Carrying the Mayan flag, members of the Colibrí Collective lead a march against the Mayan Train in the city of Valladolid, in the southern Mexican state of Yucatán, in May 2023. The construction of the Mexican government’s most important megaproject has drawn criticism from affected communities due to its environmental, social and cultural effects. CREDIT: Arturo Contreras / Pie de Página

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, May 18 2023 (IPS)

Mexico’s development banks have violated their own socio-environmental standards while granting loans for the construction of the Mayan Train (TM), the flagship project of the presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador.

The National Bank of Public Works and Services (Banobras), the Nacional Financiera (Nafin) bank and the Foreign Commerce Bank (Bancomext) allocated at least 564 million dollars to the railway line since 2021, according to the yearbooks and statements of the three state entities.

Banobras, which finances infrastructure and public services, granted 480.83 million dollars for the project in the Yucatan peninsula; Nafin, which extends loans and guarantees to public and private works, allocated 81 million; and Bancomext, which provides financing to export and import companies and other strategic sectors, granted 2.91 million.

Bancomext and Banobras did not evaluate the credit, while Nafin classified the information as “confidential”, even though it involves public funds, according to each institution’s response to IPS’ requests for public information.“(The banks) are committing internal violations of their own provisions in the granting of credits, in order to give loans to projects that are not environmentally viable and that do not respect the local communities.” -- Gustavo Alanís

The three institutions have environmental and social risk management systems that include lists of activities that are to be excluded from financing.

In the case of Bancomext and Nafin, these rules are mandatory during the credit granting process, while Banobras explains that its objective is to verify that the loans evaluated are compatible with the bank’s environmental and social commitments.

Bancomext prohibits 19 types of financing; Banobras, 17; and Nafin, 18. The three institutions all veto “production or activities that place in jeopardy lands that are owned by indigenous peoples or have been claimed by adjudication, without the full documented consent of said peoples.”

Likewise, Banobras and Nafin must not support “projects that imply violations of national and international conventions and treaties regarding the indigenous population and native peoples.”

The three entities already had information to evaluate the railway project, since the Superior Audit of the Federation, the state comptroller, had already pointed to shortcomings in the indigenous consultation process and in the assessment of social risks, in the 2019 Report on the Results of the Superior Audit of the Public Account.

The total cost of the TM has already exceeded 15 billion dollars, 70 percent above what was initially planned, mostly borne by the government’s National Fund for Tourism Promotion (Fonatur), responsible for the megaproject.

Mexico’s three state development banks are partially financing the Mayan Train, for which they have failed to comply with the due process of the evaluation of socio-environmental risks that are part of their regulations. The photo shows the clearing of part of the route of one of the branches of the railway line in the municipality of Playa del Carmen, in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo, in March 2022. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy / IPS

Violations

Angel Sulub, a Mayan indigenous member of the U kúuchil k Ch’i’ibalo’on Community Center, criticized the policies applied and the disrespect for the safeguards regulated by the state financial entities themselves.

“This shows us, once again, that there is a violation of our right to life, and there has not been at any moment in the process, from planning to execution, a will to respect the rights of the peoples,” he told IPS from the Felipe Carrillo Port, in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo, where one of the TM stations will be located.

Sulub, who is also a poet, described the consultation as a “sham”. “Respect for the consultation was violated in all cases, an adequate consultation was not carried out. They did not comply with the minimum information, it was not a prior consultation, nor was it culturally appropriate,” he argued.

In December 2019, the government National Institute of Indigenous Peoples (INPI) organized a consultation with indigenous groups in the region that the Mexican office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights questioned for non-compliance with international standards.

Official data indicates that some 17 million native people live in Mexico, belonging to 69 different peoples and representing 13 percent of the total population.

INPI initially anticipated a population of 1.5 million indigenous people to consult about the TM in 1,331 communities. But that total was reduced to 1.32 million, with no official explanation for the 12 percent decrease. The population in the project’s area of ​​influence totaled 3.57 million in 2019, according to the Superior Audit report.

The conduct of the three financial institutions reflects the level of compliance with the president’s plans, as has happened with other state agencies that have refused to create hurdles for the railway, work on which began in 2020 and which will have seven routes.

The Mayan Train, run by Fonatur and backed by public funds, will stretch some 1,500 kilometers through 78 municipalities in the states of Campeche, Quintana Roo and Yucatán, within the peninsula, as well as the neighboring states of Chiapas and Tabasco. It will have 21 stations and 14 other stops.

The Yucatan peninsula is home to the second largest jungle in Latin America, after the Amazon, and is notable for its fragile biodiversity. In this territory, furthermore, to speak of the population is to speak of the Mayans, because in a high number of municipalities they are a majority and 44 percent of the total are Mayan-speaking.

The government promotes the megaproject, whose locomotives will transport thousands of tourists and cargo, such as transgenic soybeans, palm oil and pork – key economic activities in the area – as an engine for socioeconomic development in the southeast of the country.

It argues that it will create jobs, boost tourism beyond the traditional attractions and energize the regional economy, which has sparked polarizing controversies between its supporters and critics.

The railway faces complaints of deforestation, pollution, environmental damage and human rights violations, but these have not managed to stop the project from going forward.

In November 2022, López Obrador, who wants at all costs for the locomotives to start running in December of this year, classified the TM as a “priority project” through a presidential decree, which facilitates the issuing of environmental permits.

Gustavo Alanís, executive director of the non-governmental Mexican Center for Environmental Law, questioned the way the development banks are proceeding.

“They are committing internal violations of their own provisions in the granting of credits, in order to give loans to projects that are not environmentally viable and that do not respect the local communities. They are not complying with their own internal guidelines and requirements regarding the environment and indigenous peoples in the granting of credits,” he told IPS.

Groups opposed to the Mayan Train protest along a segment of the megaproject in the municipality of Carrillo Puerto, in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo, on May 3. CREDIT: Arturo Contreras / Pie de Página

Trendy guidelines

In the last decade, socio-environmental standards have gained relevance for the promotion of sustainable works and their consequent financing that respects ecosystems and the rights of affected communities, such as those located along the railway.

Although the three Mexican development banks have such guidelines, they have not joined the largest global initiatives in this field.

None of them form part of the Equator Principles, a set of 10 criteria established in 2003 and adopted by 138 financial institutions from 38 countries, and which define their environmental, social and corporate governance.

Nor are they part of the Principles for Responsible Banking, of the United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative, announced in 2019 and which have already been adopted by 324 financial and insurance institutions from more than 50 nations.

These standards address the impact of projects; sustainable client and user practices; consultation and participation of stakeholders; governance and institutional culture; as well as transparency and corporate responsibility.

Of the three Mexican development banks, only Banobras has a mechanism for complaints, which has not received any about its loans, including the railway project.

In this regard, Sulub questioned the different ways to guarantee indigenous rights in this and other large infrastructure projects.

“The legal fight against the railway and other megaprojects has shown us in recent years that, as peoples, we do not have effective access to justice either, even though we have clearly demonstrated violations of our rights. Although it is a good thing that companies and banks have these guidelines and that they comply with them, we do not have effective mechanisms for enforcement,” he complained.

In Sulub’s words, this leads to a breaching of the power of indigenous people to decide on their own ways of life, since the government does not abide by judicial decisions, which in his view is further evidence of an exclusionary political system.

For his part, Alanís warned of the banks’ complicity in the damage reported and the consequent risk of legal liability if the alleged irregularities are not resolved.

“If not, they must pay the consequences and hold accountable those who do not follow internal policies. The international banks have inspection panels, to receive complaints when the bank does not follow its own policies,” he stated.

The Puente Madera community, in the municipality of San Blas Atempa in the southern Mexican state of Oaxaca, is opposed to the sale of land to an industrial park in that town, one of the 10 projects in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec Interoceanic Corridor, as demonstrated at a February 2022 protest. CREDIT: APIIDTT

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Mar 28 2023 (IPS)

In March 2021, the community assembly of the municipality of San Blas Atempa, in the southern Mexican state of Oaxaca, approved the sale of 360 hectares for the creation of an industrial park. But part of the community opposed the initiative due to irregularities, such as the falsification of signatures of supposed attendees, including those of people who had already died.

The facility is one of 10 planned within the Isthmus of Tehuantepec Interoceanic Corridor (CIIT), which in turn is part of the Program for the Development of the Tehuantepec Isthmus that the Mexican government has been implementing since 2019 with the aim of developing the south and southeast of this country of 1,964,375 square kilometers and almost 130 million inhabitants."It is the replica of the maquiladora model, jobs that exploit workers and cheap labor. There are legitimate concerns, like water, and what kind of industries will be installed. The isthmus is not an industrial zone.”
-- Geocomunes

Mario Quintero, a member of the Assembly of Indigenous Peoples of the Isthmus in Defense of Land and Territory (APIIDTT), said the plan is plagued by “land grabbing, exploitation, dispossession, and displacement of peoples.”

“It is a large-scale geopolitical project in a geostrategic region. The system is corrupt. The way this is being carried out is obscene. The government agrees to the lease, but then says it is going to expropriate,” the activist told IPS from the municipality of Juchitán, in Oaxaca, some 480 kilometers south of Mexico City.

The 200-km wide isthmus is the narrowest area in Mexico between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, in the Gulf of Mexico, which has a large indigenous population and is abundant in biodiversity, hydrocarbons and minerals.

In addition to the 10 industrial sites of 360 hectares each in size, called “Development Poles for Well-being” and focused on exports, the CIIT includes the renovation of the ports of Salina Cruz, on the Pacific Ocean in Oaxaca, and Coatzacoalcos in the state of Veracruz.

It also includes the reconstruction of the Tehuantepec Isthmus Railroad, which links Chiapas, in the state of the same name, with Dos Bocas, in Tabasco.

In addition, it involves the upgrade of the Salina Cruz and Minatitlán refineries, in the state of Veracruz, the laying of a gas pipeline and the construction of a gas liquefaction plant off the coast of Salina Cruz.

But this industrial model is criticized for the few benefits it brings the host communities and the fact that the largest economic benefits go to exporters, and due to its environmental impacts. For example, the municipality of Coatzacoalcos is one of the most polluted in the country.

The non-governmental organization Geocomunes, dedicated to building maps for the defense of common goods, provided IPS with a list of effects such as the pollution of rivers and aquifers, as well as poor working conditions.

“Except for the promise of jobs, it’s business as usual. It is the replica of the maquiladora model, jobs that exploit workers and cheap labor,” the organization said. “There are legitimate concerns, like water, and what kind of industries will be installed. The isthmus is not an industrial zone, it implies a change in the traditional economy. It’s important to look at what kind of employment it will bring. Construction means precarious employment.”

The organization also anticipates that the industries will not arrive as soon as promised, since industrial production does not only consist of the installation of companies.

The Interoceanic Corridor seeks to connect both coasts of Mexico, the Pacific and the Atlantic, through highways and a refurbished railway, to promote industrial development in the south-southeast of the country and foment exports. CREDIT: Fonadin

Appetite for exports

Mexico, the second largest economy in Latin America, is home to more than 500 industrial parks on more than 51,000 hectares, which swell the automotive, electronic, food and beverage, metallurgical, medical, textile and aerospace industries.

Altogether, more than 3,700 companies generate some three million jobs in these industrial parks.

The trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – ​​in force between 1994 and 2020, when it was replaced by the U.S. Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA) – fomented the installation of export assembly plants or maquilas.

They mainly set up shop in northern Mexico, the area closest to the United States, drawn by tax benefits, lower wages and more lax environmental regulations than in their nations of origin.

The northern state of Nuevo León and the central states of Mexico and Guanajuato are home to the largest number of maquilas.

But the socioeconomic conditions in these places have not improved, as demonstrated by the available statistics.

Figures from the government’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (Coneval) indicate that poverty and extreme poverty increased in Nuevo León, home to some 150 industrial poles, between 2018 and 2020.

Overall poverty rose from 1.07 million people to 1.34 million (from 19.24 percent to 24.3 percent of the population) while extreme poverty climbed from 40,000 to 124,000 people (0.7 percent to 2.1 percent).

In Nuevo León, one of the states with the highest levels of income per person and social development in the country, home to 5.78 million people, the unemployment rate stood at 3.57 percent in 2022, and 35.8 of the workforce was in the informal sector of the economy.

In the state of Mexico, adjacent to Mexico City and home to 113 industrial facilities, poverty grew from 7.04 million to 8.34 million people (from 41.8 percent to 48.9 percent of the population), while extreme poverty rose from 783,000 to 1.4 million people (from 4.7 percent to 8.2 percent).

The state of Mexico, population 17 million, had 4.46 percent unemployment in 2022 while 56.8 percent of the workforce was in the informal sector.

The results are similar in other states where industrial parks have been built.

In contrast, in the southern state of Oaxaca, poverty and extreme poverty declined, from 2.75 million to 2.58 million people (from 64.3 percent to 61.7 percent) and from 868,000 to 860,000 (from 21.7 percent to 20.6 percent), respectively.

Oaxaca, which so far has only one industrial pole, is home to 4.13 million people, with an unemployment rate of 1.28 percent in 2022 and 81 percent of the labor force in the informal sector.

The Interoceanic Corridor is part of the Program for the Development of the Tehuantepec Isthmus, covers the southern state of Oaxaca and the southeastern state of Veracruz, and has drawn opposition from local communities who consider it an imposition by the government and a threat to their culture and territory. The photo shows a Mar. 21, 2023 protest against the megaprojects, outside the United States Embassy. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

More hydrocarbons

The Program for the Development of the Tehuantepec Isthmus covers 46 municipalities in Oaxaca and 33 in Veracruz, forming an area where 11 of the country’s 69 indigenous peoples live, totaling 17 million native people.

The Corridor revives a set of similar projects that then President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) proposed in 1996 but which never were carried out. Now President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, in office since December 2018, is recycling them.

The CIIT budget, under the Ministry of the Navy, grew from 162 million dollars in the first year, 2020, to 203 million in 2021 and to more than double that, 529 million, in 2022. But in 2023 it has shrunk to 374 million.

The Corridor divides the 10 projected industrial poles equally between Oaxaca and Veracruz. On Mar. 21 López Obrador announced that the tender for four locations in Oaxaca would be held in early April.

The Tehuantepec isthmus is a region already impacted by the presence of other infrastructure, such as 29 wind farms, most of them private. That installed capacity, plus new wind and solar fields, will fuel the new industrial facilities.

The Mexican government also projects the laying of a 270-km gas pipeline with a transport capacity of 500 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d), between the towns of Jáltipan and Salina Cruz.

The pipeline will complement the 247-km Jáltipan-Salina Cruz gas pipeline that has been operating since 2014 and transports 90 Mmcf/d.

The new pipeline, at a cost of 434 million dollars, will carry 430 MMcf/d to the planned liquefaction plant near Salina Cruz and between 50 and 70 MMcf/d to the industrial parks.

The Federal Electricity Commission, responsible for the project, calculates that it will supply gas to 470 plants and 30 industrial parks.

The communities are fighting it and will seek to build autonomy through local self-management projects, according to Quintero.

“The project is not going to improve the lives of the communities, just as the railroad in the 20th century or the hydroelectric plants failed to do, or the refinery (in Salina Cruz) or the wind farms, because their promises translate into belts of marginalization,” said the activist. “Development and benefits for whom?”

Geocomunes doubts the promise of development. “The land, the water, basic things that are at risk. Who will bear the costs? What is the government going to demand?”

Residents of Mexico City take shelter from the heat in a covered area, on a central street in the capital, in the month of March, when spring has not even arrived yet in the country. Heat waves will become more frequent and will last longer, due to the climate emergency. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Mar 14 2023 (IPS)

On Mar. 9, more than half of Mexico reported maximum temperatures above 30 degrees Celsius, although spring has not even arrived yet in this Latin American country located in the northern hemisphere.

In fact, the Megalopolis Environmental Commission, which brings together the federal government, the Mexican capital city government and those of five states in the center of the country, forecasts four heat waves, a level similar to that of 2022 – one in March, one in April and two in May – before summer.

Despite constituting a public health problem, Mexico lacks a national heat warning system, like the ones that other Latin American nations, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia, have in place.“The authorities must keep the public informed and get them to take the necessary measures. It is very important for the entire population to know what kind of weather lies ahead and to act appropriately. Unfortunately, misinformation is a social problem that we must eradicate all together, but it cannot be a pretext to say that we did not know what could happen." -- Ismael Marcelo

Ismael Marcelo of the National Meteorological Service recommended the creation of a warning system with a regional scope, based on temperature levels.

“Most of the population has a cell phone,” the meteorologist told IPS. “It’s important for the authorities to inform the public about meteorological events that affect us. In a culture of prevention, we have to adapt. At the National Meteorological Service we have all the tools to inform people, a website and through the social networks.”

A heat wave is an unusually hot, dry or humid period that begins and ends abruptly, lasting at least two to three days, with a discernible impact on humans and ecosystems, as defined by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), based in Washington DC.

These phenomena cause public health problems, especially for vulnerable groups – such as children and the elderly – food spoilage, increased air pollution, atmospheric environmental emergencies and forest fires.

The Geneva-based World Meteorological Organization warns that heat waves and other negative trends in the climate will become more frequent and will continue until at least 2060, due to the climate crisis.

In Mexico, a federal country, there are two governments that do have their own heat warning systems: Mexico City, which has a Meteorological Early Warning Network, and the southeastern state of Veracruz, which has a Grey Alert.

The scorching sun

Meanwhile, several Latin American countries do have heat warning systems.

In Colombia, a country of 52 million people, the government Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies monitors hot spots.

Lídice Álvarez, an academic in the nursing program at the Colombian University of Magdalena, told IPS about the relative usefulness of early warnings.

“In assessing how to prevent mortality from climatic events, we found that early warnings help, but it is difficult to predict certain events, because climatic variability further complicates things,” she told IPS from the city of Santa Marta, on Colombia’s Caribbean coast.

“What they do is to say that we are in a heat wave. But the public do not pay attention to the warnings. There is no discipline when it comes to checking climatological variables.”

In Colombia, heat waves have not yet occurred this quarter, but when the El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon hits in July, a period of drought and lack of rain is expected, which will bring heat waves in the Caribbean zone in the second half of the year. ENSO cools the surface of the ocean and unleashes droughts in some parts of the planet and storms in others.

In Chile, a country of 19.2 million inhabitants, the government of Santiago introduced an “Extreme Heat and High Temperatures” system in December, which seeks to prevent deaths and protect people’s health during the southern hemisphere summer, through preventive alerts.

The number of heat waves in the Andean country increased from nine to 62 in the last 10 summers, according to figures from the Annual Environment Report from the government’s National Institute of Statistics.

In the metropolitan region there were 81 heat waves between 2011 and 2020 and forecasts point to a doubling of the percentage of days of extreme temperatures in the next 30 years. During a summer day in Chile, 100 people die from different causes, but when the temperature exceeds 34 degrees Celsius, the number goes up by 10 additional deaths, related to heat waves in Santiago.

Since 2018, Argentina’s National Meteorological Service (SMN) has operated a national warning system, which ranges from white to red according to the impact on human health, in the country of 46 million people.

Since 2009, the SMN has used a heat wave alert mechanism in the capital, Buenos Aires, which was later replicated in several other cities. In the current southern hemisphere summer that officially ends on Mar. 20, there have been nine heat waves so far, and in the metropolitan area of ​​Buenos Aires a red alert has been issued due to the high temperatures.

The places marked in red show spots where temperatures above 30 degrees Celsius were recorded in Mexico on Mar. 9, according to a map of the National Water Commission. In Latin America, extreme heat warnings can save lives. CREDIT: Conagua

A worsening problem

In Mexico, population 129 million, events due to high temperatures and victims of heat stroke are on the rise, with the exception of 2020, due to the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic led millions of people to stay at home.

In 2018, 631 health incidents linked to extreme temperatures and 30 deaths were documented, with the numbers growing to 838 and 44 the following year, according to figures from the General Directorate of Epidemiology, under the Ministry of Health.

Due to the pandemic, the numbers fell to 193 health events and 37 deaths in 2020, but the first figure jumped to 870 in 2021, although the latter dropped to 33. However, in 2022 both statistics climbed, to 1,100 and 42, respectively.

PAHO recommends strengthening the ability of the health sector, through the design of action plans against heat waves that include improvements in preparedness and response to this threat, to reduce the excess of diseases, deaths and social disruptions.

It also recommends improving the capacities of the meteorological services to generate accurate projections and forecasts, so that meteorological information can be used for decision-making before, during and after a heat wave.

Marcelo, the Mexican meteorologist, emphasized the importance of disseminating information.

“The authorities must keep the public informed and get them to take the necessary measures. It is very important for the entire population to know what kind of weather lies ahead and to act appropriately. Unfortunately, misinformation is a social problem that we must eradicate all together, but it cannot be a pretext to say that we did not know what could happen,” he said.

Álvarez from Colombia said mortality is preventable. “We have focused on how people are part of the problem and can take measures. They believe that they cannot make any changes, but they are realizing that simple steps taken at home can generate changes,” she said.

Wirikuta, in the northern Mexican state of San Luis Potosí, is a sacred site for the Wixárika people, threatened by mining concessions and large-scale agriculture. CREDIT: Wixárika Research Center

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Feb 14 2023 (IPS)

Tatei Haramara, one of the sacred sites of the Wixárika indigenous people in the state of Nayarit in northwestern Mexico, has shrunk in size from its original area and is suffering from a lack of legal protection.

Also known as Isla del Rey, off the port of San Blas, six hectares are under protection as sacred, although the San Blas city council approved another 29 hectares. But now the ancestral land faces the threat of a ferry dock and other tourism projects.

The problem is not exclusive to Tatei Haramara, the name of the mother of five-colored corn and of the sacred gateway to the fifth world, represented by the white stones Tatei Waxieve and Tatei Cuca Wima, which rise up in front of the island.“If the resources we need are not allocated, the justice plan will not be completely fulfilled. We are concerned that this will happen. We are facing difficulties in how to get resources in order to work, with respect to all of the issues. The plan must come up with something fair. We don’t just want it to be empty words." -- Paulita Carrillo

Abandonment of ceremonies, lack of legal protection and budget, as well as poverty, violence and environmental damage undermine the application of the Mexican government’s Justice Plan for the Wixárika, Na’ayeri and O’dam peoples, who are from the states of Durango, Jalisco, Nayarit, Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí.

This is stated in the document “Systematization of proposals: Justice Plan for the Wixárica, Na’ayeri and O’dam peoples”, drawn up by the government’s National Institute of Indigenous Peoples (INPI), and seen by IPS, which was among the thousands of emails from the ministry of national defense that the hacktivist Grupo Guacamaya leaked in September.

The assessment, dated July 2022 and 102 pages long, identifies insufficient coordination and communication between the authorities of the Wixárika people to make offerings in sacred places and the Na’ayeri people for the management, protection and conservation of their sacred spots, as well as deterioration and difficulties for the use of sacred places and the tangible and intangible heritage of the three groups due to lack of physical and legal protection.

In Mexico, justice plans for indigenous peoples were created in 2021 by the current government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador as a mechanism to identify and respond to the just demands and historical needs of native communities, including the issue of sacred sites.

But although it is a public policy, it is not legally binding.

Since then, the government has promoted six justice plans for the Yaquis, Yoreme-Mayos, Seris, and Guarijíos in the state of Sonora, the Rarámuris in Chihuahua, and the Wixárika, Na’ayeris, O’dams and Mexikans. But very few of them have been published.

Paulita Carrillo, who has participated in the process of debate and drafting of the plan for her people, the Wixárika, said the programs are not moving forward but are barely dragging along.

“They are moving slowly. It’s not like we thought it would be, it’s a lot of work. There are several factors: you have to engage in dialogue with the institutions of each state; the strength is in the protection of sacred places, and they are located in the four states. And it is difficult to do that,” she told IPS from San Andrés Cohamiata (TateiKie, in Wixárika), in the municipality of Mezquitic, some 460 kilometers from Mexico City, in the western state of Jalisco.

With regard to the Wixárika, “we drew up the proposals, they were gathered in each community,” she added, explaining that for their part they carried out the necessary work.

According to official data, there are nearly 17 million indigenous people belonging to 69 different peoples and representing 13 percent of the population of Mexico, the second-largest Latin American country in population and economy after Brazil, and the third in size, following Brazil and Argentina.

The program for the Wixárika, Na’ayeris and O’dams represents an update of the Hauxa Manaka Pact for the preservation and development of the Wixárika culture, which the governments of the five states involved, the federal administration and the indigenous leadership signed in 2008, but which has remained dead letter.

The Wixárika people have 17 sacred sites, the O’dam and A’daum groups share 17 and the A’daum have another 10.

The federal government has not yet published the decree for the defense and preservation of the sacred places of the Wixárika, Naáyeri, O’dam and Mexikan peoples, because the survey has not been completed of the Tee ́kata site, place of the original fire, where the sun was born, located in Santa Catarina Cuexcomatitlán (Tuapurie) in Mezquitic, a protected area covering 100 hectares.

Irene Alvarado, an academic with the Intercultural Indigenous Program at the private Western Institute of Technology and Higher Studies of the Jesuit University of Guadalajara, told IPS that the plans are aimed at creating a different kind of relationship with native groups.

“You have to understand how systematically the native peoples have been made invisible. We are in a system that denies and imposes its own culture and does not recognize that they are ancient cultures. The plans are an exercise in analysis and discussion with authorities and representatives of the peoples to examine problems and propose collective solutions. They have emerged to meet these ignored demands,” she said from the city of Guadalajara.

The plan for the Yaquis includes the construction of an aqueduct for water supply, the creation of an irrigation district and the installation of an intercultural university under their management.

Recognition of sacred sites constitutes a fundamental element of the Wixárika, Na’ayeri, O’dam and Mexikan Justice Plan, created by the Mexican government and these indigenous groups. The photo shows a ceremony held on Nov. 25, 2022 at the Hauxa Manaka site, located in Cerro Gordo, in the community of San Bernardino de Milpillas Chico, in the northern state of Durango. CREDIT: INPI

Fragmented

But ancestral territory is a fundamental element for native groups, and without it the exercise of their rights is limited. For this reason, five communities in the states of Durango, Jalisco and Nayarit have denounced the invasion of 91,796 hectares of land of which they say they were dispossessed by third parties.

In these same states, eight communities are demanding the adequate execution of judicial sentences and presidential resolutions for the recognition and titling of 23,351 hectares.

In addition, 27 communities maintain conflicts over the limits of communal “ejido” lands in this area and another 15 are engaged in border disputes between the states of Durango, Jalisco, Nayarit and Zacatecas.

The question of territory has an impact on the sacred sites. For example, Xapawiyemeta, located on Lake Chapala in Jalisco, only measures 377 square meters due to the reduction of the original site. In the north-central state of San Luis Potosí, the Wixárika people have 140,212 hectares under protection, but suffer from mining concessions and large-scale tomato and chili pepper production.

Three copper, gold, silver and zinc mines operate in the Wixárika zone and another five projects are in the exploration phase in San Luis Potosí. In this state and in Zacatecas, there are 203 mining concessions.

But some native communities have set conditions for participating. For example, San Sebastián Teponahuaxtlán, in the municipality of Mezquitic in Jalisco, will participate when 10,500 hectares are returned to it. Meanwhile, the Bancos de San Hipólito community, in Durango, is about to recover 10,720 hectares, in compliance with a 2008 court ruling.

The Mexican government and indigenous peoples have been drawing up six justice plans since 2021 to remedy the historical injustice and neglect suffered by these groups. The photo shows Mayo-Yoreme indigenous people dancing during a working session with government representatives on Jan. 27, 2023 in the northern state of Sonora. CREDIT: INPI

Constitutional reform – a bogged-down promise

However, the government initiative for constitutional reform on the rights of indigenous and Afro-Mexican peoples, also drafted in 2021, has not advanced in the legislature.

But the measures contain contradictions. In the south and southeast of the country, the government is building the Mayan Train, the administration’s flagship megaproject, which has brought it into confrontation with native Mayan groups in that area.

In fact, the office in Mexico of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said the indigenous consultation undertaken by the Mexican government in 2019 failed to comply with international standards.

In the southern state of Oaxaca, the government is pushing for an industrial corridor to connect the Pacific coast with the Gulf of Mexico in the Atlantic, which has brought it to loggerheads with indigenous populations in the area.

Funds are declining

The justice plans depend on the budget allocated both to native peoples and to the plans themselves.

Since 2018, INPI funds have steadily shrunk, from 316.52 million dollars that year to 242.07 million dollars in 2023.

In 2020, the programs for economic empowerment, education, infrastructure and indigenous rights totaled 77 million dollars, the execution of which was affected by the COVID pandemic that hit the country in February of that year. The following year, the amount had dropped to 39.63 million and in 2022, to 27.26 million dollars.

At a round table held on Jan. 17 in Durango, it was agreed that 382,803 dollars were needed from four institutions for the protection of sacred places, culture and identity of the Wixárika, Na’ayeri, O’dam and Mexikan peoples.

Carrillo said the lack of budget funds jeopardizes the execution of the plans.

“If the resources we need are not allocated, the justice plan will not be completely fulfilled. We are concerned that this will happen. We are facing difficulties in how to get resources in order to work, with respect to all of the issues. The plan must come up with something fair. We don’t just want it to be empty words,” said the Wixárika activist.

In 2021, INPI did not examine whether the Program for the Comprehensive Well-being of Indigenous Peoples assisted the development of indigenous and Afro-Mexican communities, according to an analysis by the government’s Superior Auditor of the Federation.

Alvarado said there is a large variety of challenges to provide justice for indigenous people.

“It is difficult to address complex issues,” said the researcher. “There are many good intentions, but the question is how to bring them to fruition. In the justice plans, most of the projects focus on infrastructure, but you can’t just think about that. The development vision is broader; it involves building a model based on the conception of native peoples.”

A mining waste deposit in the center of the municipality of Topia, in the northern Mexican state of Durango, threatens the air, water and people’s health. The Escazú Agreement, In force since 2021, guarantees access to environmental information and justice in Latin American countries, as well as public participation in decision-making on these issues. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Feb 7 2023 (IPS)

In the municipality of Papantla, in the southeastern Mexican state of Veracruz, the non-governmental Regional Coordinator of Solidarity Action in Defense of the Huasteca-Totonacapan Territory (Corason) works with local communities on empowering organizations, advocacy capacity in policies and litigation strategies.

“This participation with organizations that work at the national level and have the capacity to influence not only the legal field is important,” Corason coordinator Alejandra Jiménez told IPS from Papantla. “They are able to bring injunctions, and this is how they have managed to block mining projects, for example.”“Up to now, the Escazú Agreement is dead letter, that is the history of many laws in Mexico. Environmentalists have clearly suffered from violence, and let's not even mention access to information, where there have even been setbacks.” -- Alejandra Jiménez

She was referring to the collaboration between locally-based civil society organizations and others of national scope.

Since its creation in 2015, Corason has supported local organizations in their fight against the extraction of shale gas through hydraulic fracturing or fracking, a highly polluting technique that uses large volumes of water and chemicals, in Veracruz and Puebla, as well as mining and hydroelectric plants in Puebla.

Cases like this abound in Mexico, as they do throughout Latin America, a particularly dangerous region for environmentalists.

Activists agreed on the challenges involved in enforcing the Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Escazú Agreement, seen as a tool to mitigate dangers faced by human rights defenders in environmental matters.

A case that has been in the hands of Mexico’s Supreme Court since August 2021 is currently addressing the power of organizations to express their disagreement with environmental decisions and will outline the future of environmental activism in this Latin American country of some 130 million people, and of the enforcement of the Escazú Agreement.

The origin of the case lies in two opposing rulings by Mexican courts in 2019 and 2020, in which one recognized the power of organizations and the other rejected that power. As a result, the case went to the Supreme Court, which must reach a decision to settle the contradiction.

In August 2022 and again on Jan. 25 this year, the Supreme Court postponed its own verdict, which poses a legal threat to the megaprojects promoted by the government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a staunch defender of the country’s oil industry.

Gustavo Ampugnani, general director of Greenpeace Mexico, said the case was an alert to the Escazú Agreement, and that it should not represent a setback for the defense of the environment.

“The significance lies in the risks involved in a wrong decision by the Supreme Court on how to resolve this existing contradiction. If the Court decides that the legal creation of an environmental organization is not enough and that other elements are required, it would limit citizen participation and access to justice,” he told IPS.

Environmentalists are waiting for their Godot in the form of the novel agreement, to which Brazil and Costa Rica do not yet belong, to improve their protection.

