Credit: Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Jun 1 2023 (IPS)

Turkey’s election hasn’t produced the change many thought was on the cards. Now women’s groups, LGBTQI+ people and independent journalists are among those fearing the worse.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has led the country for two decades, first as prime minister and then as president, prevailed in the 28 May runoff poll, taking around 52.2 per cent of the vote, with his opponent, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, on 47.8 per cent.

The election represented Erdoğan’s biggest-ever electoral test. The run-up was dominated by a cost-of-living crisis. Many pointed the finger at highly unorthodox economic policies insisted on by Erdoğan – of lowering rather than raising interest rates in response to inflation – for making them worse off.

Anger was also sparked by devastating earthquakes that struck Turkey and Syria in February, leaving over 50,000 people dead and an estimated 1.5 million people homeless in Turkey. The government was accused of being slow to respond and of overlooking building regulations.

Erdoğan has overcome these hurdles, albeit with a narrow victory. The close vote shows that many Turks wanted change. But after a deeply polarised election, there’s no hint Erdoğan plans to moderate the way he governs.

 
Media dominance tells

Erdoğan prevailed despite facing a united opposition in which six parties put aside their differences. Their aim was to bring to an end Erdoğan’s hyper-presidential form of government and turn Turkey back into a pluralist democracy where parliament can act as a check on excessive presidential power.

A similar approach was tried in Hungary last year, when parties came together to try to oust authoritarian hardman Viktor Orbán, and also failed. Some of their challenges were similar. Both were forced to work in a severely unequal media landscape where media – state media and private media owned by business leaders closely connected to the government – focused almost entirely on the incumbent and starved the challenger of airtime. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe observers concluded that while the election was competitive, the playing field wasn’t level, with freedom of expression restrictions and media bias giving Erdoğan ‘an unjustified advantage’.

Over his 20 years, Erdoğan has concentrated power on himself and moved to suppress dissent. In 2017, Erdoğan pushed through changes that turned a parliamentary system into an intensely presidential one, placing virtually unlimited powers in his hands.

And he’s used those powers. Turkey is now the world’s fourth-largest jailer of journalists, with terrorism charges commonly applied, and the number of trials and length of sentences increasing.

The deteriorating climate for dissent could be seen in the wake of the earthquakes, when people were detained for criticising the government’s response. There were several reports of attacks on and obstruction of journalists during the election campaign.

A race to the bottom

In past elections, Erdoğan campaigned on his economic record. But this time, with the economic crisis and earthquake destruction leaving him unable to press those points, he fell back on another weapon, deploying a tactic nationalists and populists are using the world over: culture war rhetoric.

The opposition was consistently smeared for allegedly supporting LGBTQI+ rights, with Erdoğan positioning himself as the staunch defender of the traditional family. This messaging persisted even though the opposition had little to say on reversing Erdoğan’s attacks on women’s and LGBTQI+ people’s rights.

The culture war strategy was blended with a strongly nationalist appeal. Political opponents were portrayed as extremists and allies of terrorists. This was reinforced by fake campaign videos – one of many examples of campaign disinformation – that claimed to show members of a banned terrorist organisation supporting Kılıçdaroğlu.

Syrian refugees were also targeted. There are 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. They’ve crossed the border to escape the brutal, 12-year civil war and grotesque human rights abuses. But Turkey’s economic decline has seen growing xenophobia, which has fuelled violence, inflamed by political rhetoric.

Whoever won the election promised to be bad news for refugees. The opposition reacted to Erdoğan’s attacks by pledging to be even tougher in returning refugees. In the last leg of the campaign, both sides hurled discriminatory and inflammatory language at each other.

Erdoğan’s more authentic appeal to nationalism and socially conservative values ultimately won the day. Erdoğan seems to have convinced enough people he’s the only person who can navigate the current crisis. As in several other countries, including Hungary and El Salvador, a majority of voters embraced authoritarianism.

What next?

Undoubtedly Turkey’s heavily restricted civic space and deeply skewed media landscape played a major role. But even acknowledging these barriers, the opposition will need to do some soul searching ahead of municipal elections next year if they hope to keep control of major city governments. The strategy of imitating Erdoğan’s rhetoric on migrants and terrorism having failed, they must find a way to connect with voters with a more positive message.

There are immediate challenges ahead for Erdoğan too, not least the state of the economy. Erdoğan was able to offer some pre-election enticements such as a minimum wage increases and temporary free gas supplies, buttressed by support from non-democratic states including Russia, with which he has developed warmer relations. The government has significantly depleted its foreign currency and gold reserves to try to prop up the Turkish lira – which still hit a record low after Erdoğan’s victory was confirmed.

Erdoğan can be expected to react to further economic difficulty by deepening his authoritarianism to try to silence critics. Those already targeted – refugees, LGBTQI+ people, women, Kurdish activists and the civil society that defends their rights and independent journalists who report their stories – will remain in the firing line.

But the 25.5 million people who voted against Erdoğan deserve a voice. Erdoğan needs to change the habits of a lifetime, show some willingness to listen and build consensus. Turkey’s democratic allies must encourage him to see it’s in his best interest to do so.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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By Yasmine Sherif
NEW YORK, May 8 2023 (IPS)

A civilian student named Saber was caught in the crossfire in Khartoum. He had two choices: either flee and lose everything; or die. But within a moment his option to choose was violently denied: he died.

As a result of the brutal internal armed conflict in Sudan right now, UNHCR projects that 860,000 people will flee across the borders as refugees and returnees into the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and South Sudan. About 50% will be children and adolescents below 18.

Will they arrive alive? They can’t choose. They can only hope.

Making it worse, none of the neighboring countries has the financial and structural capacity to manage such influx, and yet they too, have no choice.

Indeed, an enormous international response will be required to support the Refugee Response Plan developed by 134 partners, including UN agencies, national and international NGOs and civil society groups, and launched on 4 May 2023.

Fleeing children and adolescents will need immediate psycho-social support and mental health care to cope with the stress and trauma of the conflict and perilous escape. They will need school meals. They will need water and sanitation. They will need protection. In the deep despair of their young lives, they will need a sense of normalcy and hope for their future. They need it now and a rapid response to establishing education can meet these needs.

Or to paraphrase ECW’s new Global Champion, the world-renowned journalist, Folly Bah Thibault – who reaffirms the need for speed and quality: the humanitarian-development nexus in action – in her high-level interview in this month’s ECW Newsletter, “We need to deliver with humanitarian speed and development depth.”

The choice is ours.

ECW is now traveling to the region to support host-governments, UN and civil society colleagues who jointly produced the Refugee Response Plan and who are on the ground working day and night in difficult circumstances. ECW will provide support both through an initial First Emergency Response investment and through our global advocacy.

We all have a choice to act now. Our choice is not between losing everything or die. Our choice is between action or inaction. Between humanity and indifference.

Prior to the breakout of the internal armed conflict in Sudan, Samiya*, a 17-year-old refugee student, wrote in her recent Postcard From the Edge: “Education is our future dream. Education is one of the most important factors to progress in life. Through education, people can thrive in their lives; they can also develop their skills and improve their life quality.”

We can help make Samya’s dream come true at the hardest, darkest moment of her life. Samiya does not have that choice. Only, we have that choice. Let us recognize it for what it is: as a privilege or blessing of choosing responsibility and humanity.

Yasmine Sherif is Director of Education Cannot Wait.

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By Jan Lundius
STOCKHOLM, Sweden, May 8 2023 (IPS)

The World changes, though prejudices and misconceptions remain. In 1996, political scientist Samuel Huntington published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he predicted that people’s cultural and religious identities would become the primary source of conflict in a Post–Cold War World. Huntington’s allegations have been contradicted by a number of critics, among them American Palestinian professor Edward Said, who lamented their extreme cultural determinism, which omitted the dynamic interdependency and interaction of cultures. Said’s own Orientalism depicted a generalised “Western view” of Arab cultures as “static and undeveloped”, while European culture was considered to be “developed, rational, flexible, and superior.” Literature and movies have depicted Arabs as exotic men riding camels and horses through the desert, and their women as dangerously seductive objects of male desire. Eventually, the exotic men turned in to being terrorists, and/or depraved oil-rich magnates, while Muslim women were presented as veiled, enigmatic, and oppressed.

Are there no counter-images to such a one-sided view, for example an Arab film industry? Since the inception of a film industry in Europe and the US it has generally been assumed that local movie production arrived in the Middle East much later than in “the West”. As a matter of fact, already by the beginning of the 20th century both screening and production had been brought into most Arab countries. Eventually, Egyptian film production came to dominate Middle Eastern movie industry, while it established affiliated companies in Lebanon. Iraq, Jordan, Iran, Israel, and more recently the United Arab Emirates and Palestine, followed suit.

Films serve as visual entertainment for huge audiences and in a vivid manner reflect social attitudes. They thus constitute a great medium for inspiring societal change. Of course, films might serve as a means for propaganda and indoctrination, but this does not hinder them from proving helpful in making people inclined to change a status quo. There are now signs that a pervasive socio/economic change is taking place in Saudi Arabia, where a growing film industry has become part of what appears to be an overhaul of hitherto domineering ideologies

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the only nation in the world named after a dynasty. It was founded in 1932 by King Abdul-Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud, though the strength of The House of Saud can be traced back to 1745, when a local leader established a politico-religious alliance with the Wahhabis, a religious affinity honouring a Salafiyya interpretation of Islam, i.e. what is believed to be the faith of the “pious predecessors of the first three generations.” The House of Saud offered obedience to the Wahhabis, while promising to propagate their faith during a fierce struggle against Turkish and foreign influences.

Initially, Saudi Arabia did not refute the idea of movie theatres and allowed improvised cinemas, but all films were heavily censored and supposed to be screened privately. In 1982, Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud became the fifth king of Saudi Arabia. Actively trying to base his authority on Wahhabism, he increased Government support to the conservative religious establishment; spending millions of dollars on religious education, strengthening separation of the sexes and the power of Muatawwa’ūn, a religious branch of the police.

Between 1983 and 2018 the only movie theatre to be found in the country was at a Science and Technology Centre, which only screened “educational” films. If Saudis wished to watch films it had to be via satellite, or DVD. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia grew into the largest economy in the Middle East. Its citizens benefit from free education and health care, along with subsidized food, electricity and housing. However, the economy relies overwhelmingly on oil. The country exports almost nothing else and imports almost everything. A welfare state has been built on the expectation that oil revenues would remain at historic levels, though prices are falling and oil will eventually run out. Furthermore, seventy per cent of the population is under thirty years of age and many demand increased personal freedom.

When King Fahd died in 2005 he was succeeded by King Abdullah Al Saud. Contrary to his predecessor, the new king realised that Saudi youth had to be better educated. As soon as he came to power, Abdullah implemented a scholarship program sending young Saudi men and women abroad for undergraduate and postgraduate studies. More than 70,000 Saudis began studying abroad in more than 25 countries, with the US, Great Britain, and Australia as main destinations. Educated and emancipated women also became considered as an asset for development. The King established a governmental department to promote women’s higher education and in 2011 women were allowed to vote in municipal council elections. The year after, women athletes competed in the Olympics and in 2013 domestic violence became a criminal offence.

However, still no movie production and screening were allowed in the country. The trend towards increased openness, innovation, efforts to limit religious bigotry and enlarged women’s rights continue under the current king, Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud. Its most visible propagator is Mohammed bin Salman, colloquially called MbS. He is Crown Prince, i.e. Salman bin Abdul-Aziz’s heir, though MbS is already the country’s Prime Minister and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia.

Already during King Abdullah’s reign, semi-clandestine initiatives were made by a budding movie industry. Wadja became the first feature-length film made by a female Saudi director. In 2012 it was entirely shot within the Kingdom. Written and directed by US-educated Saudi citizen Haifaa al-Mansour it told the story of a spirited 10-year old living in Riyadh. On her way to school she passed a shop window with a green bike. However, its price was high and girls riding bikes were frowned upon.

Wadja deals with feelings of school girls, though it mirrors a society where grown women are regimented as if they were still in school. Behind closed doors the beauty and wit of Wadjda’s mother were unmasked, though she seemed to be barely aware of it. Her main concern was that her husband intended to take a much younger woman as second wife. Wadjda set about to earn cash to buy the bicycle. Her target was a school prize, awarded to the student expressing most devotion in learning and reciting passages from the Quran. Wadjda feigned orthodox goodness and her efforts at memorization impressed her teacher. She won the competition, though staff and students became shocked when Wadjda announced her intention to use the prize to buy a bicycle. The headmistress was furious and against Wadjda’s will donated the prize money to charity.

Despite an apparent sentimental depiction of a little schoolgirl’s desires, Wadjda emphasized her longing for freedom and self-realization, as well as fear of emotional abandonment when her father took a second wife. It is not only a film about a young person’s awkward relationship with an authoritative society and distressed parents – her longing for a bicycle of her own actually became emblematic of an entire people’s striving for freedom.

Wadjda was shot in a country where zealous clergy forbade cinemas and with a totalitarian regime with zero-tolerance of female film directors. al-Mansour had most of the time to work from the back of a van, as she could not publicly mix with men of her crew. She generally had to communicate via walkie-talkie and watch the actors on a monitor.

Haifaa al-Mansour spent seven years on finding adequate funding. It was the Saudi Arabian billionaire businessman Al Waleed bin Talal Al Saud who finally agreed to contribute. Al Waleed is a grandson of Abdul-Aziz, the first king of Saudi Arabia, and among other altruistic initiatives he financed the training of the first Saudi female commercial airline pilot, declaring that he was disposed to give “full support of Saudi ladies working in all fields.”

In November 2017, Al Waleed and other prominent Saudis were arrested during an “anti-corruption drive”. Some 200 detainees were brought to the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Riyadh and subjected to coercion and abuse. Some, among them Al Waleed, were released after paying heavy fines. MbS not only attacked the old, extremely wealthy oligarchy, but also religious leaders who uphold Wahhabi doctrines. He openly declared that there are no static schools of thought, nor any infallible persons. In another statement MbS acknowledged that the Saudi state had not been “normal” for the past 30 years and that it was his intention to introduce social, religious, economic, political changes and a new educational policy, asserting a “Saudi national identity” within what he called a post-Wahhabi era.

Without interrupting or limiting his totalitarian powers MbS prohibited the Muatawwa’ūn to “stop, follow, arrest, punish, and ask people for their ID.” Muatawwa’ūn had until recently 4,000 officers, assisted by thousands of volunteers, and an additional 10,000 administrative personnel. It imposed strict segregation between the sexes, controlled that women wore the hijab, and forbade the sale of dogs and cats, as well as toys like Barbie dolls and Pokémon items.

Most of these restrictions are now abandoned. Women are allowed to drive cars and can chose not to wear the hijab. Women above 21 years can obtain passports and travel abroad without permission from their male guardians. It has become legally possible for women to independently open their own businesses and bank accounts, while mothers are authorised to retain immediate custody of their children after divorce. Women have now access to operas, concerts, cinemas and sports events.

This is part of the Government’s Saudi Vision 2030, aiming at diversifying the nation’s economy through heavy investments in non-oil sectors, including “green” technology, tourism, local expenditure and entertainment. In Riyadh, construction has begun of The Mukaab, a gigantic structure, which will include an armada of hotels, shopping malls, several cinemas and an “immersive” theatre. In the Northwest, Neom I is under construction – a high-technology megalopolis, with robotic services and even an artificial moon. The Line, a zero-carbon city stretching 170 kilometres across the desert. Qiddiya, a gigantic amusement park just outside of Riyadh. Trojena, a luxury ski resort in the Tabouk Mountains. The Red Sea Project, which is intended to be a string of luxurious hotels along the Red Sea shores.

Saudi Arabia has now 60 high-tech cinemas with approximately 500 screens in operation, as well as an increasing local production of TV entertainment. In accordance with Vision 2030 a General Entertainment Authority has been established. Its current chairman is bin Salman’s old friend Turki Al-Sheikh, known for his lyrics, sung by several Arab artists.

The film The Cello is expected to premiere in Riyadh this year. It is based on a novel by Turki Al-Sheikh that takes place in several locations, foremost in the 18th Century Italian town of Cremona, but also in present time. After being filmed in Prague, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Vienna, the movie stars world famous actor Jeremy Irons, as well as a great number of movie celebrities from Europe, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In The Cello a young man purchases a cursed cello, built by a Cremonese master luthier, builder of string instruments, who butchered and cut up his entire family, using parts of their blood and bones to make a cello.

The cutting up of people in Turki Al-Sheikh’s The Cello might remind viewers of the murder and dismemberment of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi, allegedly carried out by Saudi officials in Turkey. However The Cello may have an intended, or unintentional, so called Boris Bus effect. i.e. changing the subject of the gruesome murder of a journalist into the making of a wondrous instrument. Boris Johnson managed to redirect Google searches from past embarrassing and deceitful bus ads about Brexit into a description of his hobby of making toy buses with painted, happy passengers on board.

Bin Salman’s occasionally brutal and draconic measures might be interpreted as residues from hundreds of years of despotism. They will hopefully mellow, or even disappear, if Arabian society is allowed to continue on its already beaten path towards an open and democratic society, allowing for women’s emancipation, free speech and general wellbeing. A trend already evident within the Saudi Arabian film industry, which does not shy away from controversial subjects and where almost forty per cent of crew and directors currently are women.

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Ending Islamophobia a prerequisite for world peace, Saudi deputy envoy tells UN Mohammed Abdulaziz Alateek urged member states to condemn bigotry, violence and extremist acts targeting Muslims, and foster understanding between cultures. He was speaking during a high-level General Assembly event in the run-up to the first International Day to Combat Islamophobia, on March 15. Credit: Arab News

By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Apr 11 2023 (IPS)

The resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the Saudis’ diplomatic overtures toward Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, are part and parcel of the Saudis’ overall reassessment of their geostrategic interests, which rest on three distinctives goals: regional stability, exerting greater regional and international influence, and uninterrupted oil exports. These three fundamental goals are tightly linked and are within the Saudis’ reach.

