on corporate income tax for the revenue required to fund cash-starved public services, making corporate tax transparency vital in addressing global poverty and inequality.

Rich countries serving corporate interests
International taxation rules have been designed by rich nations, especially by their club, OECD. Tax justice activists, such as the African Tax Administration Forum allege that developing countries are “not at the table” at the OECD, but on the menu, with OECD rules designed to allow multinationals to continue to extract profits in the global south, without making fair contributions.

The OECD’s standards for MNCs tax reporting are riddled with loopholes. As Oxfam points out, the OECD rules do not allow people in low-countries to have access to information about MNCs’ profit made or tax paid in their countries and nor do most tax authorities in low-income countries.

Similarly, the European Union’s CbC reporting is seriously watered-down. Tax transparency is only required for the 27 EU member states and the 21 black-listed or grey-listed jurisdictions on their flawed list of tax havens. Oxfam points out this means secrecy is retained for more than 75% of the world’s nearly 200 countries. The EU also provide a “corporate-get-out-clause” for “commercially sensitive information” for 5 years; and limit reporting to companies with consolidated turnover above EUR 750 million, excluding 85 – 90% of MNCs.

Unions’ play a critical role
The Labour movement has taken on the fight to end corporate tax avoidance. Labour’s share in GDP has been declining since the early 1970s in advanced countries and since the early 1980s in developing countries. Some unions have recognised that corporate tax avoidance erodes the public services workers need and undermines collective bargaining, while increasing corporate power.

The global union federation, Public Services International (PSI), co-ordinated union action to in support of public CbC reporting amongst other tax reforms. PSI joined the technical committee that drafted new Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Tax Standards and worked with union pension funds to back the standards, which are now widely regarded as the best benchmark for corporate tax accountability.

In Australia PSI and affiliates exposed corporate tax avoidance in aged care, labour hire companies and corporations receiving large government contracts and worked with unions to shape the Labor party’s policy platform.

The announcement reflects one of the recommendations PSI and the International Trade Union Congress made to the Australian Treasury in its submission on Multinational Tax integrity and enhanced tax transparency.

Can Australia lead?
Since being elected in May 2022, the new Australian government has sought to improve its international standing by setting stronger climate targets, increasing engagement with Pacific Island countries and rebuilding capacities of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. If the government can make good on its promise to implement the GRI standards and require public CbC reporting, it will have significantly contributed to the global public good and set a precedent for the EU and other countries to follow.

In addition to setting new tax transparencies standards, the Albanese Government should support the push by African countries for a truly inclusive UN tax convention – which could slash the scope for tax abuse by MNCs and wealthy individuals. Together, these contributions would deliver more to low-income countries than Australia’s entire development aid budget.

Kate Lappin is the Asia Pacific Regional Secretary for Public Services International (PSI), the Global Union Federation representing more than 30 million workers who deliver public services in 154 countries and territories. Kate headed the Asia Pacific forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD) for eight years and has worked across labour, feminist and human rights movements for more than 20 years.

Anis Chowdhury is Adjunct Professor, Western Sydney University. He served as Director of Macroeconomic Policy & Development and Statistics Divisions of UN-ESCAP (Bangkok) and Chief, Financing for Development Office of UN-DESA (New York).

IPS UN Bureau

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As the year 2022 drew to an end, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) warned, “Developing countries face ‘impossible trade-off’ on debt”, that spiralling debt in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) has compromised their chances of sustainable development.

Anis Chowdhury

Debt on the rise
Debt build-up accelerated in the wake of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (GFC). The World Bank’s, Global Waves of Debt reveals that total (public & private; domestic & external) debt in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) reached an all-time high of around 170% of GDP ($55 trillion) – more than double the 2010 figure – by 2018, before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Total debt in low-income countries (LICs), after a steep fall from the peak of around 120% of GDP in the mid-1990s to around 48% ($137 billion) in 2010, increased to 67% of GDP ($270 billion) in 2018.

Pandemic debt
The COVID-19 pandemic greatly lengthened the list of EMDEs in debt distress as rich nations and institutions dominated by them, e.g., the World Bank, failed to provide any meaningful debt reliefs or increase financial support to adequately respond to the health and economic crises.

The World Bank’s chief economist advised, “First fight the war [pandemic], then figure out how to pay for it”. The IMF’s managing director counselled, “Please spend, spend as much as you can. But keep the receipts”.

The World Bank’s International Debt Statistics 2022 reveals that the external debt stock of LMICs in 2021 rose to $9.3 trillion (an increase of 7.8% compared to 2020) – more than double a decade ago in 2010. For many countries, the increase was by double digit percentages.

Riskier debt
Over the past decade, the composition of debt has changed significantly, with the share of external debt owed to private creditors increasing sharply. At the end of 2021, LMICs owed 61% of their public and publicly guaranteed external debt to private creditors—an increase of 15 percentage points from 2010.

The private creditors charge higher interest rates, and offer little or no scope for restructuring or refinancing at favourable terms, as they maximise profit. The private creditors also usually offer credits for shorter duration, while development financing needs are for longer-terms.

Failed aid promises
Development needs of developing countries have increased many-folds, especially for meeting internationally agreed development goals, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and now Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The LMICs’ estimated aggregate investment needs are $1.5–$2.7 trillion per year—equivalent to 4.5–8.2% of annual GDP— between 2015 and 2030 to just meet infrastructure-related SDGs. But the rich nations spectacularly failed to honour their promises of finance made at the 2015 UN conference on financing for development (FfD) in Addis Ababa.

In fact, they failed all their past aid promises, e.g., to provide 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) as aid, a promise made over half a century ago. While aid hardly reached half the promised percentage of GNI, it in fact declined from the peak of around 0.55% of GNI in the early 1960s to around 0.34% in recent years. Oxfam estimated 50 years of unkept promises meant rich nations owed $5.7 trillion to poor countries by 2020!

At their 2005 Gleneagles Summit, G7 leaders pledged to double their aid by 2010, earmarking $50 billion yearly for Africa. But actual aid delivery has been woefully short. G7 and other rich OECD countries also broke their 2009 pledge to give $100 billion annually in climate finance until 2020.

Promoting private finance
Meanwhile institutions dominated by rich nations – the World Bank and OECD, in particular – promoted private financing of development. The World Bank, the IMF and multilateral regional development banks, e.g. Asian Development Bank jointly released From billions to trillions, just before the 2015 FfD conference.

The document optimistically but misleadingly advised governments to “de-risk” development projects for enticing trillions of dollars of private capital in public private partnerships (PPPs). While de-risking effectively meant governments bearing financial risks, or socialise private investors’ loss, PPPs are found to have dubious impacts on SDGs, especially poverty reduction and enhancing equity.

Meanwhile the OECD donors advocated “blended finance” (BF) to use aid money to leverage, again trillions of dollars of private capital. But as The Economist noted, BF is struggling to grow, stuck since 2014 “at about $20 billion a year…far off the goal of $100 billion set by the UN in 2015”, despite suspected double counting. Like PPPs, BF has effectively transferred risk from the private to the public sector. On average, the public sector has borne 57% of the costs of BF investments, including 73% in LICs.

Collateral damage
In the wake of the GFC the rich countries followed so-called unconventional monetary policies that kept interest rates exceptionally low – in some cases at zero – for a decade. This saw capital flowing from rich countries to EMDEs in search for higher returns, as exceptionally low interest rates enticed EMDE governments and businesses.

The opportunity to borrow at low rates also made the EMDE governments lazy in their domestic revenue mobilisation efforts. Such policy complacency was rewarded by the donor community, especially the World Bank, through its now discredited Doing Business Report, encouraging a harmful race to the bottom tax competition among countries to cut corporate and other direct taxations. The World Bank and IMF also advised to remove or lower easier to collect indirect taxes, e.g., excise duties in exchange for regressive and difficult to implement goods & services or value-added tax in poorer countries.

Bleeding revenues
Meanwhile transnational corporations (TNCs) continue to avoid and evade paying taxes using creating accounting, aided by tax havens, mostly situated in rich nations’ territories. Developing countries lost approximately $7.8 trillion in illicit financial flows from 2004 to 2013, mostly through TNCs’ transfer mispricing, or the fraudulent mis-invoicing of trade in cross-border tax-related transactions.

African countries received $161.6 billion in 2015, primarily through loans, personal remittances and aid. But, $203 billion was extracted, mainly through TNCs repatriating profits and illegally moving money out of the continent.

International tax rules are designed by the rich nations. They continue to oppose developing countries’ demand for an inclusive international tax regime under the auspices of the UN.

Perfect storm
Global supply-demand mis-matches due to the pandemic, the Ukraine war and sanctions are a perfect recipe for a perfect storm. The advanced countries’ inflation fight is causing adverse spill-over on developing countries.

Higher interest rates have slowed the world economy, and triggered capital outflows from developing countries, depreciating their currencies, besides lowering export earnings. Together, these are causing devastating debt crises in many developing countries, similar to what happened in the 1980s.

In October 2022, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report estimated that 54 countries, accounting for more than half of the world’s poorest people, needed immediate debt relief to avoid even more extreme poverty and give them a chance of dealing with climate change.

Rich nations fail again
As pandemic debt distress became obvious, the G20 countries devised the so-called Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) for 75 poorest countries, supposedly to provide some modest relief between May and December 2020. DSSI does not cancel debt, but only delays re-payments, to be paid fully later with the interest cost accumulating – thus effectively “kicks the can down the road”. As the private lenders refused to join the G20’s initiative, unsurprisingly only 3 countries expressed interest in DSSI. Moreover, the G20 initiative does not address debt problems facing MICs, many of which also face debt servicing, including repayment issues.

Although the IMF acted innovatively at the start of the pandemic debt distress with debt service cancellation for 25 eligible LICs (estimated at $213.5 million), the World Bank’s Chief refused to supplement, let alone complement the IMF’s debt service cancellation for the most vulnerable LICs. Nonetheless, the Bank’s President hypocritically advocates debt relief as “critical”. He wants to have the cake and eat it too; apparently wanting to increase lending, but without sacrificing the institution’s AAA credit rating.

China debt trap diplomacy?
Meanwhile the rich nations accuse China of “debt trap diplomacy” that China is deliberately pushing loans to poorer countries for geopolitical and economic advantages. Less than 20% of LICs external debt is owed to China as against more than 50% to the commercial lenders.

Most Chinese loans are concessional, and China has provided more debt relief than any other country, bilaterally negotiating around $10.8 billion of relief since the onset of the pandemic.

Unsurprisingly, independent studies debunked the Western accusation. And China has emerged as a major source of development finance for poorer countries. A recent IMF study concluded, “Beijing’s foreign assistance has had a positive impact on economic and social outcomes in recipient countries”.

Damaging trade-off
Rising debt servicing in the face of higher import costs, falling export revenues and declining remittances, are forcing developing countries to a damaging trade-off. They are forced to service external debt owed to rich nations and international financiers at the cost of development.

For many African nations, the increased cost of debt repayments is the equivalent of public health spending in the continent, according to the UNCTAD. But, “No country should be forced to choose between paying back debts or providing health care”.

IPS UN Bureau

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Inflation worries topped Ipsos’s What Worries the World survey in 2022 overtaking COVID concerns. The return of inflation caught major central banks, e.g., the US Federal Reserve (Fed), Bank of England, European Central Bank “off guard”. The persistence of inflation also surprised the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The return of inflation and its persistence exposed the poverty of the economics profession, unable to agree on its causes and required policy responses. It also exposed the profession’s anti-working class biases.

Anis Chowdhury

The US Fed was not alone in failing to see inflation coming. The Governor of Australia’s central bank – the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) – was so confident of low inflation that he declared in March 2021 that the interest rate would remain at a historic low until at least 2024. Inflation in advanced economies during 2021 exceeded the average of forecasters’ expectations by around 5–8 percentage points. The IMF’s forecasts have badly and repeatedly undershot inflation.

There was a widespread view among most central bankers and leading economists that the price increases (or inflation) that began in mid-2021 were temporary, and price increases would slow or inflation would drift downwards in 2022. Some, of course, insisted otherwise, and wanted immediate anti-inflationary measures. Thus, policy confusion ruled.

Inflation phobia and dogma
Soon inflation phobia overtook and central banks were advised to act decisively with interest rate hikes even if it meant slowing the economy or a rise in unemployment. Exaggerated claims were made without evidence that not acting now would be more costly later.
References to rare episodes of hyperinflation were made to justify tough policy stances.

The dogmatic inflation hawks ignored the fact that, in most cases, inflation does not accelerate to become harmful hyperinflation, but remains moderate. They also ignored their own neo-classical macroeconomic model, which suggests small welfare loss from moderate inflation.

Notwithstanding the IMF’s Article IV preamble which provides that economic policies should aim to foster “orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to [country specific] circumstances”, a one-size-fits-all policy of steep interest rate hikes became the only medicine to be applied to achieve a universal inflation target of 2%, a figure plucked from thin air. Yet, central bankers and mainstream economists boast their credibility!

Inflation excuse for class war
Inflation is primarily an expression and outcome of conflicting claims over the distribution of national output and income, e.g., firms’ profit mark-ups vis-à-vis workers’ wages. Thus, no sooner inflation spiked early in the year due to slow adjustment of COVID-induced supply shortages to pent-up demand, exacerbated by war and sanctions, leading central bankers and mainstream economists found an excuse to weaponise economic policies against the working class.

Stoking the fear of wage-price spirals, they advocate the use of an interest rate sledgehammer to create unemployment and, in turn, discipline labour. This is despite research within the IMF and the Reserve Bank of Australia which found no evidence of wage-price spirals since the 1980s due to declines in labour’s bargaining power. Thus, Bloomberg headlined, “Fattest Profits Since 1950 Debunk Wage-Inflation Story of CEOs”.

Research conducted by the IMF also found increases in firms’ or corporations’ market power, resulting in higher prices and profit margins. Yet, the IMF does not think such factors “are contributing in any sizeable way to the current inflationary environment”. Instead, it justifies such fattening of profits on the ground that “they provide flexible buffers between general wage and general price increases” and that it is only a catching-up “after taking a hit in 2020”!

But no such compassion is extended to the working people who have lost their lives and livelihoods. The calls for “front-loaded interest rate hikes simply got louder. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) warned, “With the prospect of higher wages as workers look to make up for the purchasing power they lost, inflation could be high for long”.

Labour a clear loser
Labour is a clear loser. Labour’s income share in the GDP has been in decline since the early 1970s. Casualisation, off-shoring, anti-union legislation and technological progress have greatly reduced labour’s bargaining power, while privatisation and dilution of anti-monopoly legislation hugely strengthened corporate power and their collusive anti-competitive behaviour. Meanwhile, CEO compensation packages swelled to obnoxious levels, rising 940% since 1978 in the US as opposed to a 12% rise for workers during that period. Profiting from the pandemic, CEO pay increased by 16% in 2020 when workers suffered, and to a record level in 2021.

Leading central bankers and mainstream economists conveniently created a dogma around a 2% inflation target to justify their anti-labour stance. The 2% inflation target has become a global norm akin to the law of gravity, even though it has no theoretical or empirical basis. The law of gravity differs depending on altitude, but the 2% target is said to be universal regardless of circumstances!

Collateral damage
Meanwhile, the advanced countries’ inflation fight is causing adverse spillover into developing countries. Higher interest rates have slowed the world economy, and triggered capital outflows from developing countries, thereby depreciating their currencies and lowering their export earnings.

Together, these are causing devastating debt crises in many developing countries, similar to what happened in the 1980s. The rating agency S&P estimates that central bank rate rises could land global borrowers with US$8.6t in extra debt servicing costs in the coming years.

Instead of providing genuine debt-relief, the G20 kicked the can down the road. As wealthy nations failed the poor countries during the pandemic, the IMF is moving to debt-distressed countries with conditionality-laden one-size-fits-all austerity packages. Thus, a Foreign Policy op-ed asked, “The International Monetary Fund: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?”

Meanwhile, the chiefs of the World Bank and the BIS urged “supply-side” policies professed to increase labour force participation and investment. These are code words for further labour market deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation.

IPS UN Bureau

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2022 has been a year of great uncertainty when it seemed the world perilously reached the brink of self-destruction – be it human-induced climate change or military conflict. Welcoming 2022, we had enough reasons to be optimistic; but it was another ‘year of living dangerously’ – Tahun vivere pericoloso in the words of Soekarno, or an annus horribilis in the words of the late Queen Elizabeth.

Anis Chowdhury

New cold war turns into proxy war
Whereas the global pandemic required extraordinary global unity, unfortunately, a ‘new cold war’ quickly turned into a ‘hot war’, bringing the world to the verge of a devastating nuclear war for the first time since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Russia, finding itself cornered by an expanding NATO, decided most foolishly to invade Ukraine, believing it could overrun the country without any resistance. While the heroic Ukrainians continue to defend their motherland, Russia seems to have become bogged down in a proxy war with NATO.

If the proxy war with Russia was not enough, the US is recklessly provoking China towards another ‘hot war’, following Trump’s trade war. Clearly the monopoly capital of the US and its military-industrial complex are pushing the US to a ‘Thucydides Trap‘. More than 60 years ago, President Eisenhower, in his farewell address to the nation, warned about the military-industrial complex, a formidable union of defence contractors and the armed forces. Eisenhower, a retired five-star Army general, who led the allies on D-Day, saw the military-industrial complex as a threat to democratic government and global peace. Alas, his dire warning fell on deaf ears.

Western hypocrisy exposed
The Russian invasion of Ukraine exposed Western pretence. The Western mainstream media unashamedly declared the dislocation of Ukrainians intolerable because the victims are blue-eyed, blond-haired Europeans, not “uncivilized” third world inhabitants or “barbaric” Arabs. Western duplicity is nowhere as blatant as it is in the case of the Palestinian plight. To them, Russia’s occupation and annexation of parts of Ukraine is illegal; but Israel’s occupation and annexation of Palestinian land as well as gross human rights violations are justified on various professed grounds, e.g., right to protection from “terrorist acts”.

Leadership vacuum
The world now needs Eisenhower to resist the military-industrial complex; it needs Teddy Roosevelt to break monopoly capital’s stranglehold and to protect consumers, workers and the environment; it needs Franklin Roosevelt to promote multilateralism and social justice; it needs Kennedy to defuse crises. At the height of the ‘old cold war’, Kennedy ate humble pie by quietly removing the security threat to the USSR posed by offensive weapons (Jupiter MRBMs) deployed in Turkey, and publicly pledging that the US would never invade Cuba or attempt another Bay of Pigs operation. Eisenhower was magnanimous enough to bear the lion’s share of financing the USSR’s proposal for global efforts to eradicate smallpox – the leading cause of death and blindness then.

Alas, we see no such signs in a world of Trump, Biden, Johnson, Marcon and Scholz. Even ‘out of touch‘, billionaire Sunak does not inspire any hope, despite being the first coloured person of colonial descent to occupy the 10 Downing Street. Sunak will probably try to prove himself holier than the Pope, instead of promoting the interest of former colonies or descendants of colonial subjects or downtrodden.

No better leadership in the South
The South is also devoid of visionaries, such as Nkrumah or Nehru who promoted non-alignment and Southern unity. Nehru’s land is now overtaken by Modi’s Hindutva movement, openly promoting violence against minorities. Unsurprisingly, Modi was in sync with Trump; but he equally cosies up to Biden professing to promote democracy and human rights. Sadly, Mandela’s South Africa is mired in scandal after scandal.

Although many, including myself, eagerly looked forward to Lula’s victory in Brazil, neither his return to power nor the so-called ‘second pink tide’ in Latin America should make one overly joyous. The Left has demonstrated its propensity to fracture or implode easily, e.g., contributing to Correa’s defeat in Ecuador, or aiding the Right to strike back in Peru. In Colombia, Finance capital, mining giants and the elite have already ganged up on Petro’s vow to tackle inequality with tax and land reforms and his proposed ban on new oil and gas exploration. Chile’s Boric has faced setbacks including the rejection of a new constitution, forcing his concessions to the Centre-Right. Constitutional coup is a common strategy of the established vested interest.

Some inspirations down under
Down under, the Australians soundly defeated an increasingly autocratic and unaccountable conservative government in May. It was the government that implemented inhumane off-shore detention centres for people seeking to escape persecution and starvation in their own countries (about to be emulated by the UK Tory Govt.). It also was cruel enough to pursue vulnerable people on social security payments with a robotic program whilst cutting taxes for the wealthy and letting them evade tax. It was the government which created plumb jobs for the boys. It was the government which continued to deny climate science and refused to act.

Finally, the Australians got rid of it. Labor showed extraordinary discipline in opposition, and in government, it stood up to big business and vested interests. It has quickly moved to put in place the processes to:

• set up an independent anti-corruption body with real teeth;
• recognise the voice of First Nations people;
• respect human rights of asylum seekers languishing in detention centres;
• address environmental degradation & achieve 43% emissions reduction target by 2030;
• restore labour rights, fair and decent wages;
• review RBA’s performance to ensure monetary policy serves broader national interest, not the finance; and
• balance geo-political alliances.

Its progressive agenda is quite long. Let me end here, wishing the Australian Labor Government success to inspire other nations – large and small, developed and developing; and with best wishes for you to be safe and remain healthy, even if not quite bright-eyed and bushy-tailed.

IPS UN Bureau

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Developing countries have long been told to avoid borrowing from central banks (CBs) to finance government spending. Many have even legislated against CB financing of fiscal expenditure.

Central bank fiscal financing
Such laws are supposedly needed to curb inflation – below 5%, if not 2% – to accelerate growth. These arrangements have also constrained a potential CB developmental role and government ability to respond better to crises.

Anis Chowdhury

A few have pragmatically suspended or otherwise circumvented such self-imposed prohibitions. This allowed them to borrow from CBs to finance pandemic relief and recovery packages.

Such recent changes have re-opened debates over the urgent need for counter-cyclical and developmental fiscal-monetary policy coordination.

Monetary financing rubbished
But financial interests claim this enables national CBs to finance government deficits, i.e., monetary financing (MF). MF is often blamed for enabling public debt, balance of payments deficits, and runaway inflation.

As William Easterly noted, “Fiscal deficits received much of the blame for the assorted economic ills that beset developing countries in the 1980s: over indebtedness and the debt crisis, high inflation, and poor investment performance and growth”.

Hence, calls for MF are typically met with scepticism, if not outright opposition. MF undermines central bank independence (CBI) – hence, the strict segregation of monetary from fiscal authorities – supposedly needed to prevent runaway inflation.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Cases of MF leading to runaway inflation have been very exceptional, e.g., Bolivia in the 1980s or Zimbabwe in 2007-08. These were often associated with the breakdown of political and economic systems, as when the Soviet Union collapsed.

Bolivia suffered major external shocks. These included Volcker’s interest rate spikes in the early 1980s, much reduced access to international capital markets, and commodity price collapses. Political and economic conflicts in Bolivian society hardly helped.

Similarly, Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation was partly due to conflicts over land rights, worsened by government mismanagement of the economy and British-led Western efforts to undermine the Mugabe government.

Indian lessons
Former Reserve Bank of India Governor Y.V. Reddy noted fiscal-monetary coordination had “provided funds for development of industry, agriculture, housing, etc. through development financial institutions” besides enabling borrowing by state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the early decades.

For him, less satisfactory outcomes – e.g., continued “macro imbalances” and “automatic monetization of deficits” – were not due to “fiscal activism per se but the soft-budget constraint” of SOEs, and “persistent inadequate returns” on public investments.

Monetary policy is constrained by large and persistent fiscal deficits. For Reddy, “undoubtedly the nature of interaction between [fiscal and monetary policies] depends on country-specific situation”.

Reddy urged addressing monetary-fiscal policy coordination issues within a broad common macroeconomic framework. Several lessons can be drawn from Indian experience.

First, “there is no ideal level of fiscal deficit, and critical factors are: How is it financed and what is it used for?” There is no alternative to SOE efficiency and public investment project financial viability.