The treaty, in force since April 2021 and which takes its name from the Costa Rican city where it was signed, guarantees access to environmental information and justice, as well as public participation in environmental decision-making. It thus protects environmentalists and defenders of local land.

Mexico’s foreign ministry, which represented this country in negotiating the agreement, has identified a legislative route to reform laws that make its application possible and promote the integration of a multisectoral group with that same purpose.

Escazú has been undermined in Mexico by López Obrador’s constant attacks against defenders of the environment, whom he calls “pseudo-environmentalists” and “conservatives” for criticizing his policies, which they describe as anti-environmental and extractivist.

For this reason, a group of organizations and activists requested in a letter to the foreign ministry, released on Feb. 2, details of the progress in the creation of inter-institutional roundtables, selection of indicators, creation of protection mechanisms, and training of officials, including courts, while demanding transparency, inclusion and equity in the process.

Activists from the southern Mexican state of Puebla protest the activities of a water bottling company, on Apr.19, 2021. Environmentalists face serious threats in Mexico, where the Escazú Agreement, which since 2021 provides guarantees to these activists in Latin American countries, has not been applied. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

High risk

In 2021, there were 200 murders of environmentalists around the world, a slight decrease from 227 the previous year, according to a report by the London-based non-governmental organization Global Witness.

Latin America led these crimes, accounting for 157 of the killings, with a slight decline from 165 the previous year. Mexico topped the list with 54 murders, compared to 30 in 2020. Colombia ranked second despite the drop in cases: 33, down from 65 in 2020, followed by Brazil (26 vs. 20), Honduras (eight vs. 17) and Nicaragua (13 vs. 12).

The attacks targeted people involved in opposition to logging, mining, large-scale agribusiness and dams, and more than 40 percent of the victims were indigenous people.

In Mexico there are currently some 600 ongoing environmental conflicts without a solution from the government, according to estimates by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources.

The most recent case was the Jan. 15 disappearance of lawyer Ricardo Lagunes and indigenous activist Antonio Díaz, an opponent of mining in the western state of Michoacán, which the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has demanded be urgently clarified.

One year after it came into force, the Escazú Agreement is facing major challenges, especially in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua, where environmentalists face particular risks.

Olimpia Castillo, coordinator of the non-governmental organization Communication and Environmental Education, said the context sends out a warning.

“It is a very interesting round, because article 10 (of the agreement) refers to highlighting the participation of the organizations. That article could be violated, which would mean a major limitation. These are things that as a country we are going to have to face up to,” the activist, who participated in the negotiation of the agreement as a representative of civil society, told IPS.

In Mexico, compliance with the agreement has already faced hurdles, such as the November 2021 decree by which López Obrador declared his megaprojects “priority works for national security”, thus guaranteeing provisional permits, in contravention of the treaty.

Dispute resolution

Activists are already planning what to do if the Supreme Court hands down a negative verdict: they will turn to the Escazú Agreement dispute resolution mechanism – although the signatory countries have not actually designed it yet.

“We would consider turning to the treaty to resolve the issue. Environmental activism is highly dangerous. But that should not set aside the right of organizations to intervene in decisions. Activists and organizations must be given tools to use regional agreements, because what is happening in the country is very serious,” said Greenpeace’s Ampugnani.

Castillo’s organization is working to raise awareness about the agreement. “If no one knows it exists and that they are obliged to comply with it, how do we make them do it? There are still informative processes in which an application has not yet received a response. We have to demand compliance. There are conditions to apply the agreement. But we need political will to comply with it and to get the word out about it,” she said.

Corason’s Jiménez questioned whether the treaty was up-to-date. “Up to now, the Escazú Agreement is dead letter, that is the history of many laws in Mexico. Environmentalists have clearly suffered from violence, and let’s not even mention access to information, where there have even been setbacks. There is an environment that hinders progress,” she said.

In her view, it is not in the interest of governments to apply the agreement, because it requires participation, information and protection in environmental issues.

In March 2022, the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Escazú Agreement took place, which focused on its operational issues and other aspects that the countries will have to hash out before the next summit is held in 2024.

The Supreme Court, which has not yet set a date for handing down its ruling, is caught between going against the government if it favors environmental organizations or hindering respect for the agreement. For now, the treaty is as far from land as Mexico City is from Escazú: about 1,925 kilometers.

The Mayan Train (TM), run by the government’s National Tourism Development Fund (Fonatur), threatens the Mayan Jungle, the second largest in Latin America after the Amazon rainforest. its ecosystems and indigenous communities, as well as underground caves and cenotes - freshwater sinkholes resulting from the collapse of limestone bedrock that exposes groundwater

By Emilio Godoy
PLAYA DEL CARMEN, Mexico, Jan 24 2023 (IPS)

The Mayan Train (TM), run by the government’s National Tourism Development Fund (Fonatur), threatens the Mayan Jungle, the second largest in Latin America after the Amazon rainforest. its ecosystems and indigenous communities, as well as underground caves and cenotes – freshwater sinkholes resulting from the collapse of limestone bedrock that exposes groundwater.

The most ambitious megaproject of the government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador involves at least 1,681 hectares and the felling of 300,000 trees, according to the original environmental impact study, with an investment that has so far run up to around 15 billion dollars, 70 percent of the initially planned cost.

The plan is for the TM, with 21 stations and 14 stops on seven routes, to start running at the end of 2023 through 78 municipalities in the southern and southeastern states of Campeche, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Yucatán, home to a combined total of 11.1 million people.

In Quintana Roo there are at least 105 flooded caves over 1,500 meters in length and 408 underwater caves. The porous karst soil of the peninsula represents a threat to the megaproject, which has forced the authorities to change the layout.

In addition, between Playa del Carmen and Tulum – 61 km apart in the south of Quintana Roo – there are at least 13 cenotes.

The Mayan Train, which covers four aquifers and 49 bodies of water along its route, includes a station in Playa del Carmen and another in Tulum, in Section 5.

Fabiola Sánchez, an activist with the non-governmental organization Voces Unidas (United Voices) de Puerto Morelos, talks about the potential impact of the railway in the municipality of Puerto Morelos, in Quintana Roo.

The concern of environmentalists stems from the 2020-2030 Urban Development Program, which they accuse of favoring hotel and real estate interests, to the detriment of citizen participation and sustainable planning, and of favoring the creation of the railway.

Deforestation and urban expansion can result in waters with more sediment in the reefs off Puerto Morelos, greater generation of solid and liquid waste, leaching, and more pollution, that would put even more pressure on an ecosystem that is already disturbed by human activities.

The trains will transport thousands of tourists and cargo, such as transgenic soybeans, palm oil and pork, major agricultural products in the region.

The Mexican government promotes the megaproject as an engine for social development that would create jobs, boost tourism beyond the traditional sites and bolster the regional economy.

A gas flare at installations of the state-owned Pemex oil company in the town of Reforma Escolín, Papantla municipality in the southeastern Mexican state of Veracruz, on Jan. 11, 2023. More than 100 gas wells operate in the area, several of which release gas without controls and put the local population and their property at risk. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
PAPANTLA, Mexico, Jan 23 2023 (IPS)

A dark mole dots the brown earth, among the green scrub at this spot in southeastern Mexico. A repetitive “glug, glug,” a noise sounding like a thirsty animal, and an intense stench lead to this site, hidden in the undergrowth, where a broken pipe has created a pool of dense oil.

The smell of fuel overpowers the usual aroma of the surrounding vegetation.

The oil and natural gas leak runs freely in a well belonging to the state-run oil giant Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) in Reforma Escolín, part of Papantla, a municipality in the southeastern state of Veracruz, in the vicinity of a natural gas flare that illuminates the semi-cloudy environment and warms the already high temperature.“The infrastructure is old, they do not maintain it. When there are leaks, you hear a ‘ssssss’ and the smell is unbearable, you can’t stay in your house.” -- Omar Lázaro

Far from the gaze of Mexico’s Agency for Security, Energy and Environment (ASEA), responsible for monitoring the fossil fuel industry in the country, and Pemex, the gas flares in an area dotted with oil and gas wells.

“The infrastructure is old, they don’t maintain it. When there are leaks, you hear a ‘ssssss’ and the smell is unbearable, you can’t stay in your house,” Omar Lázaro, a delegate to the municipality of the non-governmental National Indigenous Congress, which brings together native peoples and organizations, told IPS.

The local community all too vividly recalls the Jun. 4, 2022 explosion of a Pemex gas pipeline that put residents on edge and confirmed, for the umpteenth time, the potentially catastrophic impacts of fossil fuels.

Lázaro, a local musician, recalled that the leak flowed for two days, there were four fires in the affected area and the fire lasted two weeks, some 300 kilometers from Mexico City, in Papantla, (which means “place of abundant papán” – a local bird – in the Nahuatl language), home to just under 160,000 inhabitants in its extensive rural and semi-urban territory.

“In some places there was a smell of gas before the explosion. The problem was that the scrubland began to burn and there was no water to put it out. Pemex threatened that it would not take responsibility if people went in to put out the fire and something happened to them,” said Lázaro, who is also a member of the Assembly for the Defense of the Territory, which represents some 20 communities and five municipal organizations.

In essence, the gas is methane, 86 times more powerful at trapping heat than carbon dioxide (CO2) over 20 years, even though it spends less time in the atmosphere.

That means it is important to control it to curb the rise in the planet’s temperature to no more than 1.5 degrees C, according to the commitments made by the international community.

In the municipality of Papantla, in the southeastern Mexican state of Veracruz, oil and gas wells abound, emiting polluting gases, such as methane, a major contributor to global warming. The photo shows the “Escolín 238” well in operation. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Massive

The incident in the town of Reforma Escolín is part of a pattern of gas leaks from the extraction and transportation of oil and gas by Pemex and private companies in Mexico, without enforcement by the environmental authorities of the existing regulations.

IPS reviewed Pemex databases on leaks and its prevention plans, obtained through public information requests, which point to underreporting of gas emissions – composed mainly of methane – and confirmed the evidence that leaks devastate an area where gas wells abound.

Historically, Pemex has been the biggest culprit in the gas leaks, due to the size of its infrastructure in Mexico.

After a drop between 2017 and 2019, gas explosions have been on the rise since 2020. Most of the incidents occur at hydrocarbon facilities in the states of Campeche, Tabasco and Veracruz in southeastern Mexico.

In 2020, 78 gas leaks by Pemex and its subsidiaries were registered, 85 by private companies, and 32 by the National Center for Natural Gas Control (CENAGAS), which manages the gas pipelines that belonged to the state oil company, without estimates of the resulting methane emissions, according to ASEA figures.

A year later, Pemex reported 91 leaks, private companies 74, and CENAGAS 28.

These leaks come from gas pipelines, compressor stations and other facilities that transport, store and distribute gas, infrastructure that adds up to some 30,000 facilities and 50,000 kilometers of gas pipelines.

The face of Pastora García, one of the 11 members of the Municipal Council of Papantla, reflects concern about the leaks.

“Things are bad here, there are a lot of risks. This is how Pemex works and we’re screwed. It is worrisome, because people live here,” she told IPS while she was working in Reforma Escolín, a town of some 1,000 people.

García was a municipal councillor in the small town and submitted three requests for pipeline repairs in 2011 and 2020, obtaining no response, and the leaks continued.

In and around the town, local residents grow citrus fruit, beans and corn, and raise cattle, and the pollution harms their activities. In the area, the ground looks like Swiss cheese from which gas frequently emanates, as during the great leak of 2013.

Although ASEA does not record the volumes of leaks, Mexico ranked tenth in the world in methane emissions in 2021, a list led by China, India and the United States, and which also includes Brazil, according to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), an intergovernmental grouping of large oil consumers.

In addition, since 2019 oil and gas infrastructure has released methane into the atmosphere in Mexico, according to satellite images.

In June 2022, a group of European scientists revealed that Pemex released 40,000 tons of methane in December 2021 from an offshore platform in the Gulf of Mexico.

In the case of Pemex, one of the aggravating factors is the deliberate venting or release and flaring of gas, which has been on the rise since 2017 due to the lack of capture technology and economic incentives for its use, since it is more convenient for the oil company to simply release and burn it off.

This practice grew from 3,800 cubic meters (m3) of gas in 2017 to 6,600 in 2021, according to the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction Initiative (GGFR), made up of 20 governments, 12 oil companies and three multilateral organizations. Mexico forms part of the alliance, but Pemex does not.

The IEA measured Mexico’s emissions at 6.33 million tons of methane in 2021, equivalent to 1.8 percent of the world total, to which agriculture contributed 2.53 million, waste 2.28 million, and production and energy consumption 1.47 million. In this segment, venting and flaring represent the main factors, and in gas pipelines, leaks.

Itziar Irakulis, a researcher at the Polytechnic University of Valencia, told IPS from that Spanish city that “from the satellite we see that every time the gas flaring stops (the torch goes out), about 100 tons of methane per hour are vented. This turns the oil platform into what in the literature we call an ultra-emitter.”

The expert, co-author of a study on the release of gas from Pemex platforms, stressed that, in the face of the climate crisis, “the last thing we need is more ultra-emission events of this type.”

In November 2022, Pemex, which ranks 20th in the world in proven crude oil reserves and 41st in gas, produced 1.7 million barrels of oil per day and 4.7 billion cubic feet of gas per day (Bcf/d). Because domestic production is insufficient, it imported 555 million Bcf/d, mainly from the United States.

Pemex resorts to the practice of flaring gas due to the lack of technology for its retention and economic incentives for its use. The photo shows a pipeline in Reforma Escolín, Papantla municipality in the southeastern Mexican state of Veracruz, on Jan. 11, 2023. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Anaid Velasco, research coordinator at the non-governmental Mexican Center for Environmental Law (CEMDA), described the “important challenges” in accounting for and curbing methane emissions.

“There is more talk about methane, but there is still no public policy. This disconnect between what is said and what is done has to do with not creating more responsibilities that could be binding, in order to apply an energy policy based on fossil fuel sources. They don’t want to generate a greater regulatory burden” for the oil industry, especially Pemex, she told IPS.

ASEA partially applies the regulation to control methane emissions, which is why Mexico faces hurdles to meet its Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The regulation was supposed to enter into force in December 2019, after it was drafted in 2018. But in July 2020, under the pretext of the COVID-19 pandemic, ASEA postponed its application for 19 months, until the end of January 2022.

As of August 2022, 18 companies, including the subsidiaries Pemex Exploración y Producción (PEP) and Pemex Logística, had presented to ASEA their program for the prevention and comprehensive control of methane emissions from the hydrocarbons sector, the fundamental component of the regulation.

The state Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) had not delivered its plan.

Between 2017 and October 2022, ASEA imposed 26 fines on state-run and private companies totaling 3.83 million dollars, of which they have paid 3.29 million, without specifying the reason, which means it is not clear if the fines targeted methane emissions.

From 2017 to 2021, it fined Pemex Transformación Industrial three times for undisclosed reasons, which the company appealed.

But ASEA did not investigate the two fires on the surface of the ocean in the Gulf of Mexico, caused by methane leaks in July and August 2021, according to its own records. After the explosion in Reforma Escolín, a group of residents filed a complaint with ASEA, to no avail.

Pemex abandoned its plan to reduce gas flaring in its fields and the ministry of energy blocked the application of regulations in this regard, as reported by the British news agency Reuters throughout 2022.

In August, the state-run National Hydrocarbons Commission, the regulator of the oil industry, fined Pemex about two million dollars for excessive gas flaring at the Ixachi oil and gas field in Veracruz.

Gas deals

In 2021 Mexico signed the Global Methane Pledge, aimed at cutting emissions by 30 percent in 2030, from 2020 levels. But the country has not yet set a specific goal.

Along these lines, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who supports fossil fuel energy over renewables and promotes Pemex, announced in June 2022 that the oil giant would invest two billion dollars, with international aid, to cut methane emissions by 98 percent.

But there is no detailed plan to reach that target, beyond Pemex’s previous program to curb them.

In its methane control plan, obtained by IPS through Mexico’s freedom of information act, the oil company set an annual reduction goal in the Cantarell field, the country’s biggest, in the Gulf of Mexico, of four percent between 2017 and 2022. and calculated that emissions totaled 27,175 tons per year. But it is not known how much progress has been made towards this target.

However, the oil company uses an emission factor – the average amount of a pollutant coming from a specific process, fuel, equipment or source – instead of a measurement at the source site.

For the Ku Maloob Zaap field, the country’s second-largest, there are no measurements. The highest estimate comes from the Macuspana-Muspac deposit, located between the states of Chiapas and Tabasco, which emit 199,222 tons, followed by the Poza Rica Altamira Reynosa deposit – between Veracruz and Tamaulipas – with 73,352 tons; the Nejo Olmos field in Tamaulipas (53,395 tons); and Samaria-Luna in Tabasco (52,669 tons).

These emissions come from equipment, gas pipelines, compressors, leaks and venting. Pemex, which did not include infrastructure in other areas of the country, estimates decreases between four percent and 25 percent over a period of six years.

Throughout 2023, public and private companies must submit their annual reports to ASEA.

For the Cantarell deposit, the oil company ordered a halt to the flaring of 80 million Bcf/d, equivalent to 72.74 tons of methane. In addition, PEP applied measures to reduce flaring by 291 billion Bcf/d.

As natural gas for consumption in Mexico continues to be imported via pipelines and burned in combined-cycle power plants that also use steam, methane emissions will also continue, as occurred in the United States.

In places like Reforma Escolín, people have not gotten used to living among time bombs and are only asking that the leaks be repaired, although opposition by the local community is waning.

Lázaro lamented that “After the accident, some community assemblies were held, but the social mobilization dwindled, undermined by the local authorities.”

Without fighting methane emissions, Mexico will have a hard time reaching its Nationally determined contributions, presented to comply with the Paris Agreement on climate change, signed in 2015.

Velasco the environmentalist doubts that Mexico will meet its commitments. “They set goals because there is a lot of international interest. It is good that they make commitments, because it gives us tools to monitor the situation and demand compliance. If Pemex receives financing, we don’t know how it will execute it. Transparency and traceability are needed,” she said.

Spanish researcher Irakulis said maintenance and continuous flaring prevent ultra-emissions.

“It is true that the flares already have other types of emissions associated with them, and there are more environmentally friendly ways than flaring to treat the excess gas obtained from oil extraction. A significant reduction in emissions can be realistic as long as they invest in improving the maintenance of the facilities,” she stated.

In Reforma Escolín, the only option seems to be the dismantling of the gas infrastructure, which is impossible. “Pemex says there is no money. We have not seen machinery to replace the pipeline, they are not doing anything. Where are we going to go? We live here, and we’re staying here,” said García the town councillor.

Government delegations celebrate the close of the historic negotiation at COP15 of the New Global Framework on Biodiversity in the early hours of the morning on Monday Dec. 19, at the Palais des Congrès in Montreal, Canada. CREDIT: Mike Muzurakis/IISD

By Emilio Godoy
MONTREAL, Dec 19 2022 (IPS)

The pillar coral (Dendrogyra cylindrus), which takes its name from its shape, is found throughout the Caribbean Sea, but its population has declined by more than 80 percent since 1990. As a result, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has listed it as “critically endangered” due to the effects of the human-induced climate crisis.

Its fate now depends on the new Kunming-Montreal Global Framework on Biodiversity, which was agreed by the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) on Monday Dec. 19, at the end of the summit held since Dec. 7 at the Palais des Congrès in Montreal.

Now, the world’s countries must translate the results into national biodiversity strategies, to comply with the new accord. In this regard, David Ainsworth, spokesman for the CBD, in force since 1993 and based in Montreal, announced the creation of a global accelerator for the drafting of national plans, with the support of U.N. agencies.

COP15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity approved a new program to protect the world’s natural heritage for the next 10 years during the summit held in the Canadian city of Montreal. The picture shows a statue of a polar bear, whose species is threatened by melting ice and habitat loss, on a street in Montreal. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

The menu of agreements

COP15, whose theme was “Ecological Civilization: Building a shared future for all life on earth”, approved four objectives on improving the status of biodiversity, reducing species extinction, fair and appropriate sharing of benefits from access to and use of genetic resources, and means of implementation of the agreement.

In addition, the plenary of the summit, which brought together some 15,000 people representing governments, non-governmental organizations, academia, international bodies and companies, agreed on 23 goals within the Global Framework, for the conservation and management of 30 percent of terrestrial areas and 30 percent of marine areas by 2030, in what is known in U.N. jargon as the 30×30.

This includes the complete or partial restoration of at least 30 percent of degraded terrestrial and marine ecosystems, as well as the reduction of the loss of areas of high biological importance to almost zero.

Likewise, the agreement reached by the 196 States Parties at COP15 includes the halving of food waste, the elimination or reform of at least 500 billion dollars a year in subsidies harmful to biodiversity, and at least 200 billion dollars in funding for biodiversity by 2030 from public and private sources.

It also endorsed increasing financial transfers from countries of the industrialized North to nations of the developing South by at least 20 billion dollars by 2025 and 30 billion dollars by 2030, and the voluntary publication by companies for monitoring, evaluation and disclosure of the impact of their activities on biodiversity.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) will manage a new fund, whose operation will be defined by the countries over the next two years.

With regard to digital sequence information (DSI) on genetic resources, the Global Framework stipulates the establishment of a multilateral fund for benefit-sharing between providers and users of genetic resources and states that governments will define the final figure at COP16 in Turkey in 2024.

The Global Framework also contains gender and youth perspectives, two strong demands of the process that was initially scheduled to end in the city of Kunming, China, in 2020. But because that country was unable to host mass meetings due to its zero-tolerance policy towards COVID-19, a first virtual chapter was held there and another later in person, and the final one now took place in Montreal.

The states parties are required to report at least every five years on their national compliance with the Global Framework. The CBD will include national information submitted in February 2026 and June 2029 in its status and trend reports.

With some differences, civil society organizations and indigenous peoples gave a nod to the Global Framework, but issued warnings. Viviana Figueroa, representative of the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity, and Simone Lovera, policy director of the Global Forest Coalition, applauded the agreement in conversations with IPS, while pointing out its risks.

“It’s a good step forward, because it recognizes the role of indigenous peoples, the use of biodiversity and the role of traditional knowledge,” said Figueroa, an Omaguaca indigenous lawyer from Argentina whose organization brings together indigenous groups from around the world to present their positions at international environmental meetings.

“It has been a long process, to which native peoples have contributed and have made proposals. The most important aspects that we proposed have been recognized and we hope to work together with the countries,” she added.

But, she remarked, “the most important thing will be the implementation.”

Goal C and targets one, three, five, nine, 13, 21 and 22 of the Global Framework relate to respect for the rights of native and local communities.

Lovera, whose organization brings together NGOs and indigenous groups, said the accord “recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, and of women. It also includes a recommendation to withdraw subsidies and reduce public and private investments in destructive activities, such as large-scale cattle ranching and oil palm monoculture.”

But indigenous and human rights organizations have questioned the 30×30 approach on the grounds that it undermines ancestral rights, blocks access to aboriginal territories, and requires consultation and unpressured, informed consent for protected areas prior to any decision on the future of those areas.

Discussions at the Convention on Biological Diversity summit intensified in the last few days of COP15 and ran late into the night, as in this session on health and biodiversity. But in the end, agreement was reached on a new Global Framework on Biodiversity, which will be binding on the 196 states parties. CREDIT: IISD/ENB

Major challenge

While the Global Framework has indicators and monitoring mechanisms and is legally binding, it has no actual teeth, and the precedent of the failed Aichi Targets casts a shadow over its future, especially with the world’s poor track record on international agreements.

The Aichi Biodiversity Targets, adopted in 2010 in that Japanese city during the CBD’s COP10 and which its 196 states parties failed to meet in 2020, included the creation of terrestrial and marine protected areas; the fight against pollution and invasive species; respect for indigenous knowledge; and the restoration of damaged ecosystems.

Several estimates put the amount needed to protect biological heritage at 700 billion dollars, which means there is still an enormous gap to be closed.

In more than 30 years, the GEF has disbursed over 22 billion dollars and helped transfer another 120 billion dollars to more than 5,000 regional and national projects. For the new period starting in 2023, the fund is counting on some five billion dollars in financing.

In addition, the Small Grants Program has supported around 27,000 community initiatives in developing countries.

“There is little public funding, more is needed,” Lovera said. “It’s sad that they say the private sector must fund biodiversity. In indigenous territories money is needed. They can do much more than governments with less money. Direct support can be more effective and they will meet the commitments.”

The activist also criticized the use of offsets, a mechanism whereby one area can be destroyed and another can be restored elsewhere – already used in countries such as Chile, Colombia and Mexico.

“This system allows us to destroy 70 percent of the planet while preserving the other 30 percent,” Lovera said. “It is madness. For indigenous peoples and local communities, it is very negative, because they lose their own biodiversity and the compensation is of no use to them, because it happens somewhere else.”

Figueroa said institutions that already manage funds could create direct mechanisms for indigenous peoples, as is the case with the Small Grants Program.

Of the 609 commitments that organizations, companies and individuals have already made voluntarily at COP15, 303 are aimed at the conservation and restoration of terrestrial ecosystems, 188 at alliances, and 159 at adaptation to climate change and reduction of polluting emissions.

The summit also coincided with the 10th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the 4th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits from their Utilization, both components of the CBD.

Images of the planet’s sixth mass extinction reflect the size of the challenge. More than a quarter of some 150,000 species on the IUCN Red List are threatened with extinction.

The “Living Planet Report 2022: Building a nature-positive society”, prepared by the WWF and the Institute of Zoology in London, shows that Latin America and the Caribbean has experienced the largest decline in monitored wildlife populations worldwide, with an average decline of 94 percent between 1970 and 2018.

With a decade to act, each passing day represents more biological wealth lost.

IPS produced this article with support from Internews‘ Earth Journalism Network.

The executive secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Elizabeth Maruma Mrema, highlighted on Friday Dec. 16 the results of the Nagoya Protocol on access to genetic resources and fair benefit sharing at an event during COP15 in the Canadian city of Montreal. But the talks have not reached an agreement on the digital sequencing of genetic resources. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
MONTREAL, Dec 16 2022 (IPS)

In addition to its nutritional properties, quinoa, an ancestral grain from the Andes, also has cosmetic uses, as stated by the resource use and benefit-sharing permit ABSCH-IRCC-PE-261033-1 awarded in February to a private individual under a 15-month commercial use contract.

The permit, issued by the Peruvian government’s National Institute for Agrarian Innovation, allows the Peruvian beneficiary to use the material in a skin regeneration cream.

But it also sets restrictions on the registration of products obtained from quinoa or the removal of its elements from the Andean nation, to prevent the risk of irregular exploitation without a fair distribution of benefits, in other words, biopiracy."The scientific community is willing to share benefits through simple mechanisms that do not unfairly burden researchers in low- and middle-income countries." -- Amber Scholz

The licensed material may have a digital representation of its genetic structure which in turn may generate new structures from which formulas or products may emerge. This is called digital sequence information (DSI), in the universe of research or commercial applications within the CBD.

Treatment of DSI forms part of the debates at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which began on Dec. 7 and is due to end on Dec. 19 at the Palais des Congrès in the Canadian city of Montreal.

The summit has brought together some 15,000 people representing the 196 States Parties to the CBD, non-governmental organizations, academia, international bodies and companies.

The focus of the debate is the Post-2020 Global Framework on Biodiversity, which consists of 22 targets in areas including financing for conservation, guidelines on digital sequencing of genetic material, degraded ecosystems, protected areas, endangered species, the role of business and gender equality.

Like most of the issues, negotiations on DSI and the sharing of resulting benefits, contained in one of the Global Framework’s four objectives and in target 13, are at a deadlock, on everything from definitions to possible sharing mechanisms.

Except for the digital twist, the issue is at the heart of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, part of the CBD, signed in that Japanese city in 2010 and in force since 2014.

The delegations of the 196 States Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity have failed to make progress at COP15 in the negotiations on new targets for the protection of the world’s natural heritage, in the Canadian city of Montreal. In the picture, a working group reviews a proposal on the complex issue. CREDIT: IISD/ENB

Amber Scholz, a German member of the DSI Scientific Network, a group of 70 experts from 25 countries, said there is an urgent need to close the gap between the existing innovation potential and a fair benefit-sharing system so that digital sequencing benefits everyone.

“It’s been a decade now and things haven’t turned out so well. The promise of a system of innovation, open access and benefit sharing is broken,” Scholz, a researcher at the Department of Microbial Ecology and Diversity in the Leibniz Institute’s DSMZ German Collection of Microorganisms and Cell Cultures, told IPS.

DSI stems from the revolution in the massive use of technological tools, which has reached biology as well, fundamental in the discovery and manufacture of molecules and drugs such as those used in vaccines against the coronavirus that caused the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Aichi Biodiversity Targets, adopted in 2010 in that Japanese city during the CBD COP10, were missed by the target year, 2020, and will now be renewed and updated by the Global Framework that will emerge from Montreal.

The targets included respect for the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities related to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, their customary use of biological resources, and the full and effective participation of indigenous and local communities in the implementation of the CBD.

Lack of clarity in the definition of DSI, challenges in the traceability of the country of origin of the sequence via digital databases, fear of loss of open access to data and different outlooks on benefit-sharing mechanisms are other aspects complicating the debate among government delegates.

Through the Action Agenda: Make a Pledge platform, organizations, companies and individuals have already made 586 voluntary commitments at COP15, whose theme is “Ecological civilization: Building a shared future for all life on earth”.

Of these, 44 deal with access and benefit sharing, while 294 address conservation and restoration of terrestrial ecosystems, 185 involve partnerships and alliances, and 155 focus on adaptation to climate change and emission reductions.

Genetic havens

Access to genetic resources for commercial or non-commercial purposes has become an issue of great concern in the countries of the global South, due to the fear of biopiracy, especially with the advent of digital sequencing, given that physical access to genetic materials is not absolutely necessary.

Although the Nagoya Protocol includes access and benefit-sharing mechanisms, digital sequencing mechanisms have generated confusion. In fact, this instrument has created a market in which lax jurisdictions have taken advantage by becoming genetic havens.

Around 2,000 gene banks operate worldwide, attracting some 15 million users. Almost two billion sequences have been registered, according to statistics from GenBank, one of the main databases in the sector and part of the U.S. National Center for Biotechnology Information.

Argentina leads the list of permits for access to genetic resources in Latin America under the Protocol, with a total of 56, two of which are commercial, followed by Peru (54, four commercial) and Panama (39, one commercial). Mexico curbed access to such permits in 2019, following a scandal triggered by the registration of maize in 2016.

There are more than 100 gene banks operating in Mexico, 88 in Peru, 56 in Brazil, 47 in Argentina and 25 in Colombia.

The largest providers of genetic resources leading to publicly available DSI are the United States, China and Japan. Brazil ranks 10th among sources and users of samples, according to a study published in 2021 by Scholz and five other researchers.

The mechanisms for managing genetic information sequences have become a condition for negotiating the new post-2020 Global Framework for biodiversity, which poses a conflict between the most biodiverse countries (generally middle- and low-income) and the nations of the industrialized North.

Brazilian indigenous activist Cristiane Juliao, a leader of the Pankararu people, calls for a fair system of benefit-sharing for access to and use of genetic resources and their digital sequences at COP15, being held at the Palais des Congrès in the Canadian city of Montreal. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Indigenous people and their share

Cristiane Juliao, an indigenous woman of the Pankararu people, who is a member of the Brazilian Coordinator of Indigenous Peoples and Organizations of the Northeast, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo, said the mechanisms adopted must favor the participation of native peoples and guarantee a fair distribution of benefits.

“We don’t look at one small element of a plant. We look at the whole context and the role of that plant. All traditional knowledge is associated with genetic heritage, because we use it in food, medicine or spiritual activities,” she told IPS at COP15.

Therefore, she said, “traceability is important, to know where the knowledge was acquired or accessed.”

In Montreal, Brazilian native organizations are seeking recognition that the digital sequencing contains information that indigenous peoples and local communities protect and that digital information must be subject to benefit-sharing. They are also demanding guarantees of free consultation and the effective participation of indigenous groups in the digital information records.

Thanks to the system based on the country’s Biodiversity Law, in effect since 2016, the Brazilian government has recorded revenues of five million dollars for permits issued.

The Working Group responsible for drafting the new Global Framework put forward a set of options for benefit-sharing measures.

They range from leaving in place the current status quo, to the integration of digital sequence information on genetic resources into national access and benefit-sharing measures, or the creation of a one percent tax on retail sales of genetic resources.

Lagging behind

There is a legal vacuum regarding this issue, because the CBD, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, in force since 2004, do not cover all of its aspects.