Regional stability

The resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran mediated by China was central to its strategy. Both countries have come to the conclusion that notwithstanding their enmity and regional rivalry, they have to coexist in one form or another.

They realized that the eight-year-long war in Yemen has done nothing to improve their regional standing. It was a lose-lose proposition. Iran failed to establish a strong and permanent foothold in the Arabian Peninsula and although Iran continues to support the Houthis, they have no illusion about converting Yemen into an Iranian satellite.

Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, having prevented Iran from dominating Yemen, no longer feels that the continuation of the war will yield any further benefit regardless of how much more money and human resources they pour into the war effort.

This explains why they have agreed on the ceasefire and further extended it until they could find a mutually accepted solution. The resumption of diplomatic relations would accelerate this reconciliation process.

This, needless to say, is not guaranteed because the adversarial relations between the two countries run deep, but their national interest resulting from their rapprochement overrides, for the time being, those concerns.

Both sides know that it will take time to fully normalize relations while testing each other’s true intentions as well as their conduct.

For the same reason, the Saudis decided that Syria’s President Assad is not going anywhere. He has weathered the most devastating war since the last World War, albeit at the expense of destroying half of the country while inflicting massive suffering on nearly half of Syria’s population.

Millions are still refugees languishing in camps in many countries in the region, especially in Turkey, and millions more are still internally displaced. Thus, mending relations with Syria will be a win-win for the Saudis as this would only enhance its influence.

Regional influence

The Saudis fully understand that they cannot boost their regional influence by remaining disengaged from their neighbors. Given Iran’s nuclear weapons program and the Saudis’ extreme concerns, the resumption of diplomatic relations could potentially ease those apprehensions.

How the Saudis can help change the dynamic of Iran’s nuclear program remains to be seen. One thing, however, is certain: the Saudis have placed themselves where they can potentially bring Iran back to negotiating with the US, albeit indirectly. Whether or not they succeed, they can still exert greater influence in this area by engaging Iran, which they did not have before.

And to further exert regional influence, the Saudis wisely decided to invite Syria’s Assad to the Arab League summit that Riyadh is hosting in May. Syria was suspended from the organization in 2011, and was sanctioned by many Western powers and Arab states because of Assad’s fierce onslaught against protesters that led to a long, drawn-out civil war during which more than 600,000 lost their lives.

The Saudi invitation certainly signals an extremely important development that will bring about the reintegration of Syria into the Arab fold—a move that would lead to the resumption of full diplomatic relations between the two countries.

There is no doubt that other Arab states will follow suit, which only strengthens Saudi Arabia’s leadership role among its fellow Arab countries.

By reopening diplomatic relations with both Iran and Syria, the Saudis will have a say about any future settlement to the Syrian conflict, where Iran still exerts considerable influence.

Given that the Saudis have deep pockets and the Syrian regime is dire economic strains and needs tens of billions to rebuild, the Saudis can do a great deal more than Iran to provide financial aid to Syria. And, of course, with financial aid comes influence.

President Assad is more than eager to cooperate not only for the critically important financial aid, but also to begin the process of ending Damascus’ isolation. Restoring diplomatic relations between Syria and the other Arab states will contribute significantly to calming the region and making it possible for Saudi Arabia to sustain its ability to supply oil in huge quantities without interruption.

Uninterrupted oil export

For the Saudis, continuing to export oil in enormous quantities and the revenue it generates is central to its objective to becoming a regional player to be reckoned with. Having the largest reservoir of oil gives the Saudis significant advantages, as many of its oil customers know they can rely on the Saudis for energy supplies for many years to come.

Thus, its resumption of diplomatic relations with Iran and Syria and financially aiding other Arab states like Egypt, would invariably contribute to stabilizing the region and in turn allow the Saudis to continue its oil exports with the least interruptions.

None of the above however will impact adversely the Saudis’ relationship with the US nor its tacit relations with Israel. The Saudis are fully aware of how critical the US’ role in both, as the main supplier of weapons to the kingdom and the region’s ultimate security guarantor.

Moreover, regardless of its discord with Israel regarding the Palestinian conflict, Saudi Arabia’s tacit cooperation with Israel on intelligence sharing and transfer of Israeli technology are and will remain an integral part of its geostrategic objective.

Riyadh wants to develop inroads into both its past adversaries including Iran and Syria while maintaining its current relations with the US and Israel, regardless of the occasional ups and downs between them.

At the same time, Riyadh is cementing its bilateral relations with China, the world’s second-largest superpower to which Saudi Arabia exports one quarter of its annual oil output ($43.9 billion’s worth in 2021, out of $161.7 billion in total exports), while becoming the de facto leader of the Arab states.

To be sure the Saudis have, thus far, been able to successfully utilize its wealth to its advantage.

Needless to say, however, many external and regional occurrences could directly and indirectly impact Saudi Arabia’s new geostrategic calculus, including the Ukraine war, the growing tension between the US and China and Russia, and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

However, under any circumstances the Saudis stand to gain as time and circumstances are on their side.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (NYU). He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies for over 20 years.

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Egypt plans to sell shares in 32 state-owned businesses, including three banks. Credit: Hisham Allam/IPS

By Hisham Allam
Cairo, Apr 6 2023 (IPS)

Egypt intends to sell shares in 32 state-owned businesses within a year, including three banks, two military-owned businesses, and numerous businesses in the energy and transportation sectors. This is part of the administration’s efforts to reduce the role of the state in the economy and attract foreign capital.

That also follows the government’s December USD 3 billion deal with the IMF to resume privatization initiatives.

The IMF approved the USD 3 billion loan to strengthen the private sector and reduce the state’s footprint in the economy.

Egypt planned to sell 23 state-owned enterprises in 2018, but the plan was postponed due to the worldwide crisis.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has put pressure on the Egyptian economy and currency, making the proposal more urgent.

According to Rashad Abdo, head of the Egyptian Forum for Economic Studies, Egypt had already received sovereign loans from many donors, including international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and Gulf countries, and these parties either set harsh lending conditions or would be reluctant to lend due to increased risks.

The State Ownership Policy Plan, adopted by President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi in December, outlines how the government would participate in the economy and how it would increase private sector involvement in public investments. Egypt wants to increase the contribution of the private sector to the nation’s economic activity from 30 percent to 65 percent within the next three years. One-quarter of these enterprises will be listed by the government within six months.

Egypt announced the offering of these companies, intending to sell them to strategic investors, specifically Gulf sovereign funds. Egypt is expected to sell enterprises worth USD 40 billion within three years, including those held by the army.

Attracting foreign investment requires strengthening the investment climate, lowering inflation rates, and expanding anti-corruption efforts, Abdo told IPS.

The State Ownership document states that 32 Egyptian state companies will be listed on the Egypt Exchange (EGX) or sold to strategic investors within a year, beginning with the current quarter and ending in the first quarter of 2024. Stakes in three significant banks, Banco du Caire, United Bank of Egypt, and Arab African International Bank, are among the scheduled transactions. Insurance, electricity, and energy companies, as well as hotels and industrial and agricultural concerns, will also be on the market. Prime Minister Moustafa Madbouly announced that the first stakes would be offered in March and a quarter by June, and more businesses could be added over the next year.

Abdo pointed out that the Monetary Fund affirmed the Egyptian government’s commitment to implementing the State Ownership Document when it agreed to grant it this loan and the Egyptian government saw it as a favorable opportunity to implement the terms of the document set by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Mohamed Al-Kilani, professor of economics and member of the Egyptian Society for Political Economy, said the privatization effort seeks to eliminate the dollar gap in Egypt and thus provide indirect compensation in the form of services and benefits from the International Monetary Fund’s debt.

The state would also send a message to foreign investors that it responds to the private sector and is willing to withdraw from certain sectors to benefit the private sector.

“The state is attempting to exploit this proposal to stimulate and revitalize the Egyptian Stock Exchange while taking into account the fair valuation of these companies in comparison to the global market. However, the state was unclear about the details of this offering and whether it is a long-term or short-term investment, and it has not clarified the size of employment or the percentages offered in terms of ownership and management,” Al-Kilani told IPS.

“The state is trying to create new types of foreign investment to attract foreign currency due to the fluctuation in exchange rates and high-interest rates,” Al-Kilani added.

According to external debt data published on the central bank’s website in mid-February, Egypt’s external debt fell by USD 728 million to USD 154.9 billion at the end of last September, but its foreign exchange reserves remain low, prompting renewed demand for state assets. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has further pressured the economy and local currency, prompting the proposal for new urgency.

Despite its relatively modest improvement in the latest data from the central bank at the beginning of February (USD 34.2 billion), it lost about 20 percent of the level of USD 41 billion at the end of February last year.

Last January, the IMF suggested that the volume of the financing gap in Egypt would reach about USD 17 billion over the next 46 months in light of its decline in foreign exchange resources and the high cost of its imports as one of the largest countries in the world to import its food and the first importer of wheat in the world.

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A camp for displaced people in Jindairis in northwestern Syria. Credit: UN News/Shirin Yaseen
 
Syrians whose lives have been upended by a 12-year civil war and a catastrophic earthquake are looking to return home and rebuild their lives. Shirin Yaseen from the Office of the Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General visited northwestern Syria as part of an interagency mission to assess the situation there. 1 April 2023

By Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
LONDON, Apr 5 2023 (IPS)

Europe’s current approach to facilitating refugee returns and containing new arrivals from Syria is based on wishful thinking. Europeans have come to terms with the fact that a political settlement for Syria’s 12-year conflict is not on the horizon.

In conversations with diplomats, one hears a reoccurring theme these days: Syria is not a priority anymore. Notoriously hesitant to lead and busy with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europeans want to keep things as calm as possible.

But what stands in the way of this old-fashioned wait-and-see approach is the issue of refugees. Not only are significant numbers not returning to Syria, but tens of thousands more continue to set out to the EU each year.

Against this background, Europeans have indicated to president Bashar al-Assad that concessions on the ‘refugee issue’ could prompt them to re-think their policy of ostracising the Syrian dictator and his regime.

Notably, discussions on refugee return have almost exclusively been about their return to regime-held Syria. Much of the official thinking on the matter, which includes that of the UN envoy, envisages Assad conceding to taking back refugees in return for the normalisation of relations with other Arab countries and Western political and financial inducements.

Putting refugee return on the negotiating table with Assad makes sense from a diplomatic expediency angle. And it is certainly attractive: if voluntary and dignified returns can be realised, this would please the domestic audience in Europe and foreign ministries as well as EU institutions could sell it as an indicator that political progress is being achieved.

However, Europe’s current approach to facilitating refugee returns and containing new arrivals is based on wishful thinking.

Assad’s ‘population warfare’

First of all, Europe falsely assumes that Assad wants his people back. Apart from the crippling pressures that any sizeable refugee return would place on resources in regime areas – water, electricity, fuel, food, etc. – there is the more important matter of security.

The regime considers all Syrians who have fled to neighbouring countries to be at best cowards and at worst traitors. By placing themselves out of the reach of the regime’s military conscriptors, they are seen as having voted with their feet in Syria’s civil war.

‘We will never forgive or forget’ echoes a longstanding view among regime supporters of those perceived to have skipped the war but now want to return once the fighting is over.

The testimonies of those who have returned only to see their loved ones arrested and killed suggest that it is not an empty threat. Those connected to rebels or their families by blood or marriage, or those that have been reported as having anti-Assad views by informants, immediately fail the regime’s security check for returning refugees, as will most that hail from former rebel strongholds.

Additionally, living in a neighbouring country for many years and establishing roots there, as most refugees have done, enables the regime to brand them as ‘politically suspect’. Syria’s Foreign Minister claims that refugees can return ‘without any condition’, but this magnanimity is only voiced when around Western reporters.

‘Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the Syrian regime’s discourse on refugees is that there barely is one’, a study on the matter finds. This should not come at all as a surprise.

Syria’s mass population displacement has for too long been seen as an unfortunate secondary effect of the war rather than an intended goal. But in civil wars that take on an ethnic or sectarian nature, de-population becomes a strategic goal in itself.

According to one study, ‘combatants displace not only to expel undesirable populations but also to identify the undesirables in the first place by forcing people to send signals of loyalty and affiliation based on whether, and to where, they flee.’

In Syria, population displacement was at the heart of Assad’s counter-insurgency strategy. Moreover, Assad’s use of chemical weapons and its wider war effort are inextricably linked – tactically, operationally and strategically.

Whether it be artillery strikes, barrel bombs, or sarin gas, the overall war strategy was collective punishment of the population in opposition-held areas.

Assad’s ‘population warfare’ doctrine aims to ensure the population balance of pre-war Syria – so nearly fatal to his family and clan – cannot be recreated. ‘Two-thirds of the population [of Syria] was Sunni and half of it has been scattered to the winds, as refugees or internal exiles’, writes one observer – a favourable outcome for the Alawite president.

For Assad, the country has now gained a ‘healthier and more homogenous society’. With that in mind, it is understandable that most Syrians reject returning to areas under the control of his regime.

Working with Turkey

Does this mean that Europeans should remove the ‘refugee file’ from the negotiating table? Not quite. But they would be well advised to be sober about their goals. If they try to utilise the refugee file as an entry point for advancing a moribund political process, it would be ethically irresponsible.

In fact, EU diplomats have already signalled that credible steps allowing refugee returns could pave the way for gradual engagement with the Assad regime. This is concerning given that turning refugees into a diplomatic currency to trade concessions with Assad hardly passes the ‘do no harm’ test.

If the goal is to get results where refugees actually return to Syria in large numbers and fewer people leave the country, Europeans should be talking not with Damascus but with Ankara.

The inconvenient truth about refugee return is that it will only work if enough refugees are willing to return voluntarily, given realistic conditions and a serious partner on the ground with an active interest in seeing returns happen.

Right now, only Turkey and a share of its Syrian refugees can tick both boxes, given the connectivity between populations on both sides of the border and Turkey’s ability to assure relative security.

According to UNHCR figures, about 800 Syrian refugees are returning to Syria from Turkey every week despite the UN agency’s assessment that conditions are not suitable for a large number of voluntary returns.

Moreover, of the nearly 750,000 refugees that have returned to Syria since 2016, most of them (500,000) have returned from Turkey to opposition-controlled areas in the north and northwest of Syria. In contrast, only 10,766 refugees returned to regime-controlled areas between January and October 2022. A greater number have fled Assad’s Syria in the same period.

The absence of security hurdles to return and compulsory military conscription (both major push factors in regime areas and those controlled by the US-allied Syrian Democratic Forces) and the fact that Sunni internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees feel relatively safe under Turkey’s protection are solid foundations on which to build a realistic returns policy.

Perhaps most important for European policymakers, Turkey controls the territory in northern Syria through which large numbers from regime and SDF areas are passing through to enter Turkey and continue to Europe, all for vast sums of money.

Dealing with Ankara on a programme for voluntary refugee return would create a firebreak in the logistical chain of the people traffickers that ends in Berlin and Amsterdam but begins at the M4 Highway.

In sum, Europeans should recognise that significant refugee returns to areas currently controlled by the Assad regime cannot precede a political settlement. Talk of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ and investments in local development labelled as ‘Early Recovery assistance’ will not change that fact.

This also applies to limiting new refugee movements. Any sort of minor concession from the regime has the purpose of maintaining the momentum of normalisation, but it cannot alter the calculus of Syrians who have no illusions about the regime’s unalterable nature.

The facts support the case for European engagement with Turkey both on returns and border security. Europeans are of course entitled to take a critical stance on Ankara’s Syria policy. Notwithstanding their condemnation of Turkey’s incursions into Syria, new realities have emerged that require a nuanced position rather than blissful ignorance.

Unless Europeans adapt to the reality that Syria is now a de facto divided country, their policy response will remain poor. If areas outside of the regime’s control continue to be seen as not being part of Syria proper, and therefore not integral to any credible nationwide refugee return programme, there will be much more talk but no delivery.

Individual diplomats may be very much aware of this reality, but as long as this realisation does not translate into actual policy, the EU will continue to deceive itself.

Malik al-Abdeh is a conflict resolution expert focused on Syria. He is managing director of Conflict Mediation Solutions, a consultancy specialized in Track II work.

Lars Hauch works as a researcher and policy advisor for Conflict Mediation Solutions, a London-based consultancy specialising in Track II diplomacy.

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS) Journal published by the International Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin

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By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Mar 31 2023 (IPS)

The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), an organisation whose motto is ‘For democracy. For everyone’, just held its global assembly in a country with a mock parliament and not the slightest semblance of democracy.

For Bahrain’s authoritarian leaders, the hosting of the IPU assembly was yet another reputation-laundering opportunity: a week before, they’d hosted Formula One’s opening race.

The day after the race, Ebrahim Al-Mannai, a lawyer and human rights activist, tweeted that the Bahraini parliament should be reformed if it was to be showcased at the assembly. His reward was to be immediately arrested for tweets and posts deemed an ‘abuse of social media platforms’.

That same week, the Bahraini authorities revoked the entry visas for two Human Rights Watch staff to attend the assembly.

Rather than opening up to host the event, Bahrain further shut down.

A mock parliament and no democracy

Bahrain is member of the IPU, which defines itself as ‘the global organization of national parliaments’, because, on paper at least, it has a parliament. But its parliament is neither representative nor powerful. Bahrain is an absolute monarchy.

The king has power over all branches of government. He appoints and dismisses the prime minister and cabinet members, who are responsible to him, not to parliament. The two prime ministers the country has had so far – the first served for over 50 years – have been prominent members of the royal family, and many cabinet ministers have been too.

The king appoints all members of the upper house of parliament, along with all judges. Parliament’s lower chamber is elected – but everything possible is done to keep out those who might try to hold the government to account.

Political parties aren’t allowed; ‘political societies’, loose groups with some of the functions of political parties, are recognised. To be able to operate, they must register and seek authorisation, which can be denied or revoked.