Second, “the management of public debt, in countries like India, plays a critical role in development of domestic financial markets and thus on conduct of monetary policy, especially for effective transmission”.

Third, “harmonious implementation of policies may require that one policy is not unduly burdening the other for too long”.

Lessons from China?
Zhou Xiaochuan, then People’s Bank of China (PBoC) Governor, emphasized CBs’ multiple responsibilities – including financial sector development and stability – in transition and developing economies.

China’s CB head noted, “monetary policy will undoubtedly be affected by balance of international payments and capital flows”. Hence, “macro-prudential and financial regulation are sensitive mandates” for CBs.

PBoC objectives – long mandated by the Chinese government – include maintaining price stability, boosting economic growth, promoting employment, and addressing balance of payments problems.

Multiple objectives have required more coordination and joint efforts with other government agencies and regulators. Therefore, “the PBoC … works closely with other government agencies”.

Zhou acknowledged, “striking the right balance between multiple objectives and the effectiveness of monetary policy is tricky”. By maintaining close ties with the government, the PBoC has facilitated needed reforms.

He also emphasized the need for policy flexibility as appropriate. “If the central bank only emphasized keeping inflation low and did not tolerate price changes during price reforms, it could have blocked the overall reform and transition”.

During the pandemic, the PBoC developed “structural monetary” policy tools, targeted to help Covid-hit sectors. Structural tools helped keep inter-bank liquidity ample, and supportive of credit growth.

More importantly, its targeted monetary policy tools were increasingly aligned with the government’s long-term strategic goals. These include supporting desired investments, e.g., in renewable energy, while preventing asset price bubbles and ‘overheating’.

In other words, the PBoC coordinates monetary policy with fiscal and industrial policies to achieve desired stable growth, thus boosting market confidence. As a result, inflation in China has remained subdued.

Consumer price inflation has averaged only 2.3% over the past 20 years, according to The Economist. Unlike global trends, China’s consumer price inflation fell to 2.5% in August, and rose to only 2.8% in September, despite its ‘zero-Covid’ policy and measures such as lockdowns.

Needed reforms
Effective fiscal-monetary policy coordination needs appropriate arrangements. An IMF working paper showed, “neither legal independence of central bank nor a balanced budget clause or a rule-based monetary policy framework … are enough to ensure effective monetary and fiscal policy coordination”.

Appropriate institutional and operational arrangements will depend on country-specific circumstances, e.g., level of development and depth of the financial sector, as noted by both Reddy and Zhou.

When the financial sector is shallow and countries need dynamic structural transformation, setting up independent fiscal and monetary authorities is likely to hinder, not improve stability and sustainable development.

Understanding each other’s objectives and operational procedures is crucial for setting up effective coordination mechanisms – at both policy formulation and implementation levels. Such an approach should better achieve the coordination and complementarity needed to mutually reinforce fiscal and monetary policies.

Coherent macroeconomic policies must support needed structural transformation. Without effective coordination between macroeconomic policies and sectoral strategies, MF may worsen payments imbalances and inflation. Macro-prudential regulations should also avoid adverse MF impacts on exchange rates and capital flows.

Poorly accountable governments often take advantage of real, exaggerated and imagined crises to pursue macroeconomic policies for regime survival, and to benefit cronies and financial supporters.

Undoubtedly, much better governance, transparency and accountability are needed to minimize both immediate and longer-term harm due to ‘leakages’ and abuses associated with increased government borrowing and spending.

Citizens and their political representatives must develop more effective means for ‘disciplining’ policy making and implementation. This is needed to ensure public support to create fiscal space for responsible counter-cyclical and development spending.

IPS UN Bureau

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Widespread adverse reactions to the UK government’s recent ‘mini-budget’ forced new Prime Minister Liz Truss to resign. The episode highlighted problems of macroeconomic policy coordination and the interests involved.

Macro-policy coordination
But macroeconomic, specifically fiscal-monetary policy coordination almost became “taboo” as central bank independence (CBI) became the new orthodoxy. It has been accused of enabling CBs to finance government deficits. Critics claim inflation, even hyperinflation, becomes inevitable.

Anis Chowdhury

Fiscal policy – notably variations in government tax and spending – mainly aims to influence long-term growth and distribution. CB monetary policy – e.g., variations in short-term interest rates and credit growth – claims to prioritize price and exchange rate stability.

By the early 1990s, the ‘Washington consensus’ implied the two macro-policy actors should work independently due to their different time horizons. After all, governments are subject to short-term political considerations inimical to monetary stability needed for long-term growth.

Claiming to be “technocratic”, CBs have increasingly set their own goals or targets. CBI has involved both ‘goal’ and ‘instrument’ independence, instead of ‘goal dependence’ with ‘instrument independence’.

CBI was ostensibly to avoid ‘fiscal dominance’ of monetary policy. Meanwhile, government fiscal policy became subordinated to CB inflation targets. For former Reserve Bank of Australia Deputy Governor Guy Debelle, monetary policy became “the only game in town for demand management”.

Debelle noted that except for rare and brief coordinated fiscal stimuli in early 2009, after the onset of the global financial crisis, “demand management continued to be the sole purview of central banks. Fiscal policy was not much in the mix”.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Adam Posen found the costs of disinflation, or keeping inflation low, higher in OECD countries with CBI. Carl Walsh found likewise in the European Community.

For Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer, CBs have sought to enhance their credibility by being tougher on inflation, even at the expense of output and employment losses.

Committed to arbitrary targets, independent CBs have sought credit for keeping inflation low. They deny other contributory factors, e.g., labour’s diminished bargaining power and globalization, particularly cheaper supplies.

John Taylor, author of the ‘Taylor rule’ CB mantra, concluded CB “performance was not associated with de jure [legislated] central bank independence”. De jure CB independence has not prevented them from “deviating from policies that lead to both price and output stability”.

The de facto independent US Fed has also taken “actions that have led to high unemployment and/or high inflation”. As single-minded independent CBs pursued low inflation, they neglected their responsibility for financial stability.

CBs’ indiscriminate monetary expansion during the 2000s’ Great Moderation enabled asset price bubbles and dangerous speculation, culminating in the global financial crisis (GFC).

Since the GFC, “the financial sector has become [increasingly] dependent on easy liquidity… To compensate for quantitative easing (QE)-induced low return…, [holders of safe long-term government bonds] increased the risk profile of their other assets, taking on more leverage, and hedging interest rate risk with derivatives”.

Independent CBs also never acknowledge the adverse distributional consequences of their policies. This has been true of both conventional policies, involving interest rate adjustments, and unconventional ones, with bond buying, or QE. All have enabled speculation, credit provision and other financial investments.

They have also helped inefficient and uncompetitive ‘zombie’ enterprises survive. Instead of reversing declining long-term productivity growth, the slowdown since the GFC “has been steep and prolonged”.

Workers’ real wages have remained stagnant or even declined, lowering labour’s income share and widening income inequality. As crises hit and monetary policies were tightened, workers lost jobs and incomes. Workers are doubly hit as governments pursue fiscal austerity to keep inflation low.

Dire consequences
The pandemic has seen unprecedented fiscal and monetary responses. But there has been little coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities. Unsurprisingly, greater pandemic-induced fiscal deficits and monetary expansion have raised inflationary pressures, especially with supply disruptions.

This could have been avoided if policymakers had better coordinated fiscal and monetary measures to unlock key supply bottlenecks. War and economic sanctions have made the supply situation even more dire.

Government debt has been rising since the GFC, reaching record levels due to pandemic measures. CBs hiking interest rates to contain inflation have thus worsened public debt burdens, inviting austerity measures.

Thus, countries go through cycles of debt accumulation and output contraction. Supposed to contain inflation, they adversely impact livelihoods. Many more developing countries face debt crises, further setting back progress.

Needed reforms
Sixty years ago, Milton Friedman asserted, “money is too important to be left to the central bankers”. He elaborated, “One economic defect of an independent central bank … is that it almost invariably involves dispersal of responsibility… Another defect … is the extent to which policy is … made highly dependent on personalities… third … defect is that an independent central bank will almost invariably give undue emphasis to the point of view of bankers”.

Thus, government-sceptic Friedman recommended, “either to make the Federal Reserve a bureau in the Treasury under the secretary of the Treasury, or to put the Federal Reserve under direct congressional control.

“Either involves terminating the so-called independence of the system… either would establish a strong incentive for the Fed to produce a stabler monetary environment than we have had”.

Undoubtedly, this is an extreme solution. Friedman also suggested replacing CB discretion with monetary policy rules to resolve the problem of lack of coordination. But, as Alan Blinder has observed, such rules are “unlikely to score highly”.

Effective fiscal-monetary policy coordination requires appropriate supporting institutions and operating arrangements. As IMF research has shown, “neither legal independence of central bank nor a balanced budget clause or a rule-based monetary policy framework … are enough to ensure effective monetary and fiscal policy coordination”.

Although rules-based policies may enhance transparency and strengthen discipline, they cannot create “credibility”, which depends on policy content, not policy frameworks.

For Debelle, a combination of “goal dependence” and “instrument or operational independence” of CBs under strong democratic or parliamentary oversight may be appropriate for developed countries.

There is also a need to broaden membership of CB governing boards to avoid dominance by financial interests and to represent broader national interests.

But macro-policy coordination should involve more than merely an appropriate fiscal-monetary policy mix. A more coherent approach should also incorporate sectoral strategies, e.g., public investment in renewable energy, education & training, healthcare. Such policy coordination should enable sustainable development and reverse declining productivity growth.

As Buiter urges, it is up to governments “to make appropriate use of … fiscal space” created by fiscal-monetary coordination. Democratic checks and balances are needed to prevent “pork-barrelling” and other fiscal abuses and to protect fiscal decision-making from corruption.

IPS UN Bureau

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Preoccupied with enhancing their own ‘credibility’ and reputations, central banks (CBs) are again driving the world economy into recession, financial turmoil and debt crises.

Wall Street ‘cred’
Most CB governors believe ‘credibility’ is desirable and must be achieved by fighting inflation at any cost. To justify their own more harmful policies, they warn inflation is ‘damaging’.

Anis Chowdhury

The US Fed deepened the 1930s’ Great Depression, the 1970s’ stagflation and the early 1980s’ contraction, besides contributing to the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC). Hence, CB notions of ‘credibility’ and ‘independence’ need to be reconsidered.

Milton Friedman – whom many central bankers revere – blamed the 1930s’ Great Depression on US Fed actions and inactions. Instead of providing liquidity support for businesses struggling with short-term cash-flow problems, it squeezed credit and economies.

But why did the Fed behave as it did? Some economic historians insist it was “to promote the interests of commercial banks, rather than economic recovery”.

Monetary policy before and during the Great Depression “was designed to cause the failure of non-member banks, which would enhance the long-run profits of the Fed’s member banks and enlarge the [Fed’s] regulatory domain”.

Others concluded, “Federal Reserve errors seem largely attributable to the continued use of flawed policies” to defend the ‘gold standard’, and its poor understanding of monetary conditions.

Central banks contractionary
Worse, few lessons were learnt. Instead of protecting the gold standard, or being counter-cyclical, fighting inflation is the new CB preoccupation. Even worse, most CBs now commit to an arbitrarily-set inflation target of 2%, first promoted by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand over three decades ago.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Ben Bernanke’s research team found the major damage from the 1970s’ oil price shocks was due to the “tightening of monetary policy” response. Other research attributed the 1970s’ stagflation largely to the Fed’s “go-stop” monetary policy, worsened by policymakers’ “misperceptions” and “faulty doctrine”.

Hence, “in substantial part the Great Stagflation of the 1970s could have been avoided, had the Fed not permitted major monetary expansions in the early 1970s”.

Labour pays
Likewise, Fed chair Paul Volcker sharply raised interest rates during 1979-81 “to a crushing level of nearly 20 per cent by the middle of 1981”.

This precipitated the “ensuing recession that started in July 1981 [which] became the most severe downturn since the second world war”. US unemployment reached nearly 11% in late 1982, the highest since the Great Depression.

Volcker’s actions betrayed the Fed’s dual mandate to pursue both full employment and price stability. First in the Employment Act of 1946, it was re-codified in the 1978 ‘Humphrey-Hawkins’ Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act.

Eventually, the long-term unemployed “became invisible to both the labour market and to policymakers”. Many became deskilled as others fell victim to criminality, substance abuse, and mental illness, even suicide.

The overall health of Americans became “poorer for years as a result of the deep economic recession in 1981 and 1982”.

Sending Global South south
Volcker’s actions caused developing country debt crises, with decades lost in Latin America and Africa. A recent New York Times opinion-editorial warned, “The Powell pivot to tighter money in 2021 is the equivalent of Mr. Volcker’s 1981 move”, and “the 2020s economy could resemble the 1980s”.

Yet, invoking CB credibility, many with power and influence are urging the Fed to stick to its guns with Volcker’s “courage to take out the baseball bat to slam the economy and slay inflation”!

The World Bank warns of dire developing country debt crises following policy-induced recessions. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund has warned developing economies with dollar-denominated debt of imminent foreign exchange crises.

Stop-go new norm
Fed, Bank of England and European Central Bank policy approaches still justify “go-stop” monetary policy reversals. Resulting booms or bubbles and busts also feature in other recent crises, e.g., the GFC.

Following the 1997 East Asian financial crises, Mexican, Russian and post-US ‘dotcom bubble’ bust, the Fed eased monetary policy too much for too long during the ‘Great Moderation’.

CBs enabled credit expansion in the 2000s, culminating in the GFC. More worryingly, the “near-consensus view” is that independent CBs have failed to achieve – let alone protect – financial stability.

Easy credit and rising stock and housing markets have involved rapid credit and loan growth worsening asset price bubbles. Regulatory oversight became increasingly lax as investors ‘chased yield’. Leverage grew, using dodgy ‘derivative’ products, making proper risk assessment difficult.

Guy Debelle, once Deputy Governor of Australia’s CB, noted, “The goal of financial stability has generally been left vague”. Hence, CBs failed to see significant build-up of financial instability”. Soon after, the Lehman Brothers’ collapse precipitated the GFC.

QE magic from bubble to bust
Governments withdrew fiscal ‘stimuli’ too soon. So, major CBs aggressively pursued ‘unconventional monetary policies’, especially ‘quantitative easing’, to keep economies afloat.

Extraordinary monetary expansion provided vital liquidity, but poor coordination also fuelled asset price bubbles. Thus, unviable enterprises survived, undermining productivity growth.

With less investment in the real economy, supply capacity is falling behind still growing demand. Pandemic, war and sanctions have also disrupted supplies.

Raising interest rates, CBs now race to reverse earlier monetary expansion. Credit contractions are squeezing economies, hitting poorer countries especially hard.

Reviewing historical data, the author of the ‘Taylor rule’ – whom many CBs profess to follow – concluded, “The classic explanation of financial crises, going back hundreds of years, is that they are caused by excesses – frequently monetary excesses – which lead to a boom and an inevitable bust”.

Independence for what?
CB independence (CBI) advocates often claim low inflation during the Great Moderation was due to CB credibility. But inflation in most countries declined from the mid-1990s, with or without CBI.

The alleged causation has been much exaggerated, and is certainly not as strong as argued. Claiming CBI ensures low inflation also denies other relevant variables, e.g., labour market casualization and globalization.

Debelle observed, “How much [low inflation] can be attributable to central bank independence or the inflation target is difficult to disentangle …[Favourable] assessment mostly relies on assertion, rather than empirical proof”.

Milton Friedman argued crisis responses involve inherently political decisions, best not left to the unelected. A modern CB’s “responsibilities overlap with other government functions”. So, CBs must be subject to political authority while maintaining operational independence.

CBI fetishism has also allowed central bankers to ignore distributional consequences of monetary policies. This has often enabled financial asset owners, speculators and creditors. CBI has also meant neglecting development responsibilities.

Emphasizing CBI also implies “a very narrow view of central bank functions”. This has made economies more prone to financial instability and crisis. Clearly, CBI is no harmless ‘elixir’ ensuring low inflation.

IPS UN Bureau

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The dogmatic obsession with and focus on fighting inflation in rich countries are pushing the world economy into recession, with many dire consequences, especially for poorer countries. This phobia is due to myths shared by most central bankers.

Anis Chowdhury

“Once-in-a-generation inflation in the US and Europe could choke off global growth, with a global recession possible in 2023”, claimed the World Economic Forum Chief Economist’s Outlook under the headline, “Inflation Will Lead Inexorably To Recession”.

The Atlantic recently warned, “Inflation Is Bad… raising the prospect of a period of economic stagnation or even a recession”. The Economist claims, “It hurts investment and makes most people poorer”.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

World Bank chief economist Michael Bruno and William Easterly asked, “Is inflation harmful to growth?” With data from 31 countries for 1961-94, they concluded, “The ratio of fervent beliefs to tangible evidence seems unusually high on this topic, despite extensive previous research”.

OECD evidence for 1961-2021 – Figures 1a & 1b – updates Bruno & Easterly, again contradicting the ‘standard narrative’ of major CBs, BWIs, BIS and others. The inflation-growth relationship is strongly positive when 1974-75 – severe oil spike recession years – are excluded.

The relationship does not become negative even when 1974-75 are included. Also, the “Great Inflation” of 1965-82 did not harm growth. Hence, there is no empirical basis for setting a particular threshold, such as the now standard 2% inflation target – long acknowledged as “plucked from the air”!

Developing countries also have a positive inflation-growth relationship if extreme cases – e.g., inflation rates in excess of 20%, or ‘excessively’ impacted by commodity price volatilities, civil strife, war – are omitted (Figures 2a & 2b).

Figure 2a summarizes evidence for 82 developing countries during 1991-2021. Although slightly weakened, the positive relationship remained, even if the 1981-90 debt crises years are included (Figure 2b).

Myth 2: Inflation always accelerates
Another popular myth is that once inflation begins, it has an inherent tendency to accelerate. As inflation supposedly tends to speed up, not acting decisively to nip it in the bud is deemed dangerous. So, the IMF chief economist advises, “Don’t let inflation ‘genie’ out of the bottle”. Hence, inflation has to be ‘nipped in the bud’.

But, in fact, OECD inflation has never exceeded 16% in the past six decades, including the 1970s’ oil shock years. Inflation does not accelerate easily, even when labour has more bargaining power, or wages are indexed to consumer prices – as in some countries.

Bruno & Easterly only found a high likelihood of inflation accelerating when inflation exceeded 40%. Two MIT economists – Rüdiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer, later International Monetary Fund Deputy Managing Director – came to a similar conclusion, describing 15–30% inflation as “moderate”.

Dornbusch & Fischer also stressed, “Most episodes of moderate inflation were triggered by commodity price shocks and were brief; very few ended in higher inflation”. Importantly, they warned, “such [moderate] inflations can be reduced only at a substantial … cost to growth”.

Myth 3: Hyperinflation threatens
Although extremely rare, avoiding hyperinflation has become the pretext for central bankers prioritizing inflation prevention. Hyperinflation – at rates over 50% for at least a month – is undoubtedly harmful for growth. But as IMF research shows, “Since 1947, hyperinflations in market economies have been rare”.

Many of the worst hyperinflation episodes in history were after World War Two and the Soviet demise. Bruno & Easterly also mention breakdowns of economic and political systems – as in Iran or Nicaragua, following revolutions overthrowing corrupt despotic regimes.

A White House staff blog noted, “The inflationary period after World War II is likely a better comparison for the current economic situation than the 1970s and suggests that inflation could quickly decline once supply chains are fully online and pent-up demand levels off”.

Myth 4: Evidence-based policymaking
Central bankers love to claim their policymaking is evidence-based. They cite one another and famous economists to enhance the aura of CB “credibility”.

Unsurprisingly, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand promoted its arbitrary 2% inflation target mainly by endless repetition – not strong evidence or superior logic. They simply “devoted a huge amount of effort” to preaching the new mantra “to everybody who would listen – and some who were reluctant to listen”.

The narrative also suited those concerned about wage pressures. Fighting inflation has provided an excuse to further weaken workers’ working conditions and pay. Thus, labour’s share of income has been declining since the 1970s.

Greater central bank independence (from the executive) has enhanced the influence and power of financial interests – largely at the expense of the real economy. Output and employment growth weakened as a result, worsening the lot of the many, especially in the global South.

Fact: Central banks induce recessions
Inappropriate CB policies have often slowed economic growth without mitigating inflation. Hawkish CB responses to inflation can become self-fulfilling prophecies with high inflation seemingly associated with recessions or growth collapses.

Before becoming Fed chair, Ben Bernanke’s research team concluded, “an important part of the effect of oil price shocks [in the 1970s] on the economy results not from the change in oil prices, per se, but from the resulting tightening of monetary policy”.

Thus, central bank interventions have caused contractions without reducing inflation. The longest US recession after the Great Depression – in the early 1980s – was due to Fed chair Paul Volcker’s 1979-81 interest rate hikes.

A New York Times opinion-editorial recently warned, “The Powell pivot to tighter money in 2021 is the equivalent of Mr. Volcker’s 1981 move”, and “the 2020s economy could resemble the 1980s”.

Fearing an “extremely severe” world recession, Columbia University history professor Adam Tooze has summed up the current CBs’ interest rate hike frenzy as “the single most dramatic simultaneous tightening of monetary policy ever”!

Phobias, especially if based on unfounded beliefs, never offer good bases for sound policymaking.

IPS UN Bureau

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Central banks (CBs) around the world – led by the US Fed, European Central Bank and Bank of England – are raising interest rates, ostensibly to check inflation. The ensuing race to the bottom is hastening world economic recession.

Going for broke
New UK Prime Minister Liz Truss has already revived ‘supply side economics’, long thought to have been fatally discredited. Her huge tax cuts are supposed to kick-start Britain’s stagnant economy in time for the next general election.

Anis Chowdhury

Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers chairman, Harvard professor Martin Feldstein found most Reagan era growth due to expansionary monetary policy. Volcker’s interest rate hikes to fight inflation were reversed. This enabled the US economy to bounce back from its severe 1982 monetary policy inflicted recession.

George W Bush’s 2001 and 2003 tax cuts also failed to spur growth. Instead, deficits and debt ballooned. “The largest benefits from the Bush tax cuts flowed to high-income taxpayers”. Likewise, Trump tax cuts failed to lift the US economy, with billionaires now paying much less than workers.

After Boris Johnson stepped down, UK Conservative Party leadership contenders started by promising more tax cuts. But The Economist was “sceptical that such cuts will lift Britain’s growth rate”. Instead, it worried tax cuts would compound inflationary pressures, triggering ever tighter monetary policy.

The Economist concluded, “It is hard to spot a connection between the overall level of taxation and long-term prosperity”. Unsurprisingly, The Economist sees Truss’ “largest tax cuts in half a century” as “a reckless budget, fiscally and politically”.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Tax cuts usually make things worse. Typically, these require cutting social protection and essential public services, ostensibly to balance the budget. So, already greater wealth and income inequalities will worsen.

Governments have to cut public investments due to ballooning budget deficits. Higher interest rates and public spending cuts will also derail efforts needed to transition to more sustainable, greener futures.

Class war
Policy fights over inflation have many dimensions, including class. Instead of helping people cope with rising living costs, increasing interest rates only makes things worse, hastening economic slowdowns. Thus, workers not only lose jobs and incomes, but also are forced to pay more for mortgages and other debts.

Unemployment, lower incomes, deteriorating health and other pains hurt workers. As workers want higher incomes to cope with rising living expenses, such austere policies are deemed necessary to prevent ‘wage-price spirals’.

As usual, workers are being blamed for the resurgence of inflation. But research by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and others has found no evidence of such wage-price spirals in recent decades.

Experience and evidence suggest very low likelihood of such dialectics in current circumstances, although some nominal wages have risen. Since the 1980s, labour bargaining power and collective wage determination have declined.

Policymakers should address stagnant, even declining real wages in most economies in recent decades. These have hurt “low-paid workers much more than those at the top”. Even the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development club of rich countries has “worryingly” noted these trends.