Scholz suggested the COP reach a decision that demonstrates the political will to establish a fair and equitable system. “The scientific community is willing to share benefits through simple mechanisms that do not unfairly burden researchers in low- and middle-income countries,” she said.

For her part, Juliao demanded a more inclusive and fairer system. “There is no clear record of indigenous peoples who have agreed to benefit sharing. It is said that some knowledge comes from native peoples, but there is no mechanism for the sharing of benefits with us.”

IPS produced this article with support from Internews’ Earth Journalism Network.

Francis Ogwal (L) of Uganda and Basile van Havre (C) of Canada, co-chairs of the group responsible for drafting the post-2020 global biodiversity framework, explain the status of negotiations at the Palais des Congrès in Montreal on Dec. 14, 2022. Discussions are entering the final stretch to approve the new biodiversity protection targets. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
MONTREAL, Dec 15 2022 (IPS)

Created in 2016, the Mexican Caribbean Biosphere Reserve (MCBR) hosts 1900 species of animals and plants and contains half of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System, the second largest in the world after Australia’s Great Barrier Reef.

This ecosystem is under pressure from the construction of two of the seven routes of the Maya Train (TM), the Mexican government’s flagship megaproject, whose construction, which began in 2020, alters the environment of the Maya Forest, the largest tropical rainforest in Latin America after the Amazon.

This is recognized in two technical reports obtained in Mexico by IPS through public information requests, which state that, although the project is outside the marine area itself, it is located within its zone of influence.

Regarding the 257-km section 4, a document from October 2021 acknowledges the impact on two high priority hydrological regions.

And with respect to the impact on the 110-km section 5, another document dated from May 2022 states that “there is no previous study or information on the monitoring and sampling sites. The presence and state of the fauna that inhabit the trees are unknown.”

The MCBR administration recognizes impacts on two priority marine regions and on the coastline of the southeastern state of Quintana Roo, which is protected by the reserve.

For this reason, the MCBR refused to issue a technical opinion on section 5 due to lack of “sufficient information and elements” and, for T4, issued an opinion that demanded the presentation of additional data and prevention, management, and oversight measures.

Despite the impact that the railroad will have in the region, the government’s National Fund for Tourism Development (Fonatur) did not request reports from at least four other nature reserves.

Fonatur will be in charge of the TM, which will run for some 1,500 kilometers, with 21 stations and 14 stops, through five states in southern and southeastern Mexico.

The case of the railway exemplifies the contradictions between the attempt to protect nature and the development of infrastructure that sabotages that aim, a theme present at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which began on Dec. 7 in the Canadian city of Montreal and is due to end on Dec. 19.

Moreover, the railway’s cost of some 15 billion dollars is classified as forming part of the harmful subsidies to biodiversity, which total 542 billion dollars a year globally. The investment needed for the conservation and sustainable use of nature is estimated at 967 billion dollars a year.

In the post-2020 global biodiversity framework, which is due to be adopted at the summit, one of the main 21 measures being negotiated is called in UN jargon 30×30: the protection of 30 percent of the planet’s marine and terrestrial areas through conservation measures by 2030, in an attempt to halt the loss of biodiversity on the planet.

The plan has attracted support from more than 100 countries but has awakened distrust among indigenous peoples, who have suffered from the imposition of natural protected areas without due information and consultation.

The summit, which has brought together some 15,000 people representing governments, non-governmental organizations, academia, international organizations and companies, will also discuss the post-2020 global framework, financing for conservation and guidelines on digital sequencing of genetic material, degraded ecosystems, protected areas, endangered species, the role of corporations and gender equality.

The 196 States Parties to the CBD, in force since 1993 and whose slogan at this year’s COP is “Ecological civilization. Building a shared future for all life on earth”, have not yet agreed in Montreal on the percentage of the oceans that should be protected and whether it should include waters under international jurisdiction.

The global framework is to succeed the 20 Aichi Biodiversity Targets, adopted in 2010 in that Japanese city during the CBD COP10 and due to be met by 2020, which have failed. Target 11 stipulated the protection of 17 percent of terrestrial areas and inland waters and 10 percent of marine and coastal areas.

The Maya Train, the Mexican government’s main megaproject, threatens protected natural areas, such as the Mexican Caribbean Biosphere Reserve in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo, according to a Google Earth capture. In the COP15 negotiations in Montreal, a central issue is the declaration of more natural protected areas, but one of the threats is infrastructure works. Image: Google Earth

Insufficient rules

Manuel Pulgar Vidal of Peru, WWF global leader of Climate and Energy, who is attending COP15, said the problem lies in the regulation of protected areas.
“Nations such as Colombia, Ecuador and Chile have strengthened the system of natural areas. But in general the systems are weak and need to be reinforced, and money, staff and regulations are needed,” he told IPS.

Mexico has 185 protected areas, covering almost 91 million hectares -19 percent of the national territory-, six of which are marine areas, encompassing 69 million hectares. Despite their importance, the Mexican government dedicated less than one dollar per hectare to their protection in 2022.

In addition, management plans have not been updated to cover works such as the Maya Train.

Colombia, meanwhile, protects 15 percent of its territory in 1,483 protected areas covering 35.5 million hectares, including 12 million hectares in marine areas.

Chile, for its part, has 106 protected areas covering 15 million hectares of land – 20 percent of the total surface area – and 105 million hectares in the sea, in 22 of the conservation areas.

Among the 49 governments that make up the High Ambition Coalition (HAC) for Nature and People, aimed at promoting 30×30, are 10 Latin American countries: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru.

Of the 586 commitments that organizations, companies and individuals have already made voluntarily at COP15, held at the Palais des Congrès in Montreal, only 93 deal with marine, coastal and freshwater ecosystems, while 294 address terrestrial ecosystem conservation and restoration; 185 involve alliances and partnerships; and climate change adaptation and emission reductions are the focus of 155.

A group of government delegates discuss the post-2020 global biodiversity framework with new biodiversity protection targets to be approved at COP15, which is being held at the Palais des Congrès in the Canadian city of Montreal. CREDIT: IISD

Aleksandar Rankovic of the international NGO Avaaz said the key challenge goes beyond a specific protection figure.

“The hows are not in the debate. It’s up to each country how it will implement it. It’s left to each country to decide what’s appropriate. There is little openness on how to achieve the goals,” the activist from the U.S.-based organization dedicated to citizen activism on issues of global interest, such as biodiversity, told IPS.

Only eight percent of the world’s oceans are protected and only seven percent are protected from fishing activities. Avaaz calls for the care of 50 percent of marine and terrestrial areas, with the direct participation of indigenous peoples.

The protection of marine areas is tied to other international instruments, such as the Global Ocean Treaty, which nations have been negotiating since 2018 within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and which aims to protect 30 percent of these ecosystems by 2030.

Pulgar Vidal, for his part, called for the approval of the 30×30 scheme. “Implementing these initiatives takes time. And you need an international financing mechanism,” he stressed.

In Rankovic’s view, a strong global framework is needed. “The issue is broader, because fisheries are not well regulated. Without this, marine areas will be part of a weak program,” he warned.

COP15 has also coincided with the 10th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the 4th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, both components of the CBD and part of its architecture for preserving biodiversity.

IPS produced this article with support from Internews’ Earth Journalism Network.

Despite the necessity of refining green marine fuels, Mexico lacks a plan to transit towards those varieties. In the imagen, some ships wait for arrival at the port of Veracruz, in the state of the same name, in in the southeast of the country, in August 2022. Credit: Emilio Godoy / IPS

By Emilio Godoy
VERACRUZ, Mexico, Dec 12 2022 (IPS)

VERACRUZ, Mexico – By 2025, the state-owned Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) should comply with Mexican regulations to produce clean fuels, including marine ones, but there’s an obstacle: Mexico lacks a plan for the development of cleaner marine fuels.

Clean gasoline is expected to be processed in the Dos Bocas refinery, located in the southeastern state of Tabasco, which would begin operations in 2023, with a capacity to process 170,000 barrels of gasoline and 120,000 barrels of ultra-low sulfur diesel daily, to prop up domestic production and thus cushion dependence on imports, especially from the United States.

Emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) from the burning of high-sulfur fuels, derived as a residue from crude oil distillation, lead to sulfurous particles in the air, which can trigger asthma and worsen heart and lung diseases, as well as threaten marine and land ecosystems, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

SO2 lasts only a few days in the atmosphere, but when dissolved in water it generates acids that lend it its dangerous nature to human health.

Meanwhile, the emissions of nitrous dioxide (NOx), derived also from hydrocarbon consumption, stream into smog, when mixed with ground-level ozone. NOx remains 114 years in the atmosphere, according to several scientific studies.

Finally, CO2 pollution contributes to the climate crisis. Global greenhouse gas emissions from shipping grew from 977 million tons of CO2 in 2012 to 1 076 million in 2018 – an expansion of 9,6% – and could increase 90%-130% by 2050, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Its total level went from 2,76% to 2,89% in that period. Between 2021 to 2030, the sector needs a 15% curtailment to meet the climate goals.

In water, hydrocarbons block the entry of light and limit the photosynthesis of algae and other plants, and in fauna they can cause poisoning, alterations of reproductive cycles and intoxication, EPA adds.

But Mexico lacks measurements of atmospheric and marine pollution. Nor does it have roadmaps for its reduction or concrete plans to produce marine fuels with reduced sulfur content, an element harmful to human health and the environment.

The production of green fuels is vital for maritime transport, whose main consumer in Mexico is the national fleet, and Pemex would play a prominet role in it.

The fact is that the national oil company “has no capacity to refine clean fuels, nor does it intend to do so,” said Rodolfo Navarro, director of the non-governmental company Comunicar para Conservar, established in the area of Cozumel, in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo and one of the largest cruise ships receiver in the world.

The 2021 report “Mexico: Promoting the Future of Mexico’s Maritime Transport Role in Transforming Global Transport through Green Hydrogen Derivatives” calculated international ships departing at Mexico emitted 7,85 million tons of CO2, 10 874 of SO2, 18 920 of NOx and 3 200 tons of particulate matter in 2018.

The report, prepared by the non-governmental organization Getting to Zero Coalition and the global platform Partnering for Green Growth and the Global Goals 2030, estimated international arrivals to Mexico released into the atmosphere 10,35 million tons of CO2, 14 947 of SO2, 25 697 of NOx and 4 300 tons of particulate matter.

The national shipping industry was responsible for the emission of 1,67 million tons of CO2, 20 370 of SO2, 33 870 of NOx and 5 710 of particulate matter in 2018.

As of 2020, IMO has applied regulations limiting the sulfur content used on cargo ships to 0,5%, from 3,5%. Thus, the agency will need to reduce pollution by 77%, equivalent to 8,5 million tons of sulfur dioxide (SO2).

A marine diesel truck pump at Ensenada, in the northwestern state of Baja California, property of Pemex and a private partner. Credit: Pemex

A needed national contribution

From December 2018, 15 parts per million (ppm) ultra-low sulfur diesel has been sold in Mexico, while all gasoline must have a content of 30-80 ppm.

The regulation on oil quality also stipulated a timeline for the reduction of sulfur in gasoline and diesel in a range of 15-30 ppm. The lower that amount, the less sulfur and the better for the vehicle’s engines, because they function more efficiently. But despite the progress, Pemex never fully complied with that standard. Meanwhile, the limit for agricultural and marine diesel stands at 500 ppm, meaning it is much more laden with sulfur.

Since 2018, Pemex’s domestic sales of marine diesel have fallen. That year it distributed 12,150 barrels per day. In 2019 sales fell to 10,670, the following year, to 7,260; in 2021, to 6,700, and last May they jumped to 9,218 barrels, according to figures from the state company.

Marine diesel has more energy density because a motorboat needs more power than a land vehicle.

A similar phenomenon has occurred with intermediate 15 (IFO), a residual fuel produced from the distillation of crude oil – and diesel – a lighter fuel –, and whose sales totaled 1,850 barrels per day in 2018, 1,290 in 2019, 1,100 in 2020, 940 in 2021 and 840 as of last May.

This data indicates, on one hand, that domestic ships tend to consume more marine diesel than IFO 15, which is more polluting. On the other hand, it would be easier to replace this with green fuels.

The Mexican fleet comprises 2 697 vessels, including fishing vessels, tankers, freighters, and containers. By 2030, these would emit 6 963 tons of NOx, docked ships would emit 528 235 tons and cargo handling would be responsible for 3 752 tons. Regarding SO2, these indicators would add up to 861, 65 294 and 276 tons, respectively. Maritime transport would release 277 tons of particulate matter and docked ships, 20 970, according to projections by the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation.

Big ship cruisers docked in Cozumel, one of the biggest ports of the world that receive this type of recreational ships, in southeast Mexico. Credit: Government of Quintana Roo

Insufficient progress

Mexico should introduce other policies beyond clean diesel refining, according to Alison Shaw, policy lead at the University College of London’s Energy Institute Shipping Group.

“While clean diesel may offer a bridging fuel for some sectors, perhaps for public transport or trucking, the deep-sea commercial shipping industry still widely relies on heavy fuel oil and this sector’s transition is about moving from fossil fuels entirely,” she wrote in an email to IPS.

The specialist highlighted the production of clean diesel doesn’t cut GHG in the same level as scalable zero-emissions fuels, such as hydrogen or ammonia, and it would just be a small, temporary improvement. “It’s not the solution for the maritime industry,” she emphasized.

Some reports stress the Mexican potential to transition to a sustainable maritime shipping industry.

The Getting to Zero Coalition’s and Partnering for Green Growth and the Global Goals 2030’s study underlined that Mexico could become a central player in supplying global demand for green fuel and attract investment of between 7-9 billion dollars by 2030.

The paper underscores that this Latin American country has “huge renewable energy potential” and direct access to busy maritime routes.

The ports of Manzanillo, Mexico’s largest; Cozumel, specialized in cruise ships; and Coatzacoalcos, focused on the export and import of oil and gas and their derivatives, could show how different types of facilities in Mexico could capitalize on a transition to pollution elimination. This transition would diversify current port activities and create a hub for the production and export of zero-carbon fuels.

Small ferries transport passengers to spend the day in Cozumel island, the biggest in Mexico’s Caribbean, off the touristic Mayan Riviera, in the state of Quintana Roo, in the southeastern Yucatan Peninsula. Credit: Emilio Godoy/ IPS

According to Eliana Barleta, independent expert in shipping and ports, the substitution options are mainly low-sulfur fuel, liquified gas – both fossil fuels – or scrubbers’ (filters) installation on ships. These are control devices that can be used to remove some gasses from industrial exhaust streams.

“The port location, the number and type of ships that arrive to it, are all important aspects to understand the fuel choice and the infrastructure solutions. Some maritime fuel applications will be more appropriate for the quick adoption of zero-emissions new fuels. The largest ships, like bulk carriers that travel between a small number of big ports, are very suitable for early adoption, because it’s much likely the biggest ports can offer fuel supply agreements, and the same largest ships’ regular demand will support the investment,” she said to IPS.

But the ships that visit more destinations or smaller ports could have problems finding installations that could supply the new fuels, so it may take longer for them to adopt zero-carbon alternatives.

The international maritime sector considers hydrogen, its byproduct methanol and ammonia to be viable as fuels. Due to its safety and energetic potential, methanol seems to take the lead in comparison with the other two alternatives, according to two recent studies.

The problem lies in the Secretary of Energy’s refusal to promote clean fuels, said one anonymous source from the maritime sector to IPS.

The scenarios collide with the fossil fuel-supporting policies that the president Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador has applied since December 2018, when he took office, and that focus on enhancing Pemex’s operations, as the transition to cleaner energy and fuels is paused.

Pemex and the Secretary of Energy didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Alison Shaw, the British expert, foresaw one possible effect of these policies would be Mexico’s late entrance to that market.

“Mexico’s energy policies risk locking the country into a soon-to-be outdated energy infrastructure and forgoing the sustainable development advantages associated with engaging in renewable energy and green fuel production,” she critiqued.

The scholar foresaw that maritime transportation will be an important market for new green fuels and will source their supply wherever it is available, which would mean “if Mexico doesn’t produce and provide green fuels, it might enter a crowded market down the line.”

For Barleta, the shipping expert, the production of green fuels seems to be a regional opportunity. “All nations should have access to opportunities related to the decarbonization of global maritime transportation. Many countries are well situated to become competitive suppliers of zero-carbon fuels, like green ammonia and hydrogen,” she suggested.

But there are important issues to resolve. “Which are the most appropriate engines and fuels? Which is the fuel with the lowest impact (as fuels may have reduced carbon, but release other pollutants)? Which trade routes may favor decarbonization, without affecting normal commercial performance?”, she questioned.

IPS produced this article with support from Internews’ Earth Journalism Network.

Trains and trucks move cargo in the port of Veracruz, in southeastern Mexico, on August 30, 2022. Through that infrastructure, the second largest in the country for freight received, pass hydrocarbons, cars, electronic appliances and food, for internal and external consumption. Credit: Emilio Godoy / IPS

By Emilio Godoy
VERACRUZ, Mexico, Dec 5 2022 (IPS)

Mexico has more than 11,000 square kilometers of continental coastline and intense maritime traffic. This Latin American country received 12 045 vessels as of July, compared to 11 971 on that date in 2021.

At the port of the city of Veracruz, the second largest in Mexico by freight received, at least five ships dock every day, according to data from the General Coordination of Ports and Merchant Navy of the Secretary (ministry) of the Navy (Semar) in 2022.

In Veracruz, in southeast Mexico, maritime traffic expanded 5% in July, receiving 1 254 vessels in 2022 compared to 1 192 in 2021.

Globally, the shipping industry accounts for about 3 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, comparable to the total emissions from aviation. If it were its own country, shipping would rank around sixth in the world for its contributions to climate change. The current international target is to reduce GHG emissions from this sector by at least 50% by 2050

But the country lacks measurements of pollution emitted by the shipping industry into the atmosphere and the water.

Globally, the shipping industry accounts for about 3 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, comparable to the total emissions from aviation. If it were its own country, shipping would rank around sixth in the world for its contributions to climate change. The current international target is to reduce GHG emissions from this sector by at least 50% by 2050.

In 2020, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) mandated that ships limit the sulfur content in fuels to 0.50% m/m (mass by mass) – a significant reduction from the previous limit of 3.5%.

However, Mexico does not have roadmaps for its reduction or concrete plans to produce marine fuels with lower sulfur content, an element harmful to human health and the environment.

Therefore, Mexico faces challenges to achieve IMO’s objectives that aim to reduce GHG emissions generated by human activities that have warmed the planet.

IMO will review their plan next year to endorse a new one, which it will check every five years, because it is estimated that GHG emissions from shipping grew from 977 million tons of CO2 in 2012 to 1 076 million in 2018 – an expansion of 9,6% – and could increase 90%-130% by 2050. Its overall level went from 2,76% to 2,89% in that period.

Emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) from the burning of high-sulfur fuels, derived as a residue from crude oil distillation, lead to sulfurous particles in the air, which can trigger asthma and worsen heart and lung diseases, as well as threaten marine and land ecosystems, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

In water, hydrocarbons block the entry of light and limit the photosynthesis of algae and other plants, and in fauna they can cause poisoning, alterations of reproductive cycles and intoxication, EPA adds.

SO2, which isn’t a GHG but is highly polluting, lasts only a few days in the atmosphere, but when dissolved in water it generates acids that lend its dangerous nature to human health.

Meanwhile, the emissions of nitrous dioxide (NOx), derived also from hydrocarbon consumption, stream into smog, when mixed with ground-level ozone. NOx remains 114 years in the atmosphere, according to several scientific studies.

Maritime pollution in Mexico. Infographic: Johana Claudio / IPS

Underestimated issue

IPS confirmed the impacts of this type of pollution, analyzing the data obtained through 30 public information requests to various government agencies and the consultation of satellite images of oil spills from ships that occurred in several areas of the country between 2019 and 2022.

As part of an exclusive collaboration with the Spanish company Orbital EOS (Earth Observation Solutions) – specialized in finding this type of pollution on the high seas –IPS identified through satellite images four discharges in Mexican marine areas that occurred between 2019 and 2021.

On December 14, 2021, an unidentified vessel spilled 3,14 cubic meters of a substance suspected of being a hydrocarbon, in an area of almost 79 km2, 147 kilometers off the Mexican coast, off Acapulco, in the southern state of Guerrero, according to an image taken by the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1 satellite.

Another oil accident monitored by the Sentinel-2 satellite happened on April 14, 2019, when a ferry dumped between 0,81 and 6,08 m3 of light fuel (distillate fuels, like diesel) and between 17,65 and 176,6 m3 of thick fuel (heavy oil), 35 kilometers off the Sinaloa state coast, in the Sea of Cortez – an area of great biodiversity which is threatened by real estate development and overfishing.

The light hydrocarbon covered 20,26 km2 and the rest, 3,53 km2, according to Orbital EOS analysis.

The vessel, whose name IPS hides for legal reasons, got away with it, since it’s missing from Semar’s lists of incidents and the Attorney General’s Office’ (prosecutor’s office) of Environmental Protection’s sanctioned ships.

The ship was built in 2001, and changed its name and navigation flag in May 2019, weeks after the spill. Its last location was reported in a port in central Italy.

Sentinel-1 detected another spill on December 8, 2021, when an unidentified ship spilled 1,15 m3 of probable hydrocarbon over 28,6 km2, 180 kilometers off the Veracruz coast.

In addition, this satellite recorded on September 27, 2021, another spill of 0,28 m3 of probable hydrocarbon in 7,1 km2, 390 kilometers from the coast, in the Gulf of Mexico.

The most recent accident occurred on August 21, 2022, when a private yacht sank and leaked fuel in Balandra, in Southern Baja California, an area afforded special protection for its biodiversity.

Moreover, the US non-governmental SkyTruth, devoted mainly to tracking spills, recorded 11 discharges of oily wastewater into Mexican waters between July 2020 and December 2021.

Ian McDonald, a Department of Terrestrial, Oceanic and Atmospheric Sciences researcher at the Florida State University (United States), underlined the presence of oil in the water due to the operation of hydrocarbon platforms and wells for decades; oil leaks from natural fractures in the seafloor and maritime shipping in Mexican marine areas.

“Preventive maintenance (of the facilities) has been lacking. The problem is the cumulative impact on an area. Ship activities, such as dredging and waste generation, have a significant footprint on marine ecosystems. The potential impact can be very large,” he told IPS from Miami.

The “Chronic Oiling in Global Oceans” research, which McDonald co-authored and was released last June, found that 97% of oil slicks come from vessels and land discharges and 3% from seafloor fumes off the Aztec coast.

An IMO spokesperson said to IPS it cannot comment on a country’s situation and informed that it will run a review on Mexico in 2024. Meanwhile, the Mexican shipping industry association declined to comment for this reportage and the navy, Semar, didn’t answer a comment request.

Hydrocarbon pollution on the high seas depends on the volume and where it happens, and chronic contamination has long-term effects.

“Any spill is going to have an impact. Where it is less direct is in open waters, because there’s more dilution, but it tends to accumulate in the depth of the ocean and affect some organisms. The impact is bigger when the spill reaches the beaches, because it has less movement there,” explained Adolfo Gracia, researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico’s Institute of Sea Sciences and Limnology.

Speaking from Mexico City, he highlighted a key element: the analysis of chronic pollution, coming from industries, agriculture and shipping, as a growing threat that marine flora and fauna are exposed to.

An oil accident, monitored by the Sentinel-2 satellite, happened on April 14, 2019, when a ferry dumped light and heavy fuels –the blue color identifies the former–, 35 km off the coast, in the Sea of Cortez – an area of great biodiversity which is threatened by many factors, in the northeastern Mexican state of Sinaloa. The vessel got away with it and it’s missing from public records.
Credit: Emilio Godoy / IPS

Worrisome sample

Of the 819 incidents that Semar has tracked since 2017, only 16 are classified as marine pollution; of these, two consisted of oil spills and one of “serious damage to the environment”, without specifying their cause, according to data obtained through public information requests. Semar only sanctioned in two cases but did not specify what the penalty consisted of.

Of the total, a hydrocarbon spill and a pollution incident occurred in Veracruz.

Semar also registered 42 fires on boats and 13 sunk ships that may pose a pollution risk.

“There is legislation (Law on Dumping in Mexican Marine Zones), but there is no enforcement. There is no accurate measurement. Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) is not investigating the issue,” Rodolfo Navarro, the non-governmental organization Comunicar para Conservar director, told IPS.

Semar said it doesn’t have registries of violations to this law.

Navarro, whose organization focuses on environmental issues, works in the Cozumel area, in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo which is one of the world’s largest cruise ship recipients, and is witness to the impact of shipping on ecosystems.

Semar, responsible for the administration of the ports since 2017 – including pollution control –, the Ministry of the Environment (Semarnat), the state-owned Pemex and the port administrations of the facilities located in the Gulf of Mexico, all lack pollution records in port areas.

As noted earlier, they also lack roadmaps to achieve the objectives of the Initial Strategy adopted in 2018 by the IMO to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by at least 40% by 2030, for all international shipping, and to aim for a reduction of 70% by 2050 compared to 2008 levels.

In ports like Veracruz, in southeastern Mexico, the daily movement of ships and freight is constant, which generates pollution. But the Mexican government lacks measurements of contamination emitted by the shipping industry into the atmosphere and the water, as well as policies to control it, for complying with international agreements.
Credit: Emilio Godoy / IPS

A decisive convention

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), in force since 1978, is one of the vital tools to meet the IMO goals and which is composed of Annex I on the prevention of oil pollution, II on harmful liquid substances transported in bulk and III on those transported in packages.

It also consists of Annex IV on sewage, V on garbage and VI on atmospheric pollution from shipping. Mexico is a signatory to annexes I, II and IV, but not to III, V, and VI.

From 2020, the IMO applies regulations limiting the sulfur content used in cargo ships to 0,5%, from a previous rate of 3,5%. Thus, the body seeks its abatement by 77%, equivalent to 8,5 million tons of SO2.

The omission on the management of hydrocarbon pollution constitutes a violation of Annex I. By belonging to IMO, the country must achieve its goals.

In addition, the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (T-Mec) Chapter 24 on the environment, in force since 2020 and which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), stipulates the control of the production, consumption and trade of substances that damage the ozone layer, as well as the reduction of air pollution.

This section stipulates air quality priorities, including the reduction of emissions from maritime traffic.

But Mexico lacks regulations to limit shipping emissions and also did not sign last November during the Glasgow climate summit the “Clydebank Declaration for Green Maritime Corridors”, which was signed only by 24 countries and which aims to create at least six low-emission routes by 2025.

The omission in pollution control implies the difficulty of achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 13 and 14, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015 to be achieved by 2030.

The number 13, of 17 SDGs, deals with fighting the climate crisis and its effects, while the 14 focuses on the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.

Merchant vessels wait for docking at the port of Veracruz, in southeastern Mexico, on August 30, 2022. The International Maritime Organization has established mid-and-long term pollution reduction goals, so that the global shipping industry has cleaner operations, but this Latin American country lacks plans for achieving those goals.
Credit: Emilio Godoy / IPS

Busy docks

The Aztec port system handled 169,77 million tons of cargo as of last July, a growth of 3% compared to the same period in 2021, according to Semar figures.

Export cargo totaled 66,4 million tons, 2,6% lower than the 2021 level – 68,19 million – while imports grew 8,8% – from 66,51 million to 72,36. In the Port of Veracruz, which has 17 docks, this has been on the rise since 2008. Off the coast you can see the row of boats waiting to head to port. A line of red and green headlights and buoys points the route to the harbor.

Inside the port area, the hustle and bustle does not stop. Vehicles, trucks, trains and cranes come and go to remove and put the cargo, on which the economic activity of the region and partially of the second economy in Latin America depends.

In their bowels, these vessels move fuel, goods, vehicles or raw materials, and also carry an environmental threat, of which there is evidence.

In 2020, the seaport managed 26,2 million tons, an amount that increased 22% the following year – 32 million. As of last July, it mobilized 19,97 million, 7,6% higher than the same period of 2021. The maritime industry represents 5% of the Mexican GDP.

For Mexico, the urgency also lies in the projected growth of emissions, as calculated by the Commission on Environmental Cooperation for North America (CEC) report “Reducing emissions from the goods movement via maritime transportation in North America”, focused on 35 Mexican ports, between 2011 and 2030 due to the increase in maritime traffic.

Jettisoned

Annex VI, in force since 1997, is relevant for Mexico, since, by addressing the control of emissions of SO2, NOx and particulate matter (PM), it implies the creation of an emission control area (ECA) in its maritime zone.

The ECA involves the adoption of mandatory special technological methods for the prevention of marine pollution of ships, by oil, wastewater or garbage, such as low sulfur fuel oil, on-board incinerator for sludge and a cleaning system for emitted gas from combustion, according to the oceanographic and ecological conditions of the area and the peculiarities of maritime traffic.

Semarnat and the U.S. EPA argue that an ECA creation would have positive effects on public health and the environment, without exorbitant costs for Mexico.

Between 2009 and 2018, the US and Mexico, with the support of the CEC – instituted by NAFTA – collaborated, so that this Latin American country adhered to Annex VI and created the ECA.

But Enrique Peña Nieto’s government (2012-2018) did not send that request to the Senate for approval nor does the current administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador seem interested in doing so. Between 2010 and 2019, the Mexican Senate sent six exhortations to the Executive to vote on the incorporation of Annex VI.

At the 2016 North American Leaders’ Summit, then-U.S. President Barack Obama; Peña Nieto, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau agreed to work together to finalize the design of the Mexican ECA and send it to the IMO, which never happened.

Navarro, the Cozumel expert, emphasized that Mexico is not on track to reach global goals. “It could do it, but there is not the slightest will. And in international waters nobody watches anything,” he denounced.

McDonald urged attention to the problem. “The government must address it. Mexico has enormous marine resources, and it is a pity that it does not protect them. There are economic benefits to the conservation of marine ecosystems. Ships are good for governments because they represent revenue, but the environmental damage can be substantial,” he said.

Gracia questions the efficacy of high seas surveillance. “It depends on everybody’s good conscience. It’s a little bit complicated. In Mexico, the sole control exists when a ship enters into port. There isn’t a general surveillance plan,” he said.

Before an unconcerned Mexico, the boats will continue with their arrival and their trail of pollution.

This article is part of a two-story series that was produced with support from Internews’ Earth Journalism Network.

The laying of the Mayan Train along 1500 kilometers through five states in the south and southeast of Mexico, mostly through the Yucatan Peninsula, will damage the fragile jungle ecosystem, with the removal of vegetation and animal species. The photo shows an area cleared of vegetation near the municipality of Valladolid, in the state of Yucatan. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Nov 2 2022 (IPS)

A beige line slashes its way through the Mayan jungle near the municipality of Izamal in the southeastern Mexican state of Yucatán. It is section 3, 172 kilometers long, of the Mayan Train (TM), the most important megaproject of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s administration.

The metal scrape of the backhoes tears up the vegetation to open up arteries in the jungle for the laying and construction of the five stops of this part of the future railway network, which is being built at a cost currently estimated at more than 15 billion dollars, 70 percent more than initially planned."Everything that is happening in the Yucatán peninsula is affecting the Mayan people, damaging the trees, the water, the animals. It is a part of our territory that is being destroyed. Those who don't produce their own food have to depend on others." -- Pedro Uc

Pedro Uc, an indigenous member of the non-governmental Assembly of Defenders of the Múuch’ Xíinbal Mayan Territory, summed up the environmental impact of the TM in an area of milpa – a traditional system of cultivation of corn, squash, beans and chili peppers – and poultry farming.

“Everything that is happening in the Yucatán peninsula is affecting the Mayan people, damaging the trees, the water, the animals. It is a part of our territory that is being destroyed. Those who don’t produce their own food have to depend on others,” he told IPS from Buctzotz (Mayan for “hair dress”), in Yucatán, some 1,400 km from Mexico City.

Without land, there is no food, stressed the activist, whose organization works in 25 municipalities on the peninsula, which includes the states of Campeche, Quintana Roo and Yucatán, and is home to the second most important jungle massif in Latin America, after the Amazon.

Despite multiple complaints of environmental damage, the Federal Attorney’s Office for Environmental Protection (Profepa) has yet to resolve these complaints, more than two years after construction began.

“It has never carried out its role. It has not addressed the issue, it is merely ornamental. Profepa should attend to the complaints,” said Uc, whose town is located 44 kilometers southeast of Izamal, where one of the railroad stations will be located.

Profepa, part of the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (Semarnat), received two complaints in 2020, one in 2021 and 159 in the first five months of this year for “acts or omissions in contravention of environmental laws,” according to public information requests submitted by IPS.