In recent years the government has shut down most opposition political societies, arresting and imprisoning their most popular leaders. All members of dissolved groups and former prisoners are banned from competing in elections. And just in case new potential opposition candidates somehow emerge, voting districts are carefully gerrymandered so the opposition can’t get a majority.

In November 2022 Bahrain once again went through the motions of an election. A large number of eligible voters were excluded from the electoral roll as punishment for abstaining in previous elections – a tactic used to ensure any boycott attempts wouldn’t affect turnout. Exactly as it was meant to, the election produced a legislative body with no ability to counterbalance monarchical power.

No space for dissent

In 2018, the king issued a decree known as the ‘political isolation law’. It banned members of dissolved opposition parties standing for election. It also gave the government control of the appointment of civil society organisations’ board members, limiting their ability to operate, and has been used to harass and persecute activists, including by stripping them and their families of citizenship rights.

In 2017, Bahrain’s last independent newspaper, Al-Wasat, was shut down. No independent media are now allowed to operate. The government owns all national broadcast media outlets, while the main private newspapers are owned by government loyalists.

Vaguely worded press laws that impose harsh penalties, including long prison sentences, for insulting the king, defaming Islam or threatening national security encourage self-censorship. Many people, including journalists, bloggers and others active on social media, have been detained, imprisoned and convicted.

This has turned Bahrain into a prison state. It’s estimated that almost 15,000 people have been arrested for their political views over the past decade, at least 1,400 of whom are currently in jail. Most have been convicted on the basis of confessions obtained under torture. Appallingly, 51 people have been sentenced to death.

An advocacy opportunity

Given the IPU’s evident lack of interest in the human rights records of host states, civil society focused its advocacy on parliamentary delegations from democratic states.

Ahead of the assembly, two dozen civil society groups published a joint statement addressed at parliamentarians who would be attending, urging them to publicly raise concerns over Bahrain’s lack of political freedoms, including violations of the rights of parliamentarians, and to ensure their presence wouldn’t be used to legitimise the authoritarian regime.

Civil society’s calls for the freedom of political prisoners were loudly echoed by parliamentary delegations from countries including Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, among several others.

The director of the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy described the event as ‘a PR disaster for the Bahraini regime’, a failure of its image-laundering plan.

The response of the Bahraini authorities was however far from encouraging. They reminded foreign parliamentarians they shouldn’t interfere in Bahrain’s domestic affairs and continued to deny evidence of imprisonment and torture.

Sustained international pressure is needed to urge the Bahraini regime to free its thousands of political prisoners and allow spaces for dissent. That, rather than high-level image-laundering events, is what will fix the country’s well-deserved bad reputation.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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Credit: Jehad Al-Nahary/Oxfam

By Ferran Puig
SA’ANA, Yemen, Mar 30 2023 (IPS)

As Yemen enters its ninth year of war, its people are facing a humanitarian crisis of horrifying proportions. In my role as Oxfam’s Yemen Country Director, I have witnessed firsthand the effects of the humanitarian catastrophe, worsened by economic collapse and sharp increases in the cost of food and other essential commodities.

Over 17 million people are experiencing high levels of food insecurity, 75% of whom are women and children. The situation is further aggravated by the global food crisis, leaving millions more at risk of catastrophic hunger. 

The time for global action is now.

The current conflict has its roots in the 2011 Arab Spring, when mass protests led to the ousting of long-serving President Ali Abdullah Saleh. His successor, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, struggled to address a range of issues, including corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity. In 2014, the Houthi rebel movement, seized control of large parts of the country, including the capital, Sana’a.

In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states, backed by the United States and other Western powers, launched military operations against the Houthis to restore Hadi’s government. The ensuing conflict has led to widespread destruction, civilian casualties, and an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.

The war has also been characterized by numerous violations of international humanitarian law, such as indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure, the use of child soldiers, and the imposition of constraints that hinder the delivery of aid.

This past Sunday, March 26, marked eight years since the conflict in Yemen escalated. The expiration of a temporary UN-brokered truce in October has left the country in a precarious state. While the truce has largely held, the political and economic future of Yemen remains uncertain.

The UN estimated in 2021 that there had already been 337,000 deaths due to the conflict and associated issues like lack of access to food, water, and healthcare. Millions have been displaced and more than 21.6 million people—two-thirds of the population—require humanitarian assistance and protection.

Despite the severity of the crisis, international donors have committed only about a third of the necessary funds for the past few years.

The importance of international aid in humanitarian emergencies cannot be overstated. Such aid provides a lifeline to affected populations, helping them meet their basic needs, rebuild their lives, and restore hope for the future. In times of crisis, international aid can mean the difference between life and death.

Moreover, it can help prevent the spread of conflict and instability by addressing root causes, such as poverty, inequality, and social unrest. As global citizens, we have a moral obligation to support those in need and to promote peace and stability worldwide.

I have seen the exhaustion and desperation of the Yemeni people firsthand. Rising food prices and unpaid salaries mean even basic foodstuffs have been pushed beyond the reach of many Yemeni families.

We cannot let donors turn their backs on one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises. It is also past time for world leaders to exert real pressure to bring all sides back to the table so they can bring a permanent end to the conflict. They must also ensure that the voices of the most marginalized—most notably women women—are included and heard.

Yemen’s cost of living crisis is compounded by the worsening global food situation. The country imports 90% of its food, with 42% of its wheat coming from Ukraine. Importers warn that rising global costs will challenge their ability to secure wheat imports into Yemen, potentially pushing millions towards starvation.

The impact on households is profound, forcing families to adopt negative coping mechanisms—such as eating lower quality foods, limiting portion sizes, going into debt to buy food, and borrowing from friends and neighbors—to survive.

As a result, 2.2 million Yemeni children under the age of five are now acutely malnourished.

The international response has been insufficient. Despite the growing need, the World Food Program has been forced to reduce the amount of aid it provides. A high-level pledging event earlier this year co-hosted by the UN and the governments of Sweden and Switzerland concluded with a collective commitment of under a third of the amount needed for 2023 ($1.2 billion of the $4.3 billion required).

At Oxfam, we work in Yemen to provide basic services like clean water, sanitation, cash, and establishing solar energy at household and community levels. However, more must be done.

I call upon the international community to provide adequate funding for life-saving aid, a rescue economic package to stabilize the economy and put money into people’s pockets, and increased efforts to negotiate a lasting comprehensive peace in Yemen.

The situation in Yemen is dire, and the international community must no longer remain passive. As we recall the grim anniversary of eight years of conflict, we must keep in mind the millions of Yemenis who continue to suffer.

It is time for world leaders to come together and take action to bring an end to the conflict and to provide the necessary resources for the people of Yemen to rebuild their lives.

IPS UN Bureau

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Excerpt:

Building renewables plants across the Global South is a preferable alternative to generate fewer emissions — but the international community has to date been unwilling to provide the substantial funding needed to construct this type of additional generation capacity at the level developing countries require. Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IPS

By Philippe Benoit
WASHINGTON DC, Mar 27 2023 (IPS)

This year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP 28, will be hosted by the United Arab Emirates, which, together with its Gulf neighbors, enjoys abundant solar, natural gas and financial resources. At the same time, many poorer countries are struggling to generate the additional affordable electricity they need to power their development — especially as wealthier nations halted their overseas financing for high-emitting coal power plants.

Unfortunately, the UAE and other Gulf states can’t easily export their solar resources to developing countries. However, they can export their natural gas to support affordable low-emissions power production in poorer countries if combined with donor-financed carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS)-equipped gas-fired power plants.

The lead-up to COP 28 provides an opportunity to explore this mechanism to support low-emissions economic growth in poorer countries — a “gas for poverty and climate” power proposal.

The decision to build more coal power plants reflects the difficult dilemma faced by many poorer countries: They are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and yet they do not feel they can afford to forestall investing in affordable power generation and the shorter-term economic benefits it provides, even if this means building high-emitting coal power plants

As I noted in an earlier opinion piece, the decisions by the G-7, China and others to halt overseas financing for coal power plants serve important climate goals but do not eliminate developing countries’ need for more electricity at affordable prices. According to a February Reuters report, the Pakistan government has decided, in the face of high and volatile natural gas prices, to pivot from building gas-fired plants to more affordable coal-fired ones notwithstanding the higher emissions.

This shift is all the more unsettling given the devastation Pakistan suffered last year from massive flooding with an intensity potentially exacerbated by climate change.

The decision to build more coal power plants reflects the difficult dilemma faced by many poorer countries: They are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and yet they do not feel they can afford to forestall investing in affordable power generation and the shorter-term economic benefits it provides, even if this means building high-emitting coal power plants.

The upcoming COP 28 context might provide a way out, one that leverages the hosting of the event in the gas-rich Gulf region, with the stated interest of wealthier countries and multilateral development banks to support poorer countries in the energy transition.

The proposal has two basic elements: an undertaking by a Gulf producer to provide natural gas at a preferential low price to new “low-emitting” gas-fired power plants built with concessional climate finance in partnering developing countries.

The preferential pricing builds off of three interrelated Gulf state dynamics: the abundance in the region of gas resources, Gulf programs to contribute to the economic development of poorer countries and efforts to lower emissions from petroleum, such as the application of carbon capture technologies. The sales price would be fixed at a concessional level — e.g., notionally at (or even potentially below) the cost of production, liquefaction and transport, rather than generating typical market returns.

The subsidy embedded in this structure would be recognized as a financial contribution by the gas-supplying country to both international development and global climate efforts. This structure could potentially also be used by wealthy gas countries from other regions, such as possibly Norway, interested in simultaneously supporting development and tackling climate change.

The second element is the use of this natural gas in gas-fired power plants equipped with “carbon capture, utilization and storage” technologies to produce “low-emissions” electricity.

Many countries have looked to expand the use of gas-fired plants in part because they emit less than half the carbon dioxide (CO2) per kilowatt hour (kWh) of a coal plant. But their emissions are still consequential, potentially in the order of 350 grams of CO2/kWh according to one estimate —  a significant level when considering the “net zero emissions” targets put out by various countries or embedded in the climate modeling of the International Energy Agency.

CCUS is one tool to substantially further reduce these emissions by 90 percent or more. The potential result is CO2 emissions per kWh that are so low they might even be termed “near-zero emissions.”

Although CCUS technologies have been developed and tested for many years on power plants, they have yet to be deployed at a large scale. One reason is that they are expensive per ton of reduced CO2 emissions. Consequently, their cost would undermine a developing country’s electricity affordability objective.

To overcome this hurdle, the CCUS-equipped gas-fired plant would need to be financed in large part through highly concessional climate funding, to be provided notably by the international donor community. There may also be an opportunity to tap into carbon markets to fund both capital and operating expenditures given the lower (i.e., avoided) emissions from the CCUS-equipped plant as compared to the alternative of a new coal-fired power plant or a gas-fired one without CCUS.

There are, of course, additional complexities to explore. For example, the plant would need to be able to access reasonably priced options for CO2 use or storage. In addition, the greenhouse gases (including methane) emitted in producing and delivering the natural gas to the plant would need to be limited to ensure the produced electricity remains “low emissions” when considering the full value chain.

Further analysis would also be needed on the pricing and other terms to make this structure attractive for the natural gas supplier, the donor community funding the CCUS-equipped plant and the developing country’s electricity consumers.

Building renewables plants across the Global South is a preferable alternative to generate fewer emissions — but the international community has to date been unwilling to provide the substantial funding needed to construct this type of additional generation capacity at the level developing countries require. And, as noted earlier, the technologies don’t yet exist for the Gulf states to export their abundant solar power resources, notwithstanding current discussions about green hydrogen.

The hosting of COP 28 in the Gulf provides an opportunity to think creatively about how to mobilize the gas resources of that region (and elsewhere) to better support both the development needs of poorer countries and the global climate effort. This COP 28 “gas for poverty and climate” power proposal might provide some elements.

(First published in The Hill on March 8, 2023)

Philippe Benoit has over 25 years of experience working in international energy and sustainability, including prior management positions at the World Bank and the International Energy Agency.  He is currently adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and  research director at Global Infrastructure Analytics and Sustainability 2050.

Iraqi university students protesting against the government, 2020. Credit: Mohsin/Shutterstock

By Shivan Fazil and Alaa Tartir
STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Mar 24 2023 (IPS)

Over the past two decades Iraq has been affected by several waves of intense conflict and violence. The 2003 invasion of Iraq by a multinational coalition led by the United States and United Kingdom toppled the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein.

It also ushered in years of chaos and civil war, as a variety of armed groups vied for power and territory and targeted coalition forces and the fledgling post-Ba’athist Iraqi Army.

A period of relative calm in the early 2010s was broken by the rise of the extremist Islamic State group, which occupied large parts of the country from 2014 until it was largely defeated by Iraqi forces with the support of a US-led international coalition in 2017.

Today Iraq is enjoying its most stable period since 2003. Armed violence persists in different forms, but it is sporadic, fragmented and localized. However, the country remains fragile and divided, and its people face an array of deepening challenges that the state is struggling to address. This Topical Backgrounder aims to provide a snapshot of the situation in Iraq 20 years since the invasion.

A fragile, oil-dependent economy

Crude oil exports accounted for an estimated 95 per cent of federal revenues in 2020. Successive governments have done little to wean Iraq off this heavy dependency on oil rents and diversify the economy. This has led to a bloated public sector characterized by patronage and to a shortage of jobs for new graduates—especially those without the necessary connections and networks.

The dependency on oil rents also exposes the Iraqi economy to fluctuations in global oil prices. Not only does this make long-term development planning difficult, but in 2020, when global oil prices plunged, the government was left unable to fund basic services or even pay public-sector salaries and pensions.

Public debt reached 84 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), and GDP itself fell 16 per cent, inflaming anger at the government. Although oil prices quickly recovered, two years of government paralysis and political turmoil have made it difficult for Iraq to take advantage and invest the increased revenues.

Despite having large natural gas reserves, Iraq currently relies on gas imports from Iran. The US and Iraq’s European partners are keen to end this dependency and to help Iraq become energy-independent.

However, the political and economic turmoil of the past few years in Iraq have stalled investment in capacity to separate and process gas from Iraqi oil fields, and instead vast quantities of gas associated with oil extraction are flared off.

This leaves Iraq still dependent on Iranian gas and electricity imports, greatly increases its climate footprint and creates acute air pollution in parts of the country. The situation is a prime illustration of the complexity of Iraq’s security challenges and governance failures, which interact in complex ways with its oil-dependent economy, tumultuous regional dynamics and environmental issues.

The changing face of armed violence

Today, Islamic State is thought to be unable to recruit more members in Iraq and only an estimated 500 fighters are still active in the country. Major military operations against Islamic State have thus ended.

In 2020, the US began reducing its military footprint in Iraq—which had risen sharply in response to the rise of Islamic State—and only around 2500 US military personnel remain in the country, at Iraq’s invitation, in an advisory role.

A key task as the threat from Islamic State dissipates is to deal with the Popular Mobilization Forces (an Iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organization comprising a number of predominantly Shia militias, some supported by Iran) as well as smaller militia groups linked to ethno-religious minorities in the country’s north that were formed in the name of community self-defence.

One of the goals of successive Iraqi governments has been integrating these forces into the Iraqi security forces, but progress has been slow. Most of the militias are nominally under the Ministry of Defence.

However, many seem to act independently of government and outside institutional jurisdiction. Some have been accused of human rights violations and abuses against civilians, particularly during the mass anti-government protests in 2019.

Another task, being urged by the US and the anti-Islamic State coalition, is to improve how the Peshmerga—the armed forces of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)—and the Iraqi Armed Forces interact.

A lack of coordination and intelligence-sharing has undermined the efficiency of security operations, particularly in the disputed territories of Iraq. Prior to the emergence of Islamic State in 2014, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government in Baghdad were jointly administering security in these territories.

Iraq has also suffered from the spillover of civil conflicts and counterinsurgency in neighbouring countries, especially in some of its more remote regions. Iran and Türkiye have both launched missile strikes or armed incursions against opposition forces on Iraqi territory in recent years.

Identity politics and worsening state-society relations

The United States and other members of the coalition that invaded Iraq in 2003 and supported its transition to post-Ba’athist democracy lacked a long-term vision. They often failed to anticipate the consequences of major decisions, such as the disbanding of the Iraqi Army in 2003 or several initiatives put forward by the transitional authorities.

One of the most consequential of these initiatives was the establishment of Muhasasa Ta’ifia, a form of consociationalist elite bargain that was adopted after 2005. Under Muhasasa Ta’ifia, government posts, sinecures and departments are shared out among the Kurdish, Shia and Sunni political elites after an election—often after a lot of fraught inter-factional horse-trading.

Voters are offered a choice of parties within a given ethnosectarian bloc, but no choice of policy platforms. There is no parliamentary opposition to hold the government accountable.

Muhasasa Ta’ifia was conceived as a way to stop Iraq fracturing and divisions along the major ethnosectarian faultlines, to encourage the groups to collaborate and to avoid one group becoming too dominant. While it has arguably succeeded to an extent in those aims, it has also given rise to ineffective governments, lack of accountability, and a public sector rife with corruption and patronage.

As a result, a major new faultline has emerged, with ordinary citizens united across ethnosectarian lines by grievances against the governing class. Along with corruption, citizens complain of economic mismanagement, unemployment, crumbling infrastructure, weak public services and more. Largely youth-led anti-government protests in 2019 expressed their feelings of alienation from the political elite with the slogan ‘We want a homeland’.

Mass protest has been growing since 2015. The October Protest or Tishreen Movement that began in 2019 was large enough to topple the government of Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi in early 2020 and was violently suppressed by state forces and militias.

Muhasasa Ta’ifia caused another political crisis in 2021–22 when elites were unable to agree on a new government for over a year after a general election in October 2021. Voter turnout in that election fell to a record low of 44 per cent, illustrating the growing popular disillusionment and frustration with the political system.

Muhasasa Ta’ifia seems unlikely to change in the near term, but there are some signs that it is slowly breaking down, and perhaps even starting to make way for a more issue-based politics. For example, political factions have recently been forming alliances beyond their ethno-sectarian blocs.