The IMF Deputy Managing Director has explained why wages do not have to be suppressed to avoid inflation. Letting nominal wages rise will mitigate rising inequality, plus declining labour income shares (Figure 1) and real wages.

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2017

Profit margins had already risen, even before the Ukraine war and sanctions. US trends prompted the Bloomberg headline, “Fattest Profits Since 1950 Debunk Wage-Inflation Story of CEOs”. Aggregate profits of the largest UK non-financial companies in 2021 rose 34% over pre-pandemic levels.

Policymakers should therefore restrain profits, not wages. Recent price increases have been due to rising profits from mark-ups. Recent trends have made it “easier for firms to put their prices up” notes the Reserve Bank of Australia Governor.

Addressing inequality
The IMF Managing Director (MD) recently warned, “People will be on the streets if we don’t fight inflation”. But people are even more likely to protest if they lose jobs and incomes. Worse, the burden of fighting inflation has been put on them while the elite continues to enrich itself.

Raising interest rates is a blunt means to fight inflation. It worsens living costs and job losses, while tax cuts mainly benefit the rich. Instead, the rich should be taxed more to enhance revenue to increase public provisioning of essential services, such as transport, health and education.

The IMF MD noted raising taxes on the wealthy will help close the yawning gap between rich and poor without harming growth. Public provision of childcare and labour market programmes (e.g., retraining) will improve labour supply. Easing worker shortages can thus dampen price pressures.

The current situation requires addressing growing inequality. Redistributive fiscal measures – taxing high earners to fund expanded social protection and public provisioning – are time-tested means to address disparities.

Increasing top tax rates and tax system progressivity are also socially progressive, checking growing inequality. Meanwhile, as consumer prices spiral, rising profits and high executive remuneration have to be checked.

Supply-side policies
The World Bank and Bank of International Settlements heads have urged reducing the current focus on demand management to counter inflation. They both insist on addressing long-term supply bottlenecks, but do not offer much practical guidance.

Poorly coordinated ‘unconventional’ monetary policies since the 2008-09 global financial crisis have created property and stock market bubbles. These damage the real economy, worsen inequality and slow labour productivity growth, with the worst spill over effects in developing counties.

Addressing supply bottlenecks can involve tax incentives and credit policies. But discredited supply-side mantras – e.g., labour market deregulation – must be discarded. Related fiscal and monetary policies – e.g., tax cuts for the rich and inappropriate interest rate hikes – should also be abandoned.

Governments are losing chances to boost productivity, achieve low carbon transformation and cut inequalities. Instead, policymakers should pro-actively push desired economic changes by favouring less carbon-intensive and more dynamic investments.

This may also require checking CBs’ monetary policy independence to more effectively coordinate fiscal with monetary policies. But this should not undermine CBs’ ‘operational independence’ to foster “orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability”.

Governments must rise to the extraordinary challenges of our times with pragmatic, appropriate and progressive policy initiatives. To do this well, they must boldly reject the ideologies and dogmas responsible for our current predicament.

IPS UN Bureau

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Inflation phobia among central banks (CBs) is dragging economies into recession and debt crises. Their dogmatic beliefs prevent them from doing right. Instead, they take their cues from Washington: the US Fed, Treasury and Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs).

Costly recessions
Both BWIs – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank – have recently raised the alarm about the likely dire consequences of the ensuing contractionary ‘race to the bottom’. But their dogmas stop them from being pragmatic. Hence, their policy analyses and advice come across as incoherent, even contradictory.

Anis Chowdhury

Warning “Increased interest rates will bite”, the IMF Managing Director has urged countries to “buckle up”, acknowledging anti-inflationary measures threaten recovery. “For hundreds of millions of people it will feel like a recession, even if the world economy avoids” two consecutive quarters of contracting output.

She also noted US Fed rate hikes have strengthened the dollar, raising import costs and making it costlier to service dollar-denominated debt. But reciting the mantra, she claims if inflation “gets under control, then we can see a foundation for growth and recovery”.

This contradicts all evidence that low inflation comes at the expense of robust growth. Per capita output growth and productivity growth both fell during three decades of low inflation. Also, low inflation has not prevented financial crises.

Even if growth recovers, recessions’ scars remain. For example, an IMF study found, “the Great Recession of 2007–09 has left gaping wounds”. Over 200 million people are unemployed worldwide, over 30 million more than in 2007.

A 2018 San Francisco Fed study assessed the Great Recession cost Americans about $70,000 each. The Harvard Business Review estimated, over 2008-10, it cost the US government “well over $2 trillion, more than twice the cost of the 17-year-long war in Afghanistan”.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Studies have documented its harmful impacts on wellbeing, particularly mental health. Recessions in Europe and North America caused over 10,000 more suicides, greater drug abuse and other self-harming behaviour. Adverse socio-economic and health impacts are worse in developing countries with poor social protection.

Interest rate hikes during 1979-82 triggered debt crises in over 40 developing countries. The 1982 world recession “coincided with the second-lowest growth rate in developing economies over the past five decades, second only to 2020”. A “decade of lost growth in many developing economies” followed.

But Bank research shows interest rate hikes “may not be sufficient to bring global inflation back down”. The Bank even warns major CBs’ anti-inflationary measures may trigger “a string of financial crises in emerging market and developing economies”, which “would do them lasting harm”.

Developing country governments’ external debt – increasingly commercial, costing more and repayable sooner – has ballooned since the 2008-09 global financial crisis. The pandemic has caused more debt to become unsustainable as rich countries oppose meaningful relief.

No policy consensus
The Bank correctly notes, “A slowdown … typically calls for countercyclical policy to support activity”. It acknowledges, “the threat of inflation and limited fiscal space are spurring policymakers in many countries to withdraw policy support even as the global economy slows sharply”.

It also suggests, “policymakers could shift their focus from reducing consumption to boosting production…to generate additional investment and improve productivity and capital allocation…critical for growth and poverty reduction.”

However, it does not offer much policy guidance besides the usual irrelevant platitudes, e.g., CBs “must communicate policy decisions clearly while safeguarding their independence”.

It even blames “labor-market constraints”. For decades, the Bank promoted measures to promote labour market flexibility, ostensibly to increase participation rates, reduce prices, via wages, and re-employ displaced workers.

Such policies since the 1980s have accelerated declining productivity growth and real incomes for most. They have reduced labour’s share of national income, increasing inequality. To make matters worse, the Bank misleadingly attributes many policy-induced economic woes to high inflation.

In May, the IMF Deputy Managing Director argued wages did not have to be suppressed to avoid inflation. She called for CB vigilance and “forceful” actions against inflation, which “will remain significantly above central bank targets for a while”.

No more Washington Consensus
In June, a Fund policy note advised allowing “a full pass-through of higher international fuel prices to domestic users”. It advised recognizing the supply shock causes of contemporary inflation and protecting the most vulnerable.

But more alarmist Fund staff urge otherwise. In July, its ‘chief economist’ urged, “bringing [inflation] back to central bank targets should be the top priority … Central banks that have started tightening should stay the course until inflation is tamed”.

Although he acknowledged, “[t]ighter monetary policy will inevitably have real economic costs”, without any evidence, he insisted, “delaying it will only exacerbate the hardship”.

In August, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) head urged shifting attention from managing demand to enabling supply. He warned central bankers had for too long assumed that supply adjusts automatically and smoothly to shifts in demand.

He warned, “Continuing to rely primarily on aggregate demand tools [i.e., the interest rate] to boost growth in this environment could increase the danger, as higher and harder-to-control inflation could result”.

But the BIS ‘chief economist’ soon urged major economies to “forge ahead with forceful” interest rate hikes despite growing threats of recession. He did not seem to care that the rate hike gamble to fight inflation may not work and its costs could be astronomical.

Inflation fear mongering
Influential economists at the US Fed, Bank of England, Fund and BIS fear “second-round” effects of mainly supply-shock inflation due to “wage-price spirals”.

But Fund research acknowledged, “little empirical research …[on]… the effects of oil price shocks on wages and factors affecting their strength”. It found very low likelihood of such ‘pass-through’ effects due to significant labour market changes, including drastic declines in unionization and collective bargaining.

It reported “almost zero pass-through for 1980-1999” and negligible effects during 2000-19, before concluding, “In a broad stroke, the pass-through has declined over time in Europe”. Similar findings have been reported by others.

Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) research found “the current episode has many differences to the 1970s, when a wage-price spiral did emerge”. It concluded, “There are a number of factors that work against a wage-price spiral emerging, … implying that the overall risk in most advanced economies is probably quite low”.

Australian professor Ross Garnaut has suggested, “the spectre of a virulent wage-price spiral comes from our memories and not current conditions”. Sadly, despite all the evidence, including their own, the Fund and RBA still urge firm CB actions against inflation!

IPS UN Bureau

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Policymakers have become obsessed with achieving low inflation. Many central banks adopt inflation targeting (IT) monetary policy (MP) frameworks in various ways. Some have mandates to keep inflation at 2% over the medium term. Many believe this ensures sustained long-term prosperity.

Anis Chowdhury

IT discord
Heads of major central banks – such as the US Federal Reserve Bank (Fed), Bank of England (BoE) and German Bundesbank – committed to keep inflation at 2% soon after NZ. Although typically ‘medium-term’, IT’s high costs are portrayed as necessary, but brief. Worse, promised growth benefits have not materialized.

The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) never endorsed any fixed inflation target. Article IV states, “each member shall: (i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to its circumstances”.

This makes clear much depends on conditions and circumstances. The sensible priority then would be to sustain prosperity with “reasonable price stability”, and not to commit to an arbitrary universal IT at any cost. Yet, many IMF officials promote the 2% target.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

For him, “Monetary policy needs to look beyond its core focus on low and stable inflation” to promote balanced and equitable growth, while minimizing adverse spill-overs on developing economies.

An IMF chief economist even asserted low inflation and economic progress was a “divine coincidence”, and insisted a 2% inflation target was too low. After the GFC, an IMF working paper argued for a long-run inflation target of 4% for advanced countries.

A Bank of Canada working paper concluded, “the current state of economic research – both empirical and theoretical – provides little basis for believing in significant observable benefits of low inflation such as an increase in the growth rate of real GDP”.

IT benefits?
Any objective consideration of actual IT experiences would have led to its rejection long ago. IT is clearly inimical to growth and equity, let alone the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Four central bank (CB) experiences offer valuable lessons about IT’s likely consequences.

The US Fed is, by far, the most important CB globally, while the BoE has been historically important. The Bundesbank has been the most inflation averse in the post-war period, while the RBNZ was the world’s IT pioneer.

NZ’s inflation during 1961-90 averaged 9%, more than the US’s 5.1% and the UK’s 8%. Yet, the mighty Fed and the venerable BoE sought to emulate the miniscule RBNZ! Germany’s well-known inflation-phobia is attributed to its inter-war ‘hyperinflation’ and its bloody aftermath. Inflation there averaged 3.4% over 1960-90, i.e., even before IT.

None achieved sustained economic prosperity despite reaching inflation targets of 2% or less. Average per capita GDP growth declined sharply in the US, UK and Germany, while rising negligibly in NZ (Table 1).

Long-term declines in their growth rates followed declining investments (Table 2). IT advocates claim high inflation causes uncertainty, thus reducing investments, but lower inflation has clearly done worse.

As the investment rate declined with IT, so did productivity growth in the UK, Germany and NZ (Table 3). While productivity growth has risen negligibly with IT in the US, it has trended down in all four economies (Figures 1-4). US hourly output grew at only 1.4% after 2004, “half its pace in the three decades after World War II”.

Most advanced economies have experienced productivity slowdowns since the 1970s. With the European Central Bank’s strict IT framework, the euro zone also saw marked slowdowns in productivity growth during 1999-2019.

Declining productivity growth often becomes the pretext for depressing real wages and working conditions, compelling workers to work more to compensate for lost earnings. Productivity and growth slowdowns are seen as “secular stagnation”.

All this has been blamed on inflation. But lowering inflation has not reversed this trend, which has actually accelerated since the GFC. Many explanations have been offered, but the reasons for this failure remain moot.

IT, low inflation, tax cuts and market reforms are supposed to improve economic performance. Weaker investment and economic growth, due to contractionary macroeconomic policies, slowed US productivity growth.

Similarly, The Economist observed, “Drooping demand crimped incentives to invest and innovate”. It ascribed declining UK productivity growth to cuts in innovation investments due to “austerity policies” and “severe reduction in credit”, inter alia.

Concluding “no doubt … the cost … was huge”, it estimated, “Britain’s GDP per person in 2019 would have been £6,700 ($8,380) higher than it turned out to be” had productivity growth not fallen further after the GFC.

There is growing acknowledgement that widespread “unconditional” CB commitment to 2% inflation targets – in the face of the current inflationary upsurge – is likely to worsen slowdowns. This is likely to compound debt crises in many developing countries.

The adverse socio-economic impacts of recessions are well documented. Policy-induced recessions – supposedly to curb inflation – will compound the effects of pandemic, war and sanctions.

Pragmatism, not dogma
Central bankers should not be dogmatic. Instead, pragmatic approaches are urgently needed to address the current inflationary surges. This is especially necessary when inflation worldwide is mainly due to supply shocks.

Western policymakers must consider the adverse spill-over impacts on developing countries, already on the brink of debt crises due to protracted slowdowns. Government debt – with more higher cost commercial borrowings – has been rising since the GFC, Western ‘quantitative easing’ and Covid-19.

Almost all central bankers know it is almost impossible to achieve 2% inflation in current circumstances. Yet, they insist not raising interest rates now will cause much economic damage later.

But such claims clearly have no theoretical or empirical bases. Hence, it is recklessly dogmatic to enforce a 2% target by falsely claiming inaction would be even more harmful.

IPS UN Bureau

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Elizabeth II dancing with Nkrumah, 1961.

By Anis Chowdhury and Jomo Kwame Sundaram
SYDNEY and KUALA LUMPUR, Sep 13 2022 (IPS)

After a quarter century of economic stagnation, African economic recovery early in the 21st century was under great pressure even before the pandemic, due to new trade arrangements, falling commodity prices and severe environmental stress.

European scramble for Africa
Africa’s borders were drawn up by European powers, especially following their ‘Scramble for Africa’ from 1881 ending by World War One. Various culturally, linguistically and religiously different ‘ethnic’ groups were forced together into colonies, to later become post-colonial ‘nations’.

Europeans came to Africa seeking slaves and minerals, later building colonial empires. The US attended the 1884 Berlin Congress, dividing Africa among European powers. Colony-less ‘latecomer’ Germany got Southwest Africa and Tanganyika, now Namibia and mainland Tanzania respectively.

Namibia’s Herero and Nama peoples revolted unsuccessfully against German occupation in 1904. General Lothar von Trotha then ordered “every Herero … shot”. Four-fifths of the Herero and half the Nama died!

Communities were surrounded, with many killed. Others were held, with many dying in concentration camps, or driven into the desert to die of starvation. In 1984, the UN Whitaker Report concluded the atrocities were among the worst 20th century genocides.

Asymmetric interdependence?
Europe’s post-Second World War recovery benefited immensely from their primary commodity exporting colonies. After the wartime devastation, European imperial powers relied on colonial currency arrangements for precious foreign exchange.

Imperial power also ensured captive colonial markets for uncompetitive post-war European manufactures. Recovery and competition brought down commodity prices, especially after the Korean War boom. For well over a century, such prices have declined against those for manufactures.

As decolonization became inevitable, French politicians promoted the notion of ‘Eurafrica’, mimicking the US Monroe Doctrine’s claim to Latin America. French elite discourse insisted African independence should be defined by (asymmetric) ‘interdependence’, not ‘sovereignty’.

Although Germany lost its few colonies in Africa after losing the First World War, the influential West German Die Welt wondered wistfully in 1960, “Is Africa getting away from Europe?”

From decolonization to Cold War
The US was the first nation to recognize Belgian King Leopold II’s personal claim to the Congo River basin in 1884. When Leopold’s brutal atrocities and exploitation of his private Congo Free State domain, killing millions, could no longer be denied, other European powers forced Belgium to directly colonize the country!

Since then, the US has shaped the Congo’s destiny. The US has been keenly interested in its massive mineral resources. Congolese uranium, the richest in the world, was used in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombs. But Washington would not allow Africans control of their own strategic materials.

Patrice Lumumba became the first elected prime minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). An advocate of pan-African economic independence, his wish for genuine independence and sovereign control of DRC resources threatened powerful interests.

Lumumba was brutally humiliated, tortured and murdered in January 1961. The shameful assassination involved both US and Belgian governments which collaborated with Lumumba’s Congolese rivals.

Struggling to stand up
Pan-Africanist leader Kwame Nkrumah wanted independent Ghana to chart an ‘anti-imperialist’ path, staying non-aligned in the Cold War. He wanted hydroelectric dams to power Ghana’s industrial progress, beginning by smelting its bauxite to develop an aluminium value chain.

The US, UK and World Bank agreed to finance the Akosombo Dam, on condition it provided cheap energy to a Kaiser Aluminium subsidiary to process alumina for export to Kaiser. This arrangement was only rescinded decades later, early this century.

Ghana made technical cooperation agreements with the Czechs and Soviets to build two other dams. But both were ended after Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup abetted by Washington in February 1966. Thus, Nkrumah’s development ambitions for Ghana were killed.

A scaled-down Bui dam was finally built by Chinese contractors decades later. Nkrumah’s 1965 book, Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, was probably the final straw in embarrassing the West.

Elsewhere, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa ‘African socialism’ focused on developing villages and food security. Western antagonism ensured Ujamaa’s failure, while his efforts were harshly condemned to deter other Africans from trying to chart their own paths.

Meanwhile, Nyerere’s pro-Western contemporaries were supported by the West. Such countries, e.g., neighbouring Kenya and Uganda, received much more Western aid although their development records have not been much better.

A luta continua
At independence, Zambia had no universities, with only 0.5% completing primary education. The country’s copper mines were mostly in British hands. Most people survived on limited land for the villagers, without electricity and other amenities.

Hemmed in by Western-supported racist states, President Kenneth Kaunda – a devout Christian – sought foreign help to bypass hostile South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) to change the landlocked nation’s fate.

After the US and World Bank refused to help, he reached out to the Soviet bloc and China. China built a $500 million railway linking Zambia to the Indian Ocean through Tanzania.

Côte d’Ivoire has long been a major producer of cocoa and coffee. But three decades of misrule by its pro-Western founding father, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, ensured endemic poverty and stark inequalities, culminating in civil war.

In 2020, almost 40% of its people lived in ‘extreme poverty’. In 2019, the middle-income country’s human development index score was a low 0.538, which dropped to 0.346, when adjusted for inequality.

Both Kaunda and Houphouet-Boigny later abandoned their early, more neo-colonial policies. Zambia nationalized copper mines, hoping to improve living conditions, instead of enriching foreign investors.

Meanwhile, Ivorian cocoa was withheld to secure better prices. But both efforts failed, as copper and cocoa prices collapsed. Thus, both nations were severely punished for trying to better their fates.

Non-alignment best
During the first Cold War, Western hostility to African aspirations forced many to turn to the ‘socialist camp’ to build infrastructure and develop human resources. Washington then was as concerned with economic gain as countering ‘Reds’.

The Kennedy administration had increased foreign aid, urging allies to do likewise. But instead of supporting African aspirations, the West pursued its own economic interests while claiming to support post-colonial aspirations.

Increasing African government indebtedness over the 1970s forced many to accept structural adjustment programme policy conditions imposed by international financial institutions from the 1980s. Of course, developing countries following International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank prescriptions became Western darlings.

Nyerere observed: “The IMF … makes conditions and says, ‘if you follow these examples, your economy will improve’. But where are the examples of economies booming in the Third World because they accepted the conditions of the IMF?”

Cold War considerations have also meant US interest in Africa has waxed and waned. Now, the West warns of imminent Chinese ‘take-overs’ and nefarious Russian designs. China seems more interested in financing and building infrastructure, while Putin promotes Russian exports.

Neglected by the US after the first Cold War until its 21st century African initiatives, including Africom, African nations have increasingly welcomed alternatives to the West, albeit somewhat warily.

Together, the world can help Africa progress. But if support for the long cruelly exploited continent remains hostage to new Cold War considerations, Africans will choose accordingly. Non-alignment is now the pan-African choice.

IPS UN Bureau

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As rich countries raise interest rates in double-edged efforts to address inflation, developing countries are struggling to cope with slowdowns, inflation, higher interest rates and other costs, plus growing debt distress.

Rich countries’ interest rate hikes have triggered capital outflows, currency depreciations and higher debt servicing costs. Developing country woes have been worsened by commodity price volatility, trade disruptions and less foreign exchange earnings.

Anis Chowdhury

Developing countries’ external debt has risen since the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC) – from $2 trillion (tn) in 2000 to $3.4tn in 2007 and $9.6tn in 2019! External debt’s share of GDP fell from 33.1% in 2000 to 22.8% in 2008. But with sluggish growth since the GFC, it rose to 30% in 2019, before the pandemic.

The pandemic pushed up developing countries’ external debt to $10.6tn, or 33% of GDP in 2020, the highest level on record. The external debt/GDP ratio of developing countries other than China was 44% in 2020.

Borrowing from international capital markets accelerated after the GFC as interest rates fell. But commercial debt is generally of shorter duration, typically less than ten years. Private lenders also rarely offer restructuring or refinancing options.

Lenders in international capital markets charge developing countries much higher interest rates, ostensibly for greater risk. But changes in public-private debt composition and associated costs have made such debt riskier.

Private short-term debt’s share rose from 16% of total external debt in 2000 to 26% in 2020. Meanwhile, international capital markets’ share of public external debt rose from 43% to 62%. Also, much corporate debt, especially of state-owned enterprises, is government-guaranteed.

Meanwhile, unguaranteed private debt now exceeds public debt. Although private debt may not be government-guaranteed, states often have to take them on in case of default. Hence, such debt needs to be seen as potential contingent government liabilities.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Private borrowings for less than ten years were 60% of Lankan debt in April 2021. The average interest rate on commercial loans in January 2022 was 6.6% – more than double the Chinese rate. In 2021, Lankan interest payments alone came to 95.4% of its declining government revenue!

Commercial debt – mostly Eurobonds – made up 30% of all African external borrowings with debt to China at 17%. Zambian commercial debt rose from 1.6% of foreign borrowings in 2010 to 30% in 2018; 57% of Ghana’s foreign debt payments went to private lenders, with Eurobonds getting 60% of Nigeria’s and over 40% of Kenya’s.

More commercial borrowing
Thus, external debt increasingly involved more speculative risk. Public bond finance, foreign debt’s most volatile component, rose relative to commercial bank loans and other private credit. Meanwhile, more stable and less onerous official credit has declined in significance.

Various factors have made things worse. First, most rich countries have failed to make their promised annual aid disbursements of 0.7% of their gross national income, made more than half a century ago.

Worse, actual disbursements have actually declined from 0.54% in 1961 to 0.33% in recent years. Only five nations have consistently met their 0.7% promise. In the five decades since promising, rich economies have failed to deliver $5.7tn in aid!

Second, the World Bank and donors have promoted private finance, urging ‘public-private partnerships’ and ‘blended finance’ in “From billions to trillions: converting billions of official assistance to trillions in total financing”.

Sustainable development outcomes of such private financing – especially in promoting poverty reduction, equity and health – have been mixed at best. But private finance has nonetheless imposed heavy burdens on government budgets.

Third, since the GFC, developed economies have resorted to unconventional monetary policies – ‘quantitative easing’, with very low or even negative real interest rates. With access to cheap funds, managers seeking higher returns invested lucratively in emerging markets before the recent turnaround.

Large investment funds and their collaborators, e.g., credit rating agencies, have profitably created new means to get developing countries to float more bonds to raise funds in international capital markets.

Making things worse
Policy advice from donors and multilateral development banks (MDBs), rating agencies’ biases and the lack of an orderly and fair sovereign debt restructuring mechanism have shaped commercial lending practices.