Profepa oversees the megaproject through its “Mayan Train Inspection Program, in the areas of environmental impact, forestry, wildlife and sources of pollution”, the results of which are unknown.

In December last year, the agency carried out an inspection of hazardous waste generation and management in the southern state of Chiapas, which, together with the states of Campeche, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Yucatán, is part of the route for the railway.

In addition, in June and July, two other visits were made to verify measures to mitigate pollutant emissions and waste management. Profepa is still analyzing the results of these visits.

The environmental prosecutor’s office has carried out exploratory visits in nine municipalities of section 2, eight of section 4 and 16 of section 5. The laying of lines 6 and 7 began last April, but the agency has not yet inspected them. The megaproject consists of a total of seven sections, which are being built in parallel.

The TM, to be built by the governmental National Tourism Fund (Fonatur), will cover some 1,500 kilometers, with 21 stations and 14 stops, according to López Obrador, who is heavily involved in the project and is its biggest supporter.

To lay the railway, whose trains will transport thousands of tourists and loads of cargo, such as transgenic soybeans, palm oil and pork, 1,681 hectares of land will be cleared, involving the cutting of 300,000 trees, according to the original environmental impact study. The laying of sections 1, 2 and 3, which require 801 hectares, began without environmental permits.

The government sees the megaproject as an engine of social development that will create jobs, boost tourism beyond the traditional tourist attractions and bolster the regional economy, which has sparked controversy between its supporters and critics.

The construction of the Mayan Train has involved logging in several jungle areas in southeastern Mexico. The photo shows a breach opened by a backhoe on the outskirts of Playa del Carmen, in the state of Quintana Roo, in March 2022, without the required intervention by the environmental prosecutor’s office. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Free way

In November of last year, López Obrador, who wants trains running on the peninsula by the end of 2023, classified the TM as a “priority project” by means of a presidential decree, thus facilitating the delivery of environmental permits. On Oct. 25 the president promised that the test runs would begin next July.

This classification reduces Profepa’s maneuvering room, according to Carlos del Razo, a lawyer specializing in environmental cases, of the law firm Carvajal y Machado.

“Some of the early complaints could be filed for works where permit exemptions were issued because they were done on existing rights-of-way. But if it decides not to act, it has to argue that decision. The environmental prosecutor’s office will not have a particular interest in approving government works,” he told IPS.

In its authorizations, Semarnat ruled that Fonatur must implement programs for integrated waste management, soil conservation and reforestation, air quality monitoring, flora management and rescue and relocation of wildlife.

Profepa must supervise that these measures comply with the General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection, in force since 1988 and which environmentalists say has been violated.

López Obrador denies that there is deforestation, and promised the construction of three natural parks in eastern Quintana Roo and the reforestation of some 2,500 hectares in the vicinity of the railroad route.

In a tacit acknowledgement of logging in the project area, the Ministry of National Defense will plant trees, at a cost of 35 million dollars, according to an agreement between Fonatur and the ministry contained in the massive leak of military emails made by the non-governmental group Guacamaya and consulted by IPS.

Viridiana Mendoza, Agriculture and Climate Change specialist for Greenpeace Mexico, criticized “the lack of action” by Profepa.

“They had already deforested without an environmental impact assessment, which is a crime. We are not surprised, because it is part of the dynamic that has characterized the Mayan Train: illegalities, omissions, false information, violation of procedures. There is a conflict of interest because Profepa answers to Semarnat,” she said.

The international non-governmental organization has found “insufficient, false and inaccurate” information on sections 5, 6 and 7, so it is not possible to assess the dangers and damage to local populations and ecosystems.

Parts of the jungle of the Yucatan peninsula, in southeastern Mexico, have been cut down to make way for the construction of the Mayan Train. But the environmental prosecutor’s office, failing to comply with its legal duty, has turned a deaf ear to complaints of alleged ecological crimes. CREDIT: Guacamaya Leaks

Risks

The project is a paradox, because while the government promises sustainable tourism in other areas of the peninsula, it threatens the very attractions of this influx of visitors, such as the cenotes – deep, water-filled sinkholes formed in limestone – cave systems and the entire ecosystem in general.

The TM endangers the largest system of underground and flooded grottoes on the planet, a complex of submerged caves beneath the limestone terrain.

The porous (karst) soil of the peninsula sabotages the government’s plans, as it has forced Fonatur to change the route of the megaproject several times. For example, section 5 has experienced three modifications between 2021 and January 2022.

Faced with the wave of impacts, the last hope lies in organization by local residents, according to the Mayan activist Uc.

“Between the possible and the impossible, we inform people so that in their own community, they can make the decision they want to make. People do not have the necessary information. Let them take up the struggle from their own communities and make the decisions about what comes next,” he said.

But attorney Del Razo and environmentalist Mendoza said the courts are the last resort.

“The judiciary continues to be the most independent branch of power in Mexico. Interested parties could seek injunctions that order Profepa to correct the process. A strategy of specific details is needed to demonstrate the infractions. The effective thing is to go into the details of the challenges,” explained Del Razo.

Mendoza said there is a lack of access to information, respect for public participation and environmental justice.

“Profepa should have stopped the works for the simple fact of not having the environmental authorization when the removal of vegetation began,” she said. “We don’t see it as likely that it will seek to stop the construction, because we have seen its reaction before. Semarnat supports the project, regardless of the fact that it has failed to comply and is in contradiction with the laws.”

While its opponents seek to take legal action, the TM runs roughshod over all obstacles, which are dodged with the help of the Environmental Prosecutor’s Office, at least until now.

The Mexico City government is increasing the number of electric buses in its fleet, such as the trolleybuses pictured here on a street in the south of the capital. But their energy source is still fossil fuels and the deployment of electric cars remains slow in the country. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Sep 19 2022 (IPS)

The Mexico City government began testing an elevated route for electric buses with great fanfare on Sept. 11, in a bid to promote more sustainable transport. The initiative is part of an incipient promotion of electromobility in the country, amidst pro-fossil fuel energy policies.

Mexico, a country of some 129 million people, lacks a national road transport strategy, considered vital for reducing polluting emissions and for the path to a low-carbon economy, which restricts the adoption of policies.

Experts consulted by IPS highlighted the limitations of the measures introduced regarding road transportation.

“Electric mobility is still not very developed, both in terms of facilities for acquiring vehicles and infrastructure. We are not advancing as fast as other Latin American cities. There is a lack of cutting-edge projects,” Bernardo Baranda, director for Latin America of the non-governmental Institute for Transportation and Development Policy, based in Mexico City, told IPS.

Mexico City, home to more than 20 million people when its suburbs are included, seeks to promote electric public transport with the new route for an elevated track exclusively for buses. It is also pushing other initiatives, such as the conversion of buses from diesel to electric, announced in July.

Only two other major cities in the country, the western city of Guadalajara and the northern city of Monterrey, have electric public transportation buses.

In the Latin American region, capitals such as Bogota, Montevideo and Santiago de Chile have large electric public transport fleets and countries such as Chile, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay already have sectoral plans in the region.

The Mexican vehicle fleet exceeds 53 million units and has been constantly growing since 2000, according to figures from the National Institute of Geography and Statistics.

Sales of electric and hybrid cars are on the rise: in 2016, dealerships sold 254 electric units, compared to 1,703 in the first half of this year alone.

Self-charging hybrids that do not need to be plugged in (they use their gasoline engines to charge the batteries) have been the most popular, with the number purchased climbing from 7,490 in 2016 to 19,060 in the first half of 2022. Sales of plug-in vehicles grew from 521 to 2,263 in that same period.

Since 2018, the government’s Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) has held at least two tenders for the installation of so-called electrolineras, charging stations, in the country, where more than 2,000 points are already operating. But not all of them are working, as IPS found in a tour of several areas of the Mexican capital.

Be that as it may, the government’s plan to deploy this infrastructure has not sufficed to boost the purchase of electric vehicles.

An electric charging point in a neighborhood in south-central Mexico City. The state-owned Federal Electricity Commission has installed more than 2,000 electric vehicle charging centers in Mexico, but this and other measures have not encouraged their spread in the country. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Gustavo Jiménez, director of the consulting firm Grupo E-mobilitas, acknowledged “slow progress” in the deployment of public transportation, cab fleets and delivery companies, as well as vehicle assembly projects.

“For the last two years there have been no export and import tariffs for electric vehicles, which reduces the cost by 20 percent. There is also a reduction in value added tax. But progress has not been as fast as we would like. It is complicated to charge your vehicle as you drive around the country,” he told IPS.

The National Electric Mobility Strategy, which the government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador froze when he took office in December 2018, created a comprehensive framework and incentive schemes for electric vehicles.

In addition, the current government, described as “pro-fossil fuels” by environmentalists critical of its defense of hydrocarbons, maintains record levels of gasoline subsidies, which will exceed 15 billion dollars in 2022, according to official estimates.

Latin America’s second-largest economy is the world’s 12th biggest oil producer and 17th biggest gas producer. In terms of proven crude oil reserves, it ranks 20th and 41st, according to data from the state-owned oil giant Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), in an industry protected by López Obrador despite the country’s climate commitments.

Among the measures of the stalled Strategy were the installation of charging infrastructure in streets and homes, the introduction of green license plates and the exemption of import and export taxes for electric vehicles.

During the 2nd Annual Meeting of the U.S.-Mexico High Level Economic Dialogue, held in Mexico City on Sept. 12, the United States invited its neighbor and trading partner to participate in an integrated electric vehicle supply chain – an essential link in the economic-environmental program implemented by the U.S. government.

White smoke

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) lists 10 electromobility projects in the region, one of which involves the manufacture and sale of electric three-wheeled vehicles in Mexico.

Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey, together with three Colombian cities and five Brazilian cities, are also participating in the TUMI E-Bus Mission project, aimed at supporting 500 cities by 2025 in their transition to the deployment of 100,000 electric buses in total.

Funded by German economic cooperation and six international organizations, the project is part of the Transformative Urban Mobility Initiative (TUMI).

The decarbonization of transportation is fundamental to the fight against the global climate crisis. In Mexico, CO2 emissions from that segment totaled 148 million tons in 2019, equivalent to 20 percent of the total, according to the government’s National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change (Inecc).

Mexico and the United States are seeking to integrate the electric vehicle manufacturing value chain. In the image, Mexico’s foreign minister, Marcelo Ebrard, shows an electric unit manufactured in Mexico in February 2022. CREDIT: Secretariat of Foreign Affairs

Estimates by the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources put life-cycle emissions (from fuel extraction to combustion in the engine) at 358 grams of CO2 per kilometer for gasoline-burning vehicles, 166 for hybrid cars (using fuel and electricity) and 77 for solar energy users.

The study “Estimation of costs and benefits associated with the implementation of mitigation actions to meet the emission reduction targets assumed under the Paris Agreement”, presented on Sept. 13 by Inecc, indicates that six sectoral policies would contribute a mitigation of 36.5 million tons by 2030.

It also outlines 35 emission reduction actions with which the country would obtain total benefits of 295 billion dollars.

In the case of electromobility, the average cost of pollution abatement amounts to 500 dollars per ton, with an investment of nearly 5.9 billion dollars, gross benefits of 3.1 billion dollars and a reduction of 600,000 tons of CO2.

By replacing diesel buses with electric buses, the average cost would add up to 152.90 dollars per ton of CO2. The benefits of fuel savings would amount to 3.2 billion dollars.

By 2030, emissions cuts would contribute one million tons, but this potential would increase as domestic power generation incorporates more clean energy.

The CFE estimates that by 2041 some 700,000 electric vehicles will be in circulation in the country and will require 40,000 charging stations, which also means strengthening the domestic electric power grid.

Last November, during the Glasgow climate summit, Mexico adopted a voluntary goal to sell only non-polluting cars by 2035.

However, at the same time, the Mexican government has provided for the legalization of used cars coming from abroad in 2021, which experts see as a negative step in the fight against pollution.

Baranda the transportation expert said gasoline subsidies, the promotion of fossil fuels and the lack of energy transition are barriers to electromobility.

“You need public policies, at the federal and state level, such as incentives and infrastructure. Many countries are doing this. Mexico is not on the way to making good on international commitments. It’s a good opportunity to invest in electric transportation,” he said.

For his part, Jiménez questioned the current energy policy, which has an impact on sustainable mobility.

“There are no clear incentives for public transportation, significant subsidies are required. There is not so much infrastructure, there are no regulations for chargers, there are no measures for the circulation of electric cars. There is a lack of a coherent enabling framework and a national program to promote electric vehicles. Mexico has no coordination at the national level,” he complained.

Aerial view of San Crisanto and its preserved mangrove, in the state of Yucatan, in southeastern Mexico. In addition to trapping and storing CO2, mangroves control coastal erosion, protect against hurricanes and clean water. However, in Yucatan, as in other similar ecosystems, they face threats from increasing urbanization, mass tourism and the effects of the climate crisis. Credit: Juan Pablo Ampudia / IPS

By Emilio Godoy
SINANCHÉ, Mexico, Aug 2 2022 (IPS)

Two extremes of coastal development can be found side-by-side in the small community of San Crisanto, in the municipality of Sinanché in Mexico’s southeastern Yucatán state.

On one side is the mangrove forest that the community has conserved since 1995. It protects the settlement from coastal erosion, supports local fisheries and provides jobs in ecotourism. And, as of 2022, it is generating income from carbon credits.

On the other side, two large housing developments are taking shape. Such building work in the coastal zone is one of the biggest threats to mangrove ecosystems in Mexico and worldwide. But in San Crisanto, the forest is safe — for now.

“Fortunately, the mangroves are well,” says to IPS José Loria, president of the community-based San Crisanto Foundation, which oversees efforts to protect and restore them. “We’re working. Thanks to this, there is a better perspective regarding their environmental services.”

But elsewhere in Mexico threats to mangroves are rising. Meanwhile, uncertainty surrounds government-funded efforts to restore the coastal forests, and it is unclear whether the mangroves can cope with rising sea levels the global warming is creating.

Loss and restoration

Only three countries — Indonesia, Australia and Brazil — have a greater area of mangroves than Mexico, which had 905 086 hectares of these forests in 2020.

These fragile ecosystems have a dual role to play in the fight against the climate crisis. On one hand, they absorb and store vast amounts of carbon. On the other, they protect coastlines from storms and rising seas.

But they are under threat from the construction of aquaculture farms, infrastructure, and tourist development. Regulations intended to protect mangroves and wetlands haven’t stopped their devastation.

Mangrove deforestation affects three states in particular, according to Mexico’s Mangrove Monitoring System. In the northern territory of Sinaloa, it totaled 5 258 hectares between 2015 and 2020, in Baja California Sur it amounted to 1 068 and in the northern state of Nayarit, 247 hectares.

As well as deforestation, large areas of mangroves are being degraded by human activities. While the total area of degraded mangroves fell from 18 332 hectares in 2015 to 9 680 hectares in 2020, it increased in the states of Baja California Sur and Chiapas, in the south.

Replanting lost mangrove forests is one of the aims of the UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration 2021-2030, which was launched in 2019, but so far no mangrove restoration projects in Mexico have been registered on the UN’s database.

But many mangrove restoration projects are in fact taking place. Between 2006 and 2020, for example, Mexico’s National Forestry Commission (Conafor) approved 74 mangrove planting projects to compensate for deforestation elsewhere. These projects took place in 13 states, covered 11 479 hectares and cost 200 million dollars, according to Conafor data. Nayarit state has hosted 21 initiatives and the southeastern state of Veracruz, 18.

In addition to these deforestation-compensation projects, Conafor funded 11 mangrove restoration initiatives in 2021. Together, they planted 1,34 million mangrove seeds on 1 048 hectares, and cost 2,52 million dollars.

Mangrove logging in Puerto Morelos, in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo, in the Yucatán Peninsula, a forbidden activity by the environmental laws. In Mexico, mangroves face threats from urbanization, tourism development and the installation of aquaculture farms. Credit: Emilio Godoy / IPS

Information vacuum

Claudia Teutli, a mangrove researcher at the Center for Research and Advanced Studies of the state-run National Polytechnic Institute, critiques some aspects of policies towards mangroves.

“We don’t know the success of the projects, due to how the restoration has been done,” she told IPS. “It has been done mostly for offsets requirements [for environmental damage]. There wasn’t a goal of recovering the ecosystem.”

Teutli says the government’s monitoring system is out of date, and that restoration requires better strategies and knowledge of restoration sites.

“There is a confusion between restoration and reforestation,” she says. “We don’t know what was done and how. Success is more than the number of planted trees.”

Joanna Acosta, a professor of conservation biology at the state-run Autonomous University of Carmen in the southeastern state of Campeche, agrees.

“We don’t know where restoration has worked or where it has failed,” she says. “The governmental cartography doesn’t clarify if the mangroves are restored or not. We have to introduce transparency strategies, because there shouldn’t be intervention in areas already under restoration.”

The scale of the challenge is huge — Acosta estimates that Mexico has at least 235 000 hectares of mangroves that are not covered by conservation or management programs. She says that acknowledgement of the value of mangroves should work in favor of the design of public policies.

“Mangroves are the most resilient to the climate crisis, that’s why they should be protected,” she says. “It’s important to protect them due to their capacity for capturing and storing carbon, and because their degradation releases carbon dioxide.”

Inside San Crisanto’s large coastal mangrove swamp, in the southeastern state of Yucatán, which survives thanks to the local community’s efforts. Mexican policies for mangrove protection haven’t yielded clear results, as there is a lack of follow-up for monitoring and evaluation of the governmental support programs. Credit: Emilio Godoy / IPS

Resisting rising seas?

The community in San Crisanto is capitalizing on this. It has begun selling carbon offsets based on the carbon its 850 hectares of mangrove forest stores.

San Crisanto is an ejido — an area of land owned by the state but held and managed communally by local people. Its mangroves also generate revenue from Conafor’s Environmental Services Payment Program. This year, the program is paying the ejido 53 dollars for each of 340 hectares of mangroves.

The ejido suggests the creation of a national mangrove network and a national coastal resources system.

“There should be some work for building the organization,” says Loria. “We are the starting point for correcting environmental processes and generating resilience.”

But despite San Crisanto’s successes, Loria acknowledges problems such as coastal erosion. This raises the questions of how Mexico’s mangroves will tolerate rising seas as the planet warms.

Some researchers say rising sea levels will outpace the rate at which mangroves accumulate sediment in the next 30 years if warming continues at its current rate. This would drown the mangroves. Other scientists, working in Mexico’s Yucatán Peninsula, say mangrove forests will vary in their ability to cope with rising seas.

Teutli is upbeat, saying that as the sea level rises, mangrove sediments will accumulate, keeping the trees above the water level.

“[Mangroves] are adapting to flooding,” she says. “Before we thought they didn’t tolerate it. Tropicalization is coming and it is going to help the mangroves.”

This article is part of a two-story series that was produced with support from Internews’ Earth Journalism Network.

Mexican workers harvest produce on a farm in the western U.S. state of California. The number of temporary agricultural workers from Mexico has increased in recent years in the United States and with it, human rights violations. CREDIT: Courtesy of Linnaea Mallette

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Jul 8 2022 (IPS)

Eduardo Reyes, originally from Puebla in central Mexico, was offered a 40-hour workweek contract by his recruiter and his employer in the United States, but ended up performing hundreds of hours of unpaid work that was not authorized because his visa had expired, unbeknownst to him.

Hired by recruiter Vazquez Citrus & Hauling (VCH), Reyes and five other temporary workers reached the United States between May and September 2017, months before starting work for Four Star Greenhouse in the Midwest state of Michigan.

In 2018, they worked more than 60 hours per week, received bad checks, and never obtained a copy of their contract, even though U.S. laws require that they be given one.

When they complained to Four Star and to their recruiter about the exploitative conditions, the latter turned them over to immigration authorities for deportation in July of that year because their visas had expired, which they had not been informed of by their agent.

In December 2017, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) authorized the arrival of 145 workers to the Four Star facilities in Carleton, Michigan. They were to earn 12.75 dollars per hour for 36 hours a week between January and July 2018.

Reyes’ case is set forth in complaint 2:20-CV-11692, seen by IPS, filed in the Southern Division of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan by six Mexican workers against the company and its manager, whom they accuse of wage gouging, forced labor and workplace reprisals.

This story of exploitation has an aggravating factor that shows the shortcomings of the U.S. government’s H-2A temporary agricultural workers program, or H-2A visa program.

The United States created H-2 visas for unskilled temporary foreign workers in 1943 and in the 1980s established H-2A categories for rural workers and 2B for other labor, such as landscaping, construction, and hotel staff.

These visas allow Mexicans, mainly from rural areas, to migrate seasonally to the U.S. to work legally on farms included on a list, with the intermediation of recruiting companies.

In 2016, the US Department of Transportation fined VCH, based in the state of Florida, for 22,000 dollars for a bus accident in which six H-2A workers were killed while returning from Monroe, Michigan to Mexico.

Two years later, the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division banned VCH and its owner for three years due to program violations in the state of North Carolina, such as failure to reimburse travel expenses and payroll and workday records. However, both continued to operate in the sector.

The workers’ odyssey begins in Mexico, where they are recruited by individual contractors -workers or former workers of a U.S. employer, colleagues, relatives or friends in their home communities – or by private U.S. agencies.

Structural problem

Reyes’ case illustrates the problems of labor exploitation, forced labor and the risk of human trafficking to which participants in the H-2A program are exposed, without intervention by Mexican or U.S. authorities to prevent human rights violations.

Advocates for the rights of the seasonal workers and experts pointed to worsening working conditions, warned of the threat of human trafficking and forced labor, and complained about the prevailing impunity.

According to Lilián López, representative in Mexico of the U.S.-based Polaris Project, the design and operation of the program result in a high risk of human trafficking and forced labor, due to factors such as the lack of supervision and interference by recruiters.

“Economic vulnerability puts migrants at risk, because many workers go into debt to get to the United States, and that gives the agencies a lot of power. They can set any kind of requirement for people to get the jobs. Sometimes recruiters make offers that look more attractive than they really are. That is fraud,” she told IPS in Mexico City.

The number of calls to the National Human Trafficking Hotline operated by Polaris in the US reflects the apparent increase in abuses. Between 2015 and 2017, 800 people on temporary visas, 500 of which were H-2A, called the hotline, compared to 2,890 people between 2018 and 2020 – a 360 percent increase.

Evy Peña, spokesperson for Mexico’s Migrant Rights Center, said temporary labor systems are designed to benefit employers, who have all the control, along with the recruiters.

“From the moment the workers are recruited, there is no transparency. There is a lack of oversight by the DOL, there are parts of recruitment that should be overseen by the Mexican government. There are things that the Mexican government should work out at home,” she told IPS from the northern city of Monterrey.

She said the situation has worsened because of the pandemic.

The United States and Mexico have idealized the H-2A program because it solves the lack of employment in rural areas, foments remittances that provide financial oxygen to those areas, and meets a vital demand in food-producing centers that supply U.S. households.

But the humanitarian costs are high, as the cases reviewed attest. Mexico’s Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare has 369 labor placement agencies registered in 29 of Mexico’s 33 states. For overseas labor recruitment, seven operate – including four in Mexico City -, a small number compared to the thousands of visas issued in 2021.

For its part, the DOL reports 241 licensed recruiters in the US working for a handful of companies in that country.

The ones authorized in Mexico do not appear on the US list and vice versa, in another example of the scarce exchange of information between the two partners.

The number of H-2A visas for Mexican workers is on the rise, with the U.S. government authorizing 201,123 in 2020, a high number driven by the pandemic. That number grew 22 percent in 2021, to a total of 246,738.

In the first four months of the year, U.S. consulates in Mexico issued 121,516 such visas, 18 percent more than in the same period of 2021, when they granted 102,952.

In 2021, the states with the highest demand for Mexican labor were Florida, Georgia, California, Washington and North Carolina, in activities such as agriculture, the operation of farm equipment and construction.

The United States and Mexico agreed to issue another 150,000 visas for temporary workers in an attempt to mitigate forced migration from the south, which will also include Central American seasonal workers.

Details of the expansion of the program will be announced by Presidents Joe Biden and Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador at a meeting to be held on Jul. 12 at the White House, with migration as one of the main topics on the agenda.

Mexican farm workers wait to be tested for COVID-19 in 2020 in Immolakee, a town in the southeastern U.S. state of Florida. The pandemic hit H-2A visa holders, who are mainly engaged in temporary agricultural work, hard. CREDIT: Doctors Without Borders

Indifference

Lidia Muñoz, a doctoral student at the University of Oregon in the United States who has studied labor recruitment, stresses that there are no policies on the subject in Mexico, even though the government is aware of the problem.

“There are regulations for recruitment agencies that are not followed to the letter,” she told IPS from Portland, the largest city in the northwestern state of Oregon. “Most recruiters are not registered. The intermediaries are the ones who earn the most. There is no proper oversight.”

Article 28 of Mexico’s Federal Labor Law of 1970 regulates the provision of services by workers hired within Mexico for work abroad, but in practice it is not enforced.

This regulation requires the registration of contracts with the labor authorities and the posting of a bond to guarantee compliance, and makes the foreign contractor responsible for transportation to and from the country, food and immigration expenses, as well as full payment of wages, compensation for occupational hazards and access to adequate housing.

In addition, Mexican workers must be entitled to social security for foreigners in the country where they offer their services.

While the Mexican government could resort to this article to protect the rights of migrants, it has refused to apply it.

Between 2009 and 2019, the Ministry of Labor conducted 91 inspections of labor placement agencies in nine states and imposed 12 fines for about 153,000 dollars, but did not fine any recruiters of seasonal workers. Furthermore, the records of the Federal Court of Conciliation and Arbitration do not contain labor lawsuits for breach of that regulation.

Mexico is a party to the International Labor Organization (ILO) Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention, which it apparently violates in the case of temporary workers.

In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) does not know how many H-2A workers it has assisted through consular services. Likewise, it does not know how many complainants it has advised.

The Mexican consulate in Denver, Colorado received three labor complaints, dated Jul. 25, Aug. 12 and Oct. 28, 2021, which it referred to “specialized allies in the matter, who provided the relevant advice to the interested parties,” according to an SRE response to a request for information from IPS.

The consulate in Washington received “anonymous verbal reports” on labor issues, which it passed on to civil society organizations so that “the relevant support could be provided.”

Consular teams were active in some parts of the US in 2021. For example, Mexican officials visited eight corporations between May and September 2021 in Denver, Colorado.

In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania they visited 12 companies between April and August, 2021. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin they visited 26 companies between June 2021 and April of this year, and in Washington, DC six workplaces were visited between August and October 2021. However, the results of these visits are unknown.

Mexico, meanwhile, is in non-compliance with the ILO’s “General principles and operational guidelines for fair recruitment” of 2016.

These guidelines stipulate that hiring must be done in accordance with human rights, through voluntary agreements, free from deception or coercion, and with specific, verifiable and understandable conditions of employment, with no attached charges or job immobility.

Ariel Ruiz, an analyst with the U.S.-based Migration Policy Institute, is concerned about the expansion of the H-2A visa program without improvements in rights.

“There are labour rights violations before the workers arrive in the US, in recruitment there are often illegal payments, and we keep hearing reports of employers intimidating workers,” he told IPS from Washington.

“There are also problems in access to health services and legal representation” in case of abuse, added the analyst from the non-governmental institute.

Judicialization

In the last decade, at least 12 lawsuits have been filed in US courts by program workers against employers.

Muñoz, the expert from Oregon, said the trials can help reform the system.

“There have been cases that have resulted in visas for trafficking victims. But it is difficult to see changes in the United States. They may be possible in oversight. Legal changes have arisen because of wage theft from workers,” she said.

López, of Polaris, said the lawsuits were a good thing, but clarified that they did not solve the systemic problems. “What is needed is a root-and-branch reform of the system,” she said.

The United States has made trade union freedom in Mexico a priority. Peña asked that it also address the H-2A visa situation.

“If they’re serious about improving labor rights, they can’t ignore the responsibility they have for migrant workers. It’s like creating a double standard,” she said.

With regard to the expansion of the temporary visa program to Central Americans, the experts consulted expressed concern that it would lead to an increase in abuses.

This article was produced with support from the organizations Dignificando el Trabajo and the Avina Foundation’s Arropa Initiative in Mexico.

Electricity generation in the city of La Paz in the northwestern state of Baja California Sur depends primarily on a thermoelectric plant that burns fuel oil, a highly polluting fuel. The Mexican government plans to replace it with gas. CREDIT: Cerca

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Jun 30 2022 (IPS)

Liquefied gas does not occupy a prominent position in Mexico’s energy mix, but the government wants to change that scenario, to take advantage of the crisis unleashed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the need for new sources of the fuel due to the sanctions against Russia.

The war modified the global outlook for gas by accentuating Europe’s dependence on natural gas and forcing it to look for other suppliers due to the sanctions against Russia. If prior to the war that began on Feb. 24 there was an oversupply and a lack of interest in financing gas projects, now the equation has changed radically.

ln addition to promoting the installation of private plants, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador announced on Jun. 11 the construction of a three billion dollar natural gas liquefaction plant in the southern state of Oaxaca, to be run by the state-owned Federal Electricity Commission (CFE).

A new gas pipeline to be laid between Oaxaca and Coatzacoalcos, in the southeastern state of Tabasco, will help feed the liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing plant using gas from the United States.

In July 2021, the Mexican government created the state-owned company Gas Bienestar, to sell the fuel at subsidized prices and thus cushion the impact of the international rise in fuel prices, driven by the increase in demand after the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has doubled since the invasion of Ukraine.

Mexico depends on U.S. gas for residential and industrial consumption, transported mostly by pipelines belonging to U.S. companies, which are now looking for ways to sell it in third party markets, re-exporting it from Mexico after liquefying it in processing plants built here.

But this model is criticized for chaining Mexico to gas in the long term and reinforcing dependence on fossil fuels, thus breaking with the commitment to an energy transition to decarbonize domestic consumption.

“This dependence is not sustainable,” Jaqueline Valenzuela, director of the non-governmental Center for Renewable Energy and Environmental Quality, told IPS from the northwestern city of La Paz. “What we are seeing is that we are receiving gas from fracking after the government promised to stop supporting that technology. It is incoherent.”

In La Paz, the capital of the state of Baja California Sur, most of the power generation depends on fuel oil, a highly polluting petroleum derivative that is also harmful to human health.

Since the 2013 energy reform, which opened the sector to private foreign and local capital, Mexico has become a recipient of gas from the United States, obtained through hydraulic fracturing (fracking), a technique that requires large amounts of polluting chemicals and water, and transported through pipelines.

A network of gas pipelines has been created in this country of 131 million people, with 27 state and private pipelines, for distribution over a territory of almost two million square kilometers.

The recipients of the gas are some 50 thermoelectric combined cycle plants – which burn gas to generate steam for electricity – and turbogas units, both state-owned and private.

Increasingly, however, the LNG processed in Mexico will also be destined for markets in other continents, which are now eager for suppliers that are not facing Western sanctions.

Opportunism

Among the beneficiaries of the new world gas scenario are Mexican facilities that receive the fuel, liquefy it and re-export it by ship, to take advantage of the rising cost of the material.

Four private plants supply LNG in the northeast and northwest of the country, mainly for thermoelectric plants and industrial consumption.

Since 2008, the private Energía Costa Azul (ECA), located in the municipality of Ensenada, Baja California, has been operating with a capacity of one billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas per day, owned by Infraestructura Energética Nova (IEnova), a Mexican subsidiary of the US company Sempra Energy, which invested some 1.2 billion dollars in the facility.

In the Port of Pichilingue, also in Baja California Sur, the terminal of the same name, with the capacity to process three million tons of LNG per year and owned by the U.S. company New Fortress, has been operating since July 2021. The processing plant supplies the derivative to a local thermoelectric plant.

In Manzanillo, in the western state of Colima, the KMS Terminal, owned by Korean and Japanese corporations, has been operating since 2012 with a capacity of 3.8 million tons per year.

On the other side of the country, in Altamira, in the northeastern state of Tamaulipas, the terminal of the same name, co-owned by the Dutch company Vopak and Enagás from Spain, has been operating since 2006 with a capacity of 5.7 million tons per year.

Mexico as a producer

Mexico is the 12th largest oil producer in the world and the 17th largest gas producer. In terms of proven crude oil reserves, it ranks 20th, and 41st in natural gas, but its hydrocarbon industry is declining due to the scarcity of easily extractable deposits.

In Mexico, Latin America’s second largest economy, between 2019 and May this year natural gas production ranged between 4.6 and 4.8 bcf per day, according to official data.