Following the 2021 election, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Shia Sadrist movement, proposed forming a majority government with a sizeable parliamentary opposition—although this was rejected by other factions.

More positively, the Tishreen Movement spawned its own political candidates, some of whom won seats. Their potential to influence federal politics is negligible, but they may be able to push forward change in subnational politics.

The Kurdistan Region in federal Iraq

The Kurdistan Regional Government has a peaceful, if occasionally fraught, relationship with the federal government in Baghdad. The KRG enjoys a high level of autonomy, which includes maintaining its own military forces, the Peshmerga.

Early on in the transition process after 2003, Kurdistan was recognized as Iraq’s most stable region, and its leaders as having valuable experience of government that the other transitional authorities lacked. This was also partly due to the no-fly zone and other measures to protect the Iraqi Kurds from Iraqi government attacks implemented by the United States and European partners after the first Gulf War in 1991.

The Kurds in Iraq have largely distanced themselves from the Kurdish independence movements in neighbouring Iran, Syria and Turkey, to the extent that Peshmerga forces have even clashed with Turkey’s Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) forces operating on Iraqi soil.

Relations between the KRG and the federal government are complicated by long-standing disagreements over oil revenue sharing and control of the disputed territories, which include the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The KRG brought these territories under its control after Iraqi security forces withdrew in the face of Islamic State advances in 2014. Resolving the status of the disputed territories should have taken place a decade earlier, according to the 2005 constitution.

When the major military operations to defeat Islamic State came to an end in 2017, tensions between the federal government and the KRG were intensified by the KRG’s push for greater autonomy. The KRG organized a referendum for independence that also included the disputed territories that were then under its control (including Kirkuk).

The federal government rejected the referendum and retook the disputed territories with military force, supported by the Popular Mobilization Forces, and implemented other punitive measures against the KRG.

The KRG and state-society relations in the KRI have similar problems to those found at the federal level. The KRG budget relies heavily on independent oil exports and on budget transfers from Baghdad, removing the incentive to diversify the economy. And the two main Kurdish factions, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have been in a power-sharing agreement since the unification of two Iraqi Kurdish enclaves in 2006.

This agreement sees government and administrative posts shared between the two parties—an arrangement not dissimilar to Iraq’s Muhasasa Ta’ifia. As in the rest of Iraq, residents of the KRI complain of corruption, patronage and mismanagement by the Kurdish authorities. Many have left Iraq to seek asylum in Europe and elsewhere.

Relations with Iran and the US

In the field of diplomacy, Iraq’s strongest relationships and ties are with Iran and the US. Nevertheless, Iraq has sought to diversify its diplomatic and economic relations in recent years, including with Arab Gulf states as well as Egypt and Jordan.

Iran is Iraq’s largest trading partner, although Iraq’s imports from Iran—worth around $9 billion in 2018—vastly outweigh trade in the other direction. Iraq and Iran have also cooperated extensively in the fight against Islamic State.

Iran’s influence in Iraq, much of it exercised through Shia political factions, has been a source of anger among protesters, especially as Iranian-backed militia groups have been involved in violence against anti-government protests.

In addition to having guided the post-invasion political transition, the USA remains Iraq’s main source of security support and of military and development aid. The USA has recently increased pressure on Iraq for tighter control of dollar sales in order to stamp out potential money laundering that benefits Iran and Syria.

Steps taken to do this contributed to a significant drop in the dollar value of the Iraqi dinar, leading to soaring inflation in early 2023 and the replacement of the central bank governor.

Iraq has been caught in the middle of regional tensions, particularly due to its diplomatic and geographic closeness to Iran. In recent years Iraq has tried to take an active role in resolving these tensions. For example, with French support Iraq has organized two regional summits—one in Baghdad the other in Amman, Jordan—aimed at de-escalating regional tensions. In 2021 Iraq hosted talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia, a prelude to the China-brokered détente announced in March 2023.

The situation for Iraq’s minorities

State failure to protect Iraq’s many ethno-religious minorities is a long-standing problem. Since 2003, many minorities have been displaced due to insecurity, often migrating to the KRI—which was seen as calmer, safer and more tolerant—and in many cases out of Iraq altogether.

The Islamic State group targeted minorities, particularly those of non-Abrahamic faiths. The worst of this was in Nineveh Province, known for its mosaic of ethnic and religious diversity. The Islamic State attacks on the Yezidi group in Sinjar district were so devastating that they have been recognized as a genocide.

Many of the minorities who were displaced during the Islamic State occupation have not returned—partly down to the presence of the many militias still active in their areas of origin and a general sense of insecurity, but also because they feel they can make a better life in their new homes.

A UN-brokered agreement between the KRG and the federal government in 2021 that was aimed at normalizing the security situation in Sinjar has had little effect on the ground that would encourage the internally displaced Yezidis to return.

Although minority citizens in Iraq are experiencing lower levels of armed violence based on their identity, discrimination against them seems to have worsened in the wake of the Islamic State occupation. SIPRI has been working in the Nineveh Plains region on ways to improve intercommunal relations and help minorities to re-establish their cultural practices and social relations.

Multiple civil society and grassroots groups are pushing for a reimagining of Iraq, where ethnicity and sect play a much smaller role. However, Iraq’s powerful political blocs are keen to maintain the current power-sharing arrangement, even though it does not seem likely to bring prosperity or lasting peace.

The legacy of the invasion still runs through many of the challenges that Iraq faces, but no longer defines them. Gradually, Iraq is shaping its own destiny—hopefully to the benefit of all its citizens.

Read more about SIPRI’s package of interviews, opinion pieces and reference materials to mark the 20th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq.

Shivan Fazil is a Researcher with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Dr Alaa Tartir is a Senior Researcher and Director of SIPRI’s Middle East and North Africa Programme.

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Delegates at the Arab and Asian Parliamentarians’ Meeting to Follow-Up on ICPD25 Commitments: Addressing Youth Empowerment and Gender-Based Violence, held in Jakarta, Indonesia held in Jakarta, Indonesia. Credit: APDA

By Cecilia Russell
JOHANNESBURG, Mar 13 2023 (IPS)

Child marriage, gender-based violence (GBV), sexuality education, religion, and tradition came under the spotlight during a conference, Arab and Asian Parliamentarians’ Meeting to Follow-Up on ICPD25 Commitments: Addressing Youth Empowerment and Gender-Based Violence, held in Jakarta, Indonesia.

Professor Keizo Takemi, MP Japan, Chair of the Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development (AFPPD), reminded delegates that GBV is on the rise in conflict situations, during disasters, and during the prolonged COVID-19 pandemic.

“Furthermore, children in some countries are at higher risk of child marriage due to economic pressures and school closures caused by the pandemic. Globally, about one in five (21 percent) girls are married before the age of 18. Child marriage not only deprives girls of educational opportunities, but early pregnancy and childbearing also come with a higher risk of complications and death.

Pierre Bou Assi, MP Lebanon, President of the Forum of Arab Parliamentarians on Population and Development (FAPPD), told the delegates it was necessary to acknowledge and confront the issues of GBV in the region. It was clear from a series of case studies from the Arab and Asia Pacific region that while there has been some success, there was plenty of work to do.

Dr Dede Yusuf Macan Effendi, MP for Indonesia and Chair of the Indonesian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development (IFPPD), said the country had had some successes – for example, the incidence of GBV dropped from 33 percent in 2016 to 26 percent in 2021. However, many incidents were unreported, and this was considered “the tip of the iceberg.”

Effendi noted the region’s issues – like the high proportion of child marriage and exposure to HIV/Aids.

Dr Hasto Wardoyo, the chairperson of BKKBN, said parliamentarians played a critical role, with various “studies suggesting that the government should take steps such as increasing care capacity and access to services such as health services, social services, developing children’s abilities, opening and equalizing access, strengthening family and social bonds.”

A professor from UIN Jakarta, Dr Nur Rofiah, gave a perspective from Islam and said the religion had a  concept of maslahah or goodness. This recognizes women’s bodily experiences are different from men’s, and it would be important to consider actions that “cause painful experiences for women’s bodies, including gender-based injustice.”

Rofiah emphasized the adverse effects of child marriage for women saying that child brides lost out on their childhood, dropped out of school, experienced domestic violence, often were adversely impacted by divorce, were stigmatized by being widowed, lacked competitiveness in the work environment, very often experienced single parenthood and were susceptible to child marriage.

COVID-19 had impacted the ICPD25 programme of action, especially on health care, with malaria and tuberculosis neglected, as was gender equality, said  Nadimul Haque, an MP in India. The Regional Sexual and Reproductive Health Adviser, UNFPA ASRO Professor Hala Youssef, developed this theme, saying policymakers need to change strategy during this decade of action to 2030 – without which it would be difficult to achieve the goals. She called on delegates to move from the idea of “funding” ICPD goals to “financing” them. Funding was reliant on the government, but financing involved the wider society.

Delegates took a deep look at the pressing issues of child marriage, sexuality education, religion and gender-based violence during the Arab and Asian Parliamentarians’ Meeting to Follow-Up on ICPD25 Commitments: Addressing Youth Empowerment and Gender-Based Violence meeting held in Jakarta, Indonesia. Credit: APDA

Youssef called on parliamentarians to concentrate on the needs of young people, people with disabilities, universal health coverage, budgetary and financial allocations, social determinants of health, maternal deaths among adolescent girls, strengthening health workforce numbers, and capacity building.

The case study presented by Professor Ashraf Hatem, an MP from Egypt, showed that his country’s Universal Health Insurance (UHI) would soon remove the issue of what he called “catastrophic health expenditure” of the poor. The scheme rolled out in phases, would decrease out-of-pocket expenditure from 62 percent to 32 percent in 2032.

The government was subsidizing about 35 percent of the population. He gave an example of open heart surgery done in a UHI facility that would cost a patient 300 Egyptian pounds or about USD 10.

A grim picture of the social, psychological, economic, and medical burdens resulting from unintended pregnancies in her country was painted by Soukaina Lahmouch, an MP from Morocco. While there had been an improvement in the legal arsenal regarding abortion, marriage, and access to quality health services, much was still to be done. She explained that in Morocco, about 153 newborns are born out of wedlock each day, of which 24 children are abandoned at birth.

About 11,4 percent of pregnant women still received no prenatal care; however, in rural areas, about one-fifth of mothers received no prenatal care, and 13.4 percent gave birth without the assistance of qualified personnel.

“More than half of the women affected by poverty do not seek follow-up during pregnancies,” Lahmouch said, adding that education was a determinant, with almost all women with secondary school education giving birth in a health facility, but those without education more likely to give birth at home.

About 12 percent of women were married under 18, and a recent survey showed that 62.8 percent of women aged between 18 and 64 experienced violence during the year before the survey.

Dr Suhail  Alouini, a former MP of Tunisia, quoted a World Bank study, saying 18 percent of women were married before 18 in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region. While in many countries, the legal minimum age for marriage is set at 18, there were exceptions for the marriage of underage individuals due to court decisions.

Alouini said conflict and displacement increased the risk of GBV, including sexual violence and forced marriages.

“In some conflict-affected areas in the Arab region, the rates of child marriage have increased, and the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a surge in reports of GBV in the Arab region and around the world. The pandemic also disrupted efforts to prevent child marriage as school closures and economic hardships made girls more vulnerable to early marriage.”

He noted that GBV and child marriage requires a comprehensive and multi-sectorial approach focusing on prevention response and political leadership, and ICPD25 recommendations provide a road map for action emphasizing the importance of investing in data and research and engaging a wide range of stakeholders and political leadership. The role of parliamentarians is critical in addressing GBV and child marriage.

Laissa Alamia, MP of Bangsamoro Transition Authority, Philippines, spoke about the situation in the self-governing region and the Philippines.

“One in four Filipino women aged 15 to 49 experienced physical, emotional, and sexual violence by their partner or husband. One in six Filipino girls finds herself married before hitting the age of 18.”

This is the case even though the Philippines is known for its “most vibrant woman’s rights movement and the most comprehensive anti-GBV legal frameworks and mechanisms in the world.”

Bangsamoro region is disproportionately poor, and 62 percent of the women belonged to poor communities; the approximate number of child brides was 88,600 out of a population of 2.46 million women.

He said ethnic minority Muslim women continue to face different forms of discrimination, and the code of Muslim personal laws in the country gives a prescribed age for marriage of 15 for men and 15 or at puberty for females.

Alamia said the Philippines law, which prohibits child marriages, is not universally accepted by all communities and brings up religious freedom debates.

Dr Jetn Sirathranont, MP Thailand, noted in his closing remarks that there was still a long way to go to achieve the ICPD25 programme of action, but he hoped this conference would give an impetus to finding solutions.

Tomoko Fukuda, Regional Director of IPPF ESEAOR, encouraged parliamentarians to continue their work on the ICPD programme of action, despite conflicting priorities.

“So we as the older generation have to be committed to ensuring that the world is a better place for the young people and the children born into this world,” she said.

Anjali Sen, UNFPA Representative in Indonesia, shared a study by Schneider and Hirsch in 2020 that showed that “comprehensive sexuality education meets the characteristics of an effective GBV prevention … comprehensive sexuality education is based on human rights and gender equality.”

She called for it to be implemented, stating that it needed support and involvement from teachers, parents, healthcare providers, young people, and the government. Parliamentarians had a role in ensuring that policy and financial support were available.

Note:. This conference was organized by APDA and FAPPD, hosted by IFPPD and supported by UNFPA and Japan Trust Fund (JTF).

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Israel's separation barrier as seen from Al Ram.. Credit: Jillian Kestler-D'Amours/IPS

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Mar 2 2023 (IPS)

Israel of today as a Jewish and democratic state is a contradiction of terms and as such may possibly become transformed into a genuinely democratic Israel tomorrow with justice and equality for all.

In Israel today, citizens who are not Jewish are treated differently than those who are Jewish, who benefit from certain rights and privileges. In a national opinion poll, most Jewish Israelis, about 80 percent, say Jews should get preferential treatment in Israel. Also, nearly half of Jewish Israelis say that Arab Israelis should be expelled or transferred from Israel.

In Israel today, citizens who are not Jewish are treated differently than those who are Jewish, who benefit from certain rights and privileges. In a national opinion poll, most Jewish Israelis, about 80 percent, say Jews should get preferential treatment in Israel. Also, nearly half of Jewish Israelis say that Arab Israelis should be expelled or transferred from Israel

In addition, several years ago Israel passed the “nation-state law”, which among other things, states that the right to exercise national self-determination in Israel is unique to the Jewish people and also established Jewish settlement as a national value. While embraced by many Jewish Israelis, the nation-state law was considered apartheid by the country’s non-Jewish population, ostensibly making them second-class citizens.

In a democratic Israel, in contrast, all Israelis irrespective of their religious affiliation would have the same rights and privileges. In such a state, justice and equality would prevail across the entire country’s population, not just for a single dominant religious group.

A democratic Israel would be similar in many respects to Western liberal democracies such as the United States. In that democracy, all religious groups, including Jewish Americans, have the same rights, privileges and equality under the law.

Most Jewish Israelis, some 75 percent across the religious spectrum, continue to believe that Israel can be a Jewish state and a democracy. In contrast, non-Jewish Israelis, including the majorities of Muslims, Christians and Druze, generally do not believe Israel can be a Jewish state and a democracy at the same time; it’s simply viewed as inconsistent.

Further complicating political, legal and human rights matters for Israelis as well as Palestinians are the new government’s recent proposals for judicial reform, which would impact the independence of the Israeli Supreme Court.

Many Israelis have gone to the streets to protest the proposed reform. Objections to the reforms are being raised by former government officials, military officers, business investors and others. Foreign allies, especially officials, Jewish leaders and journalists in America, have also expressed concerns over the proposals. In addition, the majority of Israelis, about two-thirds, oppose the proposed judicial reform.

Turning to demographics, Israel’s population stood at 9.656 million at the end of 2022. The composition of the population was 74 percent Jewish, 21 percent Arab (largely Christian and Muslims) and 5 percent others (Figure 1).

Source: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).

In 1948 when Israel was established, the country’s proportion Jewish was 82 percent of its population of 806 thousand. By the 1960s the proportion Jewish reached a record high of nearly 90 percent. Since that high, the proportion Jewish in Israel has been steadily declining to its current level of 74 percent.

In addition to Israel’s changing demographics, the Jewish Israeli population has not been confined to its 1948 borders. Large numbers have expanded to settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Israel’s Jewish settler population in the West Bank, for example, is now estimated at more than half a million. Many of the estimated 700 thousand Jewish Israelis now living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are motivated by their religious mission to restore historic Israel to the Jewish people.

The Jewish settler population is continuing to increase rapidly in the West Bank, which is a top priority of ultranationalist parties who oppose Palestinian statehood.

The Israeli government has also pledged to legalize wildcat outposts and increase the approval and construction of settler homes in the West Bank.

In contrast, the United Nations Security Council and much of the international community of nations, including the United States, the European Union and the United Nations, continue to support the idea of an independent Palestinian state. However, the changing demographics in the West Bank have virtually eliminated the possibility of the two-state solution.

Without the two-state solution, Jewish Israelis face a major challenge affecting their majority status, namely the possibility of the one-state solution.

The one-state solution would involve the entire Israeli and Palestinian populations now living between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River. In such a population numbering approximately 15 million inhabitants, the Jewish population would become a ruling minority of approximately 47 percent, a fundamental change from the sizable Jewish majority of 74 percent in Israel today (Figure 2).

Source: Times of Israel.

Even today the Israeli government is confronting human rights issues with its expansion throughout the occupied Palestinian territories. International, Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations as well as independent observers have found Israeli authorities practicing apartheid and persecution in the occupied Palestinian territories.

According to those human rights organizations, Israeli government policy is to maintain the domination by Jewish Israelis over Palestinians as well as the abuses and discriminatory policies against Palestinians living in the occupied territories.