Favouring private market solutions, donors, MDBs and the IMF have discouraged pro-active development initiatives for over four decades. Hence, many developing countries remain primary producers with narrow export bases and volatile earnings.

They have urged debilitating reforms, e.g., arguing tax cuts are necessary to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Meanwhile, corporate tax evasion and avoidance have worsened developing countries’ revenue losses. Thus, net revenue has fallen as such reforms fail to generate enough growth and revenue.

Credit rating agencies often assess developing countries unfavourably, raising their borrowing costs. Quick to downgrade emerging markets, they make it costlier to get financing, even if economic fundamentals are sound.

The absence of orderly and fair debt restructuring mechanisms has not helped. Commercial lenders charge higher interest rates, ostensibly for default risks. But then, they refuse to refinance, restructure or provide relief, regardless of the cause of default.

When will we learn?
Following the 1970s’ oil price hikes, western, especially US banks were swimming in liquidity as oil exporters’ dollar reserves swelled. These banks pushed debt, getting developing country governments to borrow at low real interest rates.

After the US Fed began raising interest rates from 1977 to fight inflation, other major central banks followed, raising countries’ debt service burdens. Ensuing economic slowdowns cut commodity exporters’ earnings.

In the past, the IMF and World Bank imposed ‘one-size-fits-all’ ‘stabilization’ and ‘structural adjustment’ measures, impairing development. Developing countries had to implement severe austerity measures, liberalization and privatization. As real incomes declined, progress was set back.

With the pandemic, developing countries have seen massive capital outflows, more than in 2008. Meanwhile, surging food, fertilizer and fuel prices are draining developing countries’ foreign exchange earnings and reserves.

As the US Fed raises interest rates, capital flight to Wall Street is depreciating other currencies, raising import costs and debt burdens. Thus, many countries need financial help.

Debt-distressed countries once again seek support from the Washington-based lenders of last resort. But without enough debt relief, a temporary liquidity crisis threatens to become a debt sustainability, and hence, a solvency crisis, as in the 1980s.

IPS UN Bureau

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Most sub-Saharan African French colonies got formal independence in the 1960s. But their economies have progressed little, leaving most people in poverty, and generally worse off than in other post-colonial African economies.

Decolonization?
Pre-Second World War colonial monetary arrangements were consolidated into the Colonies Françaises d’Afrique (CFA) franc zone set up on 26 December 1945. Decolonization became inevitable after France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and withdrawal from Algeria less than a decade later.

Anis Chowdhury

CFA countries are now in two currency unions. Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo belong to UEMOA, the French acronym for the West African Economic and Monetary Union.

Its counterpart CEMAC is the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, comprising Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad.

Both UEMOA and CEMAC use the CFA franc (FCFA). Ex-Spanish colony, Equatorial Guinea, joined in 1985, one of two non-French colonies. In 1997, former Portuguese colony, Guinea-Bissau was the last to join.

Such requirements have ensured France’s continued exploitation. Eleven of the 14 former French West and Central African colonies remain least developed countries (LDCs), at the bottom of UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI).

French African colonies
Guinea was the first to leave the CFA in 1960. Before fellow Guineans, President Sékou Touré told President Charles de Gaulle, “We prefer poverty in freedom to wealth in slavery”.

Guinea soon faced French destabilization efforts. Counterfeit banknotes were printed and circulated for use in Guinea – with predictable consequences. This massive fraud brought down the Guinean economy.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Ex-French espionage documentation service (SDECE) head Maurice Robert later acknowledged, “France launched a series of armed operations using local mercenaries, with the aim of developing a climate of insecurity and, if possible, overthrow Sékou Touré”.

In 1962, French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou warned African colonies considering leaving the franc zone: “Let us allow the experience of Sékou Touré to unfold. Many Africans are beginning to feel that Guinean politics are suicidal and contrary to the interests of the whole of Africa”.

Togo independence leader, President Sylvanus Olympio was assassinated in front of the US embassy on 13 January 1963. This happened a month after he established a central bank, issuing the Togolese franc as legal tender. Of course, Togo remained in the CFA.

Mali left the CFA in 1962, replacing the FCFA with the Malian franc. But a 1968 coup removed its first president, radical independence leader Modibo Keita. Unsurprisingly, Mali later re-joined the CFA in 1984.

Resource-rich
The eight UEMOA economies are all oil importers, exporting agricultural commodities, such as cotton and cocoa, besides gold. By contrast, the six CEMAC economies, except the Central African Republic, rely heavily on oil exports.

CFA apologists claim pegging the FCFA to the French franc, and later, the euro, has kept inflation low. But lower inflation has also meant “slower per capita growth and diminished poverty reduction” than in other African countries.

The CFA has “traded decreased inflation for fiscal restraint and limited macroeconomic options”. Unsurprisingly, CFA members’ growth rates have been lower, on average, than in non-CFA countries.

With one of Africa’s highest incomes, petroleum producer Equatorial Guinea is the only CFA country to have ‘graduated’ out of LDC status, in 2017, after only meeting the income ‘graduation’ criterion.

Its oil boom ensured growth averaging 23.4% annually during 2000–08. But growth has fallen sharply since, contracting by -5% yearly during 2013–21! Its 2019 HDI of 0.592 ranked 145 of 189 countries, below the 0.631 mean for middle-ranking countries.

Poor people
With over 70% of its population poor, and over 40% in ‘extreme poverty’, inequality is extremely high in Equatorial Guinea. The top 1% got over 17% of pre-tax national income in 2021, while the bottom half got 11.5%!

Four of ten 6–12 year old children in Equatorial Guinea were not in school in 2012, many more than in much poorer African countries. Half the children starting primary school did not finish, while less than a quarter went on to middle school.

CFA member Gabon, the fifth largest African oil producer, is an upper middle-income country. With petroleum making up 80% of exports, 45% of GDP, and 60% of fiscal revenue, Gabon is very vulnerable to oil price volatility.

One in three Gabonese lived in poverty, while one in ten were in extreme poverty in 2017. More than half its rural residents were poor, with poverty three times more there than in urban areas.

Côte d’Ivoire, a non-LDC CFA member, enjoyed high growth, peaking at 10.8% in 2013. With lower cocoa prices and Covid-19, growth fell to 2% in 2020. About 46% of Ivorians lived on less than 750 FCFA (about $1.30) daily, with its HDI ranked 162 of 189 in 2019.

CFA’s neo-colonial role
Clearly, the CFA “promotes inertia and underdevelopment among its member states”. Worse, it also limits credit available for fiscal policy initiatives, including promoting industrialization.

Credit-GDP ratios in CFA countries have been low at 10–25% – against over 60% in other Sub-Saharan African countries! Low credit-GDP ratios also suggest poor finance and banking facilities, not effectively funding investments.

By surrendering exchange rate and monetary policy, CFA members have less policy flexibility and space for development initiatives. They also cannot cope well with commodity price and other challenges.

The CFA’s institutional requirements – especially keeping 70% of their foreign exchange with the French Treasury – limit members’ ability to use their forex earnings for development.

More recent fiscal rules limiting government deficits and debt – for UEMOA from 2000 and CEMAC in 2002 – have also constrained policy space, particularly for public investment.

The CFA has also not promoted trade among members. After six decades, trade among CEMAC and UEMOA members averaged 4.7% and 12% of their total commerce respectively. Worse, pegged exchange rates have exacerbated balance of payments volatility.

Unrestricted transfers to France have enabled capital flight. The FCFA’s unlimited euro convertibility is supposed to reduce foreign investment risk in the CFA. However, foreign investment is lower than in other developing countries.

Total net capital outflows from CFA countries during 1970–2010 came to $83.5 billion – 117% of combined GDP! Capital flight from CFA economies was much more than from other African countries during 1970–2015.

IPS UN Bureau

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After four years of Trump’s ‘America first’ isolationism, US President Joe Biden announced “America is back”. His White House has since tried to find allies against China and Russia.

But it has not found many, especially in the Global South. His summit with Southeast Asian leaders was well attended, but promised little. Worse, his Summit of the Americas revealed fading US influence in its long-time backyard.

Anis Chowdhury

Biden’s strategy explicitly seeks to “counter harmful activities” by China and Russia, and “to expose and highlight the risks of negative PRC and Russian activities in Africa”. But it offers no evidence of such threats.

It asserts China “sees the region as an important arena to challenge the rules-based international order, advance its own narrow commercial and geopolitical interests, undermine transparency and openness”.

Similarly, it insists “Russia views the region as a permissive environment for parastatals and private military companies, often fomenting instability for strategic and financial benefit.”

Presenting Biden’s SSA strategy in South Africa (SA), US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken claimed, “Our commitment to a stronger partnership with Africa is not about trying to outdo anyone else”. He emphasized, “our purpose is not to say you have to choose”.

While “glad” the US was not forcing Africa to choose, SA foreign minister Naledi Pandor reminded the Blinken mission no African country can be “bullied” or threatened thus: “either you choose this or else.” The host also reminded her guests of the plight of the Palestinian people and life under apartheid.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Pandor described the US Congressional bill, ‘Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act’ as “offensive legislation”. The bill, the 2021 Strategic Competition Act and the US Innovation and Competition Act have all been criticized by Africans, including governments, as “Cold War-esque”.

Calling for diplomacy, not war, Pandor urged, “African countries that wish to relate to China, let them do so, whatever the particular form of relationships would be.”

US credibility in doubt
Biden’s SSA strategy has four explicit objectives – foster openness and open societies, deliver democratic and security dividends, advance pandemic recovery and economic opportunity, and support conservation, climate adaptation, and a just energy transition.

The US strategy paper refers to the 2022 G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) promising $600bn. Confident the PGII will “advance U.S. national security”, the White House has pledged $200bn “to deliver game-changing projects to strengthen economies”.

After all, the 2005 G7 Gleneagles Summit promise – to double aid by 2010, with $50bn yearly for Africa – remains unfulfilled. Actual aid has been woefully short, with no transparent reporting or accountability.

Over half a century ago, rich nations promised 0.7% of their national income in development aid. The US has long ranked lowest among the G7, spending only 0.18% in 2021. Worse, US aid effectiveness is worst among the world’s 27 wealthiest nations.

Meanwhile, rich countries have fallen far short of their 2009 pledges to provide $100bn in climate finance annually until 2020 to help developing countries adapt to and mitigate global warming.

After his stillborn Build Back Better World initiative, many doubt how much Congress will approve, and what will be for SSA. Likewise, before mid-2021, the Biden administration promised support for pandemic containment.

But it did not support developing countries’ request to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for a temporary waiver of related patents. The June 2022 WTO compromise was nothing less than “shameful”.

Supplies of Covid pandemic needs from China and Russia have been decried as “vaccine diplomacy”. Sanctions against Russia have disrupted contracted delivery of 110 million doses of its vaccine. This jeopardizes UNICEF efforts to vaccinate many countries, including Zambia, Uganda, Somalia and Nigeria.

With 43.87 vaccine doses per 100 people – less than a third of the 157.71 world average, or under a quarter of the US mean of 183 doses per 100 people – Africa had the lowest Covid-19 vaccination rate, by far, in mid-August 2022.

The SSA strategy paper highlights US-Africa HIV-AIDS partnerships. But it is silent about Big Pharma getting a US sanctions threat against SA for producing generic HIV-AIDS drugs. The US only backed down after a worldwide backlash as Nelson Mandela stood firm.

West still exploiting Africa
Biden’s SSA strategy promises to “engage with African partners to expose and highlight the risks of negative PRC and Russian activities in Africa” in line with the US 2022 National Defense Strategy.

But it ignores why Africa remains underdeveloped and poor. After all, Africa has around 30% of the world’s known mineral reserves, and 60% of its arable land. Yet, 33 of its 54 nations are deemed least developed countries.

The New Colonialism report showed British companies control Africa’s key mineral resources, with 101 mostly UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange having mining operations in 37 SSA countries.

Together, they controlled over a trillion dollars’ worth, while $192 billion is drained yearly from Africa via profit transfers and tax dodging by foreign companies.

France retains control of its former colonies’ monetary systems, requiring them to deposit foreign exchange reserves with the French Treasury. It has never hesitated to topple ‘unfriendly’ governments through coups and its military.

Recently, the US promised to continue providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support on Africa to France, using its advanced drone and satellite technology.

As ex-colonial powers continue to control and exploit SSA, policies imposed by donors, the International Monetary Fund and multilateral development banks have ensured its continuing underdevelopment and impoverishment.

Once a net food exporter, Africa has become a net food importer. With more pronounced Washington Consensus policies since the 1980s, food insecurity has worsened. SSA has also deindustrialized, making it more resource dependent and vulnerable to international commodity price volatility.

Forget the past?
Many Africans have suffered much due to colonialism, racism, apartheid and other oppressions. Pan-Africanism contributed much to the non-aligned movement during the old Cold War. Julius Nyerere famously declared in 1965, “We will not allow our friends to choose our enemies”.

Half a century later, Mandela reminded the West not to presume its “enemies should be our enemies”. Older Africans still remember the former Soviet Union and China for their support through past struggles, when most of the West remained on the wrong side of history.

Africans are correctly wary of the new “Greeks bearing gifts” and promises. While most do not want a new Cold War, many see China and Russia offering more tangible benefits. Unsurprisingly, 25 of Africa’s 54 states did not support the March 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

IPS UN Bureau

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Half a century after the 1970s’ stagflation, economies are slowing, even contracting, as prices rise again. Thus, the World Bank warns, “Surging energy and food prices heighten the risk of a prolonged period of global stagflation reminiscent of the 1970s.”

In March, Reuters reported, “With surging oil prices, concerns about the hawkishness of the Federal Reserve and fears of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, the mood on Wall Street feels like a return to the 1970s”.

Anis Chowdhury

When growth is weak and many are jobless, prices rarely rise, keeping inflation low. The converse is true when growth is strong. This inverse relationship between economic activity and inflation broke down with supply shocks, particularly oil and other primary commodity price surges during 1972-75.

Non-oil primary commodity prices on The Economist index more than doubled between mid-1972 and mid-1974. Prices of some commodities, e.g., sugar and urea fertilizer, rose more than five-fold!

As costlier energy pushed up production expenses, businesses raised prices and cut jobs. With higher food, fuel and other prices, rising costs, coupled with income losses, reduced aggregate demand, further slowing the economy.

Fed chokes economy to cut inflation
Years before becoming US Fed chair in 2006, a Ben Bernanke co-authored paper noted, “Looking more specifically at individual recessionary episodes associated with oil price shocks, we find that … oil shocks, per se, were not a major cause of these downturns”.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Following Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, other economists also found “in the postwar era there have been a series of episodes in which the Federal Reserve has in effect deliberately attempted to induce a recession to decrease inflation”.

The US Fed began raising interest rates from 1977, inducing an American economic recession in 1980. The economy briefly turned around when the Fed stopped raising interest rates. But this nascent recovery soon ended as Fed chair Paul Volcker raised interest rates even more sharply.

The federal funds target rate rose from around 10% to nearly 20%, triggering an “extraordinarily painful recession”. Unemployment rose to nearly 11% nationwide – the highest in the post-war era – and as high as 17% in some states, e.g., Michigan, leaving long-term scars.

Interest rate hikes reduced needed investments. Outside the US economy, these sharp and rapid interest rate hikes triggered debt crises in Poland, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, South Korea and elsewhere.

Earlier open economic policies meant “the increase in world interest rates, the increased debt burden of developing countries, the growth slowdown in the industrial world…contributed to the developing countries’ stagnation”.

Countries seeking International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial support had to agree to severe fiscal austerity, liberalization, deregulation and privatization policy conditionalities. With per capita incomes falling and poverty rising, Latin America and Africa “lost two decades”.

Stagflation reprise
The IMF chief economist recently reiterated, “Inflation is a major concern”. The Bank of International Settlements has warned, “We may be reaching a tipping point, beyond which an inflationary psychology spreads and becomes entrenched.”

Central bankers’ anti-inflationary efforts mainly involve raising interest rates. This approach slows economies, accelerating recessions, often triggering debt crises without quelling rising prices due to supply shocks.

Economic recoveries from the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC) remained tepid for a decade after initially bold fiscal responses were quickly abandoned. Meanwhile, ‘quantitative easing’, other unconventional monetary policies and the Covid-19 pandemic raised debt to unprecedented levels.

GFC trade protectionist responses, US and Japanese ‘reshoring’ of foreign investment in China, the pandemic, the Ukraine war and sanctions against Russia and its allies have reversed earlier trade liberalization.

Higher interest rates in the rich North have triggered capital flight, causing developing country currencies to depreciate, especially against the US dollar. The slowing world economy has reduced demand for many developing country exports, while most migrant worker remittances decline.

Interest rate hikes have worsened debt crises, particularly in the global South. The poorest countries have seen an $11bn surge in debt payments due while grappling with looming food crises. Thus, developing country vulnerabilities have been worsened by international trends over which they have little control.

Lessons not learned
Supply-side cost-push inflation is very different from the demand-pull variety. Without evidence, inflation ‘hawks’ insist that not acting urgently will be costlier later.

This may happen if surging demand is the main cause of inflation, especially if higher costs are easily passed on to consumers. However, episodes of dangerously accelerating inflation are very rare.

Acting too quickly against supply-shock inflation can be unwise. The 1970s’ energy crises sparked greater interest in energy efficiency. But higher interest rates in the 1980s deterred needed investments, even to reverse declining or stagnating productivity growth.

Raising interest rates also accelerated recessions. But similar commodity price rises before the 1970s’ and imminent stagflation episodes – involving energy and food respectively – obscure major differences.

For instance, ‘wage indexing’ – linking wage increases to price rises – enhanced the 1970s’ inflation spiral. But labour market deregulation since the 1980s has largely ended such indexation.

The IMF acknowledges globalization, ‘offshoring’ and labour-saving technical change have weakened unionization and workers’ bargaining power. With both elements of the 1970s’ wage-price spirals now insignificant, inflation is more likely to decline once supply bottlenecks ease.

But the wage-price spiral has also been replaced by a profit-price swirl. Reforms since the 1980s have also enhanced large corporations’ market power. Greater corporate discretion and reduced employees’ strength have thus increased profit shares, even during the pandemic.

In November 2021, Bloomberg observed the “fattest profits since 1950 debunks wage-inflation story of CEOs”. Meanwhile, the Guardian found “Companies’ profit growth has far outpaced workers’ wages”.

Corporations are taking advantage of the situation, passing on costs to customers. The net profits of the top 100 US corporations were “up by a median of 49%, and in one case by as much as 111,000%”!

Meanwhile, many more consumers struggle to meet their basic needs. Interest rate hikes have also hurt wage-earners, as falling labour shares of national income have been exacerbated by real wage stagnation, even contraction.

Hence, policymakers should ease supply bottlenecks and address imbalances to accelerate progress, not raise interest rates causing the converse. Thus, they should rein in corporate power, improve competition and protect the vulnerable.

Allowing international price rises to pass through, while protecting the vulnerable, can accelerate the transition to more sustainable consumption and production, including cleaner renewable energy.

IPS UN Bureau

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The world economy is on the brink of outright recession, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Ukraine war and sanctions have scuttled recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Over 80 central banks have already raised interest rates so far this year. Except for the Bank of Japan governor, major central bankers have reacted to recent inflation by raising interest rates. Hence, stagflation is increasingly likely as rising interest rates slow the economy, but do not quell supply-side cost-push inflation.

Anis Chowdhury

While acknowledging the short-term costs of raising interest rates, he has never bothered to explain why inflation targets should be considered sacrosanct regardless of circumstances. Simply asserting inflation will be more costly if not checked now makes for poor evidence-based policy making.

After all, only a month earlier, on 7 June, the IMF advised, “Countries should allow international prices to pass through to domestic prices while protecting households that are most in need”.

The Fund recognized the major sources of current inflation are supply disruptions – first due to pandemic lockdowns disrupting supply chains, and then, delivery blockages of food, fuel and fertilizer due to war and sanctions.

US Fed infallible?
Without explaining why, US Federal Reserve Bank Chair Jerome Powell insists on emulating his hero, Paul Volcker, Fed chair during 1979-87. Volcker famously almost doubled the federal funds target rate to nearly 20%.

Thus, Volcker caused the longest US recession since the 1930s’ Great Depression, raising unemployment to nearly 11%, while “the effects of unemployment, on health and earnings of sacked workers, persisted for years”.

Asked at a US Senate hearing if the Fed was prepared to do whatever it takes to control inflation – even if it harms growth – Powell replied, “the answer to your question is yes”.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Similarly, later Fed chair Ben Bernanke and his co-authors showed overzealous monetary tightening was mainly responsible for the 1970s’ stagflation. With prices still rising despite higher interest rates, stagflation now looms large.

North Atlantic trio
Most central bankers have long been obsessed with fighting inflation, insisting on bringing it down to 2%, despite harming economic progress. This formulaic response is prescribed, even when inflation is not mainly due to surging demand.

Powell recently observed, “supply is a big part of the story”, acknowledging the Ukraine war and China’s pandemic restrictions have pushed prices up.

While admitting higher interest rates may increase unemployment, Powell insists meeting the 2% target is “unconditional”. He asserted, “we have the tools and the resolve to get it down to 2%”, insisting “we’re going to do that”.

While recognizing “very big supply shocks” as the primary cause of inflation, Bank of England (BOE) Governor Andrew Bailey also vows to meet the 2% inflation target, allowing “no ifs or buts”.

While European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde does not expect to return “to that environment of low inflation”, admitting “inflation in the euro area today is being driven by a complex mix of factors”, she insists on raising “interest rates for as long as it takes to bring inflation back to our [2%] target”.

April Fools?
Much of the problem is due to the 2% inflation targeting dogma. As the then Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand – the first central bank to adopt a 2% inflation target – later admitted, “The figure was plucked out of the air”.

Thus, a “chance remark” by the NZ Finance Minister – during “a television interview on April 1, 1988 that he was thinking of genuine price stability, ‘around 0, or 0 to 1 percent’” – has become monetary policy worldwide!

Powell also acknowledged, “Since the pandemic, we’ve been living in a world where the economy has been driven by very different forces”. He confessed, “I think we understand better how little we understand about inflation.”

Meanwhile, Powell acknowledges how changed globalization, demographics, productivity and technical progress no longer check price increases – as during the ‘Great Moderation’.

Bailey’s resolve to get inflation to 2% is even more shocking as he admits the BOE cannot stop inflation hitting 10%, as “there isn’t a lot we can do”.

Although it has no theoretical, analytical or empirical basis, many central bankers treat inflation targeting as universal best practice – in all circumstances! Thus, despite acknowledging supply-side disruptions and changed conditions, they still insist on the 2% inflation target!

Interest rate, blunt tool
Central bankers’ inflation targeting dogma will cause much damage. Even when inflation is rising, raising interest rates may not be the right policy tool for several reasons.

First, the interest rate only addresses the symptoms, not the causes of inflation – which can be many. Second, raising interest rates too often and too much can kill productive and efficient businesses along with those less so.

Third, by slowing the economy, higher interest rates discourage investment in new technology, skill-upgrading, plant and equipment, adversely affecting the economy’s long-term potential.

Fourth, higher interest rates will raise debt burdens for governments, businesses and households. Borrowings accelerated after the 2008-09 global financial crisis, and even more during the pandemic.

Monetary tightening also constrains fiscal policy. A slower economy implies less tax revenue and more social provisioning spending. Higher interest rates also raise living costs as households’ debt-servicing costs rise, especially for mortgages. Living costs also rise as businesses pass on higher interest rates to consumers.

Policy innovation
The recent inflationary surge is broadly acknowledged as due to supply shortages, mainly due to the new Cold War, pandemic, Ukraine war and sanctions.

Increasing interest rates may slow price increases by reducing demand, but does not address supply constraints, the main cause of inflation now. Anti-inflationary policy in the current circumstances should therefore change from suppressing domestic demand, with higher interest rates, to enhancing supplies.