Extraction is lower than domestic demand and to balance the deficit Mexico imports gas, especially from the United States, from which it imported a maximum of 935 million and a minimum of 640 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d) over the last three years, according to figures from state-owned oil giant Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex).

In addition, LNG processing has been falling. In 2019, the country refined 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) equivalent, which fell to 84,000 in 2021. And in April 2022, the total dropped to 43,000 bpd.

Imports of LNG vary widely: Mexico imported almost 54 billion bpd in 2019, a total that fell by one billion in 2020 and rose to 67 billion bpd in 2021, dropping again to 27 billion bpd last April. In addition, it has not exported LNG since July 2020, due to the demand of the domestic market.

Meanwhile, U.S. pipeline exports to Mexico have quadrupled in recent years, according to data from the U.S. government’s Energy Information Administration.

“While the U.S. must help its allies in need, the ability of U.S. gas to provide reliable and affordable energy to the world is quite limited,” Tyson Slocum, director of the Energy Program at the nonprofit consumer advocacy organization Public Citizen, told IPS from Washington.

Slocum said that “our concern is that U.S. exports to Mexico will simply feed Mexican exports of liquefied gas.”

Addiction

The greed for gas attracts private and public companies alike. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has issued at least five permits to export LNG and to re-export it via Mexico since 2016. In addition, one project is under construction and three others are planned on Mexico’s Pacific coast.

IEnova and France’s TotalEnergies are building phase one of ECA, a plant with a capacity of 3.25 million tons of LNG per year with an investment of two billion dollars, scheduled to start operating in 2024. Meanwhile, phase two is under design, to produce an additional 12 million tons per year.

Mexico Pacific Limited LLC (MPL), owned by three U.S. private investment funds, is building another regasification plant in Puerto Libertad in the northwestern state of Sonora, with an investment of 2.5 billion dollars, which is projected to export 14 million tons of LNG annually to Asia.

The first stage is to begin in 2025, with 4.7 million tons, President López Obrador said at one of his morning press conferences.

In December 2018, the DOE authorized MPL to export up to 1.7 bcf per day from the future facility, an endorsement required to export the fuel from the U.S.

In addition, the Vista Pacifico LNG project planned by Sempra in Topolobampo, in the northwestern state of Sinaloa, is to transport fuel from the Permian Basin oil-and-gas-producing area in West Texas for re-export to Asia and Europe, in addition to several destinations in South America.

In April 2021 Vista Pacifico received permission from the DOE to export 40 bcf per year – 110 mcf per day – to Mexico. Of that total, 200 bcf of gas per year – 550 mcf per day – would be for liquefaction and re-export.

Last January, Mexico’s state-owned CFE and U.S.-based Sempra signed a voluntary memorandum of understanding for the probable construction of a plant for this purpose.

Also in Sinaloa, the private LNG Alliance of Singapore is building the Amigo LNG plant, which will begin operations in 2027 with the capacity to process 3.9 million tons per year.

“The country continues to bet on the fossil fuel extractivist model. We do not see another energy alternative being built in the face of the climate emergency,” complained Edmundo del Pozo, coordinator of the Territory, Rights and Development area of the non-governmental Fundar Center for Research and Analysis.

The expert told IPS that the modernization of hydroelectric plants and the strengthening of Pemex promoted by López Obrador since he took office in December 2018 have favored gas consumption.

“Continuing with fossil fuels is not an option. We are fighting for the inputs used to generate electricity to be local,” such as sunlight, said Valenzuela, the head of the non-governmental Center for Renewable Energy and Environmental Quality.

Lack of disclosure of contracts, payments and socio-environmental impacts characterize Mexico's coal industry. The picture shows workers at the Nueva Rosita coal mine in the northern state of Coahuila. CREDIT: Courtesy of Cristóbal Trejo

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, May 9 2022 (IPS)

In the northern Mexican state of Coahuila the current situation of coal, used mainly to generate electricity, is opaque.

A veil surrounds the industry in terms of production, consumption, inspections, pollution, contracts and the state of the mines that supply coal to two power plants belonging to the governmental Federal Electricity Commission (CFE).

In the southern state of Guerrero, another power plant uses coal from Australia and Colombia.

Cristina Auerbach, director of the non-governmental organization Familia Pasta de Conchos, said there is a veil of mystery surrounding the industry in Mexico.

“The system is not transparent. Sometimes the issue goes unnoticed, because at a global level coal in Mexico is insignificant. But it is so problematic that they can’t make it transparent because they can’t order transparency” in the country, she told IPS.

Her organization was created in 2006, following an explosion caused by methane accumulation that year at the Pasta de Conchos mine in Coahuila, which left 65 workers dead, 63 of whom were buried in the explosion and whose bodies have never been recovered.“With regard to coal…there is no national registry of how many pits there are. There have been complaints about illegal coal mining. The final results are quite poor. We don't know if it is lack of commitment, or a lack of interest in promoting transparency.” -- Sol Pérez

Coal is mined in Coahuila and Tamaulipas, in the north of this Latin American country. In December 2020, according to official figures, Mexico produced 459,414 tons of coal, which is highly polluting and harmful to human health.

But to meet domestic demand, the country imports about nine million tons per year.

Last March, coal-fired generation contributed more than 2,000 megawatts of electricity, three percent of the national total. In Coahuila, there are some 40 underground coal mines.

Ignored

Coal has been left out of the natural resource transparency schemes negotiated between the federal government and international civil society organizations in platforms such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Open Government Partnership (OGP).

EITI, created in 2003, brings together more than 50 countries and promotes open and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources. Mexico joined EITI in 2017 and is currently undergoing the first review of its compliance with the standards, a process that began last August and whose results are to be published in the coming months.

In Latin America, Colombia, a producer of hydrocarbons and coal, has the most advanced status, receiving a rating of “satisfactory progress” in implementing the EITI standards. The South American nation practices proactive transparency, issuing a biannual report.

Peru, another oil and gas producer, has made “significant progress,” according to the global transparency standard.

Argentina, Ecuador and Trinidad and Tobago are other hydrocarbon producers in the region that are also under evaluation, while Brazil and Venezuela do not belong to EITI.

The José López Portillo thermoelectric plant, owned by the governmental Federal Electricity Commission and located in the northern state of Coahuila, burns coal to generate energy in Mexico. CREDIT: CFE

OGP, founded in 2011, groups 78 nations and hundreds of civil society organizations. In Mexico, the 4th National Action Plan 2019-2021 revolves around 13 topics, including transparency in final beneficiaries of companies in the hydrocarbon and mining sector.

Transparency can help strengthen accountability, the fight against corruption, the evaluation of public policies and informed decision-making by stakeholders, such as local communities.

Sol Pérez, a researcher at the non-governmental Fundar, Centro de Análisis e Investigación, questions the lack of exhaustive information on fossil fuels.

“There is no effective access to information” in the state-owned oil giant Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), she told IPS.

“With regard to the issue of coal, the picture is very similar,” she added. “There is no national registry of how many pits there are. There have been complaints about illegal coal mining. The final results are quite poor. We don’t know if it is lack of commitment, or a lack of interest in promoting transparency.”

The “EITI-Mexico Shadow Report: Progress and Challenges in Socio-environmental Transparency”, published in May 2021, concluded that the government and companies have persisted in their refusal to disclose disaggregated socio-environmental information on the extractive sector.

The report, prepared by organizations participating in EITI, exposed phenomena such as the partial existence of data on royalty payments for the exploitation or use of national waters and the lack of complete files on environmental matters.

Another case addresses the unavailability of geo-referenced oil well locations.

The document found that out of 49 hydrocarbon contracts of EITI companies, only 10 include social impact assessments, while only two contain an environmental impact analysis.

Mexico ranks 12th in the world in oil production, 17th in gas extraction, 20th in proven crude oil reserves and 41st in proven natural gas deposits. But its position in the oil industry is declining due to the scarcity of easily extractable hydrocarbons.

Since 2020, hydrocarbon production has been dropping. In February 2020 oil extraction totaled 1.73 million barrels per day; the following year, 1.67 million; and last February, 1.63 million, according to the government’s National Hydrocarbons Commission.

Gas has followed a similar trajectory, with production totaling 4.93 billion cubic feet per day in February 2020; 4.838 billion cubic feet per day 12 months later; and 4.673 billion cubic feet per day last February.

The lack of sufficient domestic gas makes imports necessary, especially from the United States, which have been on the rise since 2020, after a drop between 2018 and 2019.

Imports of gas grew six percent between 2020 and 2021 – from 853 million cubic feet to 904.6 million. Last February, imports totaled 640 million, more than half the volume of the entire previous year.

View of a service station of the state oil giant Pemex in Mexico City. The company’s activities suffer from a lack of transparency and access to information, despite commitments in this regard made by the Mexican government. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Empty promises

For its part, OGP includes the development of a National Action Plan to drive beneficial ownership transparency and initiate the publication of such data from hydrocarbon and mining companies, with the aim of building a corporate Beneficial Ownership Register by 2023.

Actions included the preparation of a diagnosis of final beneficiaries in Mexico and a pilot project for the dissemination of information, which have been completed.

These examples show how little importance the Mexican government attaches to access to public information and transparency in the extractive sector.

In addition, they highlight the challenges ahead for the government in implementing the regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, in force since April 2021 and known as the Escazú Agreement.

In 2020, CFE purchased 1.58 million tons of coal through 60 direct contracts awarded to producers in the Coahuila coal region, without environmental and social impact assessments, as revealed last November by the non-governmental organization México Evalúa.

Although the country evolved in the Resource Governance Index, developed by the non-governmental Natural Resource Governance Institute, between 2019 and 2021, issues such as governance of social and environmental impacts still need to be improved.

“Governance of local impacts is poor, mainly due to opacity in the disclosure of environmental mitigation plans, which the government considers confidential,” the paper states.

Increased pressure

In 2021 and 2022, EITI priorities in Mexico include providing information about the energy transition, supporting open data, providing information on investment decisions, strengthening revenue mobilization, addressing corruption risks, and measuring impact.

In the design of OGP’s new action plan, which is to be ready in August, civil society wants to include a commitment to transparency in hydrocarbons, mining and electric energy.

Auerbach, the activist, complained that communities have become “sacrifice zones” in exchange for mining.

“They don’t care if we are informed or not, if we protest or not, it changes absolutely nothing,” she said. “There are environmental liabilities from 50 years ago, from 30 years ago or from last week. And that is not included. Whatever the CFE and Pemex say is fine and the rest just go along with it. Under this government, they are untouchable. The Ministry of the Environment says that it is going to review how the area will end up when they finish exploiting the concessions in 50 years.”

EITI’s alternative report suggested publishing information on environmental impact mitigation in priority maritime areas for biodiversity conservation that host oil projects and payments for environmental licenses, environmental taxes, non-compliance with regulations or environmental impacts.

Pérez said the Escazú Agreement offers an opportunity to promote transparency and access to information.

“The ideal conditions don’t exist, but Escazú is an opportunity. On the environmental issue, the lack of information is well identified. The lack of public commitment is worrisome. We can link EITI and Escazú,” she said.

Every other Tuesday, a working group of Mayan women meets to review the organization and progress of their food saving and production project in Uayma, in the state of Yucatán in southeastern Mexico. CREDIT: Courtesy of the Ko'ox Tani Foundation

By Emilio Godoy
UAYMA, Mexico , Apr 26 2022 (IPS)

Every other Tuesday at 5:00 p.m. sharp, a group of 26 Mexican women meet for an hour to discuss the progress of their work and immediate tasks. Anyone who arrives late must pay a fine of about 25 cents on the dollar.

The collective has organized in the municipality of Uayma (which means “Not here” in the Mayan language) to learn agroecological practices, as well as how to save money and produce food for family consumption and the sale of surpluses.

“We have to be responsible. With savings we can do a little more,” María Petul, a married Mayan indigenous mother of two and a member of the group “Lool beh” (“Flower of the road” in Mayan), told IPS in this municipality of just over 4,000 inhabitants, 1,470 kilometers southeast of Mexico City in the state of Yucatán, on the Yucatán peninsula.

The home garden “gives me enough to eat and sell, it helps me out,” said Petul as she walked through her small garden where she grows habanero peppers (Capsicum chinense, traditional in the area), radishes and tomatoes, surrounded by a few trees, including a banana tree whose fruit will ripen in a few weeks and some chickens that roam around the earthen courtyard.

The face of Norma Tzuc, who is also married with two daughters, lights up with enthusiasm when she talks about the project. “I am very happy. We now have an income. It’s exciting to be able to help my family. Other groups already have experience and tell us about what they’ve been doing,” Tzuc told IPS.

The two women and the rest of their companions, whose mother tongue is Mayan, participate in the project “Women saving to address climate change”, run by the non-governmental Ko’ox Tani Foundation (“Let’s Go Ahead”, in Mayan), dedicated to community development and social inclusion, based in Merida, the state capital.

This phase of the project is endowed with some 100,000 dollars from the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), the non-binding environmental arm of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), formed in 1994 by Canada, the United States and Mexico and replaced in 2020 by another trilateral agreement.

The initiative got off the ground in February and will last two years, with the aim of training some 250 people living in extreme poverty, mostly women, in six locations in the state of Yucatán.

The maximum savings for each woman in the group is about 12 dollars every two weeks and the minimum is 2.50 dollars, and they can withdraw the accumulated savings to invest in inputs or animals, or for emergencies, with the agreement of the group. Through the project, the women will receive seeds, agricultural inputs and poultry, so that they can install vegetable gardens and chicken coops on their land.

The women write down the quotas in a white notebook and deposit the savings in a gray box, kept in the house of the group’s president.

José Torre, project director of the Ko’ox Tani Foundation, explained that the main areas of entrepreneurship are: community development, food security, livelihoods and human development.

“What we have seen over time is that the savings meetings become a space for human development, in which they find support and solidarity from their peers, make friends and build trust,” he told IPS during a tour of the homes of some of the savings group participants in Uayma.

The basis for the new initiative in this locality is a similar program implemented between 2018 and 2021 in other Yucatecan municipalities, in which the organization worked with 1400 families.

María Petul, a Mayan indigenous woman, plants chili peppers, tomatoes, radishes and medicinal herbs in the vegetable garden in the courtyard of her home in Uayma, in the southeastern Mexican state of Yucatán. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Unequal oasis

Yucatan, a region home to 2.28 million people, suffers from a high degree of social backwardness, with 34 percent of the population living in moderate poverty, 33 percent suffering unmet needs, 5.5 percent experiencing income vulnerability and almost seven percent living in extreme poverty.

The COVID-19 pandemic that hit this Latin American country in February 2020 exacerbated these conditions in a state that depends on agriculture, tourism and services, similar to the other two states that make up the Yucatán Peninsula: Campeche and Quintana Roo.

Inequality is also a huge problem in the state, although the Gini Index dropped from 0.51 in 2014 to 0.45, according to a 2018 government report, based on data from 2016 (the latest year available). The Gini coefficient, where 1 indicates the maximum inequality and 0 the greatest equality, is used to calculate income inequality.

The situation of indigenous women is worse, as they face marginalization, discrimination, violence, land dispossession and lack of access to public services.

More than one million indigenous people live in the state.

Women participating in a project funded by the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation record their savings in a white notebook and deposit them in a gray box. Mayan indigenous woman Norma Tzuc belongs to a group taking part in the initiative in Uayma, in the southeastern Mexican state of Yucatán. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Climate crisis, yet another vulnerability

Itza Castañeda, director of equity at the non-governmental World Resources Institute (WRI), highlights the persistence of structural inequalities in the peninsula that exacerbate the effects of the climate crisis.

“In the three states there is greater inequality between men and women. This stands in the way of women’s participation and decision-making. Furthermore, the existing evidence shows that there are groups in conditions of greater vulnerability to climate impacts,” she told IPS from the city of Tepoztlán, near Mexico City.

She added that “climate change accentuates existing inequalities, but a differentiated impact assessment is lacking.”

Official data indicate that there are almost 17 million indigenous people in Mexico, representing 13 percent of the total population, of which six million are women.

Of indigenous households, almost a quarter are headed by women, while 65 percent of indigenous girls and women aged 12 and over perform unpaid work compared to 35 percent of indigenous men – a sign of the inequality in the system of domestic and care work.

To add to their hardships, the Yucatan region is highly vulnerable to the effects of the climate crisis, such as droughts, devastating storms and rising sea levels. In June 2021, tropical storm Cristobal caused the flooding of Uayma, where three women’s groups are operating under the savings system.

For that reason, the project includes a risk management and hurricane early warning system.

The Mexican government is building a National Care System, but the involvement of indigenous women and the benefits for them are still unclear.

Petul looks excitedly at the crops planted on her land and dreams of a larger garden, with more plants and more chickens roaming around, and perhaps a pig to be fattened. She also thinks about the possibility of emulating women from previous groups who have set up small stores with their savings.

“They will lay eggs and we can eat them or sell them. With the savings we can also buy roosters, in the market chicks are expensive,” said Petul, brimming with hope, who in addition to taking care of her home and family sells vegetables.

Her neighbor Tzuc, who until now has been a homemaker, said that the women in her group have to take into account the effects of climate change. “It has been very hot, hotter than before, and there is drought. Fortunately, we have water, but we have to take care of it,” she said.

For his part, Torre underscored the results of the savings groups. The women “left extreme poverty behind. The pandemic hit hard, because there were families who had businesses and stopped selling. The organization gave them resilience,” he said.

In addition, a major achievement is that the households that have already completed the project continue to save, regularly attend meetings and have kept producing food.

The Yucatán peninsula in southeastern Mexico has abundant solar and wind resources, but relies on fossil fuels for electricity generation. The photo shows a wind turbine belonging to the state-owned CFE next to a section of the power grid between Cancún and Puerto Morelos, in the state of Quintana Roo. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
MÉRIDA, Mexico , Apr 18 2022 (IPS)

At home, Isabel Bracamontes uses gas only for cooking. “We try to prepare food that doesn’t need cooking, like salads,” she says in the southeastern Mexican city of Mérida.

The 20-kilogram cooking gas cylinder lasts her between three and four months, and by using it less she saves money, since the price has increased in recent months. The electricity in her home comes from plants fired by gas that is essentially methane, which has 86 times more capacity to absorb heat than carbon dioxide over a period of 20 years, hence the danger it poses to the climate.

An environmental activist and mother of one, Bracamontes lives in a middle-class neighborhood where other families face a similar situation to hers with regard to gas.

The southeastern Yucatán peninsula, home to 5.1 million people, contributes almost five percent of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP), thanks to agriculture, tourism and services.

Comprised of the states of Campeche, Quintana Roo and Yucatán, of which Mérida is the capital, Yucatán receives enormous amounts of sun and wind but depends on gas to meet its electricity needs.

Tied to gas

Quietly, this fuel is spreading throughout the peninsula, which is particularly vulnerable to droughts, intense storms and rising sea levels – symptoms of the climate crisis, one of the main causes of which is the burning of fossil fuels.

The peninsula receives gas through the Mayakán pipeline, a 780-kilometer pipeline owned by the Italian company Engie. The gas is injected from Ciudad Pemex, in the state of Tabasco, adjacent to the west of the peninsula, and the pipeline has been in operation since 1999.

In 2020, the Cuxtal I expansion also came into operation, with a 16-kilometer pipeline which connects to the Cactus Gas Processing Complex in the state of Chiapas, to the south of the peninsula.

The government’s Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE) purchases gas from the state-owned oil giant Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) to deliver it to its thermoelectric plants Lerma in Campeche, Valladolid and Mérida II in Yucatán, as well as to the private combined cycle plants Mérida III and Valladolid III, which operate with gas and steam.“The big problem is the direction the energy sector is headed. It's not what the transition needs. Climate action is full of false solutions, like trying to fight climate change with gas." -- Pablo Ramírez

The peninsula has a generation capacity of 2455 megawatts (MW), of which combined cycle thermoelectricity contributes 1463, turbogas 368, conventional thermal 314, wind 244, solar 50, and internal combustion 14, according to the U.S. government’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL).

According to official Mexican data, five solar and wind farms are operating in the state of Yucatán alone. But communities opposed to renewable initiatives have managed to block at least six other projects of this type, due to their environmental impact and the failure to carry out consultations with local indigenous residents.

In December, the state of Yucatán was the sixth of the 32 Mexican states with the highest number of contracts for the installation of residential solar panels of less than 0.5 MW, with 12,458 producing a total of 89 MW. Quintana Roo had 3969 that produced 27 MW, while Campeche was the state with the fewest, with 1515 producing 11 MW, according to figures from the official Energy Regulatory Commission.

The national total amounted to 270,506 producing 2,031 MW.

In the entire peninsula, the CFE requires about 340 million cubic feet of gas per day for its plants in this region, while total demand is about 500 million, including 160 million for industry and commerce, according to the Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce, Services and Tourism.

A map of the Yucatán peninsula on the Caribbean Sea in southeastern Mexico shows the route of the 780-kilometer Mayakán pipeline, which carries natural gas from the state of Tabasco to the three states of that region. CREDIT: Sener

Running against the current on fossil fuels

Pablo Ramírez, Energy and Climate Change specialist with environmental watchdog Greenpeace Mexico, questioned the expansion of gas in Yucatán and the rest of the country.

“The big problem is the direction the energy sector is headed. It’s not what the transition needs. Climate action is full of false solutions, like trying to fight climate change with gas,” he told IPS from Mexico City.

Mexico is the 12th largest oil producer in the world and the 17th largest gas producer. In terms of proven reserves, it ranks 20th for crude oil and 41st for natural gas, but its hydrocarbon industry is declining due to the scarcity of easily extractable deposits.

In February, 75 percent of electricity generation was based on fossil fuels, followed by wind energy (7.5 percent), hydroelectric (7.0 percent), solar (4.94 percent), nuclear energy (4.23 percent), geothermal (1.56 percent) and biomass (0.07 percent), according to data from the non-governmental Energy Transition Observatory in Mexico.

In decline

Gas production has been declining in Latin America’s second largest economy. In February 2020, according to official data, extraction totaled 4.93 billion cubic feet per day, and had dropped to 4.83 billion 12 months later, and to 4.67 billion in February 2022.

The shortfall forces the country to import gas, especially from the United States, from which it has imported a maximum of 904.6 million and a minimum of 640 million cubic feet every February over the last three years.

For its distribution over a territory of almost two million square kilometers, a network of gas pipelines has been laid in this country of 131 million inhabitants, with 27 state and private pipelines. In addition, the construction of three others has been halted due to opposition from the communities through which they would run.

The recipients of the gas are 50 thermoelectric, combined cycle and turbogas plants, both state-owned and private. In addition, six more combined cycle plants, using two thermal sources, gas and steam, are under construction.

This shows how Mexico has tied itself to gas, despite its climatic effects, and the difficulties of abandoning it in the future, since this infrastructure has a useful life of decades. It also raises questions regarding the increase in international gas prices, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The use of solar energy is still limited on the Yucatán peninsula, despite the high levels of solar radiation. The photo shows a hotel with solar panels on its roof in the city of Playa del Carmen, in Quintana Roo, one of the three states of Mexico’s southeastern region. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Transition halted

In Mexico, the energy transition has been paralyzed since 2019 due to the policies of the government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, which have favored fossil fuels and hydroelectric power plants, to the detriment of new clean energies.

In September 2021, López Obrador presented a legal proposal to annul the 2013 reforms that opened the power industry up to domestic and foreign private participation, so that the public sector would resume the direction of strategic planning in the industry.

The projected changes favor the CFE and prop up gas as the preeminent source of electricity.

At the national level, in January, the CFE directly awarded the construction of six combined cycle plants that would come into operation in 2024, to provide a total of 4,000 MW, with an investment of 3.4 billion dollars.

In the case of the Yucatán peninsula, the CFE would need 200 million cubic feet of gas per day for two new combined cycle plants in Mérida and Valladolid, with a capacity of 1519 MW, considering the projected annual growth in demand of between 3.2 and 3.5 percent.

Meanwhile, the peninsula is wasting its available renewable resources.

The US-based NREL reports that Campeche has a solar potential of 727,502 MW and wind power of 1599 MW; Yucatán, 757,820 and 6125, respectively; and Quintana Roo, 168,029 and 2035.

For the peninsula, the NREL suggested organizing regional clean energy auctions based on competitive renewable energy zones, introducing energy efficiency programs for government buildings and small businesses, designing energy procurement mechanisms for government buildings, and encouraging the deployment of renewable energy in local communities.

Bracamontes, the Mérida environmentalist and representative of the global youth movement Fridays for Future Mexico in Yucatán, criticized the waste of renewable energy potential.

“There are many alternatives to take advantage of the sun and wind and solid waste, the disposal of which the state has not solved,” she said. “We ignore all that potential. We must analyze what is best for us and what has the least impact. If we are still married to the idea that fossil fuels are the only way, we are wrong. Sunshine is free.”

The local population also faces energy instability under the current energy scheme. For example, the neighborhood where Bracamontes lives, in western Mérida, suffered three short blackouts in one week.

Like other cities on the peninsula, Mérida also has high electricity rates, even with public subsidies, and unstable electricity generation.

Greenpeace’s Ramírez said the winners of the electricity counter-reform are Pemex and the gas companies.

“The possibility of making a transition to renewable sources and distributed generation is erased,” he said. “We are talking about a model that has serious implications for health, air, soil and water pollution, and climate externalities, which are not in the equation.”

In the photo, people in several vehicles inspect a section of the Mayan Train, the flagship megaproject of Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, near the city of Valladolid, in the southeastern Yucatán peninsula, seat of the second most fragile jungle massif in Latin America, after the Amazon rainforest. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
PLAYA DEL CARMEN, Mexico , Apr 8 2022 (IPS)

Along the wide slash of white earth in southwestern Mexico there are no longer trees or animals. In their place, orange signs with white stripes warn visitors: “Heavy machinery in motion,” “No unauthorized personnel allowed”.

Five tractors spread over the terrain, like intimidating metallic guards with sharp teeth. Two blue portable toilets keep them mute company, two white cans overflow with garbage, and a white and solitary awning attempts to protect them from the punishing sun.

The metal teeth tear up the jungle carpet on land in the Río Secreto ejido – an area of communal land used for agriculture – south of the city of Playa del Carmen. With a population of 305,000, Playa del Carmen is the seat of the municipality of Solidaridad, in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo, some 1,600 kilometers from Mexico City, on the Yucatán peninsula.

The new 90-meter gap in the jungle opens the way for the 120-kilometer southern route of Section 5 of the Mayan Train (TM), the most ambitious megaproject of the government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who wants at all costs for the locomotives to blow their horns by late 2023."Hundreds of hectares are being deforested. We are going to end up with new cities or existing ones are going to grow. This could be a tragedy of enormous proportions, because the ecosystems are being disturbed. Simply by removing vegetation cover, the capacity of water systems to capture and filter water is altered.” -- Lorenzo Álvarez

Mina Moreno, an independent environmental conservationist, describes Section 5, one of the seven sections of the project, as “illegal and opaque”.

“There are no studies, there is no information as to why the route was changed, what is behind the new route. The problem is what the railway will bring with it: it’s a Trojan horse for what is coming behind,” she told IPS.

The project, under the responsibility of the government’s National Tourism Development Fund (Fonatur), has suffered delays and cost overruns since construction began in 2020 and will have environmental, social, cultural and labor impacts, as IPS saw during a tour of several areas along the route.

With seven sections running through the Yucatan peninsula and part of the southeast, the plan is for the Mayan Train, with 21 stations and 14 stops, to cover a distance of some 1,500 kilometers. The railroad will pass through 78 municipalities in the southern and southeastern states of the country: Campeche, Quintana Roo, Yucatán, Chiapas and Tabasco, which are home to a combined total of more than 13 million people.

The first three are located in the Yucatan Peninsula, which has one of the most important and fragile Mexican ecosystems and the second largest jungle massif in Latin America, after the Amazon rainforest.

It is here that around 80 percent of the TM railway will run, whose locomotives will pull wagons carrying thousands of tourists and cargo, such as transgenic soybeans, palm oil and pork, the main agricultural products from the peninsula.

The Mexican government is promoting the president’s flagship megaproject as an engine of social development that is to create jobs, boost tourism beyond the traditional attractions and bolster the regional economy. But these arguments have sparked conflicts between its supporters and critics.

UN Habitat, which is providing technical advice on the project’s land use planning, believes that the railway will create one million jobs by 2030 and will lift 1.1 million people out of poverty in an area with 42 municipalities with high rates of poverty and marginalization. (The estimates were made prior to the COVID-19 epidemic that hit Latin America’s second-largest economy hard.)

The Mayan Train, which will run 1,500 kilometers through five states in southern and southeastern Mexico, threatens ecosystems and tourist attractions, such as subterranean caves and cenotes. The photo shows tourists swimming in the cenote Azul, on the outskirts of Playa del Carmen, in the southeastern state of Quintana Roo on the Yucatan Peninsula. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

One land, two faces

The TM, built with public funds, requires 1,681 hectares of land, which implies the cutting of 300,000 trees, according to the original environmental impact study. The construction of the first three sections, which require 801 hectares, began without environmental permits.

The western route is causing social, cultural and land-ownership conflicts, while the eastern route will cause greater environmental damage.

López Obrador denies that the railway will lead to deforestation, and promised the creation of three natural parks in eastern Quintana Roo and the reforestation of some 2,500 hectares.

But available information shows that the megaproject is moving ahead with construction while leaving environmental management plans behind.

This is seen in a close look at the 2020 public accounts of the Chief Audit Office of Mexico – the comptroller of the public treasury – on the budget and execution of the TM. The office concluded that the project lacks a master plan and the necessary resources to guarantee sustainable development and environmental protection.

It also documented an increase in cost from 7.3 billion dollars in 2019 to 8.8 billion the following year, and found that there was no explanation for the expenditure of about 13 million dollars.

Moreover, the megaproject only advanced one-fifth of what was planned in 2019 and 2020, a bad omen for the president’s plans, although the rate of progress in 2021 and the first quarter of 2022 is not known.

But it is clear that Fonatur decided to step on the accelerator to fulfill the president’s promise and that the last two sections may be built with the participation of the army in the middle of the jungle. It is also clear that López Obrador does not want to inaugurate the TM until the entire line is completed.

The Federal Prosecutor’s Office for Environmental Protection (PROFEPA) did not inspect the works in 2020, nor has it done so for section 5, as stated in a request for access to public information filed by IPS.

The porous karst soil of the peninsula has sabotaged the government’s plans and deadlines, as it has forced Fonatur to change the design several times. For example, section 5 underwent three modifications from January 2021 to January 2022.

In the Mexican municipality of Solidaridad, whose municipal seat is Playa del Carmen, on the Yucatán peninsula, the construction of one of the seven sections of the Mayan Train has deforested at least 10 kilometers of jungle. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

The megaproject contains contradictions, because while the government promises sustainable tourism in other areas of the peninsula, the railway threatens the local sustainable tourism attractions, such as the cenotes, the caves and the entire ecosystem.

In the Yucatan Peninsula there are some 7,000 cenotes – freshwater sinkholes resulting from the collapse of limestone bedrock that exposes groundwater. Between Playa del Carmen and Tulum, cities only 61 kilometers apart, there are 13 of these ecosystems.

In the entire state of Quintana Roo there are at least 105 flooded caves over 1,500 meters in length and 408 underwater caves.

The TM threatens the largest system of subterranean rivers and flooded caves on the planet, a complex of submerged caves more than 340 kilometers long beneath the limestone floor.

From land to sea

Lorenzo Álvarez, a researcher at the Academic Reef Systems Unit of the Institute of Marine Sciences and Limnology at the public National Autonomous University of Mexico, says that as a regional development project, the railway will be “catastrophic”.

“Hundreds of hectares are being deforested,” he told IPS. “We are going to end up with new cities or existing ones are going to grow. This could be a tragedy of enormous proportions, because the ecosystems are being disturbed. Simply by removing vegetation cover, the capacity of water systems to capture and filter water is altered.”

The consequences: water with more sediment in the reefs, waste, leachates and more pollution.

That is the vision that the visitor gets looking at the map from inland to the coast in Puerto Morelos, in the north of Quintana Roo, which has suffered a real estate invasion, to the extent that the reefs have been mortally wounded. They are part of the Mesoamerican Reef, the second largest in the world, after Australia’s Great Barrier Reef.

The fear in this former fishing village, which is now the largest port on the so-called Riviera Maya with 27,000 inhabitants, is that the TM will exacerbate the real estate boom. But most locals are unaware of the danger.