Israel rejects those accusations, saying it is a democracy and committed to international law and open to scrutiny. The government cites security concerns and protecting the lives of Israelis for its imposition of travel and related restrictions on Palestinians, whose violence in the past included suicide bombings of Israeli cities and deadly attacks against Israelis.

Many have come to the conclusion that given the policies of the current Israeli government, a political path for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully is simply wishful thinking. For some the two-state solution is effectively dead and it is simply waiting for its formal funeral.

In addition, the human cost of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been high and is rising. So far in 2023, the conflict has resulted in the deaths of an estimated 63 Palestinians and 13 Israelis.

From 2008 to 2020 the numbers of killed and injured from the conflict among Israelis and Palestinian documented by the UN were 251 and 5,590 deaths, respectively, and 5,600 and 115,000 injuries, respectively. In brief, over that time period approximately 95 percent of those killed and injured due to the conflict were Palestinians (Figure 3).

Source: UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

It is evident that the Israeli government and many Israelis would like to continue the Jewish settler expansion in the West Bank. That expansion clearly has serious consequences for the resident Palestinian population and the Israelis as well as the prospects of an independent Palestinian state.

The demise of the two-state solution and the possible one-state solution also creates a major foreign and domestic dilemma for the United States, Israel’s major political, military and economic supporter and biggest ally.

Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, estimated at more than 3 billion dollars annually and more than 150 billion dollars cumulatively. Also, America has vetoed scores of United Nations Security Council resolutions critical of Israel, including at least 53 since 1973.

Given America’s commitment to democratic values, freedom of religious beliefs and equality of citizenship, the White House, U.S. Senators, Congressional Representatives as well as the nation’s citizens will be faced with how to respond to the absence of a possible Palestinian state and Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.

In the absence of the two-state solution, it will become increasingly difficult for the United States to continue its unwavering commitment and unequivocal support in light of Israeli policies and treatment of the Palestinians. Perhaps, consistent with its values and laws, America will decide to support the one-state solution with equality of all inhabitants, regardless of religious identities.

More importantly, in the absence of a truly independent Palestinian state, Israel may slowly come to embrace the one-state solution. Eventually then, especially given the unavoidable demographic realities strikingly visible on the ground, Israel may possibly come to realize that it’s time to transform the Israel of today into a truly democratic Israel of tomorrow with justice and equality for all.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division and author of numerous publications on population issues, including his recent book, “Population Levels, Trends, and Differentials”.

Shahd, a 12-year-old girl with a hearing disability, stands in front of a window facing her father, in the house her family live in, Azaz, Aleppo, Syria. Credit: Human Rights Watch.

By Emina Ćerimović
NEW YORK, Feb 28 2023 (IPS)

A few days ago, I saw a photo shared to Twitter of Sham, a young Syrian girl rescued from under the rubble in northwest Syria, sitting upright in her hospital bed, According to the Syrian Civil Defense, a volunteer humanitarian group also known as the White Helmets, Sham will lose both her legs because of injuries from the quake.

Looking at her photo, I couldn’t help but think of the additional human rights abuses Sham will experience on the basis of her disability. She will join the ranks of all the children with disabilities who are surviving the 12-year-conflict in Syria without equal access to humanitarian aid.

And so will others who experienced traumatic physical and psychological injuries in the wake of the earthquakes: a girl who had spent 30 hours under the rubble in the heavily affected town of Jindires in northwest Syria and who had lost both her legs; a 3-year-old boy in Jinderis who was trapped for 42 hours and whose left leg was amputated; a young Syrian man living in Gaziantep, Turkey, whose right hand was amputated.

In Syria, approximately 28 percent of the current population – nearly double the global average – are estimated to have a disability, and their rights and needs are largely unmet

As issues of humanitarian aid access to various affected parts of Syria dominate the news, relief efforts should not overlook the short and long-term needs of people with disabilities and the thousands of earthquake survivors who have sustained physical and psychological injuries that could lead to permanent disabilities.

As two more powerful earthquakes struck the region on February 20, panic and fear spread among earthquake survivors in both Syria and Turkey, bringing into sharp focus the psychological trauma caused by the natural hazard and, for Syrians, by over 12 years of war.

In Syria, approximately 28 percent of the current population – nearly double the global average – are estimated to have a disability, and their rights and needs are largely unmet. As I found in my September report on the greater risk of harm and lack of access to basic rights for children with disabilities caught up in the Syrian war, the design and delivery of humanitarian programs in Syria are not taking into account the particular needs of children with disabilities. In some cases, such programs explicitly exclude them.

As an example, some educational activities and child-friendly spaces excluded children with intellectual and developmental disabilities. Children with disabilities are growing up without safety, basic necessities, education, assistive devices, or psychosocial support, in ways that put their lives and rights at risk.

They experience stigma, psychological harm, and higher levels of poverty. The situation is no better for adults with disabilities who also face systematic challenges in accessing humanitarian services on an equal basis with others.

This crisis should serve as a wake-up call for UN agencies, donor states, humanitarian organizations, and charities to properly respond to all children’s rights by ensuring the rights and needs of children with disabilities are also met.

They should develop and implement their response and recovery action plans with people with disabilities at their core. The attention and investment in children – like Sham – and adults with disabilities will enhance human rights for everyone.

Excerpt:

Cooperative members in southern Lebanon make a rare, traditional bread called Mallet El Smid to be sold at the MENNA shop in Beirut. Women are central to meeting the SDGs, say parliamentarians. Credit: UN Women/Joe Saade

By IPS Correspondent
JOHANNESBURG, Feb 23 2023 (IPS)

The post-COVID-19 period has been a crucial one for members of parliament who have their work cut out to ensure that issues that arose during the pandemic are addressed, especially concerning the ICPD25 commitments and programmes of action for universal access to sexual and reproductive rights, gender-based violence and building peaceful, just and inclusive societies. Across the world, progress toward achieving the SDGs by 2030 was impacted during the pandemic.

As Dr Samar Haddad, a former member of the Lebanese Parliament and head of the Population Committee at the Bar Association in Lebanon commented at a recent meeting of the Forum of the Arab Parliamentarians  for Population and Development (FAPPD): “The main theme for this year is combating gender-based violence, which is a scourge that the entire world suffers from, and its rate has risen alarmingly in light of the economic crisis, bloody stability, wars, and displacement.”

IPS was privileged to interview two members of parliament from the region about how they are tackling GBV, youth empowerment, and women’s participation in politics, society, and the economy.

Here are edited excerpts from the interviews:

Pierre Bou Assi, MP from Lebanon

Pierre Bou Assi, MP from Lebanon

IPS: What legislation, budgets, and monitoring frameworks are in place or planned for combating GBV in Lebanon?

Pierre Bou Assi (PA): Lebanon has launched a project to support protection and prevention systems to prevent gender-based violence within the framework of continuous efforts aimed at responding to social and economic challenges in Lebanon and aims to strengthen prevention and monitoring mechanisms for gender-based violence, and support the efforts made by the Public Security Directorate through the Department Family and juvenile protection.

IPS: One of your speakers at a recent conference spoke about rapid population growth, youth, and high urbanization rates. Youth are often impacted by unemployment or low rates of decent employment. What are parliamentarians doing to assist youth in ensuring that the country can benefit from its demographic dividend?

PA: Youth are the pillar of the nation, its present and future, and the means and goal of development. They are the title of a strong society and its future, stressing that the conscious youth (educated and mindful) armed with science and knowledge are more than capable of facing the challenges of the present and the most prepared to enter the midst of the future.

I would like to say that the Youth Committee in the Lebanese Parliament is working on developing a targeted and real strategy that includes advanced programs that are agreed upon by experts and active institutions in this field to consolidate the principles of citizenship, the rule of law and patriotism, and empower the youth politically and economically to achieve their potential and develop and expand their horizons.

In addition, we are expanding youth participation in public life by providing them with opportunities for practical training in legislative and oversight institutions, and refining the participants’ personal skills by informing them of the decision-making process in the Council.

IPS: Looking back at the COVID-19 situation, most countries experienced two clear issues, an increase in GBV and its impact on children’s education. There was also an issue with high levels of violence experienced by children. Are parliamentarians concerned about the COVID impacts on children, and what programs have been implemented to support them?

PA: There is no doubt that Lebanon, like other countries in the world, was affected by the coronavirus pandemic in all aspects of life, including children and its impact on the quality of education, as well as the high level of violence that children were exposed to during that period, as I would like to take a look at the more positive side. We note a number of measures Lebanon took during the pandemic – which included the release of children who were in detention, the strengthening or expansion of social protection systems through cash assistance, and an overall decrease in levels of violence in conflict situations.

Lebanon has a plan that includes the following points:

• The continuity and safety of learning for all school children, including bridging the digital divide and creating low-cost technology.
• Implementing a basic package for equitable access to primary health care for children and mothers.
• Expanding the scope and appropriateness of infant and young child feeding programs and general educational messages.
• Expanding social protection systems to reach the most affected children and families through cash transfer programmes.
• Enhancing government budgetary allocations and public funding for social sectors, with a special focus on health care and education.

Hmoud Al-Yahyai, MP from Oman.

Hmoud Al-Yahyai, MP from Oman

Al-Yahyai spoke to IPS about the development of a human-rights-based framework. The interview followed a meeting with the theme “Human Rights and their relationship to the goals of sustainable development. The meeting was held by the Omani Parliamentary Committee for Population and Development in cooperation Omani National Commission for Human Rights, the Forum of Arab Parliamentarians for Population and Development (FAPPD), and the Asian Population and Development Association (APDA) on “Human Rights and their relationship to the goals of sustainable development.”

IPS: How is Oman working towards a human rights-based legislative framework, and what role are parliamentarians taking to ensure implementation? What role does Oman Vision 2040 play in this?

Hmoud Al-Yahyai (HY): The government of the Sultanate of Oman has integrated the sustainable development goals into national development strategies and plans and made them a major component of the long-term national development strategy components and axes known as Oman Vision 2040. The strategy is enhanced by broad societal participation when designing and implementing it and evaluating the plans and policies set. And we, as parliamentarians, make sure, as stated in the voluntary national report, (to provide oversight of) the government’s commitment to achieving the goals of sustainable development, with its three dimensions, economic, social, and environmental, within the specified time frame.

I commend the efforts of the Sultanate of Oman in implementing the goals of sustainable development through several axes, including the pillars of sustainable development, implementation mechanisms, progress achieved, and future directions for the localization of the sustainable development agenda in the short and medium term, and the consistency of Oman Vision 2040.

The Sultanate of Oman reviewed its first voluntary national report on sustainable development at the United Nations headquarters as part of its participation in the work of the UN Economic and Social Council.

Sustainability is crucial to Sultanate, emphasizing that development is not an end in itself, but aimed at building up its population.

Future directions for the localization of the SDGs in the short and medium term are represented on five axes, which include raising community awareness, localizing sustainable development, development partnerships, monitoring progress and making evidence-based policies, and institutional support.

The axes for sustainable development are human empowerment, a competitive knowledge economy, environmental resilience through commitment and prevention, and peace. These form the pillars for sustainable development through efficient financing, local development, and monitoring and evaluation.

Oman has adopted a coordinated package of social, economic, and financial policies to achieve inclusive development based on a competitive and innovative economy. This is being worked upon toward Oman Vision 2040 and its implementation plans, through a set of programs and initiatives that seek to localize the development plan toward achieving the SDGs 2030 and beyond.

IPS: What role do women play in your legislative framework, and do they play a role in ensuring, for example, SRHR rights?

HY: The Sultanate has taken many positive measures to sponsor women. The Sultanate’s policies towards accelerating equality between men and women stem from the directives of the Sultan and his initiatives to appoint women to high positions, to feminize the titles of positions when women fill them, and to grant them political, economic, and social rights.

Women benefit from support in the

• Social field: through comprehensive social insurance and social security system.
• Political field: through the appointment of female ministers, undersecretaries, and ambassadors, and in the field of public prosecution.
• Economic field: through labor and corporate law.
• Cultural field: through the system of education and grants.

There are many programs geared or dedicated to women. The government has begun to circulate and implement a program to support maternal and childcare services at the national level to reduce disease and death rates by providing health care for women during pregnancy, childbirth, and postpartum and encouraging childbirth under medical supervision.

IPS: What are the achievements of Oman in reaching SDG Target 3.7 (Sexual and reproductive health by 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive healthcare services, including family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies)?

HY: In this regard, a campaign was launched on sexual and reproductive health in the Sultanate due to its positive impact on public health and society. This campaign confirms that reproductive health services are an integral part of primary health care and health security in the country and that it has long-term repercussions on health and social and economic health. Family planning is one of the most important of these services because, if it is not organized, it constitutes a social bomb that can hit everyone, whether a citizen or an official. Therefore, we must take proactive preventive steps.

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Faruqi, Education Cannot Wait Global Champion and Captain of the Afghan Girls Robotics Team speaking during the Spotlight on Afghanistan at the ECW High-Level Financing Conference in Geneva, Switzerland. Credit: ECW/Michael Calabrò

By Busani Bafana
GENEVA & BULAWAYO, Feb 16 2023 (IPS)

It has been more than 500 days since the Taliban regime in Afghanistan shut down schools and shattered the education dreams of girls and women like Somaya Faruqi, who has been forced to leave her homeland to continue her education.

Faruqi, a student and engineer, has appealed for global intervention in securing the right to education for the millions of girls and women stopped from attending school and university after the Taliban regime that took power in the war-scarred nation in September 2021 closed girls out of school.

“Exactly 514 days ago, my heart was shattered along with the dreams of millions of girls in Afghanistan after the Taliban took over the country; they unleashed terror upon us, tearing apart families and our homes and leaving us hopeless and in a world that no longer feels like our own,” Faruqi, a Girls’ Education Advocate and Captain of the Afghan Girls Robotics Team, said at the Education Cannot Wait (ECW) High-Level Financing Conference in Geneva, Switzerland this week, calling on the world to take decisive action against the Taliban.

ECW, the UN global fund for education in emergencies and protracted crises, convened a two-day conference to marshal support to raise $1.5 billion to roll out its four-year strategic plan to support children and adolescents affected by crises to learn in safety and without fear. The conference seeks to mobilize the resources to meet the educational needs of the 222 million children and adolescents in crisis.

International correspondent and author Christina Lamb, who moderated a panel discussion on Afghanistan, highlighted that war and natural disasters posed a challenge to children’s education and dominated the news agenda. Today Afghanistan was one country that has dropped out of the headlines where girls and women need help more than any other place on earth.

“Two decades of educational progress has literally been wiped out in 18 months by the return of the Taliban and the devastating restrictions that have been imposed on women and girls,” remarked Lamb, who has been reporting on Afghanistan for over 30 years as a  foreign correspondent.

“Afghanistan today is the only place on earth today where girls are banned from high school … one Afghan girl recently told me, ‘Soon they will say there is a shortage of oxygen, so only men are allowed to breathe.’”

Speakers at the Spotlight on Afghanistan session asked the world not to forget the plight of girls in the country. They were speaking at the ECW High-Level Financing Conference in Geneva. Credit: ECW/Sandra Blaser

Describing education as the key to unlocking the limitless potential in every child, Faruqi—now a refugee in the United States— lamented that millions of children are today deprived of their basic right to education because of the Taliban’s quest to suppress women’s rights.

Calling the denial of education a “tragedy beyond measure,” Faruqi says girls and women in many parts of the world are in a predicament—from the banned education in Afghanistan to child marriages in Ethiopia to the insecurity of girls in schools in Nigeria.

“222 million children are missing the  opportunity of education, and it means that we are missing 222 million for incredible talent; future leaders, the scientists, the writers and the doctors, the engineers, and many more,” she said, adding that, “We can’t afford to waste any time and the hope of all these children is on you the leaders and donors to support and help to fund the education system in every crisis-affected country … solidarity without action cannot do anything.”

Pakistani education activist and 2014 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Malala Yousafzai recalled the time she was unable to attend school when the Taliban banned education in her country and fears that the world will forget the plight of Afghan women and girls.

“We should not accept the excuses given by the Taliban; what is the justification given by the Taliban … it is time for world leaders to unite and become one voice for Afghan women and girls. It is time we find ways in which we ensure that the Afghan people and children are not left behind,” Yousafzai said in a video message to the ECW conference.

ECW Executive Director Yasmine Sherif told a press conference that ECW was committed to ensuring that girls’ education continued in Afghanistan. Credit: ECW

​Education Cannot Wait’s Director Yasmine Sherif said that about USD 70 million had gone to education in Afghanistan, and nearly 60 percent of that funding has gone to supporting girls.

“We have an ongoing program that has continued—it did not stop,” Sherif said at a press briefing, noting that there was a short suspension after the Taliban issued the decree banning education for girls, but the education program had now resumed.

“We have informal discussions with the de facto Ministry of Education, and we are able also at the local community level, through our partners, to continue delivering education to girls, and we will not stop,” said Sherif, adding that the program to support secondary girls education was soon to launch a USD 30m investment.

“We have informal discussions with the de facto Ministry of Education, and we are able also at the local community level, through our partners, to continue to deliver education to girls, and we will not stop.”

Fawzia Koofi, a Women’s Rights Activist and Former Deputy Speaker in the Afghan National Parliament, called on the world to put pressure on the Taliban to respect transformation in Afghanistan and secure the rights to education for girls and women.

“We should take the situation of Afghanistan as a global humanitarian crisis,” Koofi urged, requesting the international community to provide study opportunities to Afghan women and girls outside Afghanistan.

Gordon Brown, UN Special Envoy for Global Education and Chair of ECW’s High-Level Steering Group, said the fight for girls and women in Afghanistan must not be lost.

“It is absolutely fundamental that no regime nor religious order nor dictator should prevent a girl having a right to an education; that is why we must turn words into action now,” Brown said, urging the world to stand in solidarity with all the girls demonstrating against the Taliban and support community schools.

Faruqi appealed to the global audience: “We have to work together and fund the education system because every child and every girl deserves to live a life at least by having the simplest human right, which is education. Words without action are not enough. This is a real and meaningful action that can make a positive difference.”