Raising interest rates increases credit costs for all. Instead, financial constraints on desired industries to be promoted (e.g., renewable energy) should be eased. Meanwhile, credit for undesirable, inefficient, speculative and unproductive activities (e.g., real estate and share purchases) should be tightened.

This requires macroeconomic policies to support economic diversification, by promoting industrial investments and technological innovation. Each goal needs customized policy tools.

Instead of reacting to inflation by raising the interest rate – a blunt one-size-fits-all instrument indeed – policymakers should consider various causes of inflation and how they interact.

Each source of inflation needs appropriate policy tools, not one blunt instrument for all. But central bankers still consider raising interest rates the main, if not only policy against inflation – a universal hammer for every cause of inflation, all seen as nails.

IPS UN Bureau

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Colonial-style currency board arrangements have enabled continuing imperialist exploitation decades after the end of formal colonial rule. Such neo-colonial monetary systems persist despite modest reforms.

In 2019, Italian Deputy Prime Minister Luigi Di Maio accused France of using currency arrangements to “exploit” its former African colonies, “impoverishing Africa” and causing refugees to “leave and then die in the sea or arrive on our coasts”.

Anis Chowdhury

The ostensible intent of the ‘Franc of the French Colonies of Africa’ (FCFA) was to cushion its colonies from the drastic French franc (FF) devaluation required to peg its value to the US dollar, as agreed at Bretton Woods.

Then French finance minister René Pleven claimed, “In a show of her generosity and selflessness, metropolitan France, wishing not to impose on her faraway daughters the consequences of her own poverty, is setting different exchange rates for their currency”.

In December 1958, the CFA franc became the ‘Franc of the Communauté Financière Africaine’ (still FCFA). In 1960, President Charles de Gaulle made CFA membership a pre-condition for French decolonization in West and Central Africa.

The CFA recently involved 14 mainly Francophone sub-Saharan African countries belonging to two currency unions, both using the CFA franc (FCFA): the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC).

UEMOA comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, while CEMAC includes Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

First, France could pay for imports from CFA countries with its own currency, saving foreign exchange for other international obligations. This became especially advantageous when the FF was weak and unstable.

Second, the French Treasury often paid negative real interest rates for CFA reserves. Thus, CFA countries have been paying it to hold their foreign reserves! Investment income is then deployed as French aid to CFA countries in the form of loans to be repaid with interest!

But CFA countries themselves cannot use their own reserves as collateral to secure credit as these are held by the French Treasury. Thus, during the global financial crisis, they had to borrow, mainly from France, at commercial rates.

Third, by supplying FCFA at the fixed rate, seigniorage – the difference between the cost of issuing currency and its face value – has effectively accrued to France and, more recently, the European Central Bank.

For every euro so deposited, the FCFA equivalent is issued and made available to the depositing country. When France joined the euro in 1999, one euro fetched 6.55957 FFs, or 655.957 FCFA.

CFA economies have thus effectively ceded monetary sovereignty to the French Treasury. Unsurprisingly, France’s monetary control has served its own, rather than CFA members’ economic interests.

Fourth, French companies operating in the CFA have been able to freely repatriate funds without incurring any foreign exchange risk. Worse, when CFA countries have faced foreign exchange problems, France has made things worse!

CFA elites, French patrons
The CFA not only benefits France, but also elites in CFA countries. Their appetite for faux French lifestyles explains their preference for overvalued exchange rates.

The CFA also facilitates financial outflows, no matter how illicitly acquired, as long as they do not challenge the neo-colonial status quo. For decades, all manner of French governments have consistently backed these elites, typically supporting despotic rule.

When its interests in Africa have been threatened, France has unilaterally deployed combat troops and superior armaments, always insisting on its ‘legitimate’ right to do so.

France is alleged to be behind military coups and even assassinations of prominent personalities critical of its interests, policies and stratagems. On 13 January 1963, only two days after issuing its own currency, Togo President Sylvanus Olympio was killed in a coup.

In 1968, six years after withdrawing Mali from the CFA, its independence leader and first President, Modibo Keita was ousted in a coup after trying to develop its economy along more independent and progressive lines.

Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose
When the CFA was first created in 1945, the colonies deposited 100% of their foreign exchange reserves in a special French Treasury ‘operating account’. This requirement was reduced to 65% from 1973 to 2005, and then to 50%, plus an additional 20% for daily foreign currency transactions or “financial liabilities”.

Thus, CFA states are still deprived of most of their foreign exchange earnings, retaining only 30%! Meanwhile, Banque de France holds 90% of CFA gold reserves, making it the world’s fourth largest holder of gold reserves.

The FCFA arrangement was supposed to end for UEMOA countries from 20 May 2020. While only six former French colonies in Central Africa formally remain in the CFA, the reform is less than meets the eye.

France remains UEMOA’s ‘financial guarantor’, appointing an ‘independent’ member to its central bank board. Meanwhile, the proposed West African ‘eco’ currency is still not yet in circulation, while the transfer of euro reserves from the French Treasury to the West African Central Bank has yet to happen.

After its creation, FCFA parity was set at 50 to one FF. On 12 January 1994, the FCFA was devalued by half, as demanded by the International Monetary Fund, with support from France. This followed problems due to commodity price slumps.

The devaluation shocked CFA economies as the FCFA’s value fell by half overnight! This pushed up prices of imported goods, including food, while increasing the FF’s purchasing power.

Meanwhile, eight FF devaluations between 1948 and 1986 against the US dollar and gold have also meant great losses to the value of CFA reserves. CFA countries have ostensibly benefitted from anchoring the FCFA to a supposedly stable FF. But in fact, the FF experienced a 70% cumulative devaluation over this period!

Less inflation, no development
CFA advocates also claim that pegging the West and Central African FCFA to the FF, and later the euro, has ensured less inflation than in other African countries. But CFA members “traded decreased inflation for fiscal restraint and limited macroeconomic options”.

The cost of lower inflation “has been slower per capita growth and diminished poverty reduction”. They have had lower growth, on average, than in non-CFA countries. Eleven of the 14 CFA member states are least developed countries at the bottom of UNDP’s Human Development Index.

The CFA has also limited credit for economic growth and industrialization. This has been seen in lower credit-GDP ratios of between 10% to 25% in CFA countries, against over 60% in other Sub-Saharan African countries. These lower ratios also reflect weak financial and banking sectors, unable to be effectively developmental.

The CFA has also not enhanced trade among members. After six decades, trade among CEMAC and UEMOA members averaged 4.7% and 12% of total trade respectively – much less than, say, ASEAN’s 23%. Low intra-CFA trade and pegged exchange rates have ensured persistent balance of payments imbalances.

The currency arrangement also encourages capital outflows. Aggregate net capital flight out of CFA countries during 1970-2010 averaged $83.5 billion, 117% of combined GDP! Unregulated capital transfers between CFA countries and France have enabled much more capital flight than elsewhere during 1970-2015.

No sovereignty, no development
Socialist Party President François Mitterrand was no less neo-colonial. He warned that without control of Africa, France would become irrelevant in the 21st century.

In January 2001, French President Jacques Chirac reputedly admitted, “While speaking of Africa, we must check our memory. We started draining the continent four and a half centuries ago with the slave trade. Next, we discovered their raw materials and seized them.

“Having deprived Africans of their wealth, we sent in our elites who destroyed their culture. Now, we are depriving them of their brains thanks to scholarships … [as] the most intelligent students do not go back to their countries … In the end, noticing that Africa is not in a good state … we are giving lectures”.

In 2008, Chirac reportedly noted, “We have to be honest and acknowledge that a big part of the money in our banks comes precisely from the exploitation of the African continent. Without Africa, France will slide down [to] the rank of a Third World power.”

Claiming to be from a different generation, President Emmanuel Macron promised to end such neo-colonial arrangements. Yet, at the 2017 G20 Summit, he patronizingly declared Africa’s problem “civilizational”.

Such neo-colonial condescension refuses to acknowledge France’s continued exploitation of its West and Central African ex-colonies. Clearly, CFA currency arrangements have limited their economic policy space and progress.

Colonial style exploitation has thus continued in Africa long after decolonization. Unsurprisingly, Chad President Idriss Deby declared, “we must have the courage to say there is a cord preventing development in Africa that must be severed”.

IPS UN Bureau

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Like so many others, Africans have long been misled. Alleged progress under imperialism has long been used to legitimize exploitation. Meanwhile, Western colonial powers have been replaced by neo-colonial governments and international institutions serving their interests.

‘Shithole’ pots of gold
US President Donald Trump’s “shitholes”, mainly in Africa, were and often still are ‘pots of gold’ for Western interests. From 1445 to 1870, Africa was the major source of slave labour, especially for Europe’s ‘New World’ in the Americas.

Anis Chowdhury

The ‘scramble for Africa’ from the late nineteenth century saw European powers racing to secure raw materials monopolies through direct colonialism. Western powers all greatly benefited from Africa’s plunder and ruin.

European divide-and-conquer tactics typically also had pliant African collaborators. Colonial powers imposed taxes and forced labour to build infrastructure to enable raw material extraction.

Racist ideologies legitimized European imperialism in Africa as a “civilizing mission”. Oxford-trained, former Harvard history professor Niall Ferguson – an unabashed apologist for Western imperialism – insists colonialism laid the foundations for modern progress.

Richest, but poorest and hungriest!
A recent blog asks, “Why is the continent with 60% of the world’s arable land unable to feed itself? … And how did Africa go from a relatively self-sufficient food producer in the 1970s to an overly dependent food importer by 2022?”

Deeper analyses of such uncomfortable African realities seem to be ignored by analysts influenced by the global North, especially the Washington-based international financial institutions. UNCTAD’s 2022 Africa report is the latest to disappoint.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

With 30% of the world’s mineral resources and the most precious metal reserves on Earth, Africa has the richest concentration of natural resources – oil, copper, diamonds, bauxite, lithium, gold, tropical hardwood forests and fruits.

Yet, Africa remains the poorest continent, with the average per capita output of most countries worth less than $1,500 annually! Of 46 least developed countries, 33 are in Africa – more than half the continent’s 54 nations.

Africa remains the world’s least industrialized region, with only South Africa categorized as industrialized. Incredibly, Africa’s share of global manufacturing fell from about 3% in 1970 to less than 2% in 2013.

About 60% of the world’s arable land is in Africa. A net food exporter until the 1970s, the continent has become a net importer. Structural adjustment reform conditionalities – requiring trade liberalization – have cut tariff revenue, besides undermining import-substituting manufacturing and food security.

Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 24% of the world’s hungry. Africa is the only continent where the number of undernourished people has increased over the past four decades. About 27.4% of Africa’s population was ‘severely food insecure’ in 2016.

In 2020, 281.6 million Africans were undernourished, 82 million more than in 2000! Another 46 million became hungry during the pandemic. Now, Ukraine sanctions on wheat and fertilizer exports most threaten Africa’s food security, in both the short and medium-term.

Structural adjustment
Many of Africa’s recent predicaments stem from structural adjustment programs (SAPs) much of Africa and Latin America have been subjected to from the 1980s. The Washington-based international financial institutions, the African Development Bank and all donors support the SAPs.

SAP advocates promised foreign direct investment and export growth would follow, ensuring growth and prosperity. Now, many admit neoliberalism was oversold, ensuring the 1980s and 1990s were ‘lost decades’, worsened by denial of its painfully obvious consequences.

Instead, ‘extraordinarily disadvantageous geography’, ‘high ethnic diversity’, the ‘natural resource curse’, ‘bad governance’, corrupt ‘rent-seeking’ and armed conflicts have been blamed. Meanwhile, however, colonial and neo-colonial abuse, exploitation and resource plunder have been denied.

While World Bank SAPs were officially abandoned in the late 1990s following growing criticism, replacements – such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – have been like “old wine in new bottles”. Although purportedly ‘home-grown’, they typically purvey bespoke versions of SAPs.

With trade liberalization and greater specialization, many African countries are now more dependent on fewer export commodities. With more growth spurts during commodity booms, African economies have become even more vulnerable to external shocks.

Can the West be trusted?
Earlier, G7 countries reneged on their 2005 Gleneagles pledge – to give $25 billion more yearly to Africa to ‘Make Poverty History’ – within the five years they gave themselves. Since then, developed countries have delivered far less than the $100 billion of climate finance annually they had promised developing nations in 2009.

The Hamburg G20’s 2017 ‘Compact with Africa’ (CwA) promised to combat poverty and climate change effects. In fact, CwA has been used to promote the business interests of donor countries, particularly Germany.

Primarily managed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, CwA has actually failed to deliver significant foreign investment, instead sowing confusion among participating countries.

Powerful Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development governments successfully blocked developing countries’ efforts at the 2015 Addis Ababa UN conference on financing for development for inclusive UN-led international tax cooperation and to stem illicit financial outflows.

Africa lost $1.2–1.4 trillion in illicit financial flows between 1980 and 2009 – about four times its external debt in 2013. This greatly surpasses total official development assistance received over the same period.

Africa must unite
Under Nelson Mandela’s leadership, Africa had led the fight for the ‘public health exception’ to international intellectual property law. Although Africa suffers most from ‘vaccine apartheid’, Western lobbyists blocked developing countries’ temporary waiver request to affordably meet pandemic needs.

African solidarity is vital to withstand pressures from powerful foreign governments and transnational corporations. African nations must also cooperate to build state capabilities to counter the neoliberal ‘good governance’ agenda.

Africa needs much more policy space and state capabilities, not economic liberalization and privatization. This is necessary to unlock critical development bottlenecks and overcome skill and technical limitations.

IPS UN Bureau

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Joining or ratifying dubious trade deals is supposed to offer miraculous solutions to recent lacklustre economic progress. Such naïve advocacy is misleading at best, and downright irresponsible, even reckless, at worst.

TPP ‘pivot to Asia’
US President Barack Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ after his 2012 re-election sought to check China’s sustained economic growth and technological progress. Its economic centrepiece was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The ITC report found projected TPP growth gains to be paltry over the long-term. Its finding was in line with the earlier 2014 findings of the Economic Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture.

Meanwhile, many US manufacturing jobs have been lost to corporations automating and relocating abroad. Worse, Trump’s rhetoric has greatly transformed US public discourse. Many Americans now blame globalization, immigration, foreigners and, increasingly, China for the problems they face.

Trump U-turn
The TPP was believed to be dead and buried after Trump withdrew the US from it immediately after his inauguration in January 2017. After all, most aspirants in the November 2016 election – including Hillary Clinton, once a TPP cheerleader – had opposed it in the presidential campaign.

Trump National Economic Council director Gary Cohn has accused presidential confidantes of ‘dirty tactics’ to escalate the trade war with China.

Cohn acknowledged “he didn’t quit over the tariffs, per se, but rather because of the totally shady, ratfucking way Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and economic adviser Peter Navarro went about convincing the president to implement them.”

Cohn, previously Goldman Sachs president, insisted it “was a terrible idea that would only hurt the US, and not extract the concessions from Beijing Trump wanted, or do anything to shrink the trade deficit.”

Anis Chowdhury

This was later rebranded the Comprehensive and Progressive TPP (CPTPP), with no new features to justify its ‘progressive’ pretensions. Following its earlier support for the TPP, the PIIE has been the principal cheerleader for the CPTPP in the West.

Although US President Joe Biden was loyal as Vice-President, he did not make any effort to revive Obama’s TPP initiative during his campaign, or since entering the White House. Apparently, re-joining the TPP is politically impossible in the US today.

Panning the Trump approach, Biden’s US Trade Representative has stressed, “Addressing the China challenge will require a comprehensive strategy and more systematic approach than the piecemeal approach of the recent past.” Now, instead of backing off from Trump’s belligerent approach, the US will go all out.

Favouring foreign investors
Rather than promote trade, the TPP prioritized transnational corporation (TNC)-friendly rules. The CPTPP did not even eliminate the most onerous TPP provisions demanded by US TNCs, but only suspended some, e.g., on intellectual property (IP). Suspension was favoured to induce a future US regime to re-join.

Onerous TPP provisions – e.g., for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) – remain. This extrajudicial system supersedes national laws and judiciaries, with secret rulings by private tribunals not bound by precedent or subject to appeal.

Lawyers have been advising TNCs on how to sue host governments for resorting to extraordinary COVID-19 measures since 2020. Most countries can rarely afford to incur huge legal costs fighting powerful TNCs, even if they win.

The Trump administration cited vulnerability to onerous ISDS provisions to justify US withdrawal from the TPP. Now, citizens of smaller, weaker and poorer nations are being told to believe ISDS does not pose any real threat to them!

After ratifying the CPTPP, TNCs can sue governments for supposed loss of profits due to policy changes – even if in the national or public interest, e.g., to contain COVID-19 contagion, or ensure food security.

Thus, supposed CPTPP gains mainly come from expected additional foreign direct investment (FDI) due to enhanced investor benefits – not more trade. This implies more host economy concessions, and hence, less net benefits for them.

Who benefits?
Those who have seriously studied the CPTPP agree it offers even fewer benefits than the TPP. After all, the main TPP attraction was access to the US market, now no longer a CPTPP member. Thus, the CPTPP will mainly benefit Japanese TNC exports subject to lower tariffs.

Unsurprisingly, South Korea and Taiwan want to join so that their TNCs do not lose out. China too wants to join, but presumably also to ensure the CPTPP is not used against it. However, the closest US allies are expected to block China.

The Soviet Union sought to join NATO in the 1950s before convening the Warsaw Pact to counter it. Russian President Vladimir Putin also tried to join NATO years after Vaclav Havel ended the Warsaw Pact and Boris Yeltsin dissolved the Soviet Union in 1991.

Unlike Northeast Asian countries, Southeast Asian economies seek FDI. But when foreign investors are favoured, domestic investors may relocate abroad, e.g., to ‘tax havens’ within the CPTPP, often benefiting from special incentives for foreign investment, even if ‘roundtrip’.

Stay non-aligned
The ‘pivot to Asia’ has become more explicitly military. As the new Cold War unfolds, foreign policy considerations – rather than serious expectations of significant economic benefits from the CPTPP – have become more important.

Trade protectionism in the North has grown since the 2008 global financial crisis. More recently, the pandemic has disrupted supply chains. With the new Cold War, the US, Japan and others are demanding their TNCs ‘onshore’, i.e., stop investing in and outsourcing to China, also hurting transborder suppliers.

Hence, net gains from joining the CPTPP – or from ratifying it for those who signed up in 2018 – are dubious for most, especially with its paltry benefits. After all, trade liberalization only benefits everyone when ‘winners’ compensate ‘losers’ – which neither the CPTPP nor its requirements do.

With big powers clashing in the new Cold War, developing countries should remain ‘non-aligned’ – albeit as appropriate for these new times. They should not take sides between the dominant West and its adversaries – led by China, the major trading partner, by far, for more and more countries.

IPS UN Bureau

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Long a means for powerful nations to influence developing countries, development finance has gained renewed significance in the new Cold War. Unlike during the US-Soviet Cold War, the rivalry now is between mixed market capitalist systems.

Development aid rivalry
After reneging repeatedly on development aid and climate finance promises, the G7 big rich nations dutifully lined up behind US President Biden’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) at their 2022 Summit in Schloss Elmau, Germany.

Anis Chowdhury

The White House denounces BRI, claiming the PGII offers “values driven, high-quality, and sustainable infrastructure”. Hence, G7 funding is more likely to have strings attached, e.g., taking sides in the new Cold War.

A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman emphasized, “China continues to welcome all initiatives to promote global infrastructure development”, but insisted China is “opposed to pushing forward geopolitical calculations under the pretext of infrastructure construction or smearing the Belt and Road Initiative”.

US national security priority
At the 2021 G7 Summit, Biden had unveiled a similar Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, insisting it would define the G7 alternative to China’s BRI. Based on his domestic Build Back Better (BBB) programme, B3W was soon ‘dead in the water’ when the Senate rejected BBB.

The White House’s claim that with the B3W, the “United States is rallying the world’s democracies to deliver for our people, meet the world’s biggest challenges, and demonstrate our shared values” has also been dropped from PGII.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

At the EU-African Union Summit in February 2022, the EU announced €150bn financing for the Africa-Europe Investment Package, half the Global Gateway budget.

EU leaders have touted their Global Gateway, suggesting G7 initiatives should be not only complementary, but also mutually reinforcing. But the EU’s African priority is not necessarily shared by other G7 members.

EU funding of €135bn will be from the European Fund for Sustainable Development. The UK Clean Green Initiative, from the 2021 Glasgow Climate Summit, and Japan’s $65bn for regional connectivity may also not be additional.

Acknowledging scepticism about how much is new money, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz urged G7 members to present their pledges consistently to allay doubts about double-counting and the low grants share viz loans.

When the PGII was announced to replace the B3W, it “created significant confusion”. Making clear its purpose, the White House unequivocally asserted PGII will “advance U.S. national security”.

Far-fetched, risky, conditional
The G7 also urges using public money to leverage private sector funds. But such initiatives have previously failed to mobilize significant private funding – hardly inspiring hope of meeting the trillion-dollar financing gap.

The Economist has found blended finance – mixing public, charitable and private money – “starry-eyed” and “struggling to take off”. Even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank warn public-private partnerships (PPPs) incur contingent fiscal risks.

Worse, PPPs distort national priorities, favour private investors and worsen debt crises. They have also not improved equity of access, reduced poverty or enhanced sustainability.

Developing country debt crises typically involve commercial loans or private sector money. For example, the 1980s’ Latin American debt crises were triggered by US Fed interest rate hikes to kill inflation.

Private sector loans usually involve higher interest rates and shorter repayment periods than loans from governments and multilateral development banks. Unsurprisingly, they lack equitable restructuring or refinancing mechanisms.

Ignoring yet another UN resolution, powerful nations disregard developing countries’ appeals for fair and orderly multilateral sovereign debt restructuring arrangements. Similarly, the West refuses to fix unfair trade, tax and other rules disadvantaging poorer countries.

Trust deficit
Over half a century ago, rich nations promised 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) as development aid. But total overseas development assistance (ODA) from rich Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) members has barely exceeded half the promised amount.

Worse, the share has actually declined from 0.54% in 1961, with only five nations consistently meeting their 0.7% commitment in many years. Oxfam estimated 50 years of unkept promises meant a $5.7 trillion aid shortfall by 2020!

At the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, G7 leaders pledged to double their aid by 2010, earmarking $50bn yearly for Africa. But actual delivery has been woefully short, with no transparent reporting or accountability.

Most development aid is neither transparent nor predictable. After some earlier progress in untying, aid is increasingly being ‘tied’ again – requiring recipients to implement donor projects or to buy from donor country suppliers – compromising effectiveness.

The US ranked lowest among the G7, giving only 0.18% in 2021. To make things worse, US aid effectiveness is worst among the world’s 27 wealthiest nations. Clearly, besides aid volume shortfalls, quality is also at issue.

The Syrian refugee crisis and Covid-19 pandemic have provided some recent pretexts to cut aid. Some powerful countries have turned to ‘creative accounting’, e.g., counting refugee settlement and ‘peace-keeping’ military operations costs as ODA.

Unsurprisingly, the UN Deputy Secretary-General is “deeply troubled over recent decisions and proposals to markedly cut” ODA to service Ukraine war impacts on refugees.

Controversies over what climate finance is ‘new and additional’ to ODA have not been resolved since the 1992 adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change at the Rio Earth Summit.

G7 countries also fell far short of rich countries’ 2009 pledge to annually give $100bn in climate finance until 2020 to help developing countries adapt to and mitigate global warming.

The OECD’s reported $79.6bn in climate finance in 2019 was the highest ever. But OECD estimates are much disputed – e.g., for double counting and including non-concessional commercial loans, ‘rolled-over’ loans and private finance.

Cooperation, not conflict
Although China is new to development finance, it is now among the world’s biggest development financiers. Following broken promises and duplicity, even betrayal, China’s significance has increased as OECD donor funding declined relatively.

China is now a bigger player in international development finance than the world’s six major multilateral financial institutions together. Many developing countries have few options but to engage with, if not rely on, China.