The Mayan Train will run through the outskirts of Puerto Morelos, seen in the distance in the photo. Located 38 kilometers from Cancun and forming part of the so-called Riviera Maya, this former fishing village is now a port city with real estate encroachment that has damaged the reefs off its coast. The railroad could spell the end for the fragile ecosystem. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

“Construction hasn’t started yet,” Fabiola Sánchez, an activist with the non-governmental group United Voices of Puerto Morelos, told IPS. “There has been no tangible damage here, as in other municipalities, but we know the environmental implications. Our aim is prevention, because we are going to suffer the same environmental effects.”

The activists’ concern is focused on the 2020-2030 Urban Development Program, which they accuse of favoring hotel and real estate interests to the detriment of citizen participation and sustainable planning on a coastline already stressed by excessive tourism.

And, above all, they accuse it of favoring construction of the new railway.

Through legal appeals, opponents of the program have managed to bring it to a halt, but they are witnessing construction without land use planning in other municipalities.

The Mayan Train megaproject includes the construction of sustainable cities (formerly called development poles) around the stations, which include businesses, drinking water, drainage, electricity and urban equipment.

The Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (Semarnat) itself warns that these poles may represent the greatest environmental threat from the railway line.

The sustainable cities should promote “well-managed urban planning” and should help reduce the backlog of local and regional services, according to the official website.

“Considering climatic conditions, efficient use of water, energy and integrated management of solid waste…and respecting natural conditions, affecting ecosystems as little as possible,” are essential, Semarnat stated.

But the construction work on the ground and the lack of urban development plans contradict these precepts.

In any case, the railway’s route does not seem to be set up for the benefit of excursionists and local workers, as its planned stations are far from tourist sites and work centers. Passengers would have to use other means to travel to these places.

In addition, the popular perspective values supposed future returns, such as jobs and income, over current and potential harms, like deforestation.

There have also been labor abuses. Section 5 workers earn about 39 dollars a week – less than the minimum daily wage of 8.5 dollars – and work without protective equipment and without signed contracts, as IPS learned.

Furthermore, there has been arbitrary treatment of “ejidatarios” or local residents of ejidos, since in Campeche the authorities paid about 2.5 dollars per square meter of expropriated land, while in Quintana Roo the price rose to about 25 dollars.

The threat of collapse is not merely an apocalyptic proclamation, environmentalists insist. They quote the closing line of the novel La vorágine (1924), by Colombian writer José Eustasio Rivera, a Latin American classic: “The jungle swallowed them up”, in allusion to the fate of its characters, and they say the same thing could happen to the TM.

A technician dressed to withstand the freezing temperatures holds a tray of seeds in the Seeds of the Future gene bank. The last phase of the process consists of storing the bags of classified seeds in a room with a temperature of -18 degrees Celsius, awaiting shipment to those interested in using them, from the headquarters of the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) in Palmira, in southwestern Colombia. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
PALMIRA, Colombia , Mar 30 2022 (IPS)

As he points to a white shelf that holds bean seeds, Austrian biologist Peter Wenzl explains that one of them, obtained in Ecuador, provided a gene for the discovery that major seed protein arcelin offers resistance to the bean weevil.

The finding made it possible to develop varieties tolerant to this common pest and thus avoid substantial losses in one of the crops that feed humanity.

“Our aim is to do research, to understand the development of improved varieties. The seed bank is genetic insurance for the future,” said the biologist, who directs the germplasm bank of the Alliance of the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) and Biodiversity International.

They are two of the 15 scientific centers of the CGIAR, formerly the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, a consortium of food research organizations promoting food security that is based in Montpellier, France.

The new gene bank, Seeds of the Future, was inaugurated on Mar. 16 with the presence of Colombian President Iván Duque, in an event that also announced a donation of 16 million dollars from the Bezos Earth Fund, created by the founder of U.S. e-commerce giant Amazon, Jeff Bezos.

The facility represents an architectural, environmental and technological leap forward from the previous bank operated by CIAT in the town of Palmira in the southwestern Colombian department of Valle del Cauca.

Founded in 1973, the former seed bank already stored the largest number of cassava (Manihot esculenta), bean and tropical forage seeds on the planet.

Seeds of the Future, the name of the new gene bank, seeks to safeguard global crop diversity and protect the future of food, as well as to study and understand genetic traits to discover more nutritious crops that are resistant to pests and to the effects of the climate crisis.

It also aims to share seeds, information and technology with partners and vulnerable farmers around the world.

The new seed bank, whose construction began in 2018 with an investment of 17 million dollars, has seed modules, a digital laboratory, a seed health laboratory and a laboratory for in vitro testing of cassava.

Of this total, the Alliance contributed 11 million dollars, the Colombian government provided three million dollars and several donors made up the rest. It employs some 60 people, while around 900 work at the center.

In addition, the new facility plans to deep freeze seeds by means of cryopreservation using liquid nitrogen, for long-term storage.

During a tour of the new seed bank by a small group of journalists, including IPS, Wenzl said that with the new facilities there will be more capacity for storage, research and new projects.

The new germplasm bank Seeds of the Future, inaugurated on Mar. 16 in Palmira, in the southwestern Colombian department of Valle del Cauca, has eco-technologies such as rainwater harvesting, a water recycling system and solar panels. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Faced with the effects of the climate emergency on agriculture, such as higher temperatures, intense droughts and the proliferation of pests, the work of the gene bank shows the importance of adaptation, such as safeguarding the best seeds, and the search for improved varieties.

In fact, in its report on impacts, adaptation and vulnerability to the climate crisis, released on Feb. 28, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) called for greater diversity in food production.

The IPCC’s demand arises from the fact that climate risks go beyond drought, since by the end of this century almost a third of the world’s crop fields will be unfit for production unless the world reduces polluting emissions.

Since its creation, the bank has distributed more than 500,000 samples from 141 countries to more than 160 nations.

It has done so on the basis of 37,938 bean varieties (46 species from 112 nations), 23,100 forage varieties (734 variants from 75 countries) and 6,600 cassava varieties (the largest number in the world, with more than 30 species from 28 countries).

The material belongs to the nations of origin, but the samples are freely available.

The gene bank also has wild varieties of five domesticated bean species and germplasm from 40 wild specimens. The cassava collection has 250 genotypes of wild species. More than a third of the tuber’s diversity comes from Colombia and almost a quarter from Brazil.

The operations at the new headquarters will strengthen the work with similar collections, such as the 100 gene banks operating in Mexico, 88 in Peru, 56 in Brazil, 47 in Argentina and 25 in Colombia.

The process of storing seeds with the embryos of future plants in the new facility in Palmira, in southwestern Colombia, begins with the analysis of their characteristics, as practiced by researcher Mercedes Parra at the Seeds of the Future gene bank. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Laborious process

When material arrives from a university, scientific center or grower group, researchers examine its characteristics to verify that it meets quality and biosafety requirements. They then inspect its genetic structure, in a first step to reveal properties that can lead to resistance to pests or drought or to better yields.

This information goes to the center’s database and to the digital laboratory equipment, which performs technological feats to collate, sift and correlate the information. The last step consists of vacuum storage in small bags at -18 degrees Celsius, in a process that takes three to four months.

The bank only collects single seeds, to make the effort of safeguarding the germplasm – of which it creates three backup copies – efficient.

It shares each one with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, another CGIAR partner located in central Mexico, epicenter of the so-called green revolution that increased food production in the developing world at the cost of polluting the soil with synthetic fertilizers.

It also sends another to the Global Seed Vault, the Noah’s Ark of future food built in 2008 and located on the Norwegian island of Spitsbergen in the remote Arctic Svalbard archipelago, and managed by the Norwegian government, the Global Crop Diversity Trust and the Nordic Genetic Resource Center.

CIAT, with 400 hectares of land in the municipality of Palmira, near the city of Cali, Colombia’s third largest city in terms of population and economy, has 22 hectares planted with cassava, two with beans and another 10 with forage plants, to test techniques to improve these crops.

CIAT incorporates cutting-edge technology, such as the autonomous robot “Don Roberto”, in a collaboration with Mineral, a sustainable agriculture project of X, the innovation plant of the U.S. transnational Alphabet, parent company of Google. Don Roberto collects data on the status of beans and other seeds critical to global food security. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

In addition, the center has four other research sites on farms in the area to study crops and silvopastoral systems.

A seed holds ancestral secrets and is at the same time memory and inheritance, a reminder of what its family was and a potential announcement of what it can be.

The seed bank also contains a paradox, since the basis of its collection dates back to a time when anyone could appropriate a material and take it far from its place of origin.

But with the advent of biodiversity and species protection treaties in the 1990s, this flow, also intended to safeguard that same biological wealth, stopped.

Today, 20 species are the basis of the world’s food supply, due to the concentration and assimilation of previously more diverse diets. Historically, humankind has used 5,000 species, but another 369,000 could serve as food.

“Many of these materials have been lost in agriculture. In Valle del Cauca there are no longer bean or cassava crops, only sugarcane,” said Daniel Debouck, director emeritus of the germplasm bank.

Another view of the new state-of-the-art building that houses the Seeds of the Future gene bank in Palmira, in southwestern Colombia, at the headquarters of the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), where the seeds of the world’s agricultural future are stored in times of uncertainty due to the climate crisis. CREDIT: Courtesy of Ciat-Biodiversity International Alliance

The data revolution in agriculture

One of CIAT’s innovations consists of the use of massive data and artificial intelligence, i.e. the use of computer codes to process the information.

“We work to avoid duplication of seeds and to interconnect the data to improve varieties. If the data yield important information on genes, they can be used for genome editing (cutting out harmful genes),” seed bank researcher Mónica Carvajal told IPS.

Of the total number of materials, 7,000 already have a complete digital sequence; in the case of beans, only 400. This year, the team is concentrating on the series of the entire collection of the common bean (Phaseolus vulgaris) and the tepary bean (Phaseolus acutifolius), native to the southwestern United States and northwestern Mexico and more resistant to dry climates than the common bean.

“We are interested in finding resistance to heat and drought,” the expert said.

Information from digital sequencing has gained relevance in recent years, due to the advances made by information technology. In fact, CGIAR has a big data platform in place to enhance collaboration between its partners and research.

As part of its strategy to link research and consumption, the Alliance is developing a project to biofortify rice, beans and corn with iron and zinc. Since 2016, they have released more than 40 bean varieties in Central America and Colombia, benefiting some 500,000 people. In Colombia, they have distributed two types of beans, one of rice and one of corn.

The seed bank building holds Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design certification from the U.S. Green Building Council and the Living Building Challenge from the Seattle-based International Living Future Institute.

Among its innovations, it operates with a rainwater harvesting system that meets its water needs, backed by a water recycling scheme; solar panels that provide half of the electricity; and a pergola made of certified wood that prevents heat accumulation.

One phase of Colombia's sugarcane agroindustrial production consists of burning bagasse to generate biofuels. In the picture, workers arrange sugarcane waste in a field in the municipality of El Cerrito, in the southwestern department of Valle del Cauca. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
BOGOTA, Mar 17 2022 (IPS)

As a visitor drives across the plains of the department of Valle del Cauca in southwestern Colombia, green carpets dominate the view: sugarcane fields that have been here since the area got its name.

The long tentacles of dirt roads draw the visitor into the thicket of golden-crested flowering green plants, which will be cut to ground level in a few months, the start of an industrial process and the restart of an annual agricultural cycle.

But this crop has left a lasting and damaging imprint on the soils, some of the most fertile in this South American nation of 51.7 million people.

Irene Vélez, an academic at the public University del Valle, said legislative changes and the opening of the market to imported sugar have led to the shift from sweetener to fuel.

“One of the consequences of this process is the expansion of the agricultural frontier to other regions of the country, because the land is cheaper and there is a different system of relations between landowners and the agro-industrial sector,” she told IPS from the Portuguese city of Coimbra, where she is doing post-doctoral studies.

Along with sugar and molasses for industrial consumption, sugarcane also provides ethanol or ethyl alcohol, which by law has been blended since 2005 in a volume of 10 percent per liter of gasoline in Colombia.

Proponents argue that this biofuel helps curb dependence on oil, and improves the octane rating of gasoline by oxygenating, which reduces urban pollution.

But in contrast, a vehicle consumes more blended fuel for the same trip due to its lower calorific value than gasoline and, the higher the mix, the higher the emission of the carcinogens formaldehyde and acetaldehyde and ozone, especially in winter, which cause respiratory problems, according to a 2007 study by researchers at Stanford University in the United States.

Colombia is the world’s 15th largest sugarcane producer, supplying 22.87 million tons of milled sugarcane per year, according to data from 2021, when it fell by a slight three percent compared to the previous year, according to data from the Sugarcane Association (Asocaña), which groups sugarcane producers.

In parallel, the country refined 396 million liters of ethanol in 2021, 0.5 percent less than the previous year. But domestic production does not meet demand, so last year it imported an additional 64 million liters, mostly from the United States, a drop of almost 400 percent compared to a year earlier, according to Asocaña.

Colombia is the third largest ethanol producer in the region, after Brazil and Argentina. This South American nation extracts ethanol from sugarcane and biodiesel from palm oil. The industry enjoys tax exemptions and subsidies, thanks to the Sugar Price Stabilization Fund, which has been in operation since 2000.

The expansion of sugarcane cultivation in Colombia has its epicenter in the Cauca River valley, in the southwest of the country, and has left a trail of water exploitation, reduction of biodiversity and pollution from the use of pesticides and synthetic fertilizers, which is not compensated by the use of part of the crop to produce biofuels. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Problematic expansion

The appearance of ethanol on the energy scene extended the sugarcane frontier in Colombia and fortified the vertical integration of the industry.

In the Cauca River valley, where most of the country’s crop is concentrated, sugarcane covers more than 225,000 hectares, which “is close to the total area available for planting sugarcane” in the region, according to Asocaña.

There are 14 sugar mills operating in the area, which directly cultivate 25 percent of the fields, while buying the rest of the cane from some 2,750 producers. The average size of the 3,300 farms that supply the mills is 63 hectares. In addition, they operate 12 energy cogeneration facilities, powered by sugarcane bagasse.

But that expansion has left social, environmental, economic and cultural impacts on local communities, says the report “The Green Monster. Perspectives and Recommendations from the Black Communities of Northern Cauca, Colombia regarding the Sugar Sector in Colombia”, published in June 2021 by the non-governmental organizations Palenke Alto Cauca-PCN and the UK-based Forest Peoples Programme.

The main impacts include the effects on soil, rivers and groundwater due to the use of pesticides such as glyphosate, soil compaction caused by the intensive use of agricultural machinery, soil erosion, polluting emissions due to the practice of burning sugarcane fields before replanting, deforestation arising from the increase in the area planted, and the monopolization of water sources.

The expansion of large-scale sugarcane plantations in Valle del Cauca has resulted in loss of land, damage to water resources, health problems, displacement and violence.

Carlos Molina, director of the El Hatico nature reserve in the municipality of El Cerrito, in the southwestern Colombian department of Valle del Cauca, stands in the middle of a cut sugarcane field on his farm. He advocates the transition from conventional sugarcane to an organic crop that contributes to the use of biofuels for energy decarbonization. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Seeking more sustainable sugarcane production

Carlos Molina, legal representative and one of the owners of the El Hatico company, said it is possible to reverse the damage caused by sugarcane, as he gestured to the surrounding fields.

“If we don’t restore now, we are going to run out of fuel. If they don’t change things, producers are going to go bankrupt. The solution is to show the alternatives and offer incentives for transformation,” he told IPS during a tour of his farm’s sugarcane crop in the municipality of El Cerrito, in Valle del Cauca.

El Hatico is a 285-hectare farm, of which 110 hectares are used for organic sugarcane production and 76 hectares for 245 grazing dairy cows. Thanks to the farm’s sustainability, it has achieved nature reserve status.

Faced with the loss of income due to soil deterioration, in the early 1990s the owners began a shock therapy program to abandon irrigation, pesticides and synthetic fertilizers and introduce natural fertilizers and other agroecological practices.

“We made an abrupt transition and that cost us 30 percent of our production, then we recovered. Sustainable management and value-added improve yields,” said Molina, who belongs to the eighth generation of sugarcane growers in his family.

For example, a conventional hectare requires about 180 kilograms of nitrogen and 12 billion cubic meters of water per year, while an organic farm needs much less.

The legal framework for biofuels began in Colombia in 2001 with regulations on their use and the creation of incentives for their production, use, marketing and consumption. In 2004, another regulation expanded the conditions to stimulate the production and marketing of biofuels of plant and animal origin to obtain biodiesel.

Thus, the introduction of the blend began in 2005 with the E10 combination, while the production of biodiesel began in 2008, with the addition of five percent of this fuel.

That same year, the National Council for Economic and Social Policy, which brings together seven ministries and the governmental scientific sector, issued guidelines to promote the sustainable production of biofuels in the country, proposing strategies to this end.

As a result, sugarcane refineries for biofuels started up in 2006, six of which operate in Valle del Cauca and one in the central department of Meta.

In 2013, the blend of ethanol per liter of gasoline increased to 10 percent and that of biodiesel to 12 percent.

A sugarcane plantation in the municipality of El Cerrito, in the department of Valle del Cauca, in southwestern Colombia. Cutting, slashing and burning are the three steps of cultivation: cutting the sugarcane, harvesting the crop and setting fire to the residues, a practice that is harmful to the health of the soil and the air. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Pros and cons

The shift of sugarcane towards ethanol production is paradoxical, as the crop causes environmental impacts but the fuel reduces emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), the gas generated by human activities that is responsible for global warming.

Sugarcane ethanol reduces 74 percent of polluting emissions, compared to corn and canola ethanol – 45 percent and 25 percent, respectively – according to the 2012 study “Life Cycle Assessment of the Biofuels Production Chain in Colombia“, sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank and the national Ministry of Mines and Energy.

By law, ethanol emissions have had limits in the country since 2017. Data from the non-governmental Sugarcane Research Center for six mills indicate that the average in 2016 was 551 kilograms of CO2 per cubic meter of fuel and 558 in 2017.

These results were below the regulatory ceiling of 924 kilograms for 2017 and 889 for the following year. In 2021, the ceiling stood at 780 kilograms.

The sugarcane manufacturing process generates the greatest amount of pollution, with 249 kilos of CO2, followed by planting and harvesting (181 kilos), effluent treatment (89) and transportation to blending centers (39).

Biofuels, part of the NDC

In its 2020 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) update, Colombia pledged to reduce its emissions by 51 percent by 2030, down from 258 million tons of CO2 in 2015, the base year, to 169 million tons, mainly by combating deforestation.

Within this voluntary goal, Colombia pledged that at least 20 percent of its energy mix would be made up of biofuels by that year, subject to financial support from industrialized countries.

The independent Climate Action Tracker calls the NDC “highly insufficient”, as other approaches are needed, especially in energy and transportation. Although transportation accounts for 12 percent of the country’s total emissions, mitigation actions, such as the deployment of electric cars, are insufficient.

The Colombian government projects stable ethanol demand between 2022 and 2025, of about 60,000 barrels per day of the biofuel.

“The agroecological transition could be completed in three years, without any problem,” said Molina.

But Vélez disagreed. “It is associated with an agro-technological package that involves improved seeds that need pesticides, fertilizers and privatized seeds from transnational corporations. There is no point in switching from sugarcane to organic pineapple, for example. If land grabbing continues, we are not generating the necessary transition,” he said.

The Peñasquito mine, owned by U.S. company Newmont Goldcorp and located in the state of Zacatecas in northern Mexico, produces gold, silver, lead and zinc, the latter two of which are essential for the energy transition. CREDIT: Courtesy of Lucía Vergara

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Feb 22 2022 (IPS)

The debate in Mexico and at an international level is focused on certain minerals that are fundamental to the energy transition, such as cobalt, lithium and nickel. But there are other indispensable minerals that remain in the background.

In addition to lithium deposits, Mexico has proven resources of bismuth, copper, fluorspar, graphite, molybdenum and zinc, involved in one way or another in the different processes of the transition to a low-carbon economy.

Beatriz Olivera, founder of the non-governmental organization Energy, Gender and Environment, stressed that Latin America’s second largest economy has the mining potential to make this transition possible.

“But we have an extractive model, the mineral is extracted and developed elsewhere,” she said, criticizing Mexico’s current mining policies, and in particular the elements that take on special value on the path towards energy decarbonization, a formula to contain global warming.

“If these minerals are extracted, where is the value chain, the benefit for countries like Mexico? We are only going to be left with the negative consequences and sacrifice zones are going to be created to satisfy technologies in other parts of the world,” she said in an interview with IPS.

Olivera is co-author of a forthcoming report on Mexico’s strategic transition metals that identifies 23 minerals for applications such as electrical installations, solar and wind power plants, as well as energy storage devices such as batteries.

The group identified 803 mining projects, of which 237 have a mineral granted in concession that is usable in the transition, most of them inactive, but still in force.

Almost half are in the initial stage, nearly a third in exploration, 13 percent in pre-production and the rest are in pre-feasibility, expansion or closed.

Meanwhile, 58 of the ventures belong to companies from Canada, 29 from Mexico, 26 from the U.S., seven from Australia, three from the United Kingdom, one from China, and in 113 cases the origin of the company is unknown.

Only 10 percent of Mexico’s territory has been granted in concession for mining activities, but these resources are present almost everywhere in the country. Several of these minerals play a vital role in the energy transition to a low-carbon economy. Map: Mexican Ministry of Economy

Mexico’s mining portfolio

Mexico is currently the world’s leading silver producer and is also a major player in the 12 minerals market.

In 2020, the country ranked second in world fluorspar production, fifth in bismuth, molybdenum and lead, sixth in zinc, ninth in copper and tenth in manganese.

In 2020, Mexican deposits produced 1.07 million tons of fluorspar, 732,863 tons of copper, 688,461 tons of zinc, 260,390 tons of lead, 198,448 tons of manganese, 18,562 tons of molybdenum and 1844 tons of graphite, according to the official Statistical Yearbook of Mexican Mining.

The country has 38 clay deposits containing lithium, potassium, magnesium and sodium, of which at least 10 contain five billion tons of these minerals, although their extractive and economic viability has yet to be analyzed, independent expert José Parga told IPS.

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that Mexico has lithium reserves of 1.7 million tons.

Part of the government’s electricity reform proposal for the public sector to regain control of this industry includes the nationalization of lithium and the creation of a state-owned company to mine it.

Mexico has reserves of 53,000 tons of copper, 68,000 tons of fluorspar, 5,000 tons of manganese, 5,600 tons of lead and 19,000 tons of zinc, according to the USGS.

The mining law in force in Mexico since 1992 prohibits state-owned entities from mining discovered minerals, which in practice means the privatization of the sector, since the activity remains in their hands and the State merely regulates it.

Although there is no exploitation of cerium, dysprosium, erbium, scandium, europium, gadolinium, holmium, ytterbium, yttrium, lanthanum, lutetium, neodymium, praseodymium, promethium, samarium, terbium and thulium – the so-called rare earths, the set of 17 elements that have become fundamental for the transition – exploration is advancing for a project in the northern state of Coahuila.

In addition, zinc deposits could provide indium, gallium and germanium – other important elements for the energy transition that Mexico does not currently produce.

Most of the veins are located in the northern part of the country.

The manufacture of electric vehicles requires the use of several minerals that are abundant in Mexico. In the photo, an electric cab recharges its battery at a public station in a neighborhood on the south side of Mexico City. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Partially harnessed potential

Parga underscored Mexico’s potential, which has been only partially tapped.

“There is certainty that the materials are there, but they have not actually been the subject of an evaluation that would allow us to really know their potential and the eventual technical-economic viability of their exploitation,” he stated in his dialogue with IPS.

The expert said, “the first step to take advantage of the country’s mineral resources is to investigate their existence, quantify and classify them to make the best possible use.”

For at least a decade, international organizations have been warning about the consumption of raw materials for the energy transition, which could lead to their depletion or “peak consumption”.

In addition, the mining industry has triggered protests and resistance in communities throughout the country where it operates, due to the environmental damage caused, the low number of local jobs generated and its small contribution to the Mexican economy.

In fact, there are currently more than 50 conflicts between local populations and mining companies in the country.

In Mexico, the energy transition has been at a standstill since 2019 due to the policies of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who favors support for fossil fuels and hydroelectric power plants, to the detriment of renewable sources such as wind and solar.

Furthermore, this Latin American country, with a territory of 1.96 million square kilometers, 10 percent of which has been granted in concession to mining companies, lacks a national industry linked to the transition or a strategy for its development.

As a result, there is no production of wind turbines, solar cells or electric cars, as the raw material is exported and returns in the form of components to assemble solar panels or electric vehicles.

At a slow pace

However, there are already some attempts in the Mexican market, such as the assembly of electric units in the central state of Puebla, neighboring Mexico City.

In addition, the foreign ministry, with support from the University of California, launched on Feb. 8 the U.S.-Mexico Electrification Working Group, which seeks “to ensure a coordinated and strategic transition towards electromobility.”

In 2022, the parties will design a binational roadmap, which includes a diagnosis of the automotive sector in both countries and their opportunities in the electric transition. Electromobility refers to the introduction of vehicles that use electricity, instead of fossil fuels, and whose manufacture requires the so-called transition minerals.

But Mexico is undertaking this initiative without the National Electromobility Strategy, ready since 2018 but halted for “review” by the environment ministry under the López Obrador administration after it took office in December of that year.

Although some cities such as Mexico City have introduced electric urban transport vehicles, it is not yet a national trend. Moreover, the energy supply for these units still comes from fossil fuels.

Since 2016, the marketing of new hybrid and electric cars has increased fivefold in Mexico, according to the private consulting firm TResearch Mexico. In 2021, those sales exceeded 39,000 units, representing four percent of the total.

During the Glasgow Climate Summit in December, Mexico signed the Glasgow Agreement on Zero Emission Vehicles, signed by 37 countries, 46 metropolitan and regional governments, as well as 11 vehicle manufacturers, 28 fleet owners, 13 institutional investors in the automotive sector, two financial entities and 21 signatories from other segments, to eliminate the production of internal combustion vehicles between 2035 and 2040.

In January, fossil fuel-based generation in Mexico accounted for 76 percent of the total, followed by wind energy (seven percent), hydroelectric (6.67 percent), solar (4.4 percent), nuclear energy (3.87 percent), geothermal (1.55 percent) and biomass (0.07 percent), according to data from the non-governmental Observatory of the Energy Transition in Mexico.

Olivera and Parga highlighted the concerns about the role of minerals in the energy transition, both at the Mexican and global level.

“They are not necessarily going to be enough to make the transition to 100 percent renewable, we have to take it with a certain amount of moderation. But neither can we continue burning fossil fuels left and right,” said Olivera.

In her view, “there must be benefits for the people, with environmental and social controls, respect for the collective rights of peoples, mitigation measures for socio-environmental impacts and a fairer and more equitable distribution of benefits.”

For his part, Parga suggested building a value chain in Mexico that leads to the production of finished products, such as lithium batteries, and the participation of local communities in mining regions in the different stages of the production process.

“Apart from taking care of the ecological balance, preserving the environment and the cultural environment of the people and communities, it must also ensure that they obtain an economic benefit that allows them to raise their standard of living,” he argued.

The dilemma revolves around internal combustion vehicles, whose economic, environmental and health costs are high, and electric vehicles, whose footprint is also significant.

With a storage capacity of 580 million cubic meters and an irrigation target of 22,500 hectares, the Picachos dam in the state of Sinaloa, in northwestern Mexico, will also generate 15 megawatts of electricity. CREDIT: Conagua

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Feb 7 2022 (IPS)

The Mexican government is prioritizing the construction and modernization of mega water projects, without considering their impacts and long-term viability, according to a number of experts and activists.

Dams, reservoirs, canals and aqueducts are part of the new infrastructure aimed at ensuring water supply in areas facing shortages, but without addressing underlying problems such as waste, leaks, pollution and the impact of the climate crisis, like droughts.

One of the flagship projects is Agua Saludable para la Laguna (ASL), which will serve five municipalities in the northern state of Coahuila and four in the neighboring region of Durango, benefiting 1.6 million people.

Gerardo Jiménez, a member of the non-governmental Encuentro Ciudadano Lagunero – an umbrella group made up of 12 organizations of people from local communities – said the ASL initiative launched in 2020 neglects the structural causes of the water crisis, water pollution and the overexploitation of water sources.

“It focuses on effects, shortages and pollution. It is designed for a 25-year period and is based on a vulnerable source. There is illegal water extraction and contraband. It does not provide alternative solutions,” he told IPS from the city of Torreón.

Five of the eight aquifers in the area that provide water are overexploited. The Principal-Región Lagunera is the most important, supplying four cities.

The reservoir becomes cyclically deficient, as its annual extraction exceeds its recharge. In addition, the water contains arsenic above the limits established by Mexican regulations and the World Health Organization (WHO).

ASL includes the construction of a water treatment plant, with a capacity of 6.34 cubic meters (m3) per second, a diversion channel and an aqueduct to transport 200 million m3 per year from the Nazas River.

At a cost of 485 million dollars, the project is part of a network of new water infrastructure promoted by the National Water Commission (Conagua), Mexico’s water regulatory agency, several of which are being challenged by social organizations and communities, in some cases through the courts.

The project also includes a diversion dam, a pumping plant, storage tanks and distribution branches.

It will start operations in 2023 and will also harness runoff from the Francisco Zarco reservoir, popularly known as Las Tórtolas, and the Lázaro Cárdenas reservoir, known as El Palmito.

These reservoirs could reduce their water supply due to the drought that has affected the area in recent years. The lack of rain is plaguing half of Coahuila, a situation set to worsen in the coming months with the arrival of the dry season.

Both dams are almost overflowing at present, but that level should change when the dry season starts.

Conagua’s budget has recovered from previous years, from 1.4 billion dollars in 2017 to 1.6 billion dollars in 2022, concentrated primarily in works to prevent floods, due to their high human and economic costs.

Mexico, a country of nearly 129 million people, is highly vulnerable to the effects of the climate emergency, such as droughts, intense storms, floods, and rising temperatures and sea levels. While the south and southeast have water in excess, people in the center to the north face water shortages.

This Latin American nation has a high risk of water stress, according to the Aqueduct water risk atlas of the Aqueduct Alliance, a coalition of governments, companies and foundations. In fact, Mexico is the second most water-stressed country in the Americas, only behind Chile.

Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (C) visited in September 2021 the Santa María dam in the northwestern state of Sinaloa, intended to strengthen agricultural irrigation and generate electricity. CREDIT: Conagua

Conventional approach

Another key project is the Libertad Dam, whose construction began in 2020 and is scheduled to be completed in 2023, with 132 million dollars in financing. Designed to take advantage of runoff from the Potosí River, the reservoir will provide 1.5 m3/s to meet demand in 24 of the 51 municipalities in the northeastern state of Nuevo León, serving 4.8 million people.

Aldo Ramírez, a researcher at the private Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, said large infrastructure and environmentally friendly works should coexist, as they make different contributions, based on a vision of urban development with an adequate hydrological focus.

“Both approaches have their advantages in certain niches,” he told IPS from Monterrey, the state capital. “When we think about water management in cities, many years ago the focus was on removing the water as quickly as possible so that it wouldn’t cause problems. Green infrastructure can help a lot, it has great environmental value, in water management and aquifer recharge.”

Like other areas of the country, Monterrey and its outlying neighborhoods, made up of 13 municipalities and inhabited by more than five million people, depends on the supply of water from the El Cuchillo, Rodrigo Gómez or La Boca and Cerro Prieto dams. The first holds half of its capacity, while the other two barely store any water, according to Conagua data.

Through a presidential decree published in November, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador classified projects that he considers to be of public interest and of national security as high priority and/or strategic for national development.

Among them are hydraulic and water projects, which will receive provisional express permits, in a measure questioned by environmental organizations due to the violation of impact evaluation procedures.

ASL, for example, still faces a challenge filed by the Encuentro Ciudadano Lagunero, while five others were withdrawn after agreeing with the government to review the project. But if this agreement is not respected, the threat of legal action remains.

More and more water

Northwest Mexico faces a similar situation to the other regions in crisis and the government is building two reservoirs and a canal, and upgrading an aqueduct.

In the state of Sinaloa, construction of the Santa María dam on the Baluarte River is moving ahead and it should also be completed in 2023, to irrigate 24,250 hectares in two municipalities. In addition, it will generate 30 megawatts (MW) of electricity, with an investment of almost one billion dollars.

The Picachos dam is also undergoing modernization, with the installation of turbines to generate 15 MW of electricity and the irrigation of 22,500 hectares. With a storage capacity of 580 million m3, it holds 322 million m3 and will cost about 136 million dollars.

To the south, in the state of Nayarit, the 58-kilometer-long Centenario Canal, with a capacity of 60 m3/s, is being built to irrigate 43,105 hectares in four municipalities. With an investment of 437 million dollars, it will serve some 7,500 farmers with water from the El Jileño and Aguamilpa reservoirs, supplied by the Santiago River.