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Excerpt:

“A child in North Syria passing by the ruins, after the earthquake hit his town.” - Credit: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)

By Sania Farooqui
NEW DELHI, India, Feb 13 2023 (IPS)

Almost over 33,000 people have been killed and thousands injured by the 7.8 earthquake which struck south-eastern Turkey and Syria in the early hours on Monday, February 6th. The first images that came out were of collapsed buildings, rubble strewn across streets, people trapped under rubbles, screaming for help. What followed was the unusually strong aftershock – including one quake which was almost as large as the first.

Rawan Kahwaji was fast asleep in her apartment in Gaziantep, in Turkey when she woke up to the sounds of people screaming. The first two minutes, she says, did not make sense to her. “It was a nightmare, I remember waking up not knowing what was going on. My apartment was shaking really hard and it went on for sometime, we didn’t expect it to be this bad, we just thought we would get out of the apartment for a few hours because earthquakes happen quite regularly. But this time with each hour that we spent waiting outside, following the aftershocks, we realised the situation was much worse,” Kahwaji said.

War in Syria had displaced Kahwaji and her family once, before they moved to Gaziantep in 2015. For many displaced like her, documents which included ID, educational degrees and travel documents meant more than anything for survival. “In the middle of that chaos, we realised we needed our documents in case we had to leave the city. Our apartment was full of cracks and everything inside was destroyed, we somehow managed to get our documents.

“A street of local markets in a residential area in North Syria that has been blocked by the ruins of collapsed buildings.” Credit: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)

After spending two days in a shelter in Gaziantep, Kahwaji and her family were amongst the few who managed to get to Ankara safely, but she describes the experience as something she has never seen before. “There were people on the road screaming, we could hear people crying for help, I saw people collapsing because they were having heart attacks. I don’t know if they made it through or not, but it was complete chaos. We lost a lot, we lost our business, our lives, physically we are safe, but mentally we are not fine. I am still imagining the earth shaking and we are all simply sitting, waiting in anticipation that something is going to happen to us again,” Kahwaji said.

It has been almost a week of relentless search and rescue operations, as workers across these regions are still trying to pull survivors from the rubble – there have been some harrowing stories of success and also of heartbreak. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has announced a three-month state of emergency in 10 provinces worst-affected by the earthquake.

“Buildings in North Syria completely destroyed.” Credit: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)

Syria Civil Defence – also known as White Helmets have been in news since the beginning of the earthquake for their immediate call to action to rescue those trapped under rubbles and for saving lives.

Almost 3000 White Helmet volunteers have been on the ground searching for survivors and pulling the dead from collapsed buildings. It’s been a race against the clock, those who have made it through for them the challenge has been to survive the cold weather, toxic smoke as people burnt plastic to stay warm, lack of water and basic necessities.

“A small truck loaded with a family’s basic items, who are seeking shelter after they lost their home amidst the disastrous earthquake in North Syria.” Credit: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)

Cities closest to the epicentre of the earthquake, as per this report, when the temperatures rose on Sunday and it became warm, “odour of rotting bodies became discernible. It was the smell of death.”

“The situation has been very catastrophic, both personally and also collectively,” says Muzna Dureid, Senior Program Manager, White Helmets in an interview given to IPS said, “One of the worst impacted regions is North West Syria, home to almost 4.5 million people who have been forcefully displaced multiple times, they have witnessed the siege, the chemical attacks, bombardments, all types of suffering and now this earthquake.

“A muddy road in North Syria with, and a car damaged by the ruins.” Credit: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)

“Unfortunately the situation has been beyond the capacity of our team, we are working with very limited resources as cities and villages have been completely destroyed. Families have been destroyed, so many are living on the streets in dire weather conditions,” Dureid said.

The possibility of finding survivors continues to decrease as the hours pass. A UN liaison officer warned that the two countries are nearing the end of the search and rescue window. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates up to 23 million people could be affected by the earthquake across both the countries.

“People gathered around the search and rescue team, trying to help them rescue families stuck under the rubble, in one of the neighborhoods that was completely destroyed in North Syria.” Credit: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has been working on the ground across Syria providing relief, water, and support to those affected by the earthquake. In a statement issued here, NRC says, “The quake happened at the worst time of the night at the worst time of the year. The destructive extent of the shock hit a number of cities in Syria, including Aleppo, Idlib, Homs, Hamah and Lattakia, including internally displaced people across Syria’s north.”

“We are now entering a new phase with search and rescue operations largely coming to an end. The real scale of the disaster will start to crystallise in the coming days,” says Emilie Luciani, Country Director, Syria Response Office, Norwegian Refugee council in an interview to IPS.

“Syrians waiting for the search and rescue team to help people stuck under the rubble, where an entire flattened by the earthquake in North Syria.” Credit: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)

“Thousands of families are without shelter in open areas or seeking refuge in damaged buildings, existing internally displaced people’s (IDP) sites, reception centres, collective centres or beings temporarily hosted by other families. Communication has been very difficult, and roads around the main affected areas are damaged.

“People in North West Syria are in a desperate situation. They have already spent many years displaced and reliant on humanitarian assistance, and now unfortunately, the aid reaching them is also restricted as the United Nations can only utilise one crossing-point to reach them from Turkey which only just reopened – 5 days after the earthquake,” says Luciani.

According to this report, the Syrian government in Damascus has been receiving aid from international donors, but there is a lot of uncertainty about whether that will be equitably distributed to all the affected parts of Syria including the rebel held North West.

“People trying to help the search and rescue team in rescuing families buried under the rubble in North Syria.” Credit: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)

The Red Cross has called for urgent access in Northern Syria to help people who need urgent support. “Impartial humanitarian assistance should never be hindered, nor politicised,” it says.

Avril Benoit, Executive Director, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) USA said: “The massive consequences of this disaster will require an equally massive international response. People urgently need shelter, food, blankets, clothes, heating materials, hygiene kits, and medical assistance – including access to mental health support. For Syrians living the earthquake zone, this is catastrophe layered on top of crisis after crisis. People have endured more than a decade of war, an economic crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and a recent cholera outbreak, benoit said.

UNHCR has warned that according to its preliminary data, as many as 5.3 million people in Syria may have been affected by the recent earthquake and will need some form of shelter assistance. A huge number and this destruction comes to a population already suffering mass displacement.

“We are really worried, as we have seen in the past, the world has the habit of replacing a crisis with a new crisis and so on. Right now everyone is opening their doors, giving donations, opening relief camps and emergency response which is needed, no doubt but what after that? We are worried that after a week or so when everyone goes back to their routine life, we will forget about those impacted by the earthquake, especially women and children, says Anila Noor, Managing Director of Women Connectors and a policy expert on refugees and migration.

“These are poor people, who have suffered due to war, they live with very limited resources especially in Syria. Emergency response is the first step, but we need to see how we can help them later, make an ecosystem and a system of accountability to track where the money and aid goes, and also see the local efforts,” says Noor.

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Women receive food rations at a food distribution site in Herat, Afghanistan. Credit: UNICEF/Sayed Bidel

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 31 2023 (IPS)

Recent visits to Afghanistan by senior-led UN delegations underscore the urgency to protect the rights of women and girls, including their access to humanitarian aid and their right to work.

The first delegation was led by Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed, who called for the Taliban to reverse its decisions that have limited women’s and girls’ rights.

The delegation, led on behalf of the Secretary-General, also included senior leaders from the UN; Executive Director of UN-Women, Sima Bahous; and the Assistant Secretary-General of the Department of Political, Peacebuilding Affairs, and Peace Operations, Khaled Khiari.

The delegation completed a four-day visit to Afghanistan to appraise the current situation and to engage with Taliban authorities. This visit followed the recent decree by the Taliban to ban women from working in national and international non-governmental organizations. This is among the latest in a series of decrees that have further stripped women and girls of the rights and means to actively participate in society.

In this mission, Mohammed and Bahous met with affected communities, humanitarian actors, and civil society in the cities of Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

“My message was very clear: while we recognize the important exemptions made, these restrictions present Afghan women and girls with a future that confines them in their own homes, violating their rights and depriving the communities of their services,” Mohammed said.

Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed called for the Taliban to reverse its decisions that have limited women’s and girls’ rights. CREDIT: UN

Mohammed later told Al-Jazeera that some work had been resumed by three NGOs in Afghanistan, particularly in the health sector. “I think that’s because the international community, and particularly the partners who are funding this, were able to show the implications and the impact of woman-to-woman services, particularly childbirth,” she said.

“What is happening in Afghanistan is a grave women’s rights crisis and is a wake-up call for the international community,” Bahous said. “It shows how quickly decades of progress on women’s rights can be reversed in a matter of days. UN-Women stands with all Afghan women and girls and will continue to amplify their voices to regain all their rights.”

The recent bans on women working in NGOs have forced these organizations to temporarily suspend their operations, which can no longer be delivered safely or meaningfully.

“The effective delivery of humanitarian assistance is predicated on principles that require full, safe, and unhindered access for all aid workers, including women,” said Mohammed in the UN’s official statement.

On the other hand, statements from Taliban spokespersons and senior government officials have stated that the current authorities would respond to issues according to the principles of Islamic law, so they claim.

“The international community, countries, and involved parties should also respect the principles, traditions, and spirituality of our country,” said Bilal Kamiri, a deputy spokesperson for the Taliban following the DSG’s meeting.

The de facto authorities in Afghanistan have acknowledged that they are reliant on international aid in order to revitalize a country where over 28 million, more than half of their population, are in need. These authorities must, therefore, also be aware that this aid would come with the basic stipulation that all the people of Afghanistan must have their rights and dignities respected, including women and girls.

How the UN will proceed in its ongoing negotiations with the Taliban will remain to be seen while they continue to reiterate their solidarity with the women and girls of Afghanistan.

The UN delegation led by the Deputy Secretary-General also met with its partners, civil society, and Government leaders, including the leadership of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Islamic Development Bank.

It was understood between partners and countries that the UN’s efforts must continue and be intensified to reflect the urgency of the situation and the immense pressure that humanitarian aid workers already face.

On Tuesday, UNESCO dedicated the International Day of Education to the women and girls of Afghanistan. In a statement, UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay noted the international community’s responsibility to ensure the restoration of their rights immediately. “The decisions made by the de facto authorities of Afghanistan threaten to wipe out the development gains made over the past twenty years,” she said in an official statement.

Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator for OCHA was in Afghanistan meeting with Taliban authorities to reconsider the edict to ban Afghan from working in NGOs.

In an interview with the BBC, Griffiths shared that he was receiving “encouraging responses” from Taliban ministers, stating that there was “a consistent pattern of Taliban leaders presenting us with exceptions, exemptions, and authorizations for women to work.”

“I think they’re listening, and they told me they will be issuing new guidelines in due course, which I hope will help us reinforce the role of women,” he said.

He added, “If women do not work in humanitarian operations, we do not reach, we do not count, the women and girls we need to listen to. In all humanitarian operations around the world, women and girls are the most vulnerable.”

The sentiments from UN officials and those publicly shared by the Taliban are at clear odds with one another. Meanwhile, humanitarian aid organizations have been prevented from providing the full capacity of their services, leaving millions of Afghans more vulnerable than before. Meanwhile, women and girls cannot openly protest or object to the loss of their basic right to education without risking violence and imprisonment.

The UN and the international community must continue to listen to and amplify the voices of the vulnerable communities and prioritize them in the coming weeks and proposed meetings. For these promised countermeasures, let us hope they do not wait for the next ban on women to put them into action.

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The FSO Safer, moored off Yemen's west coast. Credit: UNRCO Yemen

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 11 2023 (IPS)

The long-delayed salvaging of an abandoned tanker, the FSO Safer off the Yemeni coast, has been described as a humanitarian disaster waiting to happen.

The rusting vessel, according to the UN, has remained anchored for more than 30 years. But off-loading and maintenance of the vessel ceased back in 2015, following the start of a devastating civil war in Yemen.

Greenpeace International Project lead Paul Horsman told IPS: “We are staring a major disaster in the face.”

It is unacceptable, he argued, that UNDP, the UN body in charge of facilitating the Safer salvage operations, is creating delays through their internal bureaucracy, potentially adding massive increase in costs, jeopardising an agreement that took years of negotiations to reach, and putting at risk people of Yemen and the Red Sea.

For over a year, everyone has been warning of the imminent danger presented by the Safer. The solution is clear, the technology and expertise are available, ready and able, and the money is there, he added.

“If the Safer leaks or, worse, explodes, it is the UNDP that will carry the blame. They should just get out of the way and allow those who do know what they are doing to get on with the job,” declared Horsman.

Asked for a response, Russell Geekie, Senior Communications Advisor to the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, told IPS under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator, UNDP has been working with other UN specialized agencies and partners to urgently implement the UN-coordinated plan to prevent a massive oil spill from the FSO Safer, off Yemen’s Red Sea coast.

The salvage operation, he said, will take place within the context of the crisis in Yemen, which greatly complicates the work to prepare and implement the operation.

“The salvage operation can only begin once a suitable vessel is in place to receive the oil from the FSO Safer”.

At present, he said, the main challenge to the start of the operation is the limited availability of suitable vessels to store the oil. The price in the global market for these vessels has sharply increased – largely as a result of the war in Ukraine.

“UNDP is working with a maritime broker and other partners to find the most suitable solution, fast-tracking processes whenever possible”, he added.

At a UN press briefing last September, David Gressly, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, said the long-delayed salvage operations can begin, now that more than $75 million had been pledged to carry out the vital operation.

The briefing, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. was co-hosted by partners in the proposed rescue effort, namely, the Netherlands, the United States, and Germany.

Gressly said that once the pledges are fully converted into cash for the initial salvage operation, with more than $77 million promised from 17 countries, an extra $38 million was still needed for phase two – the installation of safe replacement capacity to secure the one million barrels of oil on board.

The UN plan is for this to be done through transferring the oil to a secure double-hulled vessel, as a permanent storage solution, until the political situation allows it to be sold or transported elsewhere, said Gressly.

But Greenpeace International has remained sceptical because the issue of the FSO Safer, it says, should have been dealt with months ago, before weather conditions deteriorated.

Last autumn, all seemed set fair for the salvage operation, and Smit Boskalis, one of the world’s most experienced salvage companies, was all set to get the operation underway, Greenpeace said.

“But this momentum appears to have now ground to a halt as the UNDP, who are supposed to be coordinating the operation, are creating serious and more expensive delays through their internal bureaucratic processes”.

Greenpeace said it has been campaigning for over two years to get the UN to deal with the FSO Safer and avoid a devastating oil spill in the area.

“We understand the UN FINALLY has the money, but UNDP (who are supposed to be coordinating the multi-donor effort but have no expertise in the oil/shipping issue) are going through internal bureaucratic processes which are creating serious delays and more expense due to daily inflating costs,” Greenpeace said.

According to the UN, fears have grown that unless the vessel is secured, it could break apart causing a devastating oil spill and other environmental damage, which the UN estimates would cost at least $20 billion just to clear up, as well as devastate the fragile economy of war-torn Yemen – triggering a humanitarian catastrophe.

Geekie said donors have generously deposited $73.4 million for the project, with another $10 million pledged. While preparatory work has begun, additional funds are still needed to fully implement the operation, which has the support of both the Government of Yemen in Aden and the Sana’a authorities.

Ensuring that the right team of experts is in place is critical to the operation’s success.

He said UNDP has already procured all the services of relevant experts and operational partners including a top-rated marine management consultancy company, a salvage operation company, a shipbroker, a maritime legal firm, an insurance broker company and oil spill experts for contingency planning to support this crucial mission.

Other UN agencies are also providing technical support to the operation.

Given the high potential environmental and humanitarian risks, the United Nations, including UNDP, is sparing no effort to address the challenges faced off the coast of Yemen and is dealing with this situation with the utmost urgency, he declared.

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Some Afghan women put their lives at risk by migrating to Europe. Along the way, and even at the destinations, they face sexual violence at the hands of traffickers, but they often take the risk so that they can live free from the constraints of the Taliban. This photo shows a woman from the Hazara minority in Bamiyan. She used to be a singer and appeared on local TV but is now forced to stay at home. Credit: Sara Perria/IPS

By Sara Perria
KABUL & ATHENS, Dec 22 2022 (IPS)

Maliha looks confident in a café in Athens as she tells the story of her journey from Afghanistan to Europe. But as she starts recounting how a smuggler assaulted her in Turkey two years ago, she pauses, looking the other way and fiddling with her loose hair.

It makes her anxious when she remembers it. She was traveling alone and soon realized she was the only woman on board a bus to the border with Greece.

“[The smuggler] told me to get off. He wanted me to himself.” With unusual strength, the young woman managed to escape as the man was trying to rape her. Still shaken, she tried to report the crime to the local police, but she felt they were more concerned about her status as an illegal migrant than the attempted rape. “Luckily, I had a contact on Facebook [who is] a cousin who I knew lived in Turkey but whom I never met.” He happened to live near that police station, and he convinced the officials to let her go.

Afghan refugees picnic in a park in Athens. Their journeys to Europe are often dangerous. Credit: Sara Perria/IPS

Now Maliha lives in Athens as a “free woman” – a fact that she remarks upon while wearing leggings and no head covering.

The violence experienced by Mahila is not an isolated case. An investigation into the journey of Afghan women from their home country to Europe carried out in Afghanistan, Turkey and Greece has revealed a pattern of systematic violence throughout, their vulnerability heightened by lack of documents and money. Women, some traveling alone or only with their children, pay to get to Europe only to become victims of trafficking and sex slaves.

According to 31-year-old Aila, an Afghan refugee and former Médecins sans Frontières worker in refugee camps in Athens, “some 90% of women suffer a form of violence during the journey.”

“When your life is in the hands of smugglers,” continues Aila, “it’s not up to you to decide whom to stay with, what to do, where to go: it’s the smuggler who decides. Even if you are with your family or the members of your family, he can still threaten you with a weapon, and if he wants to separate you from them, he’ll do it”.