Undoubtedly, there are justifiable concerns over China’s development finance and practices. These have included adverse environmental impacts, poor transparency and a high share of commercial loans – even if at concessional rates.

In 2019, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde suggested the new BRI phase would “benefit from increased transparency, open procurement with competitive bidding, and better risk assessment in project selection”.

Lagarde approved of China’s new debt sustainability framework and green investment principles to evaluate BRI projects. She expected “BRI 2.0 … will be guided by a spirit of collaboration, transparency, and a commitment to sustainability that will serve all of its members well, both today and tomorrow”.

The new Cold War may well spur more healthy and peaceful rivalry, inadvertently improving development aid and prospects for developing countries.

IPS UN Bureau

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Long seen as means to seek advantage on the pretext of providing mutual benefit, free trade agreements (FTAs) may increasingly be used as economic weapons in the emerging new Cold War.

Pivot to Asia, containing China
In November 2009, President Obama observed, “in an inter-connected world, power does not need to be a zero-sum game… the United States does not seek to contain China”.

Anis Chowdhury

His US Trade Representative (USTR) claimed the TPP was based on principles the US champions, such as protecting intellectual property (IP) and human rights. While claiming all who accept its principles would be welcome to join, China was conspicuously not among countries negotiating the TPP.

For Washington, this new rivalry with China involves strengthened US alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia. In October 2011, the US Congress ratified the Korea-US (KORUS) FTA.

With the military and economic containment of China central to US security strategy, the TPP was concluded in 2015. Obama emphasized, “TPP allows America – and not countries like China – to write the rules of the road in the 21st century.”

Creating an “anyone but China club” was the US motive for establishing the TPP. But with changed public sentiment since Trump’s presidency, once Obama’s loyal Vice-President, now President Biden did not attempt to revive the TPP during his presidential campaign, or since.

Security alliances
“American prosperity and security are challenged by an economic competition playing out in a broader strategic context… We must work with like-minded allies and partners to ensure our principles prevail and the rules are enforced so that our economies prosper”, noted President Trump’s national security strategy.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

By 2020, leaders of all four countries were more aligned in their concerns about China’s rise. In November 2020, navies of all four countries participated in their first joint military exercise in over a decade.

Meanwhile, under Shinzo Abe, Japan radically transformed its security policy. Abe has greatly expanded the Japan Self-Defence Forces’ role, mission and capabilities within and beyond the US-Japan alliance, especially in East Asia.

‘Defence cooperation’ has also been enhanced through country-to-country arrangements, such as the recent Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement as well as the earlier Japan-India Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement.

The US security profile in the region has been boosted by the AUKUS (Australia-UK-USA) alliance. Its clear intention is to enhance the US and its allies military presence in the Indo-Pacific, with the greatest ‘China focus’ of all regional security arrangements.

World hegemony
The US is also linking trade to its national security strategy, especially to contain China, in Africa and Latin America. As the USTR notes, “The Biden Administration is conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. trade policy toward China as part of its development of its overall China strategy”.

Her office also emphasizes, “Addressing the China challenge will require a comprehensive strategy and more systematic approach than the piecemeal approach of the recent past.”

Reflecting his Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, Biden emphasizes, “The United States must renew its enduring advantages…; modernize our military capabilities…; and revitalize America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships”. He notes “growing rivalry with China, Russia… reshaping every aspect of our lives”.

Biden insists his administration “will make sure that the rules of the international economy are not tilted against the United States. We will enforce existing trade rules and create new ones… This agenda will strengthen our enduring advantages, and allow us to prevail in strategic competition with China or any other nation”.

His administration announced a review of all Trump-era trade negotiations. Due to expire in 2025, President Clinton’s African Growth and Opportunity Act has offered enhanced US market access to qualifying African countries since 2000.

In April 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed US-Kenya FTA talks would resume. Observers believe the US-Kenya FTA, initiated by Trump in 2020, would help expand US ‘carrot and stick’ trade and security policies on the continent to counter China.

In the US ‘Monroe doctrine backyard’, six US FTAs already involve 12 Latin American and Caribbean countries. On 8 June, Biden announced a new regional economic partnership to counter China. His speech inaugurated a Summit of the Americas, criticized for omitting countries seen as friendly to China.

But Biden’s Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity is still seen as a work in progress. Not even offering FTAs’ standard tariff relief, the US anticipates initially focusing on “like-minded partners”. Although Biden hailed his “ground-breaking, integrated new approach”, responses suggest “waning” US influence.

Now, five years after Trump withdrew from the TPP, Biden has revived Obama’s China strategy with his own Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Smug, he could not help but echo Obama’s TPP brag, “We’re writing the new rules”.

IPS UN Bureau

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Rich country governments claim the high moral ground on climate action. But many deny their far greater responsibility for both historic and contemporary greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, once acknowledged by the Kyoto Protocol.

Climate injustice
Worse, responsibility has not been matched by commensurate efforts, especially by the largest rich economies in the G7, which dominates the G20. Its continued control of international economic resources and policymaking blocks progress on climate justice.

Anis Chowdhury

On a per capita basis, the US and close allies – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Australia and Canada – produce more than a hundred times the planet-warming greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of some African countries.

The African population produced about 1.1 metric tonnes of carbon (dioxide equivalent) emissions per person in 2019, under a quarter of the 4.7 tonnes global average. The US emitted 16.1 tonnes – nearly four times the global average.

GHG emissions accumulate over time and trap heat, warming the planet. The US has emitted over a quarter of all GHG emissions since the 1750s, while Europe accounts for 33%. By contrast, Africa, South America and India contributed about 3% each, while China contributed 12.7%.

Wealth inequalities worsen climate injustice. The world’s richest 5% were responsible for 37% of GHG emissions growth during 1990-2015, while the bottom half of the world’s population accounted for 7%!

Poor regions and people take the brunt of global warming. The tropical zone is much more vulnerable to rapid climate change. Most of these countries and communities bear little responsibility for the GHG emissions worsening global warming, but also have the least means to cope and protect themselves.

Thus, climate justice demands wealthy nations – most responsible for cumulative and current GHG emissions – not only reduce the harm they cause, but also help those with less means to cope.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The OECD club of rich countries has been criticized for exaggerating climate finance, but acknowledges, “Australia, Japan and the United States consider financing for high-efficiency coal plants as a form of climate finance.”

It reports climate finance of US$79.6bn in 2019, but these figures are hotly contested. However, ‘commercial credit’ is typically not concessional. But when it is, it implies official subsidies for “bankable”, “for profit” projects.

Many also doubt much of this funding is truly additional, and not just diverted (‘repurposed’) from other ends. Private finance also rarely goes where it is most needed while increasing debt burdens for borrowers.

Leading from behind
At the COP26 Climate Summit in Glasgow in November 2021, US President Joe Biden described climate change as “an existential threat to human existence” and pledged to cut US emissions by up to 51% by 2030.

Biden had claimed his ‘Build Back Better’ (BBB) package of proposed social and climate spending would be a cornerstone of restoring international trust in the US commitment to stem global warming.

At the G7 Summit in June 2021, Biden announced his vision of a “Build Back Better World” (B3W) would define the G7 alternative to China’s multitrillion USD Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

All this was premised on US ability to lead from the front, with momentum growing once BBB became law. But his legislative package has stalled. Unable to attract the needed votes in the Senate, BBB is ‘dead in the water’.

Putting on a brave face, US Senate majority leader Chuck Schumer promises to bring the legislation to a vote early next year. But with their party’s declining political fortunes, likely ‘horse-trading’ to pass the bill will almost certainly further undermine Biden’s promises.

Meanwhile, breaking his 2020 campaign promise, Biden approved nearly 900 more permits to drill on public land in 2021, more than President Trump in 2017. While exhorting others to cut fossil fuel reliance, his administration is now urging US companies and allies to produce more, invoking Ukraine war sanctions.

Aid laggard
At COP26, Biden promised to help developing nations reduce carbon emissions, pledging to double US climate change aid. But even this is still well short of its proportionate share of the grossly inadequate US$100bn yearly rich nations had pledged in 2009 in concessional climate finance for developing countries.

Considering its national income and cumulative emissions, the US should provide at least US$43–50bn in climate finance annually. Others insist the US owes the developing world much more, considering their needs and damages due to US emissions, e.g., suggesting US$800bn over the decade to 2030.

In 2017-18, the US delivered US$10bn to the pledged US$100bn annual climate finance – less than Japan’s US$27bn, Germany’s US$20bn and France’s US$15bn, despite the US economy being larger than all three combined.

President Obama pledged US$3bn to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) – the UN’s flagship climate finance initiative – but delivered only US$1bn. Trump totally repudiated this modest pledge.

At the April 2021 Earth Day leaders’ summit, Biden vowed to nearly double Obama’s pledge to US$5.7bn, with US$1.5bn for adaptation. But even this amount is far short of what the US should contribute, given its means and total emissions.

After the European Commission president highlighted this in September 2021, Biden vowed to again double the US contribution to US$11.4bn yearly by 2024, boasting this would “make the US a leader in international climate finance”.

At COP26, the US cited this increased GCF promise to block developing countries’ call for a share of revenue from voluntary bilateral carbon trading. The US has also opposed developing countries’ call for a funding facility to help vulnerable nations cope with loss and damage due to global warming.

Worse, the US Congress has approved only US$1bn for international climate finance for 2022 – only US$387m more than in the Trump era. At that rate, it would take until 2050 to get to US$11.4bn. Unsurprisingly, Biden made only passing mention of climate and energy in his last State of the Union address.

IPS UN Bureau

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After decades of rejecting international tax cooperation under multilateral auspices, rich countries have finally agreed. But, by insisting on their own terms, progressive corporate income tax remains distant.

Tax avoidance and evasion by transnational corporations (TNCs) are facilitated by ‘tax havens’ – jurisdictions with very low ‘effective’ taxation rates. Intense competition among developing countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) makes things worse.

Anis Chowdhury

Minimal minimum rate
TNCs exploit legal loopholes to avoid or minimize tax liabilities. Such practices are referred to as ‘base erosion and profit shifting’ (BEPS).

Tax havens collectively cost governments US$500–600bn yearly in lost revenue. Low-income countries (LICs) will lose some US$200bn, more than the foreign aid, of around US$150bn, they receive annually.

Corporate income tax represents 15% of total tax revenue in Africa and Latin America, compared to 9% in OECD countries. Developing countries’ greater reliance on this tax means they suffer disproportionately more from BEPS.

A GMCTR requires TNCs to pay tax on their worldwide income. This discourages hiding profits in tax havens. The Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT) recommended a 25% GMCTR.

This 25% rate was around the current GDP-weighted average statutory corporate tax rate for 180 countries. Slightly below the OECD countries’ average, it is much less than the developing countries’ average. So, a GMCTR below 25% implies major revenue losses for most developing countries.

To reverse President Trump’s 2017 tax cut, the Biden administration proposed, in April 2021, to tax foreign corporate income at 21%. In June, the G7 agreed to a 15% GMCTR, endorsed by G20 finance ministers in July. This poor G7 rate is now sold as a “ground-breaking” tax deal.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The OECD also wants to distribute taxing rights and revenue by sales, and not where their goods and services are produced. Critics, including The Economist, have pointed out that large rich economies would gain most. Small and poor developing economies, particularly those hosting TNC production, will lose out.

The OECD proposals could reduce small developing economies’ (SDEs) tax bases by 3%, while four-fifths of the revenue would likely go to high income countries (HICs). Hence, developing countries prefer revenue distribution by contribution to production, e.g., employees, rather than sales.

Undemocratic inclusion
Developing countries have never had a meaningful say in international tax matters. G20 members should have asked multilateral organizations, such as the UN and the IMF, which the G7 dominated OECD has long blocked.

Instead, the G20 BEPS initiative asked the OECD to work out its rules. After decades of keeping developing countries out of tax governance, its compromise Inclusive Framework on BEPS (IF) promotes lop-sided international tax cooperation.

Developing countries were only involved “after the agenda had been set, the action points were agreed on, the content of the initiatives had been decided and the final reports were delivered”.

Developing countries have been allowed to engage with OECD and G20 members, supposedly “on an equal footing”, to develop some BEPS standards. To become an IF member, a country or jurisdiction must first commit to the BEPS outcome.

Thus, the non-OECD, non-G20 countries must enforce a policy framework they had little role in designing. Unsurprisingly, with little real choice or voice, the 15% GMCTR was agreed to, in October 2021, by 136 of the 141 IF members.

FDI vs taxes
The proposed OECD tax reforms are supposed to be implemented from 2023 or 2024. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Investment Division recognizes it will have major implications for international investment and investment policies affecting developing countries.

UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2022, on International tax reforms and sustainable investment, offers guidance for developing country policymakers to navigate the complex new rules and to adjust their investment and fiscal strategies.

Committed to promoting investments in the real economy, especially by FDI, UNCTAD recognizes most developing countries lack the technical capacity to address the complex tax proposal. Implementing BEPS reports and related documents via legislation will be difficult, especially for LICs.

Existing investment treaty commitments also constrain fiscal policy reform. “The tax revenue implications for developing countries of constraints posed by international investment agreements (IIA) are a major cause for concern”, the Report notes.

Although tax regimes influence investment decisions, tax incentives are far from being the most important factor. Other factors – such as political stability, legal and regulatory environments, skills and infrastructure quality – are more significant.

Nonetheless, tax incentives have been important for FDI promotion. Such incentives inter alia include tax holidays, accelerated depreciation and ‘loss carry-forward’ provisions – reducing tax liability by allowing past losses to offset current profits.

With the GMCTR, many tax incentives will be less attractive to much FDI. Tax incentives will be affected to varying degrees, depending on their features. UNCTAD estimates productive cross-border investments could decline by 2%.

Hence, policymakers will need to review their incentives for both existing and new investors. The GMCTR may prevent developing countries from offering fiscal inducements to promote desired investments, including locational, sectoral, industry or even employment-creating incentives.

Investors rule
With generally lower rates, ‘top-up taxes’ could significantly augment SDEs’ revenue. Top-up taxes would apply to profits in any jurisdiction where the effective tax rate falls below the minimum 15% rate. This ensures large TNCs pay a minimum income tax in every jurisdiction where they operate.

However, host countries may be prevented by IIAs – especially Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions – from imposing ‘top-up taxes’. If so, they will be imposed by TNCs’ mainly rich ‘home countries’.

Thus, FDI-hosting countries would lose tax revenue without benefiting by attracting more FDI. Existing IIAs – of the type found in most developing countries – are likely to be problematic.

Hence, the GMCTR’s implications are very important for FDI promotion policies. Reduced competition from low-tax locations could benefit developing economies, but other implications may be more relevant.

As FDI competition relies less on tax incentives, developing countries will need to focus on other determinants, such as supplies of skilled labour, reliable energy and good infrastructure. However, many cannot afford the significant upfront financial commitments required to do so.

Many important details of reforms required still need to be clarified. Thus, developing countries must strengthen their cooperation and technical capabilities to more effectively negotiate GMCTR reform details. This is crucial to ‘cut losses’, to minimize the regressive consequences of this supposedly progressive tax reform.

IPS UN Bureau

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US-led sanctions are inadvertently undermining the dollar’s post-Second World War dominance. The growing number of countries threatened by US and allied actions is forcing victims and potential targets to respond pro-actively.

SWIFT strengthened dollar
The instant messaging system of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) informs users, both payers and payees, of payments made. Thus, it enables the smooth and rapid transfer of funds across borders.

Anis Chowdhury

Co-owned by more than 2,000 BFIs, it is run by the National Bank of Belgium, together with the G-10 central banks of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Joint ownership was supposed to avoid involvement in geopolitical disputes.

Many parties use USD accounts to settle dollar-denominated transactions. Otherwise, banks of importing and exporting countries would need accounts in each other’s currencies in their respective countries in order to settle payments.

SWIFT abuse
US and allied – including European Union (EU) – sanctions against Russia and Belarus followed their illegal invasion of Ukraine. Created during the US-Soviet Cold War, SWIFT remains firmly under Western control. It is now used to block payments for Russian energy and agriculture exports.

But besides stopping income flows, it inadvertently erodes USD dominance. As sanctions are increasingly imposed, such actions intimidate others as well. While intimidation may work, it also prompts other actions.

This includes preparing for contingencies, e.g., by joining other payments arrangements. Such alternatives may ensure not only smoother, but also more secure cross-border financial transfers.

As part of US-led sanctions against the Islamic Republic, the EU stopped SWIFT services to Iranian banks from 2012. This blocked foreign funds transfers to Iran until a compromise was struck in 2016.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

About 40% of worldwide cross-border payments are in USD. CHIPS settles US$1.8 trillion in claims daily. As all CHIPS members maintain US offices, they are subject to US law regardless of headquarters location or ownership.

Hence, over nearly two decades, CHIPS members like BNP Paribas, Standard Chartered and others have paid nearly US$13 billion in fines for Iran-related sanctions violations under US law!

Exorbitant privilege
The USD remains the currency of choice for international trade and foreign reserve holdings. Hence, the US has enjoyed an “exorbitant privilege” since World War Two after the 1944 Bretton Woods conference created the gold-based ‘dollar standard’ – set at US$35 for an ounce of gold.

With the USD remaining the international currency of choice, the US Treasury could pay low interest rates for bonds that other countries hold as reserves. It thus borrows cheaply to finance deficits and debt. Hence, it is able to spend more, e.g., on its military, while collecting less taxes.

Due to USD popularity, the US also profits from seigniorage, namely, the difference between the cost of printing dollar notes and their face value, i.e., the price one pays to obtain them.

In August 1971, President Nixon unilaterally ‘ended’ US obligations under the Bretton Woods international monetary system, e.g., to redeem gold for USD, as agreed. Soon, the fixed USD exchange rates of the old order – determining other currencies’ relative values – became flexible in the new ‘non-system’.

In the ensuing uncertainty, the US ‘persuaded’ Saudi King Feisal to ensure all oil and gas transactions are settled in USD. Thus, OPEC’s 1974 ‘petrodollar’ deal strengthened the USD following the uncertainties after the Nixon shock.

Nevertheless, countries began diversifying their reserve portfolios, especially after the euro’s launch in 1999. Thus, the USD share of foreign currency reserves worldwide declined from 71% in 1999 to 59% in 2021.

With US rhetoric more belligerent, dollar apprehension has been spreading. On 20 April 2022, Israel – a staunch US ally – decided to diversify its reserves, replacing part of its USD share with other major trading partners’ currencies, including China’s renminbi.

Sanction reaction
The EU decision to bar Iranian banks from SWIFT prompted China to develop its Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). Operational since 2015, CIPS is administered by China’s central bank. By 2021, CIPS had 80 financial institutions as members, including 23 Russian banks.

At the end of 2021, Russia held nearly a third of world renminbi reserves. Some view the recent Russian sanctions as a turning point, as those not entrenched in the US camp now have more reason to consider using other currencies instead.

After all, before seizing about US$300 billion in Russian assets, the US had confiscated about US$9.5 billion in Afghan reserves and US$342 million of Venezuelan assets.

Threatened with exclusion from SWIFT following the 2014 Crimea crisis, Russia developed its own SPFS (Financial Message Transfer System) messaging system. Launched in 2017, SPFS uses technology similar to SWIFT’s and CIPS’s.

Both CIPS and SPFS are still developing, largely serving domestic BFIs. By April 2022, most Russian banks and 52 foreign institutions from 12 countries had access to SPFS. Ongoing developments may accelerate their progress or merger.

The National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) has its own domestic payments systems, RuPay. It clears millions of daily transactions among domestic BFIs, and can be used for cross-border transactions.

Sanctions cut both ways
Unsurprisingly, those not allied to the US want to change the system. Following the 2008-9 global financial crisis, China’s central bank head called for “an international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations”.

Meanwhile, China’s USD assets have declined from 79% in 2005 to 58% in 2014, presumably falling further since then. More recently, China’s central bank has been progressively expanding use of its digital yuan or renminbi, e-CNY.

With over 260 million users, its app is now ‘technically ready’ for cross-border use as no Western bank is needed to move funds across borders. Such payments for imports from China using e-CNY will bypass SWIFT, and CHIPS will not need to clear them.

Russia has long complained of US abuse of dollar hegemony. Moscow has tried to ‘de-dollarize’ by avoiding USD use in trade with other BRICS – i.e., Brazil, India, China and South Africa – and in its National Wealth Fund holdings.

Last year, Vladimir Putin warned the US is biting the hand feeding it, by undermining confidence in the US-centric system. He warned, “the US makes a huge mistake in using dollar as the sanction instrument”.

The scope of US financial payments surveillance and USD payments will decline, although not immediately. Thus, Western sanctions have unwittingly accelerated erosion of US financial hegemony.

Besides worsening stagflationary trends, such actions have prompted its targets – current and prospective – to take pre-emptive, defensive measures, with yet unknown consequences.

IPS UN Bureau

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Food crises, economic stagnation and price increases are worsening unevenly, almost everywhere, following the Ukraine war. Sanctions against Russia have especially hurt those relying on wheat and fertilizer imports.

Unilateral sanctions illegal
Unilateral sanctions – not approved by the UN Security Council – are illegal under international law. Besides contravening the UN Charter, unilateral sanctions inflict much human loss. Countless civilians – many far from target countries – are at risk, depriving them of much, even life itself.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Like laying siege on enemy settlements, sanctions are ‘weapons of mass starvation’. They “are silent killers. People die in their homes, nobody is counting”. The human costs are considerable and varied, but largely overlooked. Knowing they are mere collateral damage will not endear any victim to the sanctions’ ‘true purpose’.

US sanctions’ victims
The US has imposed more sanctions, for longer periods, than any other nation. During 1990-2005, the US imposed a third of sanctions regimes worldwide. These were inflicted on more than 1,000 entities or individuals yearly in 2016-20 – nearly 80% more than in 2008-15. Thus, the Trump administration raised the US share of all sanctions to almost half!

Tens of millions of Afghans now face food insecurity, even starvation, as the US has seized its US$9.5 billion central bank reserves. President Biden’s 11 February 2022 executive order gives half of this to 9/11 victims’ families, although no Afghan was ever found responsible for the atrocity.

Biden claims the rest will be for ‘humanitarian crises’, presumably as decided by the White House. But he remains silent about the countless victims of the US’s two-decade long war in Afghanistan, where airstrikes alone killed at least 48,308 civilians.

Anis Chowdhury

The six decade-long US trade embargo has cost Cuba at least US$130 billion. It causes shortages of food, medicine and other essential items to this day. Meanwhile, Washington continues to ignore the UN General Assembly’s call to lift its blockade.

The US-backed Israeli blockade of the densely populated Gaza Strip has inflicted at least US$17 billion in losses. Besides denying Gaza’s population access to many imported supplies – including medicines – bombing and repression make life miserable for its besieged people.

Meanwhile, the US supports the Saudi-led coalition’s war on Yemen with its continuing blockade of the poorest Arab nation. US arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have ensured the worst for Yemenis under siege.

Blocking essential goods – including food, fuel and medical supplies – has intensified the “world’s worst ongoing humanitarian crisis”. Meanwhile, “years of famine” – including “starving to death a Yemeni child every 75 seconds” – have been aggravated by the “largest cholera outbreak anywhere in history”.

Humanitarian disasters and destroying lives and livelihoods are excused as inevitable “collateral damage”. Acknowledging hundreds of thousands of Iraqi child deaths, due to US sanctions after the 1991 invasion, an ex-US Secretary of State deemed the price “worth it”.

Poverty levels in countries under US sanctions are 3.8 percentage points higher, on average, than in other comparable countries. Such negative impacts rose with their duration, while unilateral and US sanctions stood out as most effective!

Clearly, the US government has not hesitated to wage war by other means. Its recent sanctions threaten living costs worldwide, reversing progress everywhere, especially for the most vulnerable.

Yet, US-led unilateral sanctions against Iran, Venezuela, North Korea and other countries have failed to achieve their purported objectives, namely, to change regimes, or at least, regime behaviour.