In addition, the government agreed with opponents of the El Zapotillo dam, in the western state of Jalisco, to leave the dam at a height of 80 meters and operate at 50 percent capacity, so as not to flood three towns, in order for the project, worth some 340 million dollars and with a capacity of 411 million m3, to start operating.

But the construction of new dams has ecological repercussions, such as the modification of the landscape, the generation of methane and the displacement of people, as evidenced by several recent scientific studies.

In the northern city of Tijuana, on the border with the United States, the government is upgrading the Río Colorado-Tijuana aqueduct, which transfers water from the Colorado River, shared by both countries, to meet urban and agricultural demand in the area, at a cost of 47 million dollars.

Jiménez, of the Encuentro Ciudadano Lagunero, calls for the regulation of the extraction of water from the Lázaro Cárdenas reservoir on the Nazas River, as well as from the wells, a more precise extraction measurement system, a fight against illegal concession trafficking and the maintenance of the urban water distribution network.

“An urgent measure must be taken so that in the medium term extraction equals the level of concessions and in the long term extraction equals recharge. We are talking about modifying agricultural production conditions and being more efficient in the use of water,” he said.

In his opinion, “this situation anticipates recurring crises. If it is not addressed, it will worsen, and it is not necessary to reach that crisis.”

But, in the midst of this complex scenario, he warned of the lack of political decision to change the country’s water policy. “The human right to water is not being fulfilled here,” he said.

Ramirez the researcher highlighted measures underway, such as pressure management to reduce leaks, the review of wells assigned to industry, the reuse of treated wastewater and demand management.

“We need to make more efficient use of water. We still have a margin of consumption, but we need to come up with more environmentally friendly solutions. We are heading towards a water crisis,” he said.

Aida Valdez stands outside her home in the Guaraní indigenous community of Yariguarenda, in northern Argentina, in front of the wood-burning oven she uses to cook - an example of energy poverty in vulnerable rural communities in Latin America. CREDIT: Daniel Gutman/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Dec 15 2021 (IPS)

The effects of the covid-19 pandemic and high energy prices have had an impact on the consumption of polluting fuels in Latin America and the Caribbean, exacerbating energy poverty in the region.

In some countries there is evidence of an increase in the use of charcoal and firewood. But there have been few studies to reflect this, because it is a recent development and there has been a tardy focus on the behavior of vulnerable sectors in response to the new realities they face.

Macarena San Martín, a researcher at the non-governmental Energy Poverty Network (RedPE) in Chile, said the phenomenon goes beyond the notion of access to electric power, and includes aspects such as the quality and affordability of energy.

“In all Latin American countries, the problem is considered one-dimensional, but multiple factors must be considered,” she told IPS from Santiago. “Access has been seen as a question of: can you plug something in? If you can, it’s solved. While today they have access, that does not necessarily guarantee that energy poverty has been eliminated. There are also problems of efficiency.”

In central Chile, many people use kerosene, a hydrocarbon derivative, and natural gas for household use and heating.

Due to the pandemic, a Basic Services Law has been in force since May, by means of which vulnerable electricity and gas users may defer payments, without the risk of being cut off. But this benefit expires on Dec. 31, so the beneficiaries will have to start paying off what they owe next February, up to a maximum of 48 monthly installments.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) establishes that a household suffers from energy poverty when it lacks equitable access to adequate, reliable, non-polluting and safe energy services to cover its basic needs and sustain the human and economic development of its members, and spends more than 10 percent of its income on energy costs.

Although access to electricity averages more than 90 percent in the region, in rural areas and urban peripheries more than 10 percent of households lack electric power in some cases, such as in Bolivia, Honduras, Haiti and Nicaragua, according to September data from ECLAC.

This charcoal factory in the state of Oaxaca in southern Mexico is an example of an ecological initiative that has not managed to curb the consumption of coal, despite rising prices, or the consumption of hydrocarbons. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Latin America and the Caribbean is the most unequal region in the world, according to international organizations, and this is reflected in the energy sector. While a minority can afford to install solar panels on their homes or drive an electric or hybrid gasoline-electric car, the majority depend on dirty energy or polluting transport.

When spending is highly unequal, as in this region, the resulting energy inequality tends to grow, concluded a 2020 report by three researchers from the School of Earth and Environment at the private University of Leeds in the UK.

Another report, entitled “Las luces son del pueblo (the lights belong to the people); Energy, access and energy poverty” and published in November by the non-governmental Observatorio Petrolero Sur, based in Argentina, puts the number of people lacking access to electricity in this region at almost 22 million, equivalent to 3.3 percent of the total population of 667 million people.

In addition, 12 percent of the region’s population use non-clean sources for energy services, as in Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Paraguay.

In the residential sector, the energy mix is based on kerosene, natural gas, firewood, electricity and liquefied gas.

The beauty of the snowy streets of Coyhaique, the capital of the southern Patagonian region of Aysén, belies the fact that it is the most polluted city in Chile, mainly due to the use of wet firewood to heat homes in an area where temperatures plunge in the wintertime. CREDIT: Marianela Jarroud/IPS

In Argentina, official figures indicate that more than one-fifth of the population lives in energy poverty, despite subsidized electric and gas rates.

In December 2019, shortly before the outbreak of the covid pandemic, the Social Solidarity and Productive Reactivation Law came into force in the Southern Cone country, which includes a revision of gas and electricity tariffs to avoid excessive increases, for the benefit of the economically vulnerable population.

Jonatan Núñez, a researcher at the Institute for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at the public University of Buenos Aires, links the lack of access to electric service in the region to income level.

There is a link “to formal employment, which not only guarantees access to a certain level of income, but also to renting housing in certain areas, and the possibility of gaining access to areas with better energy infrastructure. In poor neighborhoods, there is no access to electricity or gas networks. They are put in place manually and that generates blackouts or precarious conditions that can cause fires,” he told IPS from Buenos Aires.

In Mexico, poverty rose as a result of the pandemic, affecting up to 58.2 million people, or 43.5 percent of the total population, according to official data released in September. This meant a more than six percent increase in poverty compared to 2018, despite the millions of government social programs aimed at tackling chronic poverty in the country.

In urban areas, liquefied petroleum gas and gasoline experienced the largest price hikes, while in rural areas, coal and firewood reported the highest increases, perhaps as a substitute for fossil fuels.

Due to the rise in gas prices, driven by international prices, the Mexican government created the state-owned company Gas Bienestar, which sells natural gas at a subsidized price with a ceiling.

At most service stations in Brazil, consumers can choose between gasoline and ethanol at the pump. But consumers only use the biofuel when its price is favorable compared to gasoline. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

Brazil, where poverty was already on the rise before the pandemic, is also facing higher domestic gas prices and the consequent increase in firewood consumption.

Brazil is a pioneer of the energy transition because of its promotion of clean energy and the low level of polluting fuels burnt in households. But in the region’s largest economy the burning of firewood has overtaken bottled gas since 2018, a trend that has been exacerbated since then, according to figures from the government’s Energy Research Company (EPE).

The existence of subsidies and frozen rates makes it more difficult to estimate energy inequality, as they do not reflect real costs, according to the experts consulted.

Energy poverty is a hurdle in the way of achieving the goals of the international Sustainable Energy for All Initiative, the program to be implemented during the United Nations Decade of Sustainable Energy for All, from 2014 to 2024.

This initiative seeks to ensure universal access to modern energy services and to double the global rate of energy efficiency improvements and the share of renewable energies in the global energy mix.

In addition, energy poverty stands in the way of reaching goal seven of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which aims to ” Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all” as part of the 2030 Agenda, adopted in 2015 by the members of the United Nations.

San Martín, the Chilean expert, said governments face a “complex problem” because there are many demands and difficulties.

“The planet is not infinite. The challenge must be adapted to the situation of each society and to territorial and cultural conditions. We have to work on how we use energy. The energy transition must consider access, quality and equality and it must be taken into account that we cannot continue spending beyond the planet’s capacity,” she said.

Núñez from Argentina said the solution is to consider energy as a right rather than a commodity.

“The response has been quite weak. Most of the energy consumed comes from gas-fired thermal power plants and hydroelectric plants, which are granted in concession to private companies. Services are still in the hands of private companies,” he stressed.

One of the family photos taken after the laborious end of the 26th climate summit in Glasgow, which closed a day later than scheduled with a Climate Pact described as falling short by even the most optimistic, lacking important decisions to combat the crisis and without directly confronting fossil fuels, the cause of the emergency. CREDIT: UNFCCC

By Emilio Godoy
GLASGOW, Nov 13 2021 (IPS)

Developing countries will surely remember the Glasgow climate summit, the most important since 2015, as a fiasco that left them as an afterthought. That was the prevailing sentiment among delegates from the developing South during the closing ceremony on the night of Saturday Nov. 13, one day after the scheduled end of the conference.

Bolivia’s chief negotiator, Diego Pacheco, questioned the outcome of the summit. “It is not fair to pass the responsibility to developing countries. Developed countries do not want to acknowledge their responsibility for the crisis. They have systematically broken their funding pledges and emission reduction commitments,” he told IPS minutes after the end of the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) on climate change in Glasgow.

The 196 Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) ignored the public clamor, which took shape in the demands of indigenous peoples, young people, women, scientists and social movements around the world for substantive measures to combat the climate crisis, even though the goal of containing global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius is barely surviving on life support.

The Glasgow Climate Pact that came out of the summit finally mentions the need to move away from the use of coal. But it had to water down the stronger recommendation to “phase out” in order to overcome the last stumbling block.

In addition, COP26 broke a taboo, albeit very tepidly, after arduous marches and counter-marches in the negotiating room and in the three drafts of the Glasgow Pact: there was a mention of fossil fuels as part of the climate emergency. And it also stated the need to reduce “inefficient” subsidies for fossil fuels.

But the summit, where decisions are made by consensus, avoided a strong stance in this regard. It also avoided moving from recommendations to obligations for the next edition, to be held in Egypt, and those that follow, while the climate crisis continues causing severe droughts, devastating storms, melting of the polar ice caps and warming of the oceans.

In a plenary session that was delayed by several minutes, the final declaration underwent a last-minute change when India, one of the villains of the meeting – along with Saudi Arabia, Australia and Russia – asked for the phrase “phasing out” of coal to be replaced by “phasing down”, a change questioned by countries such as Mexico, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

A paradoxical fact at the close of COP26, where civil society organizations complained that they were left out, was the decision of several countries to endorse the final text even though they differed on several points, including the fossil energy face-lifts.

“Today, we can say with credibility that we have kept 1.5 degrees within reach. But its pulse is weak. And it will only survive if we keep our promises. If we translate commitments into rapid action,” said conference chairman Alok Sharma, choking back tears after a pact – albeit a minimal one – was reached by negotiating three drafts and holding arduous discussions on the fossil fuel question, right up to the final plenary.

COP26 chair Alok Sharma blinked back tears during his closing speech at the climate summit, expressing the tension of negotiating the Glasgow Climate Pact, due to the hurdles thrown in the way of a consensus by the big coal and oil producers. CREDIT: UNFCCC-Twitter

The South is still waiting

Lost amidst the impacts of the climate emergency and forgotten by the industrialized countries, the global South failed to obtain something vital for many of its nations: a clear plan and funding for loss and damage, an issue that was deferred to COP27 in Egypt.

Mohamed Adow, director of the non-governmental Power Shift Africa, said the pact is “not good enough…There is no mention of solidarity and justice. We need a clear process to face loss and damage. There should be a link between emission reduction, financing and adaptation.”

The final decision by China, the United States, India and the European Union to turn their backs on a global fossil fuel exit and deny climate support to the most vulnerable nations left the developing world high and dry.

“There are things that cannot wait to COP27 or 2025. To face loss and damage, the most vulnerable countries need financing to battle the impacts on their territories,” Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, global climate and energy leader for the non-governmental World Wildlife Fund, told IPS.

Climate policies were, at least on the agenda, the focus of COP26.

The summit focused on carbon market rules, climate finance of at least 100 billion dollars per year, gaps between emission reduction targets and needed reductions, strategies for carbon neutrality by 2050, adaptation plans, and the working platform for local communities and indigenous peoples.

But the goal of hundreds of billions of dollars per year has been postponed, a reflection of the fact that financing for climate mitigation and adaptation is a touchy issue, especially for developed countries.

The corridors of the Blue Zone of the Scottish Events Campus, where the official part of the 26th Climate Conference was held in the city of Glasgow, were emptying on Saturday Nov. 13, at the end of the summit, which lasted a day longer than scheduled and ended with a negative balance according to civil society organizations. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Offers and promises – on paper

One breakthrough at COP26 was the approval of the rules of the Paris Agreement, signed in the French capital in December 2015, at COP21, to form the basis on which subsequent summits have revolved. By 2024, all countries will have to report detailed data on emissions, which will form a baseline to assess future greenhouse gas reductions.

The agreement on the functioning of carbon markets creates a trading system between countries, but does not remove the possibility of countries and companies skirting the rules.

Industrialized countries committed to doubling adaptation finance by 2025 based on 2019 amounts. In addition, COP26 approved a new work program to increase greenhouse gas cuts, with reports due in 2022.

It also asked the UNFCCC to evaluate climate plans that year and its final declaration calls on countries to switch from coal and hydrocarbons to renewable energy.

Apart from the Climate Pact, the summit produced voluntary commitments against deforestation, emissions of methane, a gas more polluting than carbon dioxide, and the phasing out of gasoline and diesel vehicles.

In addition, at least 10 countries agreed to put an end to the issuing of new hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation licenses in their territories.

Furthermore, some thirty nations agreed to suspend public funding for coal, gas and oil by 2022.

Demonstrations demanding ambitious, substantive and equitable measures to address the climate crisis continued throughout the 14-day climate summit in Glasgow, which ended on the night of Saturday Nov. 13 with disappointing results for the global South. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Finally, more than 100 stakeholders, including countries and companies, signed up to the elimination of cars with internal combustion engines by 2030, without the major automobile manufacturers such as Germany, Spain and France joining in, and a hundred nations signed a pact to promote sustainable agriculture.

All of the 2030 pledges, which still need concrete plans for implementation, imply a temperature rise of 2.8 degrees C by the end of this century, according to the independent Climate Action Tracker.

The climate plans of the 48 least developed countries (LDCs) would cost more than 93 billion dollars annually, the non-governmental International Institute for Environment and Development said in Glasgow.

In addition, annual adaptation costs in developing countries would be about 70 billion dollars, reaching a total of 140 to 300 billion dollars by 2030, according to the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).

But the largest disbursements are related to loss and damage, which would range between 290 billion and 580 billion dollars by 2030, and hence the enormous concern of these nations to obtain essential financing, according to a 2019 study. And their disappointment with the results of the Oct. 31-Nov.13 conference.

During his presentation at the closing plenary, Seve Paeniu, a climate envoy from Tuvalu, an island nation whose very existence is threatened by the rising sea level, showed a photo of his three grandchildren and said he had been thinking about what to say to them when he got home.

“Glasgow has made a promise to guarantee their future. It will be the best Christmas gift that I can bring home,” he said. But judging by the Climate Pact, Paeniu may have to look for another present.

IPS produced this article with the support of Iniciativa Climática of Mexico and the European Climate Foundation.

The climate summit COP26 was accompanied by protests by social movements, with demonstrators arriving in Glasgow from all over the world and expressing themselves in their own language or dressing up as dinosaurs to symbolize their criticism. But government delegates did not listen to their demands for ambitious and fair action to contain the global warming crisis. CREDIT: Laura Quiñones/UN

By Emilio Godoy
GLASGOW, Nov 11 2021 (IPS)

One element that runs through all social movement climate summits is their rejection of the official meeting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the low ambition of its outcomes – and the treaty’s 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) was no exception.

The leaders of the UNFCCC gladly welcome those responsible for the crisis and “COP26 hasn’t done anything more than simulation and greenwashing,” Mitzi Jonelle Tan, a member of the non-governmental organization Youth Advocates for Climate Action from the Philippines, told IPS during a rally at the Glasgow Screening Room, a few blocks from the venue where the official meeting is being held until Friday, Nov. 12.

The COP26 Coalition, the alternative summit to the climate conference, has been a motley crew of organizations and movements whose common demand was a real effort to fight the climate crisis through concrete and fair measures and whose 200 events in this Scottish city included workshops, forums, artistic presentations and protests, which ended on Wednesday, Nov. 10.

Among the demands with which the alternative meeting in Glasgow lobbied the 196 Parties to the UNFCCC were the abandonment of fossil fuels, the rejection of cosmetic solutions to the climate emergency, the demand for a just transition to a lower carbon economy and the call for reparations and redistribution of funds to indigenous communities and the global South.

The movement also called for a gender perspective in policies, climate justice – that those primarily responsible (developed nations) take responsibility and pay for their role -, respect for the rights of indigenous peoples, and a halt to air pollution.

Due to logistical issues and the limitations imposed by the covid-19 pandemic, which postponed the official summit for a year, the parallel sessions of the social movements were held in this Scottish city in a hybrid format, combining face-to-face and virtual participation. Exhibitors and online participants struggled with the quality of their internet connections.

One of the most unanimous and loudest criticisms from non-governmental social and environmental organizations focused on the exclusion of civil society groups from Latin America, Africa and Asia, due to the UK host government’s decision to modify the admission criteria according to the level of contagion in each country and the extent of vaccination.

In addition, they complained about the strict hurdles imposed by the COP26 presidency, held by the United Kingdom, supported by Italy, to the presence of NGO observers at the official negotiating tables, which undermined the transparency of the Glasgow process, whose agreements are to be embodied in a final declaration, which is weakening every day and whose final text will be released on Nov. 12 or 13, if the negotiations stretch out.

The alternative movement also had a formal but unofficial space in the so-called COP26 Green Zone, located in the same area as the official negotiations, in the center of Glasgow.

In the forums parallel to COP26 in Glasgow, indigenous women were major protagonists with their demands for respect for their rights and effective participation in the negotiations. In the picture, indigenous women delegates take part in a forum on women of the forest at the peoples’ summit. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

In-depth solutions

One of their key proposals was for a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty aimed at moving towards the end of the era of coal, gas and oil, the consumption of which is primarily responsible for the growing planetary climate emergency.

The initiative, which imitates the name of the treaty against nuclear weapons, demands an immediate end to the expansion of fossil fuel production, a fair phase-out and a just energy transition.

“Countries and corporations keep investing in the production of the stuff. We need to see efforts to leave out fossil fuels, stop financing, subsidies and exploitation of fossil fuels,” Tzeporah Berman, the Canadian chair of the anti-fossil fuel initiative, told IPS.

The idea for the treaty emerged in 2015 from a call by leaders and NGOs from Pacific island states – whose very existence is threatened by the climate crisis – and it was formally launched in 2020.

So far it has received the support of some 750 organizations, 12 cities, more than 2,500 scientists, academics, parliamentarians from around the world, and religious leaders, indigenous movements and more than 100 Nobel Prize winners.

Climate policies are the focus of COP26 which has addressed carbon market rules, at least 100 billion dollars a year in climate finance, gaps between emission reduction targets and necessary reductions, strategies for carbon neutrality by 2050, adaptation plans, and the working platform on local communities and indigenous peoples.

The International Rights of Nature Tribunal tried the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), parallel to COP26. In the case, Philippine activist Mitzi Jonelle Tan testified to the lack of effective action against the climate emergency. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Indigenous people and rights of nature tribunal in the spotlight

Indigenous people, especially from the Amazon jungle, have been key participants at the latest edition of the alternative summit, with at least 40 activists present in Glasgow to complain about harassment by the government of far-right Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and demand more protection for the rainforest, whose destruction can have dramatic effects on the environmental health of the planet.

“Our main demand is demarcation of our territories,” because this guarantees a number of rights, Cristiane Pankararu, a member of the Pankararu people and leader of Brazil’s non-governmental National Association of Indigenous Women Warriors (ANMIGA), told IPS.

Her organization belongs to the Association of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil, whose demands are demarcation, climate solutions based on indigenous peoples’ knowledge and practices, and investment in forest protection.

One of the most symbolic activities of the counter-summit was the Fifth International Rights of Nature Tribunal, which tried the cases of “False solutions to the climate change crisis” and “The Amazon, a threatened living entity”.

In the first verdict, the tribunal, which sat for the first time in 2014 and was composed this time of seven judges from six countries, found the UNFCCC at fault for failing to attack the roots of the climate emergency.

In the second ruling, the jury, composed of nine experts from seven countries, accused developed countries and China, as well as agricultural, mining and food corporations, of destroying the Amazon, the planet’s main rainforest ecosystem, which is threatened by these extractive activities.

Nick Dearden, director of Global Justice Now, listed three serious problems: the role of large corporations, the protection of corporate intellectual property, and the power of corporations to sue states that want to protect the environment, in international arbitration tribunals.

“It’s a deep symptom of how the global economy protects the interests of big corporations, especially the extractivists, and that’s not in the COP,” he told IPS.

A dialogue of the deaf has prevailed between the UNFCCC and civil society, as the official summit has ignored the demands of social movements.

“They haven’t heard us. We are here to demand actions. We don’t need another COP to resolve the climate crisis, we need changes,” Tan complained.

Despite the obstacles, “we will not stop participating actively. The women’s movement is unifying. It is a slow process, because people are not used to being led by women,” Pankararu said.

IPS produced this article with the support of Iniciativa Climática of Mexico and the European Climate Foundation.

At an event in the so-called Green Zone, Canadian native leaders and the non-governmental Indigenous Clean Energy launched a global hub of social enterprises to pass on knowledge and advice during the Glasgow climate summit. In the picture, Mihskakwan James Harper (R) of the Cree indigenous community explains a mixed battery energy storage project built by a private firm and an indigenous company in the province of Ontario, Canada. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
GLASGOW, Nov 9 2021 (IPS)

In the community of Bella Bella on Turtle Island in the western Canadian province of British Columbia, the indigenous Heiltsuk people capture heat from the air through devices in 40 percent of their homes, in a plan aimed at sustainable energy sovereignty.

“We use less energy, pay less, and that’s good for our health,” Leona Humchitt, a member of the Heiltsuk community, told IPS during a forum on indigenous micro-grids in the so-called Green Zone of the climate summit being hosted by Glasgow, Scotland since Oct. 31. “The project coincides with our view. We need to have a good relationship with nature.”

For native groups, these initiatives mean moving towards energy sovereignty to avoid dependence on projects that have no connection to local populations, combating energy poverty, paving the transition to cleaner sources and combating the exclusion they suffer in the renewable energies sector due to government policies and corporate decisions.

The modernisation process that began in the first quarter of 2021 lowered electricity rates from 2,880 dollars a year to about 1,200 dollars for each participating household.

In addition, the switch to heat pumps eliminates five tons of pollutant emissions per year and has reduced the community’s annual diesel consumption of 2,000 litres per household, which is usually supplied by a private hydroelectric plant.

Funded by the Canadian government and non-governmental organisations, the “Strategic Fuel Switching” project is part of the Heiltsuk Climate Action plan, which also includes measures such as biofuel and biomass from marine algae and carbon credits from marine ecosystems.

In 2017, more than 250 remote indigenous communities, out of 292 in Canada, relied on their own electricity microgeneration grids, dependent especially on diesel generators.

The venture in the Heiltsuk community, which is part of the three major Canadian native peoples, is included in a portfolio of indigenous transitional energy initiatives that have been incorporated into the non-governmental Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE) social enterprise in Canada.

A global hub for social entrepreneurship was one of the initiatives launched in the Green Zone, an open event held parallel to the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), whose annual session ends Nov. 12.

ICE has a list of 197 projects – 72 in bioenergy, 127 in energy efficiency, and 19 in other alternative sources – with more than one megawatt of installed capacity. These initiatives together represent 1.49 billion dollars in revenue over 10 years.

Mihskakwan James Harper, an indigenous man from the Cree people of Sturgeon Lake in the western Canadian province of Alberta, said it is not only about energy sovereignty, but also about community power to dispose of their own resources.

“We change our self-consumption and the communities benefit themselves from the energy, and the earth get benefits as well. Without us, we are not going to reach the climate goals. We show that indigenous peoples can bring innovations and solutions to the climate crisis,” Harper, who is development manager at the NR Stor energy company, told IPS.

NR Stor Inc. and the Six Nations of the Grand River Development Corporation in the Canadian province of Ontario are building the Oneida battery storage project – with a capacity of 250 MW and an investment of 400 million dollars – in the south of the province.

The facility, which will prevent some 4.1 million tons of pollutant emissions, the largest of its kind in Canada and one of the largest in the world, will provide clean and stable energy capacity by storing renewable energy off-peak for release when demand rises.

ICE estimates 4.3 billion dollars in investments are needed to underpin this energy efficiency that would create some 73,000 direct and indirect jobs and would cut carbon dioxide emissions by more than five million tons over 10 years.

Electric vehicles are still a pipe dream in many indigenous communities, due to their price and the lack of charging infrastructure. In the picture, an electric car is charged at a station in downtown Glasgow, near COP26. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Slow progress

The increase in clean sources plays a decisive role in achieving one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set out in 2015 by the international community in the 2030 Agenda, within the framework of the United Nations.

SDG 7 is aimed at affordable, modern energy for all.

But processes similar to Canada’s ICE are proceeding at a slow pace.

Two projects of the Right Energy Partnership with Indigenous Peoples (REP), launched in 2018 by the non-governmental Indigenous Peoples Major Group for Sustainable Development, are being implemented in El Salvador and Honduras.

In El Salvador, the project is “Access to photovoltaic energy for indigenous peoples”, carried out since 2020 in conjunction with the non-governmental National Salvadoran Indigenous Coordination Council (CCNIS).

It is financed with 150,000 dollars from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Small Grants Programme to provide 24 solar power systems to three communities in the town of Guatajiagua, in the eastern department of Morazán.

In Honduras, the Lenca Indigenous Community Council and the Pro Construction Committee are installing a mini-hydroelectric plant to benefit two Lenca indigenous communities in the municipality of San Francisco de Opalaca, in the southwestern department of Intibucá.

The project “Hydroelectric power generation for environmental protection and socioeconomic development in the Lenca communities of Plan de Barrios and El Zapotillo”, launched in 2019, received 150,000 dollars in GEF funding.

Clean alternative sources face community distrust due to human rights violations committed by wind, solar and hydroelectric plant owners in countries such as Colombia, Honduras and Mexico, including land dispossession, contracts harmful to local communities and lack of free consultation and adequate information prior to project design.

Amazonian indigenous people participate in protests by social movements in Glasgow, in which they claimed that their voices were not adequately heard at COP26. CREDIT: Arturo Contreras/Pie de Página

The evolution of energy initiatives has been slow, due to funding barriers and the limitations imposed by the covid-19 pandemic.

“Our main interest is to enable access to affordable renewable energy and for indigenous peoples to participate in the projects,” Eileen Mairena-Cunningham, REP project coordinator, told IPS.

“These processes should be led by indigenous organisations. Of course we are interested in participating in the global networks,” added the Miskita indigenous woman from Nicaragua.

After the always difficult first step, indigenous communities want to accelerate progress towards these goals.

In Bella Bella, Canada, the hope is to progressively replace diesel with biofuel in vehicles and in the boats that are vital to the fishing community.

“We are not going to electrify transportation overnight,” Humchitt said. “But we see an opportunity in biodiesel. We have to go forward on this issue.”

Harper concurred with that vision. “Of course we want EVs, as they become accessible and satisfy our own needs. We want to get rid of diesel. The communities have to lead the process of the local transition,” he said.

Mairena-Cunningham stressed that indigenous peoples attach primary importance to participating in global networks.

“Existing projects leave us with lessons of what can be done in our territory,” said the activist. “There is a need for policies that facilitate indigenous participation and special safeguards for access to the land. Capacity building is also needed.”

Renewable energies can be added to ecological measures that indigenous peoples already use, such as forest protection and biodiversity and water conservation. But their local implementation requires more than just willingness.

IPS produced this article with the support of Iniciativa Climática of Mexico and the European Climate Foundation.

In the face of substantial international offers of funding for indigenous lands and forests at COP26, indigenous peoples are calling for specific schemes for their participation. Shuar leader Katan Kontiak (left) of Ecuador and Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim of Chad took part in a Nov. 2 forum on the indigenous peoples and local communities platform. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
GLASGOW, Nov 4 2021 (IPS)

“For my people, the effects of climate change are an everyday reality. The rainy season is shorter and when it rains, there are floods. And we’ve suffered droughts.” said Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim, a member of the Wodaabe or Mbororo pastoral people of Chad.

For the founder of the non-governmental Association of Indigenous Women and Peoples of Chad, one pernicious effect is the violence generated, because “When people lose their resources, they fight for them, water, for instance,” she told IPS after a forum on the progress made by native groups at the climate summit in Glasgow, Scotland.

Around the world, indigenous peoples face the ambiguity of protecting ecosystems, such as forests or coastal zones, while at the same time suffering the onslaught of climate fury unleashed by humanity’s addiction to fossil fuels, like droughts, destructive storms and rising sea levels.

For decades, native peoples have insisted that their traditional knowledge can contribute to the fight against climate change. The emergence of the covid-19 pandemic in 2020 reaffirmed the results of treating nature as just another commodity.

Although in the last decade, indigenous representatives have gained a place at environmental summits, such as the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which began on Sunday Oct. 31 in this city in the UK, now they want to be more than just token participants.

“We hope that the summit takes indigenous communities into account. We need funds that go directly to indigenous peoples,” Graciela Coy, an indigenous woman from Ak’Tenamit (our people, in the Q’eqchi’ language), a non-governmental organisation that works in northern Guatemala, told IPS.

Representatives of indigenous organisations have gained a place in every part of the COP. They participate as observers in the official sessions where the agreements are debated, in the parallel summit of social movements and in all the other forums held during the two weeks of the climate conference.

One of the expectations this year among indigenous people is the approval of the three-year working plan of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform that emerged at COP21, which approved the Paris Agreement in 2015.

The proposal must be approved by the Facilitative Working Group, composed of seven indigenous and seven government representatives and endorsed at COP24, held in the Polish city of Katowice in 2018. It must then be ratified by the plenary of the 196 Parties to the COP and is to include capacity building activities for indigenous groups, the mapping of measures for their participation in the UNFCCC and financing.

Between 2019 and 2021, the group conducted 11 activities, with no physical sessions due to the pandemic.

Climate policies are the focus of COP26, which ends Nov. 12, after being postponed for a year as a result of the covid-19 pandemic.

Government delegates at COP26 are addressing carbon market rules, climate finance of at least 100 billion dollars per year, gaps between emission reduction targets and necessary reductions, strategies for carbon neutrality by 2050, adaptation plans and the working programme for the local communities and indigenous peoples platform.

Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, an indigenous activist from the Kankana-ey Igorot people of the Philippines, said the inclusion of human rights in the financing of emission reductions and adaptation to the effects of the climate crisis, as well as in the creation of carbon markets, is fundamental.

“Indigenous peoples suffer too the climate solutions, such as renewable energy projects. There should be effective safeguards, for guaranteeing indigenous peoples’ human rights” in climate policies, the former U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples between 2014 and 2020 told IPS.

This respect has become urgent in areas such as the Amazon, the main jungle in Latin America shared by eight countries and a French territory, whose indigenous inhabitants have suffered the deterioration caused by the inroads made by agribusiness, livestock, soybean, hydrocarbon and mining companies, as well as the construction of dams, railroads, highways and river ports.

For this reason, Tuntiak Katan, a member of the indigenous Shuar people of Ecuador and general coordinator of the Global Alliance of Territorial Communities (GATC), told IPS that the removal of extractive activities from this ecosystem is a fundamental condition for making progress in protection of the climate.

“Indigenous peoples already protect 950 million hectares of land worldwide. What we are asking for is the protection of 80 percent of the Amazon by 2025. We are the voice of the women, children and elders” who suffer the impacts on the territories, said Katan, vice-coordinator of the non-governmental Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon River Basin (Coica).

The most recent scientific evidence shows that native peoples are the most effective protectors of tropical forests, which is why greater efforts are required for their conservation in the face of growing threats.

Q’eqchí’ indigenous activist Graciela Coy (R) from Guatemala called during the Glasgow climate summit for the promised international funds to go directly to indigenous peoples. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

More than empty promises

In the face of the abundant offers made during the first week of COP26 activities to promote indigenous land tenure and reforestation, indigenous peoples were skeptical and demanded direct participation in these schemes.

Oumarou Ibrahim and Coy agreed on the need to define mechanisms to ensure that the resources provided reach the territories directly.