Afghans are now the second largest group of asylum seekers in the EU after Ukrainians, but the flow of asylum seekers started well before the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021. According to the International Organization for Migration, nearly 77,000 women and girls were registered at arrival by sea and by land in Europe between 2018 and 2020, making up 20 percent of total arrivals. Women make up an increasing percentage of asylum requests globally, all facing gender-based risks.

The reasons behind Afghans’ search for a safe place run deep in a country torn by decades of war. Social and financial restrictions within a deeply patriarchal society and the hope for a better life abroad had already pushed many to leave the country even before the arrival of the Taliban.

However, the challenges of the journey can be harrowing. “I remember traveling with a 10-year-old and her grandmother,” Aila recalls. “During the journey, her grandmother died, and she was handed over to the trafficker,” says Aila, describing one of the most traumatic episodes she witnessed.

“Was she raped? Of course. For them, she was a woman”.

Women escaping from the increasingly restrictive Taliban regime in Afghanistan find their journeys to freedom are fraught with dangers. This week the Taliban banned women from universities. They are increasingly forced to remain at home. Credit: Sara Perria/IPS

The risks are so stacked against women that word of mouth has led to the development of ‘survival’ techniques, such as dressing up as a man. Aila says she put on a similar short jacket, jeans, and sneakers to that of other boys. “I kept my hair hidden under my cap. And when the trafficker gave me his hand to get on the boat, he said, “Hey, boy.” I didn’t answer. “Never talk to traffickers,” is the second ‘tip’ dispensed by Aila.

Acceptance rates of Afghan asylum seekers are now high, especially in countries such as Spain and Italy, with 100% and 95% in 2021, respectively, and 80% in Greece, the first EU frontier for the many who come after spending months or years in Turkey or Iran.

Yet getting adequate assistance after suffering abuse, rape and forced prostitution is a different story. The violence suffered often doesn’t get denounced by the police due to cultural or linguistic barriers and the stigma surrounding rape or forced prostitution. Lack of adequate protection in Europe is also a reason, so NGOs set up by fellow Afghans try to step in.

Months of interviews with Afghan asylum seekers in Afghanistan, Turkey, and Europe expose the extent of the danger for women who embark on a journey organized by smugglers. Direct witnesses’ accounts and NGO transcripts, seen exclusively by this reporter, reveal a pattern of how women – and in particular Afghans belonging to ethnic minorities – fall into a ‘trap’ of violence.

Freshta spent years between Iran and Turkey with a sick brother before eventually succeeding in reaching a refugee camp in Greece and then a place in Athens hosted by a friend. However, her attempts to find a job and become independent soon turned into a prolonged series of tortured experiences. The possibility of asking for help was radically reduced by her illegal status and lack of documents.

“One day, I was in a café with my friend, and she introduced me to this man. We only knew that he was a trafficker of Iraqi nationality.” He, himself a refugee, knew very well how vulnerable women like Freshta are. “He started following me and kept saying that I should go with him.” Her constant rejections didn’t work. On the contrary, he threatened to kill her brother, who was still in the refugee camp – a sign of the long reach of influence traffickers can call upon.

One day, despite attempts to protect herself, hiding for days at a friend’s house, the man managed to kidnap her and take her to her apartment. He then hit her on the head, threatening her with a knife pointed at her stomach and forcing her to get into his car. At that moment, Freshta became a slave, first suffering violent rape, with beatings that made her pass out because she also suffered from asthma.

“When I woke up, he wasn’t there. I was full of pain and didn’t know what to do; I was in shock. I went to the bathroom, got washed, dressed, and cried.”

Upon his return, the trafficker told her that she now belonged to him. If she went out and told anyone what had happened, then he would kill her.

Freshta managed to hide at her friend’s again, but again the man managed to take her by force, beating her and locking her up at home for weeks, repeatedly raping her. Freshta got pregnant. “He told me I couldn’t do anything because he had become a Greek citizen, and I was nothing; I didn’t have any document.”

It took many weeks and the help of an association to allow her to report the incident. She had an abortion. The woman has since been moved by the Greek government to a secure facility in an undisclosed location.

To add to Freshta’s tragic testimony is the fact that, as the operator of an NGO in Athens explains, “There are many cases of sexual slavery like this, which are not reported by the victims because they are afraid of being stigmatized and of their lack of documents.” The perpetrators of the violence can be fellow nationals, generally belonging to a different ethnic group and, to a lesser extent, other nationalities.

The lack of support is accentuated by a form of class distinction within the refugee community and by the way resources are thus distributed, according to some of the Afghan women interviewed in Athens. “The refugees who arrived in Europe through the evacuation program [in Kabul] consider themselves ‘different’ from those who arrived here on foot, with the traffickers. And they are also treated differently by the authorities,” says Aila.

While for men, the lack of documents, money, and a family network leads more easily to labor exploitation, women can often fall victim to sexual exploitation. Some women are “passed from trafficker to trafficker,” says Aila, while the local association also reports cases of forced prostitution just outside the camps. But even in the aftermath of a violent attack, NGOs are worried about the short time women are allowed to spend in safe structures, as well as the limited space available there. Resources do not meet the seriousness and extent of the problem.

“When they asked me if I wanted to report the man [who kept me as a slave], I said yes, but only if I had a safe place to stay first,” says Freshta. “I was so desperate that I left behind everything I had.”

This project on trafficking has been developed with the financial support of Journalismfund.eu

https://www.journalismfund.eu/

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Qatar at the UN General Assembly. Credit: United Nations

By Rosi Orozco
MEXICO CITY, Dec 5 2022 (IPS)

Peter Zimmermann owns a bar located in the German city of Cologne, which for thirty years has been a favorite for those who want to watch a soccer game.

Curiously enough, for the World Cup that is currently taking place in Doha, Qatar, the owner of Lotta, as the bar is called, decided to join a protest movement, and instead of announcing any specials, he hung a banner with the legend “#BoycottQatar2022”.

The position taken by the German sector that presumes to be concerned about the condition of human rights is interesting, considering that human traffickers for sexual exploitation are treated with benevolence in that country.

In the most recent Trafficking in Persons Report released in July 2022 by the United States Department of State (DOS), it is recognized that the German government meets “minimum standards” to address the problem.

However, the report criticizes that “Judges continued to issue lenient sentences resulting in 66 percent of traffickers arrested receiving fully suspended sentences or fines of less than one year in prison.”

This means that in Germany, traffickers continue to operate, causing internal security and injustice problems. “A German who steals a car will spend more time in jail than a human trafficker,” John Cotton Richmond, who was the US Ambassador General to Monitor and Combat Human Trafficking from 2018 to 2021, told us recently.

The same DOS report highlights that the German government still does not have a national victim identification guide, a fact that makes the process complicated for those who seek refuge or request asylum.

Nor did the government report whether it granted compensation or restitution for the victims, something that is infrequent for cases in that country, where funding for shelters and NGOs for care and assistance to victims is scarce.

All this is also ignored by German soccer player Phillip Lahm, (Brazil 2014 World Cup Champion), who also claimed that “human rights should play a more important role in the awarding of a tournament” and was surprised that the competition takes place “in a country that is one of the worst in terms of respect for human rights.”

Faced with similar lawsuits launched in all parts of the world, we have to ask ourselves: Is Qatar one of the worst-rated countries in terms of human rights? Taking into account the 2022 Trafficking in-person report, the small nation is located at a second level in terms of human trafficking along with countries such as Denmark, Israel, Italy, Mexico, and Switzerland.

It also shares the second level with other Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, and is well ahead of others recognized as human rights violators such as Iran or Syria, let alone Yemen or Libya.

Although the report charges that “the Government of Qatar does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking”, it concedes that “it is making significant efforts to do so” and found that the authorities have shown an overall increase in efforts compared to the previous period.

Currently, more cases of forced labor are being investigated, and a greater number of traffickers are being prosecuted and convicted.

Where Qatar receives the harshest criticism is in the recent report by Amnesty International (AI) which points out that despite the reforms celebrated by the government, “the migrant worker population continued to suffer labor abuse” without being allowed to “change jobs freely” also pointing out the increase in restrictions on freedom of expression in the run-up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup “while women continued to suffer discrimination in law and practice”.

Once again, AI’s criticism of Qatar seems fair, but it should be noted that a country like Mexico —which was awarded the venue for the 2026 World Cup together with the United States and Canada—, according to AI, has reported disappearances, violence and impunity, unlawful homicides, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and other ill-treatment, violence against human rights defenders, violence against refugees and migrants; a large package of violations that do not occur in Qatar.

Since 2009, the United Nations Organization has had a Human Rights Documentation and Training Center (OHCHR) in Doha, the capital of Qatar. Not only for the nation where the World Cup is being held but also, for 21 others located in Southwestern Asia and Arab regions.

Through training programs, the center focuses on judicial laws and practices to address, prevent, and increasingly reduce human rights violations on the application of international standards. OHCHR trains Judges and others to increase accountability for serious violations of international law and human rights in general.

I witnessed this training in 2015 when I had the opportunity to participate in the 13th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice held in Qatar, where I as part of a group of experts, demanded that the authorities of that country accelerate the changes; demands on which they were quite receptive.

Finally, seeking to host the World Cup, opening up to the world, and being examined by a magnifying glass in every way, allows us to see another face of the monarchy that has ruled Qatar for more than 70 years.

I am convinced that taking the 2022 World Cup was an excellent idea because, in addition to no longer excluding the countries of the Middle East from events like this (the first one in almost 100 years), it is an opportunity to try to understand their traditions, mentality, and customs, sometimes so far removed from our “western values”. Cancel culture does not pave the way to progress, understanding and accountability, it alienates and harbors resentment.

Rosi Orozco is President, United Against Human Trafficking and former Congresswoman, Mexican Chamber of Deputies.

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Wind and solar energy are behind a major project to transport electricity from Egypt to Greece. Credit: Hisham Allam/IPS

By Hisham Allam
Cairo, Dec 1 2022 (IPS)

As Europe braces for an unusual winter due to a global energy crisis, Greece is embarking on one of Europe’s most ambitious energy projects by connecting its electricity grid to Egypt’s.

An underwater cable will transport 3,000 MW of electricity to power up to 450,000 households from northern Egypt to Attica in Greece.

In October, the two countries agreed to construct the Mediterranean’s first undersea cable to transport electricity generated by solar and wind energy in North Africa to Europe. The project’s total length is 1373 kilometres.

The Copelouzos Group is in charge of the project, and its executives met with Egyptian leaders in October to speed up the process.

The agreement comes at a time when Greece, Cyprus, and Israel want to invest $900 million in constructing a line connecting Europe and Asia that will be the longest and deepest energy cable across the Mediterranean.

At a ceremony in Athens, Greek Energy Minister Costas Skrickas and his Egyptian counterpart Mohamed Shaker signed a memorandum of understanding on the project.

“This connection benefits Greece, Egypt, and the European Union,” Skrickas said.

He explained that the project would help to build an energy hub in the eastern Mediterranean and improve the region’s energy security.

Besides boosting the share of renewable energy sources in the energy mix and lowering greenhouse gas emissions in the energy sector, the project is anticipated to enable the export of renewable energy from Egypt to Greece in periods of high renewable energy generation and vice versa.

According to Dr Ayman Hamza, spokesman for the Ministry of Electricity, the Egyptian-Greek electrical connectivity project has significant technical, economic, environmental, and social benefits. The project aims to establish a robust interconnection network in the Eastern Mediterranean to increase the security and dependability of energy supplies, as well as to assist in the event of transmission network breakdowns, interruptions, and emergencies, and to raise the level of security of electrical supplies.

The project, scheduled to start in 2028, is a significant component of the two nations’ ongoing strategic relations and cooperation. It will speed up the development of the energy corridor by increasing the supply of electricity to Egypt and Greece while balancing energy demand, encouraging responses to the challenges of climate change, and reducing emissions, all of which will contribute to the corridor’s continued growth, Hamza told IPS.

“We have 16 memorandums of understanding related to green hydrogen,” he explained, adding that “there is a great demand from investors to invest in renewable energy, whether the sun or wind.”

“On the margins of the COP27 climate conference, it is expected that extremely major agreements on the level of green hydrogen and others, with great experience, will be signed,” Hamza elaborated.

The possibility of Egypt increasing its reliance on renewable energy, he continued, is made possible by a large number of investors pouring money into solar and wind energy. He stated that Egypt would become a regional renewable energy hub.

Egypt has electrical interconnection lines with Libya and Sudan, and we are collaborating with other African organizations to take significant steps to connect Africa and Europe through electrical interconnection. Because Africa is a major energy source, this will benefit both continents, the spokesperson continued.

According to Dr Farouk Al-Hakim, Secretary-General of the Egyptian Society of Electrical Engineers, Egypt’s export of electricity indicates a surplus, which generates a significant economic return, strengthens Egypt’s political position, and transforms Egypt into a regional energy hub, in addition to the numerous job opportunities created in operation and maintenance.

Al-Hakim told IPS that Egypt has a significant surplus due to the installation of three enormous power stations in the past several years in the administrative capital, Burullus, and Beni Suef, as well as solar plants, including the Benban facility, which is the biggest in Africa and the Middle East.

The electrical connection currently offers many benefits, he continued, particularly given that Europe, like most other nations worldwide, is experiencing an energy crisis due to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Therefore, it is a good idea to start with two nations that have shared a history with Egypt, such as Greece and Cyprus, he added.

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Water scarcity in the Middle East is impacting on lives and causing diplomatic tensions in between countries. The Turkish dam project, which includes the large Ataturk and Ilisu dams, has reduced water flow to the Tigris River’s natural channel impacting Syria and Iraq. Pictured here is Koctepe - a village covered by water in the Ilisu dam project. Credit: Mustafa Bilge Satkın/Climate Visuals Countdown

By Hisham Allam
Sharm El Sheikh, Nov 17 2022 (IPS)

The Middle East and North Africa are the world’s most water-scarce regions – with 11 of the 17 water-stressed countries on the globe.

According to UNICEF, nine out of 10 children live in areas with high or very high-water stress, resulting in significant consequences for their health, cognitive development, and future livelihoods.

Now climate change is resulting in less rain for agriculture and a decline in the quality of freshwater reserves due to saltwater transfer to fresh aquifers and increased pollution concentrations.

Maha Rashid, Middle East managing committee member for Blue Peace, which works for water cooperation among borders, sectors, and generations to foster peace, stability, and sustainable development, says the situation in the region is dire.

“More than 60% of this region’s population lives in areas of high or very high-water stress, compared to the global average of about 35%. While the Middle East and North Africa have continued to experience water scarcity for thousands of years, several interconnected challenges today threaten environmental sustainability and security for the region’s water supply.”

Water scarcity is expected to impact development in the Middle East. Credit: Hisham Allam/IPS

As COP27 negotiations continue at Sharm El Sheikh in Egypt, people in the Middle East are dealing with the impacts of climate change. Rashid explained that Iraq relies on water from Turkey and Iran, as well as rain and snow, to feed its rivers, especially in the spring. Water revenues to Iraq’s rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, dropped for the third season in succession. The current season has experienced a more severe and unprecedented fall not seen for several years, and water levels in the Euphrates and Tigris rivers declined, and drought conditions are experienced in the rivers and lakes in Diyala Governorate.

The Turkish dam system, which includes the large Ataturk and Ilisu dams, has reduced water flow to the Tigris River’s natural channel. It will result in a 10 billion cubic metre annual reduction in water flow for downstream countries – like Syria and Iraq.

Despite having large amounts of arable land, Iraq will not be able to achieve food and water security. Instead, over the long term, water will confine development, plans, and programs and not bring food or water security, says Rashid, who is also a professor at Tigris University, told IPS.

Water insecurity in the region had also impacted international relations, with tensions arising over Ethiopia’s building of the Renaissance Dam for irrigation and electricity generation without considering the significant effects on Egypt and Sudan. Now the threat of water scarcity is growing for the two countries, followed by food security and potential future natural disasters.

The Middle East is now experiencing rising temperatures, which is one of the effects of climate change. As a result, North Africa is now experiencing drought in some regions and torrential downpours in others.

According to Rashid, since 2010, which set new temperature records in 19 countries, many of which were Arab nations, countries are experiencing summertime temperatures of up to 54 degrees Celsius, including in Iraq and Morocco, where two-thirds of the oases have vanished as a result of decreased precipitation and increased evaporation. Saudi Arabia and Sudan are also experiencing fierce sandstorms.

These climatic changes are predicted to get worse unless the inhabitants and governments of the area deal with them properly and urgently over the course of the next fifty years.

Rashid contended that doing this calls for more prudent resource management as well as adjustments to sectoral and economic models, mindsets, and behaviours. While she is optimistic about the outcome of the climate negotiations, most countries have not committed to implementing the recommendations and reducing carbon emissions since the COP 26 climate summit in Scotland.

“I believe that COP27 will address climate change issues and, in the end, will insist on finding a method that works to save poor communities.”

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COP 27’s official Youth Envoy, Dr Omnia El Omrani, believes solid evidence will convince wealthy countries to honour their climate change financial commitments. Credit: Hisham Allam/IPS

By Hisham Allam
Cairo, Oct 27 2022 (IPS)

COP 27’s official Youth Envoy, Dr Omnia El Omrani, realised the impact of climate change in 2017, and Hurricane Irma slammed Miami.

As a doctor, she witnessed the influx of emergency patients into the hospital as a result of the hurricane, which piqued her interest in environmental and climate issues. She described it as a significant milestone in her life.

“As a result, I decided to become an activist in the areas of public health and climate change over the ensuing years. I did this by attending events as a representative of a global organisation of medical students and young doctors, starting with the COP24 Climate Change Summit in Poland in 2018 and continuing through the Glasgow Conference in Britain in 2021,” Omnia said in an interview with IPS.

El Omrani is an Egyptian plastic and reconstruction surgery resident, community leader and climate change activist. She was appointed by the President-designate of the 27th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP27), Sameh Shoukry.

Host country Egypt has committed to empowering youth. It sees the role of the youth envoy as a way to encourage and promote youth perspectives before COP27 and throughout the negotiations and conference itself.