Changing US policy?
Although unilateral sanctions are not valid under the UN Charter, many US reformers want Washington to “lead by example, overhaul US sanctions, and ensure that sanctions are targeted, proportional, connected to discrete policy goals and reversible”.

Last year, the Biden administration began a comprehensive review of US sanctions policies. It has promised to minimize their adverse humanitarian impacts, and even to consider allowing trade – on humanitarian grounds – with heavily sanctioned nations. But actual policy change has been wanting so far.

US sanctions continue to ruin Iran’s economy and millions of livelihoods. Despite COVID-19 – which hit the nation early and hard – sanctions have continued, limiting access to imported goods and resources, including medicines.

A US embargo has also blocked urgently needed humanitarian aid for North Korea. Similarly, US actions have repeatedly blocked meeting the urgent needs of the many millions of vulnerable people in the country.

The Trump administration’s sanctions against Venezuela have deepened its massive income collapse, intensifying its food, health and economic crises. US sanctions have targeted its oil industry, providing most of its export earnings.

Besides preventing Venezuela from accessing its funds in foreign banks and multilateral financial institutions, the US has also blocked access to international financial markets. And instead of targeting individuals, US sanctions punish the entire Venezuelan nation.

Russia’s Sputnik-V was the first COVID-19 vaccine developed, and is among the world’s most widely used. Meanwhile, rich countries’ “vaccine apartheid” and strict enforcement of intellectual property rights – augmenting corporate profits – have limited access to ‘Western’ vaccines.

The US has not spared Sputnik-V from sanctions, disrupting not only shipments from Russia, but also production elsewhere, e.g., in India and South Korea, which planned to produce 100 million doses monthly. Denying Russia use of the SWIFT international payments system makes it hard for others to buy them.

Rethinking sanctions
Economic sanctions – originally conceived a century ago to wage war by non-military means – are increasingly being used to force governments to conform. Sanctions are still portrayed as non-violent means to induce ‘rogue’ states to ‘behave’.

But this ignores its cruel paradox – supposedly avoiding war, sanctions lay siege, an ancient technique of war. Yet, despite all the harm caused, they typically fail to achieve their intended political objectives – as Nicholas Mulder documents in The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War.

As Cuba, Iran, Afghanistan and Venezuela were not major food or fertilizer exporters, their own populations have suffered most from the sanctions against them. But Russia, Ukraine and even Belarus are significant producers and exporters.

Hence, sanctions against Russia and Belarus have much wider international implications, especially for European fuel supplies. More ominously, they threaten food security not only now, but also in the future as fertilizer supplies are cut off.

With tepid growth since the 2008 global financial crisis, the West now blocks economic recovery. Vaccine apartheid, deliberate supply disruptions and deflationary policies now disrupt international economic integration, once pushed by the West.

As war increasingly crowds out international diplomacy, commitments to the UN Charter, multilateralism, peace and sustainable development are being drowned by their enemies, often invoking misleadingly similar rhetoric.

IPS UN Bureau

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US and allied economic sanctions against Russia for its illegal invasion of Ukraine have not achieved their declared objectives. Instead, they are worsening economic stagnation and inflation worldwide. Worse, they are exacerbating hunger, especially in Africa.

Sanctions cut both ways
Unless approved by the UN Security Council (UNSC), sanctions are not authorized by international law. With Russia’s veto in the UNSC, unilateral sanctions by the US and its allies have surged following the Ukraine invasion.

During 1950-2016, ‘comprehensive’ trade sanctions have cut bilateral trade between sanctioning countries and their victims by 77% on average. The US has imposed more sanctions regimes, and for longer periods, than any other country.

Unilateral imposition of sanctions has accelerated over the past 15 years. During 1990-2005, the US imposed about a third of sanctions regimes around the world, with the European Union (EU) also significant.

The US has increased using sanctions since 2016, imposing them on more than 1,000 entities or individuals yearly, on average, from 2016 to 2020 – nearly 80% more than in 2008-2015. The one-term Trump administration raised the US share of all new sanctions to almost half from a third before.

During January-May 2022, 75 countries implemented 19,268 restrictive trade measures. Such measures on food and fertilizers (85%) greatly exceed those on raw materials and fuels (15%). Unsurprisingly, the world now faces less supplies and higher prices for fuel and food.

Monetary authorities have been raising interest rates to curb inflation, but such efforts do not address the main causes of higher prices now. Worse, they are likely to deepen and prolong stagnation, increasing the likelihood of ‘stagflation’.

Sanctions were supposed to bring Russia to its knees. But less than three months after the rouble plunged, its exchange rate is back to pre-war levels, rising from the ‘rouble rubble’ promised by Western economic warmongers. With enough public support, the Russian regime is in no hurry to submit to sanctions.

Sanctions pushing up food prices
War and sanctions are now the main drivers of increased food insecurity. Russia and Ukraine produce almost a third of world wheat exports, nearly 20% of corn (maize) exports and close to 80% of sunflower seed products, including oil. Related Black Sea shipping blockades have helped keep Russian exports down.

All these have driven up world prices for grain and oilseeds, raising food costs for all. As of 19 May, the Agricultural Price Index was up 42% from January 2021, with wheat prices 91% higher and corn up 55%.

The World Bank’s April 2022 Commodity Markets Outlook notes the war has changed world production, trade and consumption. It expects prices to be historically high, at least through 2024, worsening food insecurity and inflation.

Western bans on Russian oil have sharply increased energy prices. Both Russia and its ally, Belarus – also hit by economic sanctions – are major suppliers of agricultural fertilizers – including 38% of potassic fertilizers, 17% of compound fertilizers, and 15% of nitrogenous fertilizers.

Fertilizer prices surged in March, up nearly 20% from two months before, and almost three times higher than in March 2021! Less supplies at higher prices will set back agricultural production for years.

With food agriculture less sustainable, e.g., due to global warming, sanctions are further reducing output and incomes, besides raising food prices in the short and longer term.

Sanctions hurt poor most
Even when supposedly targeted, sanctions are blunt instruments, often generating unintended consequences, sometimes contrary to those intended. Hence, sanctions typically fail to achieve their stated objectives.

Many poor and food insecure countries are major wheat importers from Russia and Ukraine. The duo provided 90% of Somalia’s imports, 80% of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s, and about 40% of both Yemen’s and Ethiopia’s.

It appears the financial blockade on Russia has hurt its smaller and more vulnerable Central Asian neighbours more: 4.5 million from Uzbekistan, 2.4 million from Tajikistan, and almost a million from Kyrgyzstan work in Russia. Difficulties sending remittances cause much hardship to their families at home.

Although not their declared intent, US measures during 1982–2011 hurt the poor more. Poverty levels in sanctioned countries have been 3.8 percentage points higher than in similar countries.

Sanctions also hurt children and other disadvantaged groups much more. Research in 69 countries found sanctions lowered infant weight and increased the likelihood of death before age three. Unsurprisingly, economic sanctions violate the UN Convention on the Rights of Children.

A study of 98 less developed and newly industrialized countries found life expectancy in affected countries reduced by about 3.5 months for every additional year under UNSC sanctions. Thus, an average five-year episode of UNSC approved sanctions reduced life expectancy by 1.2–1.4 years.

World hunger rising
As polemical recriminations between Russia and the US-led coalition intensify over rising food and fuel prices, the world is racing to an “apocalyptic” human “catastrophe”. Higher prices, prolonged shortages and recessions may trigger political upheavals, or worse.

The UN Secretary-General has emphasized, “We need to ensure a steady flow in food and energies through open markets by lifting all unnecessary export restrictions, directing surpluses and reserves to those in need and keeping a lead on food prices to curb market volatility”.

Despite declining World Bank poverty numbers, the number of undernourished has risen from 643 million in 2013 to 768 million in 2020. Up to 811 million people are chronically hungry, while those facing ‘acute food insecurity’ have more than doubled since 2019 from 135 million to 276 million.

With the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, OXFAM warned, the “hunger virus” could prove even more deadly. The pandemic has since pushed tens of millions into food insecurity.

In 2021, before the Ukraine war, 193 million people in 53 countries were deemed to be facing ‘food crisis or worse’. With the war and sanctions, 83 million – or 43% – more are expected to be victims by the end of 2022.

Source: 2022 Global Report on Food Crises; 2022: projected

Economic sanctions are the modern equivalent of ancient sieges, trying to starve populations into submission. The devastating impacts of sieges on access to food, health and other basic services are well-known.

Sieges are illegal under international humanitarian law. The UNSC has unanimously adopted resolutions demanding the immediate lifting of sieges, e.g., its 2014 Resolution 2139 against civilian populations in Syria.

But veto-wielding permanent Council members are responsible for invading Ukraine and unilaterally imposing sanctions. Hence, the UNSC will typically not act on the impact of sanctions on billions of innocent civilians. No one seems likely to protect them against sanctions, today’s weapons of mass starvation.

IPS UN Bureau

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A class war is being waged in the name of fighting inflation. All too many central bankers are raising interest rates at the expense of working people’s families, supposedly to check price increases.

Forced to cope with rising credit costs, people are spending less, thus slowing the economy. But it does not have to be so. There are much less onerous alternative approaches to tackle inflation and other contemporary economic ills.

Short-term pain for long-term gain?
Central bankers are agreed inflation is now their biggest challenge, but also admit having no control over factors underlying the current inflationary surge. Many are increasingly alarmed by a possible “double-whammy” of inflation and recession.

Nonetheless, they defend raising interest rates as necessary “preemptive strikes”. These supposedly prevent “second-round effects” of workers demanding more wages to cope with rising living costs, triggering “wage-price spirals”.

In central bank jargon, such “forward-looking” measures convey clear messages “anchoring inflationary expectations”, thus enhancing central bank “credibility” in fighting inflation.

They insist the resulting job and output losses are only short-term – temporary sacrifices for long-term prosperity. Remember: central bankers are never punished for causing recessions, no matter how deep, protracted or painful.

But raising interest rates only makes recessions worse, especially when not caused by surging demand. The latest inflationary surge is clearly due to supply disruptions because of the pandemic, war and sanctions.

Raising interest rates only reduces spending and economic activity without mitigating ‘imported’ inflation, e.g., rising food and fuel prices. Recessions will further disrupt supplies, aggravating inflation and worsening stagflation.

Wage-price spirals?
Some central bankers claim recent instances of wage increases signal “de-anchored” inflationary expectations, and threaten ‘wage-price spirals’. But this paranoia ignores changed industrial relations and pandemic effects on workers.

With real wages stagnant for decades, the ‘wage-price spiral’ threat is grossly exaggerated. Over recent decades, most workers have lost bargaining power with deregulation, outsourcing, globalization and labour-saving technologies. Hence, labour shares of national income have declined in most countries since the 1980s.

Labour market recovery, even tightening in some sectors, obscures adverse overall pandemic impacts on workers. Meanwhile, millions of workers have gone into informal self-employment – now celebrated as ‘gig work’ – increasing their vulnerability.

Pandemic infections, deaths, mental health, education and other impacts, including migrant worker restrictions, have all hurt many. Contagion has especially hurt vulnerable workers, including youth, migrants and women.

Ideological central bankers
Economic policies by supposedly independent and knowledgeable technocrats are presumed to be better. But such naïve faith ignores ostensibly academic, ideological beliefs.

Typically biased, albeit in unstated ways, policy choices inevitably support some interests over – even against – others. Thus, for example, an anti-inflation policy emphasis favours financial asset owners.

Politicians like the notion of central bank independence. It enables them to conveniently blame central banks for inflation and other ills – even “sleeping at the wheel” – and for unpopular policy responses.

Of course, central bankers deny their own role and responsibility, instead blaming other economic policies, especially fiscal measures. But politicians blaming central bankers after empowering them is simply shirking responsibility.

In the rich West, governments long bent on fiscal austerity left the heavy lifting for recovery after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (GFC) to central bankers. Their ‘unconventional monetary policies’ involved keeping policy interest rates very low, enabling corporate shenanigans and zombie business longevity.

This enabled unprecedented increases in most debt, including private credit for speculation and sustaining ‘zombie’ businesses. Hence, recent monetary tightening – including raising interest rates – will trigger more insolvencies and recessions.

German social market economy
Inflation and policy responses inevitably involve social conflicts over economic distribution. In Germany’s ‘free collective bargaining’, trade unions and business associations engage in collective bargaining without state interference, fostering cooperative relations between workers and employers.

The German Collective Bargaining Act does not oblige ‘social partners’ to enter into negotiations. The timing and frequency of such negotiations are also left to them. Such flexible arrangements are said to have helped SMEs.

Although Germany’s ‘social market economy’ has no national tripartite social dialogue institution, labour unions, business associations and government did not hesitate to democratically debate crisis measures and policy responses to stabilize the economy and safeguard employment, e.g., during the GFC.

Dialogue down under
A similar ‘social dialogue’ approach was developed by Australian Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke from 1983. This contrasted with the more confrontational approaches pursued in Margaret Thatcher’s UK and Ronald Reagan’s USA – where punishing interest rates inflicted long recessions.

Although Hawke had been a successful trade union leader, he began by convening a national summit of workers, businesses and other stakeholders. The resulting Prices and Incomes Accord between the government and unions moderated wage demands in return for ‘social wage’ improvements.

This consisted of better public health provisioning, pension and unemployment benefit improvements, tax cuts and ‘superannuation’ – involving required employees’ income shares and matching employer contributions to a workers’ retirement fund.

Although business groups were not formally party to the Accord, Hawke brought big businesses into other new initiatives such as the Economic Planning Advisory Council. This consensual approach helped reduce both unemployment and inflation.

Such consultations have also enabled difficult reforms – including floating exchange rates and reducing import tariffs. They also contributed to the developed world’s longest uninterrupted economic growth streak – without a recession for nearly three decades, ending in 2020 with the pandemic.

Social partnerships
A variety of such approaches exist. For example, Norway’s kombiniert oppgjior, from 1976, involved not only industrial wages, but also taxes, salaries, pensions, food prices, child support payments, farm support prices, and more.

‘Social partnerships’ have also been important in Austria and Sweden. A series of political understandings – or ‘bargains’ – between successive governments and major interest groups enabled national wage agreements from 1952 until the mid-1970s.

Consensual approaches undoubtedly underpinned post-Second World War reconstruction and progress, of the so-called Keynesian ‘Golden Age’. But it is also claimed they have created rigidities inimical to further progress, especially with rapid technological change.

Economic liberalization in response has involved deregulation to achieve more market flexibilities. But this approach has also produced more economic insecurity, inequalities and crises, besides stagnating productivity.

Such changes have also undermined democratic states, and enabled more authoritarian, even ethno-populist regimes. Meanwhile, rising inequalities and more frequent recessions have strained social trust, jeopardizing security and progress.

Policymakers should consult all major stakeholders to develop appropriate policies involving fair burden sharing. The real need then is to design alternative policy tools through social dialogue and complementary arrangements to address economic challenges in more equitably cooperative ways.

IPS UN Bureau

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Central bank policies have often worsened economic crises instead of resolving them. By raising interest rates in response to inflation, they often exacerbate, rather than mitigate business cycles and inflation.

Neither gods nor maestros
US Federal Reserve Bank chair Jerome Powell has admitted: “Whether we can execute a soft landing or not, it may actually depend on factors that we don’t control.” He conceded, “What we can control is demand, we can’t really affect supply with our policies. And supply is a big part of the story here”.

Anis Chowdhury

Thus, Milton Friedman – whom many central bankers still worship – blamed the 1930s’ Great Depression on the US Fed. Instead of providing liquidity support to businesses struggling with short-term cash-flow problems, it squeezed credit, crushing economic activity.

Similarly, before becoming Fed chair, Ben Bernanke’s research team concluded, “an important part of the effect of oil price shocks [in the 1970s] on the economy results not from the change in oil prices, per se, but from the resulting tightening of monetary policy”.

Adverse impacts of the 1970s’ oil price shocks were worsened by the reactions of monetary policymakers, which caused stagflation. That is, US Fed and other central bank interventions caused economic stagnation without mitigating inflation.

Likewise, the longest US recession after the Great Depression, during the 1980s, was due to interest rate hikes by Fed chair Paul Volcker. A recent New York Times op-ed warned, “The Powell pivot to tighter money in 2021 is the equivalent of Mr. Volcker’s 1981 move” and “the 2020s economy could resemble the 1980s”.

Monetary policy for supply shocks?
Food prices surged in 2011 due to weather-related events ruining harvests in major food producing nations, such as Australia and Russia. Meanwhile, fuel prices soared with political turmoil in the Middle East.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Referring to Boston Fed research, he noted commodity price changes did not affect the long-run inflation rate. Other research has also concluded that commodity price shocks are less likely to be inflationary.

This reduced inflationary impact has been attributed to ‘structural changes’ such as workers’ diminished bargaining power due to labour market deregulation, technological innovation and globalization.

Hence, central banks are no longer expected to respond strongly to food and fuel price increases. Policymakers should not respond aggressively to supply shocks – often symptomatic of broader macroeconomic developments.

Instead, central banks should identify the deeper causes of food and fuel price rises, only responding appropriately to them. Wrong policy responses can compound, rather than mitigate problems.

Appropriate innovations
A former Philippines central bank Governor Amando M. Tetangco, Jr noted it had not responded strongly to higher food and fuel prices in 2004. He stressed, “authorities should ignore changes in the price of things that they cannot control”.

Tetangco warned, “the required policy response is not… straightforward… Thus policy makers will need to make a choice between bringing down inflation and raising output growth”. He emphasized, “a real sector supply side response may be more appropriate in addressing the pressure on prices”.

Thus, instead of restricting credit indiscriminately, financing constraints on desired industries (e.g., renewable energy) should be eased. Enterprises deemed inefficient or undesirable – e.g., polluters or those engaged in speculation – should have less access to the limited financing available.

This requires designing macroeconomic policies to enable dynamic new investments, technologies and economic diversification. Instead of reacting with blunt interest rate policy tools, policymakers should know how fiscal and monetary policy tools interact and impact various economic activities.

Used well, these can unlock supply bottlenecks, promote desired investments and enhance productivity. As no one size fits all, each policy objective will need appropriate, customized, often innovative tools.

Lessons from China
China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), developed “structural monetary policy” tools and new lending programmes to help victims of COVID-19. These ensured ample interbank liquidity, supported credit growth, and strengthened domestic supply chains.

Outstanding loans to small and micro businesses rose 25% to 20.8 trillion renminbi by March 2022 from a year before. By January, the interest rate for loans to over 48 million small and medium enterprises had dropped to 4.5%, the lowest level since 1978.

The PBOC has also provided banks with loan funds for promising, innovative and creditworthy companies, e.g., involved in renewable energy and digital technologies. It thus achieves three goals: fostering growth, maintaining debt at sustainable levels, and ‘green transformation’.

Defying global trends, China’s ‘factory-gate’ (or producer price) inflation fell to a one-year low in April 2022 as the PBOC eased supply chains and stabilized commodity prices. Although consumer prices have risen with COVID-19 lockdowns, the increases have remained relatively benign so far.

In short, the PBOC has coordinated monetary policy with both fiscal and industrial policies to boost confidence, promote desired investments and achieve stable growth. It maintains financial stability and policy independence by regulating capital flows, thus avoiding sudden outflows, and interest rate hikes in response.

Improving policy coordination
Central bankers monitor aggregate indicators, such as wages growth. However, before reacting to upward wage movements, the context needs to be considered. For example, wages may have stagnated, or the labour share of income may have declined over the long-term.

Moreover, wage increases may be needed for critical sectors facing shortages to attract workers with relevant skills. Wage growth itself may not be the problem. The issue may be weak long-term productivity growth due to deficient investments.

Input-output tables can provide information about sectoral bottlenecks and productivity, while flow-of-funds information reveals what sectors are financially constrained, and which are net savers or debtors.

Such information can helpfully guide design of appropriate, complementary fiscal and monetary policy tools. Undoubtedly, pursuing heterodox policies is challenging in the face of policy fetters imposed by current orthodoxies.

Central bank independence – with dogmatic mandates for inflation targeting and capital account liberalization – precludes better coordination, e.g., between fiscal and monetary authorities. It also undercuts the policy space needed to address both demand- and supply-side inflation.

Monetary authorities are under tremendous pressure to be seen to be responding to rising prices. But experience reminds us they can easily make things worse by acting inappropriately. The answer is not greater central bank independence, but rather, improved economic policy coordination.

IPS UN Bureau

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The world is being pressed by financial interests to raise interest rates, ostensibly to check inflation. After the US Federal Reserve started raising interest rates, more central banks have been doing likewise.

Considering inflation’s contemporary causes, such ‘follow the leader’ central bank mimicry cannot check it except by slowing economies. Worse, this has meant taking on huge new risks, seriously damaging world economic prospects in the medium and long-term.

Anis Chowdhury

Nonetheless, “The ratio of fervent beliefs to tangible evidence seems unusually high on this topic”. Unsurprisingly, central banks are still trying to keep inflation below 2% – an arbitrary target “plucked out of the air”, due to a “chance remark” by New Zealand’s finance minister then.

Raising interest rates will derail recovery and worsen supply disruptions and shortages due to the pandemic, war and sanctions. European Central Bank (ECB) Executive Board member Fabio Panetta has noted the euro zone is “de facto stagnating” as economic growth has almost stopped.

As policymakers struggle with inflation, growth and wellbeing are being subjected to huge risks. As Panetta warns, “monetary tightening aimed at containing inflation would end up hampering growth that is already weakening”.

Interest rates rising globally
Among emerging markets and developing economies, South Africa’s central bank raised interest rates for the first time in three years in November 2021.

On 24 March 2022, the Bank of Mexico raised interest rates for the seventh consecutive time. On the same day, Brazil’s central bank raised interest rates to its highest level since 2017.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Without evidence or reasoning, they insist higher interest rates will check inflation. Their recognized adverse effects for recovery and growth are dismissed as unavoidably necessary short-term costs for some unspecified long-term gains.

But despite facing higher inflationary expectations, tightening international monetary conditions, and Ukraine war uncertainties, the ECB and Bank of Japan have not joined the bandwagon, refusing to raise policy interest rates so far.

Interest rate – blunt tool
But central bankers’ dogmatic stances, knee-jerk responses and ‘follow the leader’ behaviour are not helpful. Even when inflation reaches dangerous levels, raising interest rates may still not be the right policy response for several reasons.

First, raising interest rates only addresses the symptoms – not the causes – of inflation. Inflation is often said to be a consequence of an economy ‘overheating’. But overheating can be due to many factors.

Higher interest rates may relieve overheating, by slowing economic activity. But a good doctor should first investigate and diagnose an ailment’s causes before prescribing appropriate treatment – which may or may not require medication.

It is widely accepted that the current inflationary surge is due to supply chain disruptions – exacerbated by war and sanctions – especially of essential goods such as food and fuel. If so, long-term solutions require increasing supplies, including by removing bottlenecks.

Higher interest rates reduce aggregate demand. But simply raising interest rates does not even address the specific causes of inflation, let alone rising prices due to supply disruptions of essential goods, such as food and fuel.

Interest rate – indiscriminate
Second, the interest rate affects all sectors, everyone. It does not even distinguish between sectors or industries needing to expand or be encouraged, and those that should be phased out, for being less productive or inefficient.

Also, raising interest rates too often, and to excessively high levels, can squeeze, or even kill productive and efficient businesses along with inefficient or less productive ones.

US bankruptcies had soared in the early 1980s after US Fed chair Volcker’s legendary interest rate spike. “Thousands of businesses that took out bank loans could fail”, warned a leading UK tax advisory firm recently.

Third, interest rates do not distinguish among households and businesses. Higher interest rates may discourage household expenditure, but also dampen all kinds of spending – for both consumption and investment.

Hence, overall demand may shrink – discouraging investment in new technology, plant, equipment and skills. Thus, higher interest rates adversely affect long-term productive capacities and technological progress of economies.