“World leaders should be our partners. Financing should be adapted to people’s needs. The issue is how resources are going to reach directly to the indigenous peoples,” said Oumarou Ibrahim.

In Coy’s opinion, the fight against climate change requires the allocation of funds, which should be transferred “to indigenous peoples, as there is a lot of international aid” that does not always materialise in local communities.

In an acceptance of what native peoples have been demanding for years, the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States and 17 private funders announced on Nov. 1 the provision of 1.7 billion dollars to help indigenous and local communities preserve tropical forests between 2021 and 2025.

It is estimated that each year only 270 million dollars are allocated to forest care and just 46 million dollars go to the direct guardians of the forest: their ancestral inhabitants.

Direct multilateral funding to aboriginal populations has been a recurring barrier to efforts to protect natural resources.

For example, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), created at COP16 in Cancun in 2010, has financed 121 community livelihood projects and delivered a total of 1.4 billion dollars.

For a total of 190 projects, it has disbursed two billion dollars and another six billion are in the pipeline. In addition, it has committed another 10 billion for projects. It has also registered 113 institutions to receive funds, but none of them are indigenous.

Furthermore, on Nov. 2, more than 105 nations signed up to the “Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use” which sets the target of zero deforestation by 2030.

Indigenous peoples are also demanding to be included in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the voluntary commitments adopted by each country for 2030 and 2050 in order to comply with the Paris Agreement and on which the goal of containing global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius is based.

“We just need a push,” said Katan. “We are sure of what we do and that is why it is good that they are offering financing. But what needs to be done is to abandon extractivism and get the oil, mining and agribusiness companies out of our territories, and apply a holistic vision, combined with the vision of the indigenous peoples.”

Even if COP26 does not produce the results desired by indigenous peoples, they will continue to care for natural resources and to demand climate justice.

IPS produced this article with the support of Iniciativa Climática in Mexico and the European Climate Foundation.

A view of the main venue for COP26 in Glasgow. Expectations are high for the outcome of the conference, but the two-week discussions and meetings must negotiate an obstacle course to reach concrete results in keeping with the severity of the climate emergency. CREDIT: UNFCCC

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Oct 29 2021 (IPS)

The climate summit in Glasgow, Scotland, the most important since 2015, may go down in history as a milestone or as another exercise in frustration, depending on whether or not it resolves the thorny pending issues standing in the way of curbing global warming.

If successful, it could be placed on a par with the 2010 Cancun meeting, which rescued the negotiations after the previous year’s failure in Copenhagen, and Paris, where an agreement was reached in 2015 which defined voluntary emission reductions and a limit to global warming.

But if the summit fails, it will be compared to Copenhagen (COP15), the 2009 conference, and Madrid (COP25), the 2019 summit, whose progress was considered more than insufficient by environmental organisations and academics.

Former Mexican climate negotiator Roberto Dondisch said it is difficult to predict success or failure at the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which will take place in Glasgow in the northern UK Oct. 31 to Nov. 12.

“This time we are not seeking an agreement, but trying to work out unresolved issues. The same thing happened in Paris, but a space was created to solve it. The reports are not very promising in terms of where we are at and what we must do. The conditions are very complicated; the will is there, but not the results,” Dondisch, a distinguished fellow at the Washington, DC-based non-governmental Stimson Center, told IPS.

Climate governance has come a long way since the first COP.

Background

In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro on the 20th anniversary of the first U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, brought together political leaders, scientists, representatives of international organisations and civil society to address the impact of human activities on the environment.

One of the results of the so-called Earth Summit was the creation of the UNFCCC, at a time when there was already evidence of global warming caused by human activity.

In fact, as early as 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), created by the U.N. General Assembly in 1988 and composed of scientists from all over the world entrusted with the responsibility of assessing the existing scientific knowledge related to climate phenomena, released its first report.

Report after report, the IPCC has become a key part of the global climate framework for understanding and addressing the crisis of rising temperatures and their impacts.

Seven years later, in 1997, the member states of the UNFCCC negotiated the Kyoto Protocol (KP), signed in that Japanese city during COP3, which established mandatory emission reduction targets for 36 industrialised countries and the European Union as a bloc, listed in Annex II of the agreement.

In Kyoto, the nations of the developing South were exempted from this obligation in Annex I of the pact.

After the first compliance period (2008-2012), the parties agreed on another period for 2013-2020, which in practice never entered into force, until the protocol was replaced by the Paris Agreement.

The KP, which came into effect in 2005 – without the participation of key countries such as the United States and Russia – also has its own Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), which oversees its implementation and takes decisions to promote its effective implementation.

The Madrid climate summit in 2019, COP25, left important pending issues that the conference in Glasgow, which begins on Sunday Oct. 31, will have to resolve. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

The relatively uneventful COP19 in Warsaw in 2013 served to testify to the birth of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM), whose rules of operation and financing will be central to the Glasgow discussions.

Climate policies will be the focus of COP26, co-chaired by the United Kingdom and Italy, which had to be postponed for a year due to covid-19 pandemic restrictions.

COP26 will address rules for carbon markets, climate finance for at least 100 billion dollars annually, gaps between emission reduction targets and necessary reductions, strategies for carbon neutrality by 2050, adaptation plans, and the local communities and indigenous peoples platform.

But missing from the agenda of the two weeks of discussions will be the goal of hundreds of billions of greenbacks per year, which has been postponed to 2023 – a sign that funding for mitigation and adaptation to climate change is the hot potato for the parties.

Complex architecture

The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994 and has been ratified by 196 parties, with the participation of the EU as a bloc, the Cook Islands and Niue – South Pacific island nations – in addition to the 193 U.N. member states.

The parties to the binding treaty subscribe to a universal convention that recognises the existence of climate change caused by human activities and assigns developed countries the main responsibility for combating the phenomenon.

The COPs, in which all states parties participate, govern the Convention and meet annually in global conferences where they make decisions to achieve the objectives of the climate fight, adopted unanimously or by consensus, especially after the KP failed to reach the negotiated goals.

In Paris, at COP21, member countries agreed on voluntary pollution reduction targets to keep the temperature increase below 1.5 degrees Celsius, considered the indispensable limit to contain disasters such as droughts and destructive storms, with high human and material costs.

These targets are embodied in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), in which countries set out their 2030 and 2050 goals. Only 13 nations have submitted a second version of their measures since they began submitting their actions to the UNFCCC Secretariat in Bonn, Germany, in 2016.

The Paris Agreement, in force since 2020 and so far ratified by 192 states parties, has its own Meeting of the Parties (MOP), which monitors compliance and takes decisions to promote compliance.

Each COP also draws thousands of business delegates, non-governmental organisations, international organisations, scientists and journalists.

In addition, a parallel alternative summit will bring together social movements from around the world, advocating an early phase-out of fossil fuels, rejecting so-called “false solutions” such as carbon markets, and calling for a just energy transition and reparations for damage and redistribution of funds to indigenous communities and countries of the global South.

Sandra Guzmán, director of the Climate Finance Programme at the non-governmental Climate Policy Initiative – with offices in five countries – foresees a complex summit, especially in terms of financing.

“No one knows for sure how loss and damage will be covered. Developed countries don’t want to talk about more funds. The scenario for political agreement is always difficult. The expectation is that the COP will move forward and establish a package of progress and build a good bridge to the next meeting,” she told IPS from London.

For 30 years, the parties to the UNFCCC have been doing the same thing, without achieving the desired reduction in emissions or control of global warming. If COP26 follows the same mechanics, the results are unlikely to change at the end of the two weeks of discussions and activities in which more than 25,000 people will participate.

Excerpt:

Every day, dozens of migrants from Central America, Haiti and Venezuela come early in the morning to the offices of the governmental Mexican Commission for Refugee Aid in downtown Mexico City to apply for asylum. Mexico is overwhelmed by the influx of migrants, to whom it has begun to apply harsh restrictions. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Oct 27 2021 (IPS)

In September, 31-year-old Yesenia decided to leave her home on the outskirts of the northern Honduran city of San Pedro Sula, driven out by violence and the lack of water.

“The maras (gangs) were threatening me, and it hadn’t rained, there was very little water. I had to leave, I had to go somewhere, anywhere. I want to stay wherever they let me,” the mother of a seven-year-old girl, who was a homemaker in one of the most violent cities in the world, told IPS.

It was the first time she had left her country. She reached the southern Mexican state of Chiapas (bordering Guatemala), and continued on by bus and hitchhiking. “We slept in the bushes, walked, went hungry, got rained on and sometimes froze,” she said, describing the journey she made with her daughter.

Yesenia, who is short and dark-haired with a round face, now lives in an area that she does not name for security reasons, and is applying for refugee status in the capital of Mexico, a country that has historically been a huge source of migrants to the United States as well as a transit route for people from other countries heading there as well. It has also become, over the last decade, a growing recipient of undocumented migrants.

Due to the large number of requests for asylum, which has stretched Mexico’s immigration and refugee system to the limit, it takes a long time for cases to be resolved. Although immigration advocacy organisations provide assistance in the form of money, food, lodging and clothing, these resources are limited and the aid eventually comes to an end.

Driven out by poverty, lack of basic services, violence and climate-related phenomena, millions of people leave their countries in Central America every year, heading mainly to the United States, to find work and to reunite with family.

But in the face of the increasing crackdown on immigration in the U.S. since 2016 under the administrations of Donald Trump (2016-January 2021) and current President Joe Biden, many undocumented migrants have opted to stay in places that were previously only transit points, such as Mexico.

The problem is that Mexico also tightened the screws, as part of the role it agreed with the U.S. to perform during the times of Trump, who successfully pressured the governments of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-December 2018) and current President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to step up their own anti-immigration measures. And this has not changed since Biden took office.

Like the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico and the so-called Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador) are highly vulnerable to the effects of the climate crisis. Drought and devastating hurricanes drive people from their homes to safer areas or across borders in search of better lives.

Honduras is one illustration of this phenomenon. Since 1970, more than 30 major tropical storms have hit the country, leaving a trail of deaths and billions of dollars in property damage. Hurricanes Eta and Iota struck in 2020. For this year, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) predicted 17 hurricanes on the Atlantic side before the official end of hurricane season on Nov. 30.

In early September, Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández also declared a drought emergency, another increasingly recurrent and intense phenomenon in Central America.

The refugee club

Caribbean island nations such as Haiti are also suffering from the climate emergency. The country was hit by Hurricane Elsa in June and by Tropical Storm Fred and Hurricane Grace in August, on top of an Aug. 14 earthquake measuring 7.2 on the Richter scale that claimed thousands of lives.

In 2017, a particularly lethal year, hurricanes Harvey and Irma struck Haiti. As a result, Sadaam decided to leave, heading first to Chile that year and now to Mexico, where he has applied for humanitarian asylum.

“Things got very difficult. The hardware store where I worked had to close because of the rains and I couldn’t work. I can do any kind of job and that’s all I ask for: work,” the 30-year-old Haitian migrant told IPS.

Tall and lean, Sadaam, originally from Port-au-Prince, also arrived in Mexico in September, with his wife and his son, as well as his brother and sister-in-law and their daughter. They are living temporarily in a hotel, with support from humanitarian organisations.

On Oct. 6, the Mexican government deported 129 Haitians to Port-au-Prince on a chartered flight from Tapachula, a city in the southern state of Chiapas. The measure was criticised by social organisations, while the U.N. called for an evaluation of the need for protection of Haitians and the risks of returning them to their country. CREDIT: INM

Climate disaster = displacement

Recent studies and migration statistics show that the paths followed by migrants and climate disasters in the region are intertwined.

Between 2000 and 2019, Cuba, Mexico and Haiti were the hardest hit, by a total of 110 storms which caused 39 billion dollars in damage, affected 29 million people and left 5,000 dead, 85 percent of them in Haiti, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

In 2020, internal and external displacement due to disasters soared in El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras. But the international migratory framework has not yet accepted the official category of climate refugee, despite growing clamor for its inclusion.

Armelle Gouritin, an academic at the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences-Mexico, told IPS that the scientific community has linked the sudden events to the climate emergency, whose influence on internal and external migration flows is growing.

“There is evidence that they are increasing. It is quite difficult to say to what extent the volume of migration is growing, because there is little quantitative data. It is hard to compare. It tends to be invisible, especially because of slow onset processes such as drought and desertification,” she explained.

In her 2021 book “The protection of internal climate migrants; a pending task in Mexico”, the expert described scenarios linked to migration, such as gradual-onset phenomena, sudden-onset disasters (hurricanes or violence generated by water shortages), relocations decided by the authorities, sea level rise and the impact of renewable energy megaprojects.

As Mexico has become a magnet for migration, measures against immigration have been stiffened. This year, through August alone, immigration authorities detained 148,903 people, almost twice as many as in all of 2020, when the total was 82,379.

Of the current total, according to official data, 67,847 came from Honduras, 44,712 from Guatemala, 12,010 from El Salvador and 7,172 from Haiti.

Deportations are also on the rise, as up to August, Mexico removed 65,799 undocumented migrants, compared to 60,315 in the whole of 2020. Of these, 25,660 were from Honduras, 25,660 from Guatemala, 2,583 from El Salvador and 223 from Haiti.

The Haitian influx was triggered after the United States announced in August that it would halt deportations of those already in the country because of the earthquake, which drew thousands of Haitians who were in Brazil and Chile, where they had migrated earlier and where policies against them had been tightened.

In Mexico, according to official figures refugee applications increased from 70,406 in all of 2019 to 90,314 this year up to and including September, of which 26,007 were filed by Haitian migrants. Migrants from Honduras, Haiti, Cuba, El Salvador, and Venezuela account for the largest number of applications.

Despite the large rise in applications, Mexico only approved 13,100 permanent refugees in September: 5,755 from Honduras, 1,454 from El Salvador, 733 from Haiti and 524 from Guatemala.

On the night of Oct. 7, a military checkpoint found 800 migrants from Central America in three truck trailers on a highway in the state of Tamaulipas in northeastern Mexico, bordering the United States, where they were headed. CREDIT: Elefante Blanco/Pie de Página

Fleeing the climate emergency

The World Bank study “Groundswell: Acting on Internal Climate Migration” warns that Mexico must prepare for the confluence of climate disasters and migration flows, and projects 86 million internal climate migrants in the world by 2050, including 17 million in Latin America.

The report, published on Sept. 13, estimates that the number of climate migrants will grow between 2020 and 2050, when between 1.4 and 2.1 million people will migrate in Mexico and Central America. Mexico’s central valley, where the capital city is located, and the western highlands of Guatemala will receive migrants, while people will flee arid, agricultural and low-lying coastal areas.

Although several international bodies link migration and the climate crisis, the concept of climate migrant or refugee does not exist in the international legal framework.

Gouritin understands the international reluctance to address the issue. “There are three narratives for mobility: responsibility, security and human rights. States are not willing to head towards the responsibility narrative. The security narrative predominates, we have seen it with the caravans from Central America (on the way to the United States through Mexico),” she said.

Few countries are prepared to address the climate dimension of migration, as is the case of Mexico. The general laws on Climate Change, of 2012, and on Forced Internal Displacement, of 2020, mention climate impacts but do not include measures or define people internally displaced by climate phenomena.

In the United States, undocumented Mexicans are experiencing the same thing, as deportations of Mexicans could well exceed the levels of all of 2020, since 184,402 people were deported that year compared to 148,584 as of last August alone.

Yesenia and Sadaam are two migrants who are suffering the statistics in the flesh, as victims of their own governments and the Mexican response.

“I’ll stay wherever I can get a job to support and educate my daughter,” said Yesenia. With refugee status, migrants can work freely.

Sadaam said: “I was offered a job as a cleaner in a hotel, but they asked me for a refugee card. The government told me that I have to wait for the call for the appointment. If I get a job, I will stay here.”

But above and beyond the detentions, deportations and refugee applications, migration will continue, as long as droughts, floods and storms devastate their places of origin.

A solar power plant in El Salvador, with 320,000 panels, is one of the largest such installations in Central America, whose countries are striving to convert the energy mix to renewable sources, but whose plans were slowed by the covid pandemic. CREDIT: Edgardo Ayala/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO CITY, Oct 25 2021 (IPS)

Latin America and the Caribbean are heading to a new climate summit with a menu of insufficient measures to address the effects of the crisis, in the midst of the impact of the covid-19 pandemic.

The world’s most unequal region, which is the hardest hit by the effects of climate change and highly vulnerable to the impacts of the climate crisis, has yet to engage in the fight against this emergency head-on, according to analysts and studies.

Tania Miranda, director of Policy and Stakeholder Engagement in the Environment and Climate Change Programme of the U.S.-based non-governmental Institute of the Americas, said Latin America’s high climate ambitions have not been supported by the measures necessary to reduce emissions.

“Goals are aspirational. If they are not backed up with policies and financing, they remain empty promises. There is a need for financing and the implementation of strategies and public policies that will lead them to fulfill their commitments. Billions of dollars are needed,” the researcher told IPS from San Diego, California, where the Institute is based.

Miranda is the author of the report “Nationally Determined Contributions Across the Americas. A Comparative Hemispheric Analysis,” which evaluates the climate targets of 16 countries, including the United States and Canada.

In her study, she analyses pollutant emission reduction targets, plans for adaptation to the climate crisis, dependence on external financing, long-term carbon neutrality commitments and the state of pollution abatement.

Climate policies will be the focus of the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which will take place Oct. 31 to Nov. 12 in Glasgow, Scotland in the north of the United Kingdom, after being postponed in that same month in 2020 due to the pandemic.

COP26 will address rules for carbon markets, at least 100 billion dollars annually in climate finance, the gaps between nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and the necessary reductions, strategies for carbon neutrality by 2050, adaptation plans, and the local communities and indigenous peoples platform.

A parallel alternative summit will also be held, bringing together social movements from around the world, advocating an early phase-out of fossil fuels, rejecting so-called “false solutions” such as carbon markets, and calling for a just energy transition and reparations for damage and redistribution of funds to indigenous communities and countries of the global South.

The Glasgow conference is considered the most important climate summit, due to the need to accelerate action in the face of alarming data on global warming since the adoption of the Paris Agreement at COP21, held in December 2015 in the French capital.

A zero-emission electric bus is parked on a downtown street in Montevideo. Public transport is beginning to electrify in Latin America’s cities as a way to contain CO2 emissions, but plans have been delayed and cut back due to the covid pandemic. CREDIT: Inés Acosta/IPS

Since then, 192 signatories to the binding treaty have submitted their first NDCs.

But just 13 countries worldwide sent their new climate contributions in 2020 to the UNFCCC Secretariat based in Bonn, despite calls from its secretary, Patricia Espinosa of Mexico, for all parties to the treaty to do so that year.

Of these, only four from this region – Argentina, Grenada, Mexico and Suriname – submitted the second updated version of their contributions.

Although they are voluntary commitments, the NDCs are a core part of the Paris Agreement, based on the goal of curbing the temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius, considered the minimum and indispensable target to avoid irreversible climate disasters and, consequently, human catastrophes.

In the NDCs, nations must set their goals for 2030 and 2050 to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions responsible for global warming, taking a specific year as a baseline, outline the way they will achieve these goals, establish the peak year of their emissions and when they would achieve net zero emissions, i.e. absorb as many gases as they release into the atmosphere.

In addition, to contain the spread of the coronavirus and its impacts, the region has taken emergency economic decisions, such as providing support for companies of all sizes, as well as for vulnerable workers.

But these post-pandemic recovery packages lack green components, such as commitments to sustainable and cleaner production.

A street in Mexico City shows reduced traffic due to covid restrictions. Automotive transport is one of the largest generators of polluting emissions in Latin America and the Caribbean. But the transition to a cleaner vehicle fleet, with the increase in the number of electric vehicles and other alternatives, is moving very slowly. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Shared irresponsibilities

While some countries, such as Argentina and Chile, improved their pledges, others like Brazil and Mexico scaled down or kept their pledges unchanged.

The measures of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia are in code red, as they are highly insufficient to contain global warming, according to the Climate Action Tracker.

In the case of the first three, the largest Latin American economies, the governments are prioritising the financing of increased fossil fuel exploitation, which would result in a rise in emissions in 2030, the Tracker highlights.

Chile’s and Peru’s measures are classified as insufficient and Costa Rica’s as almost sufficient.

That Central American nation, Colombia and Peru are on track to meet their commitments by 2030 and 2050, the Tracker notes.

In the case of Argentina, Chile and Ecuador, they would need additional measures to achieve their goals. At the other extreme are Brazil and Mexico, the biggest regional polluters, which have strayed from the medium- and long-term path.

Enrique Maurtúa, senior climate policy advisor for the non-governmental Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN), said that Argentina is an example of the countries in the region that are caught between these contradictions.

“Argentina follows the line of what is happening in several countries in the region. In terms of commitments, it does its homework, what it is supposed to do, it is preparing a long-term strategy. But those commitments are not in line with what Argentina is doing behind closed doors,” the expert told IPS from Buenos Aires, where the Foundation is based.

As part of this approach, the Argentine Congress is debating a draft Hydrocarbon Investment Promotion Regime to provide fiscal stability to the sector for the next 20 years.

In addition, the government weakened the carbon tax, which averages a 10 dollar charge, through exemptions and the exclusion of gas, and is preparing a sustainable mobility strategy that dispenses with hydrogen.

Mexico is following a similar path, as the government favours support for the state-owned oil company Pemex and the government’s electric utility Comisión Federal de Electricidad, is building a refinery in the state of Tabasco, on the southeastern coast of the country, and has stalled actions aimed at an energy transition.

On Dec. 29, 2020, Mexico released its updated NDC, without increasing the emissions reduction target, to the disappointment of environmental organisations, and in contravention of the Paris Agreement and its own climate change law.

But on Oct. 1 it was reported that a federal court annulled the update, considering that there was an illegal reduction in the mitigation goals, so the 2016 measures remain in force until the government improves on them.

Isabel Bustamante, a member of the Fridays for Future Mexico movement who will attend COP26, questioned Mexico’s climate stance.

“It does not take a solid stance. We need declarations of climate emergency throughout the country and to make resources more readily available. We are concerned about the focus on more fossil fuel production,” she told IPS from the southeastern city of Mérida.

President Andrés Manuel López Obrador is facing pressure from the environmental sector, but does not seem adept at changing course. He is even sending mixed signals, such as his announcement on Oct. 18 that the country will raise climate targets in 2022.

At most service stations in Brazil, consumers can choose between gasoline and ethanol, the price of which is attractive when it does not exceed 70 percent of that of gasoline. But users only opt for biofuel when it is economically attractive, so it does not contribute to alleviating the emission of polluting gases. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

The COP and the question marks it raises for the region

The UNFCCC stated in September that the NDCs presented are insufficient to curb warming to 1.5 degrees C.

Miranda believes COP26 could be beneficial for the region.

“Expectations are very high. We need the big polluters to be present. There will be pressure for tangible results. The region knows where its needs are, it has many opportunities to use ecosystems to reduce emissions,” she said.

Maurtúa, for his part, stresses that the main results will depend on the concrete financing and means of implementation of the Paris Agreement.

“Developed countries have to make financial contributions to the transition in developing countries. Industrialised nations are asking for more ambition, but they have to provide financing,” he argued.

In the expert’s opinion, “it is what the region needs. There are signs of willingness in Costa Rica, Colombia and Chile. But that is not happening in the case of Argentina or Mexico.”

For young people like Bustamante, the summit needs to offer more real action and fewer empty offers. “We expect an urgent climate action agenda to emerge. We need to stop investments in fossil fuel infrastructure, which compromises our near future. We will not stop until we do,” she said.

Under pressure due to the urgency of pending matters and within the constraints imposed by the pandemic, Glasgow could be a defining benchmark of a real global commitment to address the climate emergency, which is causing more and more destruction.

Excerpt:

The Chichipicas spring is one of the San Huitzizilapan indigenous community's water sources, in the Lerma municipality, in the state of Mexico -adjacent to Mexico City-, where several community systems manage the resource. Credit: Emilio Godoy / IPS

By Emilio Godoy
LERMA/COYOTEPEC, Mexico, Sep 18 2021 (IPS)

In the San Lorenzo Huitzizilapan Otomí indigenous community, in the state of Mexico –adjacent to the country’s capital–, access to water has been based on collective work.

“Public services come from collective work. What we have done is based on tequio (free compulsory work in benefit of the community), cooperation. The community has always taken care of the forests and water,” Aurora Allende, a member of the sector’s Drinking Water System, told IPS.

In San Lorenzo Huitzizilapan, a town of 18,000 people in the municipality of Lerma – about 60 kilometres west of Mexico City – some 10 autonomous community water management groups are responsible for the water supply in their areas.

The first community system emerged in 1960 to meet local needs. “The water falls by gravity and we pipe it. The water runs through 200 drains that come from the hill, and there are two or three wells for the smaller neighbourhoods,” explained Allende, whose father started the first autonomous system in the community and who is a homemaker in addition to her community work.

The Drinking Water System serves some 150 families who pay about two dollars a month for the maintenance of the facilities.

Huitzizilapan, whose name means “river of hummingbirds” in Nahuatl and which owns about 4,000 hectares of land, half of it forests, is part of a strip of water factories that supply the Cutzamala System, the set of dams that supplies water to both the capital and the state of Mexico.

The Otomi people are one of Mexico’s 69 native groups, numbering some 17 million people, out of a total national population of 128 million. More than 400 000 indigenous people belonging to five groups live in the state of Mexico.

Despite being guardians of the cultural and biological heritage of this Latin American country, they suffer discrimination and poverty. Almost 50 percent of the headwaters of Mexico’s watersheds are in areas inhabited by indigenous peoples and the regions with the highest rainfall are located in their territories.

The 1992 National Water Law does not recognise the rights of native inhabitants and allows the government’s National Water Commission (Conagua) to grant water permits throughout the country to anyone who applies for them. In 2012, a constitutional amendment recognised the human right to water. However, approval of a new law to implement the constitutional reform is still pending.

In addition, water faces the three horsemen of the apocalypse: the effects of the climate crisis, such as drought; overexploitation; and pollution.

Native peoples suffer from restrictions on new uses of water, put in place by Conagua with the argument that there are water shortages. Today, at least nine of these measures apply in eight of Mexico’s 31 states and the federal district of Mexico City.

Autonomous initiatives have become a mechanism for organising and defending access to water, despite the fact that they are not recognised by law, although they are not prohibited either. But there is no estimate of how many operate in the country nor has there been an assessment of how they function.

But for Conagua and the state-owned Federal Electricity Commission, these systems are a nuisance, because they fall outside the jurisdiction of the former and, for the latter, electricity to operate wells serves as a means of pressure to promote the municipalisation of the service, due to the costs paid by the independent systems.

Aurora Allende, seen here outside the gate of one of the local waster plants, is an autonomous water management system member in the San Lorenzo Huitzizilapan indigenous community, in central Mexico. Credit: Emilio Godoy / IPS

Struggles over water

The water issue is a reflection of how native groups are treated in Mexico, because Conagua has granted individuals, companies and municipalities more than 29,000 concessions for the use of water in their territories, covering about 35 billion cubic meters.

For that reason, water is a recurring source of political, social and environmental conflicts in this country with the second-largest population and economy in Latin America and the third largest area, as indicated by recent reports.

Mexico faces a high risk of water stress, surpassed in the region only by Chile, according to the Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas developed by the Aqueduct Alliance, made up of governments, companies and foundations. In 2021, the country has been suffering from a severe drought that has had a major impact on agriculture, livestock and water availability in urban centres.

The 2015 report “Conflicts among Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Mexico” prepared by the official National Institute of Indigenous Peoples and seen by IPS, documents 246 disputes over agrarian issues, mining projects and violations of indigenous rights.

Of these, 16 involve water issues, such as the construction of thermoelectric plants, aqueducts and hydroelectric dams.

In the Coyotepec municipality, in the state of Mexico -adjacent to the capital of the country-, the official National Water Commission manages 11 wells to supply the resource on site. Community liquid management systems pose a challenge for the authorities to control the water. Credit: Emilio Godoy / IPS

The 2019 “Report on Violations of the Human Rights to Drinking Water and Sanitation in Mexico,” drawn up by a collective of NGOs, provides a more detailed picture of conflicts over water, outlining 72 cases of violations of the right to water in 16 states.

The municipality of Coyotepec, also in the state of Mexico, illustrates like few others the struggle for water.

In June 2013, the municipal government tried unsuccessfully to take control of the water service, a move that was opposed by the public. The local water supply was managed by the autonomous Coyotepec Drinking Water Administration (AAPCOY), founded in 1963 to provide water to the town of about 41,000 people.

In May 2016, local residents prevented a municipal consultation because they considered it was rigged and aimed at approving the transfer of water to nearby real estate projects.

“The conflict persists. The state government saw that we were winning the battle and forcibly removed us. We oppose municipalisation, because it is the door to the privatisation of the service. They want to take control of our water,” a retired accountant who is a member of the June 9 Popular Front in Defence of Natural Resources of Coyotepec told IPS.

In Coyotepec, which means “place of coyotes” in Nahuatl, located about 40 kilometres north of Mexico City, AAPCOY serves some 12,000 members, who pay about 2.50 dollars a month, and is complemented by two other water systems. For its part, Conagua manages 11 wells and a pumping plant.

In San Lorenzo Huitzizilapan, Coyotepec and other localities with a majority indigenous population, there were violations of rights to water availability, physical and economic accessibility, water quality, as well as access to information and participation, accountability and justice, according to organisations that defend the right to water.

Seeking a remedy, indigenous peoples have sought legal protections that denounce the breach of the International Labour Organisation’s Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007, which recognise native territory and the right to water.

Claudia Gómez, a non-governmental Lawyers Collective member, and Wilfrido Gómez, the head of Social Data Ibero at the private Iberoamerican University, agree that legal questions are at the root of the problem.

“There are not enough legal mechanisms to guarantee the protection of water as part of indigenous territory,” Claudia Gómez told IPS. “Neither the Water Law nor the constitution has adequately regulated water for the people. There is a battle to gain recognition for native practices and use of water.”

Wilfrido Gómez (no relation) said that “if water is available and if they meet certain legal requirements, companies are given concessions, but for the communities it is more complicated. Control over water is gained by whoever has the money to obtain permits. One implication is the widespread dispossession of land and water, which go together.”

Due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the urgent need for clean water, the U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs urged governments in its 2020 report “Indigenous Peoples and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Considerations” to improve access to and management of water and sanitation, especially for indigenous people in remote villages, and said this should include “relevant indigenous practices, such as watershed management.”

Despite this situation, Mexico’s National Indigenous Peoples Program 2018-2024 does not mention water once.

Community water rights advocate Sergio Velázquez is fighting for the continuity of an independent water management system in the municipality of Coyotepec, in central Mexico, which has brought him up against pressure from the city council for control of the resource in the municipality. Photo: Emilio Godoy / IPS

Caught between risks and promises

The solution seems to lie in a new water law, which has been held up in the Chamber of Deputies. The lower house of Congress has received at least six initiatives, including the first in the country developed by organisations defending the human right to water, indigenous peoples, agricultural producers and academics.

After seven years of forums and workshops, the citizens’ initiative was built on 12 consensuses.

These include respect for the water rights of local communities, a ban on water permits for toxic mining and fracking endeavours, an end to the hoarding of water permits, prevention of the privatisation of water services, a guarantee of full access to information and sufficient public funds for water supply.

Allende said “all they want is our water and our forests. There are projects for bottling plants and real estate developments in the highlands. They’re doing everything they can to have access to that area. There is a threat of urbanisation; we are afraid that they will enter our territory.” She lamented that they receive no compensation for taking care of the forest and the water.

Claudia Gómez and Wilfrido Gómez advocate the approval of the citizens’ initiative.

“We believe that the approval of a new law that recognises the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities is necessary. There should be conservation and care policies, so that there is no shortage of water in other regions. Therefore, we ask for consensual regional plans, which are achieved through planning by region or basin, and thus priorities are selected,” said the lawyer.

Wilfrido Gómez stressed that the citizens’ initiative provides tools for controlling water concessions. “Very soon there will come a time when there will be no access to water and there will be no guarantees for the right to it. Today, Conagua has no legal tools to deny or withdraw concessions,” he explained.

In Coyotepec, the solution lies in new elections to lead AAPCOY and “oust the usurpers”, in Velázquez’ words, although it is also necessary for the beneficiaries to pay on time for the service, one of the shortcomings of the system.

“Thus, we could return to representative management that guarantees the right to water,” said the activist.

The project for this report was the winner of the Journalistic Research Grants on community water management in Mexico, a Fundación Avina, Cántaro Azul and Fondo para la Paz initiative. But this resulting content is solely the responsibility of IPS.