Debt, recessions and financial crises
Fourth, higher interest rates raise debt servicing costs for governments, businesses and households. With the exceptionally low interest rates previously available after the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC), debt burdens rose in most countries.

These undoubtedly encouraged risky, speculative behaviour as well as unproductive share buybacks, increased dividends, and mergers & acquisitions. Interest rate hikes have triggered many recessions and financial crises. Thus, raising interest rates now will likely trigger a new, albeit different era of stagflation.

The pandemic has pushed public debt to historic new highs. Forty-four per cent of low-income and least developed countries were at high risk of, or already in external debt distress in 2020.

Before the COVID-19 crisis, half the small island developing states surveyed already had solvency problems, i.e., were at high risk of, or already in debt distress. Thus, raising interest rates can trigger a global debt crisis.

Fifth, paradoxically, higher interest rates raise debt-servicing expenses, especially mortgage payments, for indebted households. Costs of living also rise if businesses pass higher interest costs on to consumers by raising prices.

Hence, the main beneficiaries of low inflation and higher interest rates are the holders of financial assets who fear the relative diminution of their value.

Developing countries vulnerable
Developing countries are particularly vulnerable. Higher interest rates in developed countries – particularly the US – trigger capital outflows from developing countries – causing exchange rate depreciations and inflationary pressures.

Higher interest rates and weaker exchange rates will aggravate already high debt service burdens – as happened in Latin America in the early 1980s after US Fed chair Volcker greatly increased US interest rates.

To discourage sudden capital outflows and prevent large currency depreciations, developing countries raise interest rates sharply. This may lead to economic collapse – as in Indonesia during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.

Although pandemic response measures – such as debt moratoria – provided some relief, business failures rose nearly 60% in 2020 from 2019. Middle- and low-income countries saw more business failures.

The World Bank’s Pulse Enterprise Survey – of 24 middle- and low-income countries – found 40% of businesses surveyed in January 2021 expected to be in arrears within six months.

This included more than 70% of firms in Nepal and the Philippines, and over 60% in Turkey and South Africa. Business failures of such scale can trigger banking crises as non-performing loans suddenly soar.

Instead of checking contemporary inflation, raising interest rates is likely to greatly damage recovery and medium-term growth prospects. Hence, it is imperative for developing countries to innovatively develop appropriate means to better address the economic dilemmas they face.

IPS UN Bureau

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Once deemed a basic human needs success story, Sri Lanka (SL) is now in its worst economic crisis since independence in 1948. Nonetheless, SL’s ‘moment of truth’ now offers lessons for other developing countries.

China scapegoat
SL has just defaulted on its foreign debt for the very first time. Attributing its current predicament to a Chinese ‘debt-trap’ is a new Cold War propaganda distraction – which we will undoubtedly hear much more of.

Anis Chowdhury

Outstanding SL government foreign debt in April 2021 was US$35.1bn. Policy errors have reduced foreign direct investment (FDI), exports and government revenue, changing the composition of its foreign debt for the worst.

Debt to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank, China, Japan and other bilateral lenders, including India, came to about a tenth each. Borrowing from capital markets – 47%, or almost half – is mainly responsible for its debt unsustainability.

After all, borrowing from multilateral development banks – mainly the World Bank and ADB – and bilateral lenders are mostly on concessional terms, while debt from commercial sources incurs higher interest rates.

Commercial loans tend to be more short term, and subject to stricter conditions. As sovereign bonds or commercial loans become due, their full value must be repaid. External debt servicing costs surge accordingly.

As of April 2021, about 60% of SL’s debt was for durations of less than ten years. The US dollar denominated debt share rose sharply – from 36% in 2012 to 65% in 2019, as Chinese renminbi denominated loans remained around 2%.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The effective interest rate on commercial loans in January 2022 was 6.6% – more than double that for Chinese debt. Unsurprisingly, SL’s interest payments alone came to 95.4% of its declining government revenue in 2021!

Deep-rooted problems
Following its 2001 recession, SL recovered, before growth declined again after 2012 and the pandemic contraction in 2020. SL also experienced premature deindustrialization, with manufacturing’s GDP share falling from 22% in 1977 to 15% in 2017.

Government tax revenue declined from 18.4% of GDP (1990-92 average) to 12.7% (2017-19), and a 8.4% pandemic nadir in 2020. Non-tax revenue – mainly dividends and profits from public investments – fell from 2.3% of GDP in 2000 to 0.9% in 2015.

SL’s exports-GDP ratio almost halved from 39% in 2000 to 20% in 2010. This took a big hit during the pandemic, dropping to 17% in 2020. From 2000, FDI inflows into SL were between 1.1% and 1.8% of GDP, before falling to 0.5% in 2020.

During 2012-19, the share of International Monetary Fund (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in SL’s debt stock fell from 28% to 14%, as borrowings ballooned! SL’s debt crisis is clearly due to the policy choices of successive governments since the 1990s.

Crisis-prone
In February 2022, SL had only US$2.31 billion in foreign exchange reserves – too little to cover its import bill and debt repayment obligations of US$4 billion.

Its 22 million people face 12-hour power cuts, and extreme scarcities of food, fuel and other essential items such as medicines. Inflation reached an all-time high of 17.5% in February 2022, with food prices rising 24% in January-February 2022. But economic crisis is not new to SL.

As a commodity producer – mainly exporting tea, coffee, rubber and spices – export earnings have long been volatile, vulnerable to external shocks. Foreign exchange earnings have also come from ready-made garments, tourism and remittances, but their shares have grown little over decades.

Since 1965, SL has obtained 16 IMF loans, typically with onerous conditionalities. The last was in 2016, providing US$1.5 billion over 2016-19. Required austerity measures have squeezed public investment, hurting growth and welfare.

Two recent shocks made things worse. First, bomb blasts in Colombo churches and luxury hotels in April 2019 drastically cut tourist arrivals by 80%, squeezing foreign exchange earnings.

Second, the pandemic has damaged not only economic activity, but also foreign exchange reserves, as it often paid monopoly prices to get COVID-19 tests, treatments, equipment, vaccines and other needs.

Tax cuts galore
The ethno-populist policies of the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government – which came to power in 2019 – have added fuel to fire. Successfully mobilizing majority Buddhist Singhala sentiment – against Tamils, Muslims and Christians – he sought political support by cutting taxes on the ‘middle class’.

His government cut taxes across the board, collecting only 12.7% of GDP in revenue in 2017-19 – one of the lowest shares among middle-income countries. Losing about 2% of GDP in revenue, its tax-GDP ratio fell to 8.4% in 2020.

SL’s value-added tax rate was cut from 15% to 8%, while the VAT registration threshold was raised from one to 25 million SL rupees monthly. Other indirect taxes and the ‘pay-as-you-earn’ system were abolished.

The minimum income tax threshold was raised from 500,000 SL rupees annually to three million, with few earning that much! Personal income tax rates were not only reduced, but also became even less progressive.

The corporate income tax rate was cut from 28% to 24%. With a 33.5% drop in registered taxpayers (corporate and individual) between 2019 and 2020, SL’s tax base shrank.

Thus, even more of the population became exempt from direct taxes, increasing government popularity, especially among the middle class. But tax cuts failed to spur investment and growth – despite old claims by Ronald Reagan, Donald Trump and their ‘guru’, Arthur Laffer.

Successive SL governments thus failed to increase tax collection, squeezing government revenue. To finance budget deficits, they increasingly borrowed from international capital markets – at higher commercial rates, with shorter maturities.

As the government cut tax rates and exempted most from paying income tax, government revenue fell. Due to its falling revenue and deteriorating credit rating, the government had to borrow more, at higher interest rates.

Facing fiscal and foreign exchange constraints, the government declared SL a 100% organic farming nation in April 2021. Banning all fertilizer imports – ostensibly to promote ‘agro-ecological’ farming as part of a larger ‘green’ transformation – compounded the looming ‘perfect storm’.

Dropped in November 2021, the policy drastically cut agricultural output, with more food imports becoming necessary. Falling tea and rubber output also reduced export earnings, exacerbating foreign exchange shortfalls.

Evidently, the SL government addressed the economic challenges it faced with ‘populist’ policy choices. Instead of addressing longstanding problems faced, this effectively ‘kicked the can’ down the road, worsening the inevitable meltdown.

IPS UN Bureau

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As China increases lending to other developing countries, ‘debt trap’ charges are growing quickly. As it greatly augments financing for development while other sources continue to decline, condemnation of China’s loans is being weaponized in the new Cold War.

Debt-trap diplomacy?
The catchy term ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ was coined by Indian geo-strategist Brahma Chellaney in 2017. According to him, China lends to extract economic or political concessions when a debtor country is unable to meet payment obligations. Thus, it overwhelms poor countries with loans, to eventually make them subservient.

Anis Chowdhury

But even Western researchers generally wary of China dispute the new narrative. A London Chatham House study concluded it is simply wrong – flawed, with scant supporting evidence.

Studying China’s loan arrangements for 13,427 projects in 165 countries over 18 years, AidData – at the US-based Global Research Institute – could not find a single instance of China seizing a foreign asset following loan default.

China has been the ‘new kid on the block’ of development financing for more than a decade. Its growing loans have helped fill the yawning gap left by the decline and increasing private business orientation of financing by the global North.

Instead of tied aid pushing exports, as before, it now shamelessly promotes foreign direct investment from donor nations. Unless disbursed via multilateral institutions, China’s increased lending to support businesses abroad has not really helped developing countries cope with renewed ‘tied’ concessional aid.

Grand ‘debt trap diplomacy’ narratives make for great propaganda, but obscure debt flows’ actual impacts. Most Chinese lending is for infrastructure and productive investment projects, not donor-determined ‘policy loans’. Some countries ‘over-borrow’, but most do not. Deals can turn sour, but most apparently don’t.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port is the most frequently mentioned China debt trap case. The typical media account presumes it lent money to build the port expecting Sri Lanka to get into debt distress. China then supposedly seized it – in exchange for providing debt relief – enabling use by its navy.

But independent studies have debunked this version. Last year, The Atlantic insisted, ‘The Chinese “Debt Trap” Is a Myth’. The subtitle elaborated, “The narrative wrongfully portrays both Beijing and the developing countries it deals with”.

It elaborated: “Our research shows that Chinese banks are willing to restructure the terms of existing loans and have never actually seized an asset from any country, much less the port of Hambantota”.

The project was initiated by then President Mahindra Rajapaksa – not China or its bankers. Feasibility studies by the Canadian International Development Agency and the Danish engineering firm Rambol found it viable. The Chinese Harbour Group construction firm only got involved after the US and India both refused Sri Lankan loan requests.

Sri Lanka’s later debt crisis has been due to its structural economic weaknesses and foreign debt composition. The Chatham House report blamed it on excessive borrowing from Western-dominated capital markets – not Chinese banks.

Even the influential US Foreign Policy journal does not blame Sri Lanka’s undoubted economic difficulties on Chinese debt traps. Instead, “Sri Lanka has not successfully or responsibly updated its debt management strategies to reflect the loss of development aid that it had become accustomed to for decades”.

As the US Fed tapered ‘quantitative easing’, borrowing costs – due to Sri Lanka’s persistent balance of payment problems – rose, forcing it to seek International Monetary Fund help. Some argue borrowing even more from China is the best option available to the island republic.

To set the record straight, there was no debt-for-asset swap after Sri Lanka could no longer service its foreign debt. Instead, a Chinese state-owned enterprise leased the port for US$1.1 billion. Sri Lanka has thus boosted its foreign reserves and paid down its debt to other – mainly Western – creditors.

Also, Chinese navy vessels cannot use the port – home to Sri Lanka’s own southern naval command. “In short, the Hambantota Port case shows little evidence of Chinese strategy, but lots of evidence for poor governance on the recipient side”.

Malaysia
China has also been accused by the media of seeking influence over the Straits of Malacca, through which some 80% of its oil imports pass. Debt-trap proponents claim Beijing therefore inflated lending for Malaysia’s controversial East Coast Rail Link (ECRL).

The Chatham House report notes, “The real issue here is not one of geopolitics, but rather – as in Sri Lanka – the recipient government’s efforts to harness Chinese investment and development financing to advance domestic political agendas, reflecting both need and greed”.

ECRL was initiated by convicted former Malaysian prime minister Najib Razak. Ostensibly to develop the less developed East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, it rejected other less costly, but much needed options.

Borrowings are far more than needed – probably for nefarious purposes. Loan terms were structured to delay repayment – to Najib’s political advantage by ‘passing the buck’ to later generations. But such abuse is by the borrower – not the lender – unless Chinese official connivance is involved.

Non-alignment for our times
There is undoubtedly much room for improving development finance, especially to achieve more sustainable development. Instead of mainly lending to the US, as before, China’s growing role can still be improved. To begin, all involved should respect the United Nations’ principles on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing.

After more than half a century of Western donors’ largely betrayed promises, China’s development finance has significantly improved ‘South-South cooperation’. Meanwhile, sustainable development finance needs – compounded by global warming, the pandemic and Ukraine war – have increased.

After decades of the West denying China commensurate voice in decision making, even under rules it made, its role on the world stage has grown. But instead of working together for the benefit of all, rich countries seem intent on demonizing it. Unsurprisingly, most developing country governments seem undeterred.

As the new Cold War and the scope of economic sanctions spread, collateral damage is undermining development finance and developing countries. To cope with the new situation, developing countries need to consider building a new non-aligned movement for our dark times.

IPS UN Bureau

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The world is sailing into a perfect storm as key leaders seem intent on threatening more war, albeit while proclaiming the noblest of intentions. By doing so, they block international cooperation to create conditions for sustainable peace and shared prosperity for all.

Anis Chowdhury

Monetarists wanted tighter monetary policies to fight inflation. Curbing rising prices was deemed urgent, even though it would increase joblessness. They advocated abandoning expansionary fiscal measures for more growth and jobs.

But US Federal Reserve Bank chair Arthur Burns still considered ensuring full employment his top priority. For Burns, addressing inflation ‘head-on’ – as urged by his detractors – was too costly for the economy and people’s wellbeing.

Nevertheless, the monetarist ascendance was confirmed when the 1946 Employment Act was replaced. The successor 1978 Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act is better known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act for its sponsors, including the Democrats’ 1968 presidential nominee.

In early 1980, Burns’ Fed chair successor, Paul Volcker insisted, “[M]y basic philosophy is over time we have no choice but to deal with the inflationary situation because over time inflation and the unemployment rate go together.… Isn’t that the lesson of the 1970s?”

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

By post-1950s’ Western standards, the 1980s saw very high unemployment. Unemployment in rich developed OECD countries averaged 7.3% during 1980-89, compared to just under 5% during 1974-79, and under 3% during the 1960s.

Debt crises, lost decades
The sharp US interest rate spike triggered debt crises in Poland, Latin America and elsewhere in the early 1980s. Earlier, US commercial banks had enjoyed windfall gains following the two oil price spikes in the 1970s.

The US government had long provided concessional low interest rate loans to allies to secure support during the Cold War. Flush with deposits from Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members in the 1970s, they pushed loans to borrowing governments, many in Latin America.

With the interest rate spikes, borrowing countries suddenly faced liquidity crises, also creating systemic risks for their US and UK bankers. Successive US Treasury Secretaries, James Baker and Nicholas Brady, came up with various debt restructuring schemes to contain the problem, with the latter adopted.

Meanwhile, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank financial support was tied to short-term stabilization programmes and medium-term liberalizing reforms, packaged as structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) with explicit policy conditionalities.

The liquidity crises were due to the sudden sharp interest rate increases. But instead, these were portrayed as solvency crises stemming from weak ‘economic fundamentals’, blamed on ‘over regulation’ and protectionism.

Although African countries were generally not able to borrow as much, they too faced problems as commodity prices collapsed with the growth slowdowns. Many were forced to seek financial support from the IMF and World Bank, and thus obliged to implement SAPs as well.

The liberalizing and deregulating SAP reforms were supposed to usher in rapid growth. Instead, however, both Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa experienced “lost decades of development”.

Stagflation in Europe
Stagflation in our times is expected to be initially most severe in Europe. This has been caricatured as fighting for Ukraine until ‘the last European’ as it bears the brunt of NATO imposed sanctions on Russia. Besides oil and gas, they will pay more for imported wheat, fertilizers and other Russian exports.

But other economic trends will likely make things worse. First, some rich economies – particularly the UK and the US – are weaker now, having lost much of their manufacturing edge. Others have been experiencing declines in productivity growth since the mid-1970s.

Second, low wages – due to labour market deregulation and ‘off-shoring’, i.e., relocating production abroad – have meant less productive activities have survived. Very low interest rates – due to ‘unconventional’ monetary policies since the 2008-09 global financial crisis – have allowed unviable ‘zombie’ enterprises to stay alive.

Third, the declining labour income share has increased income inequalities, lowering aggregate demand. But demand has been sustained by rising household debt. Low, if not negative real interest rates have also encouraged more corporate debt, but with less used for productive new investments.

Fourth, the pandemic has raised all types of debt – household, corporate and government – to record levels. Fifth, countries, especially smaller ones, are now far more internationally integrated – via trade and finance – than in the 1970s.

Therefore, small interest rate increases can have devastatingly large impacts on household, corporate and government finances. Advanced countries are thus likely to see severe economic contractions and rising unemployment.

Meanwhile, more racism and intolerance in recent decades show little sign of receding. Worse, these are likely to worsen as political elites compete in the ethno-populist league to blame Others for their problems. The recent European decision to privilege Ukrainian refugees is a poignant reminder of what is in store.

But impacts on developing countries are likely to be far worse due to capital outflows, declining development finance and aid, as well as slowing world trade after decades of globalization. Increasing inequality since the 1980s and declining growth since 2014 – now worsened by the pandemic – will not help.

Thus, instead of striving to ensure sustainable peace, necessary to improve conditions for all, the world seems set for sustained conflict. This has involved easy resort to sanctions, namely war by economic siege, hurting all. We all thus risk the prospect of mutual destruction instead of shared prosperity for all.

IPS UN Bureau

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The spectre of ‘stagflation’ threatens the world once again. This time, the risk is the direct consequence of political provocations and war, and not simply due to inexorable economic forces.

Stagflation?
Stagflation is a composite word implying inflation with stagnation. Stagnation refers to weak, ‘near zero’ growth, inevitably worsening unemployment. Inflation refers to price increases – not high prices, as often implied.

Anis Chowdhury

In 1965, he told the UK Parliament that amid “swiftly rising” incomes and “completely stagnant” production, “we now have the worst of both worlds. We have a sort of stagflation situation”.

The term caught on in the 1970s, when high inflation and unemployment ended an economic era dubbed the ‘Golden Age of capitalism’ describing the post-World War Two (WW2) boom.

Normally, in a recession, the inflation rate – i.e., the overall rate at which prices increase – falls. As unemployment rises, wages come under pressure, consumers and businesses spend less, reducing demand for goods and services, slowing price rises.

Similarly, when the economy booms, the labour market tightens, pushing up wages, in turn passed on to consumers via increasing prices. Thus, inflation rises and unemployment falls during a boom.

However, stagflation poses a dilemma for central banks. Normally, when economies stall, central banks try to stimulate growth by cutting interest rates, encouraging more borrowing, and thus spending.

But that could also fuel further price rises and higher inflation. On the other hand, if they raise interest rates to check inflation, growth may slow even more, further worsening unemployment.

1970s’ stagflation
The growth of world trade after WW2 increased demand for the US dollar, the de facto world currency under the 1944 Bretton Woods (BW) international monetary agreement. The US financed much post-WW2 reconstruction to broaden its ‘Free World’ sphere of influence as the Cold War began.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

During the 1960s, US economic growth was increasingly sustained by government military and social expenditure. Spending increased for both ‘defence’, especially the Vietnam War, and social programmes, e.g., President Lyndon B. Johnson’s ‘war on poverty’ and ‘Great Society’.

As LBJ was reluctant to acknowledge the rising costs of the Vietnam War, it was difficult to raise taxes to pay for his ‘swords and ploughshares’ spending. Instead, spending was financed by government debt, from selling US Treasury bonds. Thus, the world financed US government spending, including the war.

By January 1967, Johnson was under pressure to cut the growing budget deficit. But it took a year and a half for the US Congress to pass his new budget with tax increases. When finally passed in mid-1968, US federal debt had grown even more as spending for both ‘guns and butter’ did not decline.

US monetary policy was obligingly expansionary. Unsurprisingly, inflation shot up from 1.1% during 1960-64 to 4.3% in 1965-70. Higher inflation also eroded US competitiveness, further worsening its balance of payments deficit.

Inflation also undermined US ability to honour its BW commitment to maintain full convertibility to gold at US$35 per ounce. This obligation did not go unnoticed by foreign governments and currency speculators.

As inflation rose in the late 1960s, US dollars were increasingly converted to gold. In August 1971, US President Richard M. Nixon ended the exchange of dollars for gold by foreign central banks, effectively violating its BW commitment.

A last-ditch attempt to salvage the international monetary system – through the short-lived Smithsonian Agreement – failed soon after. By 1973, the post-WW2 BW international monetary arrangements were effectively done with.

Commodity supply disruptions
Oil exporting, European and other countries which held reserves in US dollars suddenly found their assets worth much less. With Venezuela, the Middle East-led Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) reacted by dropping their earlier willingness to keep oil prices low.

In October 1973, ‘nationalist’ Saudi monarch Faisal embargoed oil exports to nations supporting Israel soon after President Anwar Sadat’s attempted reprisal following Egypt’s defeat by Israel in 1970. The oil price almost quadrupled – from US$3 to nearly US$12 per barrel when the embargo ended in March 1974.

This steep oil price rise was paralleled by great increases in other commodity prices during 1973-74. Besides petroleum, other primary commodity prices more than doubled between mid-1972 and mid-1974. Meanwhile, the prices of some commodities – such as sugar and urea – rose more than five-fold.

Commodity supply shocks and higher commodity prices increased production costs, consumer prices and unemployment. As rising consumer prices triggered demands for higher wages, these in turn increased consumer prices. Thus, wage-price spirals accelerated price increases and inflation.

The 1979 Iranian revolution triggered a second oil price shock. The resulting ‘great inflation’ saw US prices rise over 14% in 1980. In the UK – then deemed the ‘sick man of Europe’ – inflation averaged 12% a year during 1973-75, peaking at 24% in 1975, while inflation in West Germany and Switzerland exceeded 5%.

In the 1960s, unemployment in the seven major industrial countries – Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US – rarely exceeded 3.25%. But in the 1970s, the unemployment rate never fell below that. By mid-1982, it rose to 8%, exacerbated by interest rate hikes, ostensibly to fight inflation.

The 1970s’ growth slowdowns – with rising unemployment and inflation – in major industrial economies caught many economists off-guard. Economic thinking then presumed inflation and unemployment were alternatives.

The Phillips Curve implied low unemployment came at the cost of higher inflation, and vice versa. This crude and static caricature of Keynesian economics enabled a major assault on its influence. The assault on development economics was collateral damage in this ‘counter-revolution’.

Peace is our best option
In October 2021, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, the US Fed and other such institutions believed the factors driving inflation were transitory. None of these authorities saw an urgent need for interest rate hikes.

But in the last month, the war in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia have driven up the prices of commodities such as wheat and oil. This will exacerbate rising inflation in much of the developed world. The threat of stagflation is undoubtedly more real now than six months ago.

By October 2021, Google searches for ‘stagflation’ hit their highest level since 2008. Mention of stagflation in online news stories surged to more than 4,000 weekly by mid-March, up from slightly more than 200 at the start of the year.

This time, ‘stagflation’ is the direct consequence of political choices, especially for war, not unavoidable economic trends. Developing countries are fast learning where they really stand in this unequal world of endless war, e.g., from the European treatment of Ukrainian refugees.

Peace is therefore imperative. The alternative is the barbarism of conflict among big powers in which most of us have no vested interests. Instead, our shared hope lies in ensuring peace, to focus instead on the common challenges facing humanity.

IPS UN Bureau

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