El Omrani sees herself as central to involving the world’s young people at COP27 to promote climate action and implementation with the critical interventions necessary for the conference’s implementation-focused strategy.

The Youth Climate Summit COY17’s most significant outcome is to develop a statement that reflects the youth’s perception of the problem – and to suggest solutions.

The youth statement’s coordination began ahead of the COY17 youth summit, and YOUNGO with working groups will review and edit a draught version in Sharm El-Sheikh from November 2–4, after which it will be sent to the COP27 president, she explained.

“The unique thing that we will do this year On the Young and Future Generations Day (November 10), we will have a roundtable discussion instead of a panel discussion at COP27. Here we will bring together high-ranking officials, negotiators, and ministers and YOUNGO to discuss the statement and (debate) how to get it implemented,” El Omrani said.

YOUNGO is the UNFCCC’s official youth constituency.

El Omrani said, “It’s exceedingly challenging to convince wealthy nations to convert pledges into actual funding, but certain approaches could help”.

These approaches include providing solid evidence on the impact of climate change. For example, Pakistan floods this year caused massive damage to the country’s economy. Small island countries share similar issues. Likewise, severe heat waves swept through Europe.

El Omrani, who is 27, has represented over 1.3 million medical students, leading their global advocacy and policy work on climate change with the UNFCCC, UNEP, and WHO, while also being engaged in climate action projects across Egypt and the world.

El Omrani was the International Federation of Medical Students’ Association’s National Public Officer, MENA Focal Point, and Liaison Officer for Public Health Issues.

She has participated in climate discussions at COP24, COP25, and COP26, environmental projects, and international climate conferences, such as the WHO Civil Society Group to Advance Climate and Health.

“I believe it is my responsibility to inform people about the significance of climate change in my community and at the institution where I work as a doctor. I also believe I must deliver these messages to decision-makers and urge them to act on this issue,” she added.

“I am now developing a curriculum to be taught at universities to increase awareness of climate change issues, not just in Egypt but also throughout Africa, in collaboration with Ain Shams University in Egypt.”

Aside from that, she participates in a wide range of charitable activities and projects coordinated by the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the European Union, the Lancet Scientific Journal, and other international groups focused on health, women’s issues, and climate change.

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Al-Masjid an-Nabawi, known in English as The Prophet's Mosque, in the city of Medina in the Al Madinah Province of Saudi Arabia. Credit: Unsplash/Yasmine Arfaoui
 
Meanwhile, regardless of the intensity of the current conflict between the Biden administration and Saudi Arabia, their long history of military alliance and shared concerns over regional stability will certainly override their conflicting interests, especially at this juncture of international tension in the wake of the war in the Ukraine.

By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Oct 18 2022 (IPS)

The recent conflict between the United States and Saudi Arabia over Riyadh’s decision to cut its oil production by 2 million barrels a day should be addressed in the context of their long and extensive relationship.

For more than 70 years, the two countries have cooperated and collaborated on many levels, including the massive sale of US military hardware, collaboration on national security, joint economic development, and transfer of sensitive US technology, along with intelligence sharing.

The current conflict is not the first that has occurred between the two countries; in fact, in 1973 the Saudis imposed an oil boycott on the US as retribution for its aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur War, and in 2001 after the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, relations became strained again due to (still unproven) allegations about the possible involvement of Saudi Arabia in the attack, as 15 of the 19 terrorists were Saudi citizens.

These two major incidents certainly disrupted the relationship to a great extent; nevertheless, each time they restored the spirit and the practical dimension of their relationship because their shared interests on so many levels overrode their conflicting positions. I believe that this recent conflict will not change, as with previous conflicts, their bilateral relationship in any fundamental way.

President Biden stated that “… when the House and the Senate comes back, there’s going to be some consequences for what [Saudi Arabia has] done with Russia.” Congressional Democrats went as far as demanding taking unprecedented countermeasures against Saudi Arabia, including the cessation of all aspects of cooperation with Riyadh.

What precipitated this stern reaction by Biden and leading Democrats is attributed to several factors. The Saudi action was seen as an affront to Biden personally, especially given his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, with the purpose of reducing the tension between the two countries and persuading the Saudis to increase oil production.

Riyadh’s action is further seen as a barefaced anti-American move and as collusion with Russia against the US. Moreover, Biden and many Democrats view the Saudis’ decision as one that would worsen global inflation and undermine US efforts to bring down the price of gas, especially now just before the mid-term elections, while helping Putin in his war against Ukraine.

To be sure, they feel that the Saudis are ungrateful and unworthy of the US’ consistent defense assistance, which leads them to conclude that the Saudis are no longer a reliable ally.

The Saudi action appears to be as if they are taking revenge against the US, specifically because Biden, from the time he was running for president, called Saudi Arabia a “pariah,” whose leadership had “very little redeeming value.”

He accused Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) of orchestrating the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and swore to never speak with him, and criticized the kingdom for its indiscriminate bombing in Yemen and its human rights violations. Finally, Saudi has been public in its opposition to Biden’s efforts to renew the Iran deal.

In a conversation I had a couple of days ago with David Rundell, former Chief of Mission in the American embassy in Riyadh, author of “Vision or Mirage,” and one of America’s foremost experts on Saudi Arabia, he emphasized that the conflict has a significant emotional component for the Saudis which the Biden administration failed to appreciate.

As Rundell stated, “The president did, I think that the only term you can use is insult, Mohammed bin Salman several times. He made it very clear that he did not like Mohammed bin Salman…The White House made it very clear that they were not going to see Mohammed bin Salman…Then the president refuses to shake his hand.”

Rundell further commented on the Saudis’ pride and independence which they hold high, and cautioned that “the Saudis acted in what they thought was their own self-interest. They will do so again. If the United States wants to try to isolate them or punish them, it will simply drive them closer to China and Russia, which is already happening.”

Although it is necessary to reevaluate the US-Saudi relationship in the wake of what happened, I concur with Rundell that it will be a mistake for the Biden administration to take any significant punitive measures against the Saudis which will only worsen their bilateral relationship at an extremely sensitive time. As Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated last year, the idea is “not to rupture the [US-Saudi] relationship, but to recalibrate [it].”

I believe that some Democratic senators, like Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez, who said that he will propose a halt to “any cooperation with Riyadh until the Kingdom reassess its position with respect to the war in the Ukraine,” adding, “enough is enough,” and others, including Senator Richard Blumenthal and Rep. Ro Khanna who introduced a bill to “immediately pause all US arms sale to Saudi Arabia,” are going far beyond the pale of what needs to be done.

Other Democrats are calling for milder measures, including withholding intelligence, refusing the sale of certain weapons, restricting access to financial markets, and curtailing some elements of military training, along with slowing down major development projects.

This may seem necessary to send Saudi Arabia a message about the US’ displeasure, but it will be still the wrong message.

Indeed, given that both countries must take into full consideration the importance of their bilateral relationship and its overall regional security implications, they should not engage in a tit for tat which can only benefit Russia and China.

It should be noted that although Saudi Arabia depends on the US for much of its military hardware and national security guarantees, the Saudis feel that they have been all along reciprocating by helping to maintain regional stability, making considerable efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, joining hands with the US in fighting terrorism, and allowing the US to continue to have a military presence on their soil.

Furthermore, the Saudis have promoted a more tolerant version of Islam, and continue to trade oil with dollar, which strengthens the American currency.

The Saudis also fundamentally disagree with the US about their motivation to cut down their oil production. As they see it, their action was strictly motivated by business considerations.

They wanted to reduce oil production in order to increase prices, and insist that even with the cut of 2 million barrels a day, the price will remain in the vicinity of $80-90 per barrel of oil which is still far less than $130 per barrel, the high of the past few years.

The Saudis see it as a business decision, nothing to do with politics. Regardless of how disingenuous this may sound, there is a financial benefit which they can reap; it is the timing of the cut that troubled many American officials.

My position is that the Biden administration should not take any punitive counter-action against Saudi Arabia, certainly not before the midterm election, which allows for a cooling off period. Following that, the Biden administration should establish contact behind-the-scenes in an effort to mitigate their differences.

Given the critical importance of their bilateral relationship especially at this juncture, both sides must avoid any public recrimination which can only aggravate the relationship.

Indeed, the continuing discord between the US and Saudi Arabia will further encourage Russia and China to do everything they can to create a schism between the two allies, especially now when Biden has just declared that China and Russia are adversaries of the US.

This may sound like an appeasement of the Saudis, but it is not. Indeed, regardless of who is right and who is wrong—and in this case, both have their share of blame—any dispute between allies must be resolved through dialogue and honest discussion.

This is the time when Saudi Arabia and the US must demonstrate that given their long friendship and constructive relationship for more than seven decades, their alliance can and will stand the test of time.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (NYU). He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies for over 20 years.

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Prime Minister Yair Lapid of Israel addresses the UN General Assembly’s seventy-seventh session. September 2022. He told delegates a two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was “the right thing” for Israel, but he cautioned that a future Palestinian state must not be “another terror base”. Credit: UN Photo/Cia Pak

By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Oct 7 2022 (IPS)

By all accounts Israel is considered a democratic country, but a close look at its domestic political combustion sadly reveals that Israel’s democracy is in tatters and is tearing at the seams. This is due to the political leaders’ dismal failure to summon their collective resourcefulness and energy to respond to the call of the hour

Righting the Wrong

Israel is now in the midst of its fifth election in four years. None of the coalition governments that were formed during this period has lasted more than a year. Why is that? The answer is fairly simple but extremely troubling.

Although the political parties are broadly divided into two camps, left vs. right, nearly fifteen political parties are running for 120 seats in the Knesset (Parliament). Most, but not all, will pass the threshold of 3.25 percent to qualify for the minimum of four seats.

The country’s political squabbles are centered around personalities and not policies: who gets what position in the government, how to lure or bribe this or the other party’s leader to join the government, which ministry the numerous contending politicians want to hold (regardless of qualifications), the financial appropriations promised for pet projects, and the list goes on.

And to cap it all, just about every head of each party feels they are the most qualified to become the prime minister, yet none can clearly articulate a national agenda to set the nation on a steady course to safeguard its democracy and political stability.

The gravest threat to Israel’s democracy, however, is the sheer failure of all party leaders to grasp that the country is polarized and divided almost evenly between the anti-Netanyahu and pro-Netanyahu blocs (which largely but not exclusively align with left and right), and that neither of the political blocs has been able to form a functioning coalition government that enjoys a stable majority in the Knesset.

Presently, numerous polls which are conducted almost daily show that the result of the coming election will not be much different. The competing two blocks are hovering around 57 and 59 seats, and the country may well have to endure another exhausting cycle of elections and still end up with roughly the same configuration.

One would think that under such circumstances—when the country is existentially threatened by Iran which is racing toward acquiring nuclear weapons, when the West Bank is simmering with violence and Palestinian casualties are mounting, when the prospect of a Palestinian uprising of unprecedented scale is becoming increasingly plausible, when extremist groups such Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah pose an omnipresent danger, when social cohesiveness is sourly lacking, when poverty is rampant and debilitating the social fabric—the leaders of all parties would come to their senses and put the nation’s interest above their own and their party’s.

Together, one would expect that they would seek common ground and reach a consensus to address the urgent issues facing the nation. But that is not the case.

The extent of Israel’s political malaise and the erosion of its democracy cannot be better exemplified by any other than the despicable former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. No prime minister in Israel’s history has been as corrupt or would stoop so low to get his way like Netanyahu.

His lust for power knows no bounds. He faces three criminal charges and is willing to destroy the judiciary to make these charges disappear. He is willing to sell the soul of the nation to the likes of Itamar Ben-Gvir, the fascist, Kahanist leader of Otzma Yehudit who is known to seek the expulsion of all Palestinians from Israel, as long as he could help Netanyahu form the next government.

So, when you have a country that has been governed consecutively for more than 12 years by a bigot like Netanyahu who potentially can still form the new government, you know that Israel’s democracy is suffering from an endemic malaise and needs major political remedies.

Just like here in the US, if the Republican party manages to cheat its way through the electoral college and Trump, the most morally bankrupt former president, wins the next presidential election in 2024, our democracy will be shattered and the American dream will wither and die. Israel could face the same fate under Netanyahu.

Thus, if Netanyahu is left with an ounce of dignity and a shred of concern for the nation’s future, he should step aside, face the court with poise, and ask for forgiveness and President Herzog may well pardon him for his service to the nation. This will pave the way for the establishment of a stable wide-based coalition government that can endure and attend to the urgent business of the country.

More than any time in its history, Israel today is in desperate need of a decent, honest, courageous, visionary, and decisive leader to meet the call of the hour. Yair Lapid meets some of the above attributes. He has demonstrated exemplary capability of making the necessary compromises to reach a consensus for the sake of the country.

He is politically savvy and has shown that in his meetings and dealings with global leaders. He demonstrated courage when he stated at the UN General Assembly that the a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the only viable option.

He bravely spoke time and again against the occupation and its demoralizing effect on the entire country. He passionately advocated for equality among Israeli Jews and Arabs, and called for lifting the poor out of their miserable existence. And finally, he strived to nurture a healthy and cohesive society which is the beating heart that sustains democracy.

This round of elections may well be one of the most consequential since Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967. Every political leader, regardless of his or her political leanings, should ask themselves what kind of a country Israel should be in 10 to 15 years. The Israelis want unity of purpose, they want to preserve their democracy, prosperity, security, and peace.

Normalizing relations with more Arab countries is of paramount importance and it should be pursued, but it will not save Israel’s democracy. Nor will using Israel’s remarkable new technologies to buy political influence abroad, however desirable that may be.

Nor will multiplying its trade with foreign nations, which is extremely vital to Israel’s economy and should be further expanded. Nor will maintaining its military prowess and credible deterrence, which is critical to the country’s national security.

Nor will making remarkable advances in just about every sphere of endeavor, including medicine, agronomy, chemistry, military innovations, engineering, electronics, and so many other fields, which are outstanding achievements that every Israeli should be proud of. Indeed, regardless of how crucial all of the above are to the country, none will preserve and safeguard Israel’s democracy.

Israel cannot secure and sustain its democracy unless the political leadership engenders social cohesiveness and equality with a functioning political system that offers political stability and where the national interests come first.

Moreover, Israel cannot and will never be a free nation and a true democracy until it ends the infamous occupation which dishonors Israel at every turn. It is, to be sure, the Achilles’ heel that will eventually make or break Israel’s democracy.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (NYU). He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies for over 20 years.

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Just another day in the main hall of the Qamishli campus. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

By Karlos Zurutuza
QAMISHLI, Syria, Sep 27 2022 (IPS)

There is a main hall as well as workshops, laboratories and, of course, a cafeteria, where the half-hour break flies by amid card games and laughs. It could well be any university if it wasn’t for those men armed with assault rifles at the entrance.

This is the campus of University of Rojava in Qamishli (700 kilometres northeast of Damascus), an institution that opened its doors in October 2016, in the midst of a war that still rages on.

The Kurdish minority in Syria coexists with Arabs and Syriacs in the so-called Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). It's in this corner of Syria, which shares borders with both Turkey and Iraq, where such a network of universities has been built. It now rivals the institutions of the Syrian Arab Republic government

“Lessons in the Kurdish language are one of our hallmarks,” Rohan Mistefa, the former dean, tells IPS from an office on the second floor. Other than the language of instruction, significant differences from other Syrian universities are also visible in the curriculum.

“We got rid of subjects such as Ideology and History of the Baath Party (in power in Damascus since 1963) and replaced it with `Democratic Culture,'” explains this Kurdish woman in her mid-forties. The creation of a Department of Science for Women (Jineoloij, in Kurdish), she adds, has been another milestone.

The University of Rojava hosts around 2,000 students on three campuses. There are, however, two other active universities in Syria’s northeast: Kobani, working since 2017, and Al- Sharq in Raqqa. The latter has been operating since last year in a city that was once the capital of the Islamic State in Syria.

“Unlike the universities of Kobani and Rojava, in Raqqa they study in Arabic because the majority of citizens there are Arabs,” says Mistefa, who is today co-responsible for coordinating between the three institutions.

Mustefa has been closely linked to the institution since its inception. She helped to found the first Kurdish university in Syria in her native district of Afrin in 2015. That pioneering initiative had to close its doors in 2018: territorially disconnected from the rest of the Kurdish Syrian territories, Afrin was taken over by Ankara-backed Islamist militias. It remains under occupation to this day.

“Many people ask us why we open schools and universities in the middle of the war. I always tell them that ours is a culture of building, and not that of destroying our neighbours and their allies”, says the Kurdish woman.

Ideologues and martyrs of the Kurdish cause are also present on the walls of the University of Rojava. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

The Kurds call “Rojava” (“west”) their native land in northeast Syria. In the wake of the so-called “Arab spring” uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, Kurds opted for what was then known as the “third way”: neither with the government nor with the opposition.

Twelve years on, the Kurdish minority in Syria coexists with Arabs and Syriacs in the so-called Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). It’s in this corner of Syria, which shares borders with both Turkey and Iraq, where such a network of universities has been built. It now rivals the institutions of the Syrian Arab Republic government.

A “titanic task”

After the opening of the first Kurdish-language schools in the history of Syria, the University of Rojava is one more step forward in a revolution that has placed education among its main values.

It consists of nine faculties that offer free academic training in various Engineering branches, as well as Medicine, Law, Educational Sciences, Administration and Finance, Journalism and, of course, Kurdish Philology.

“I chose Philology because I love writing poems in Kurdish; I am very much into folklore, literature… everything that has to do with our culture,” Tolen Kenjo, a second-year student from the neighbouring city of Hasaka tells IPS.

The 19-year old still remembers being punished at school whenever she would utter a word in her mother tongue. For more than four decades, the ban on the Kurdish language in Syria was just another chapter within an ambitious assimilation plan that also included the displacement of the country’s Kurdish population and even the deprivation of citizenship of tens of thousands of them.

The cafeteria during the half-hour break. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

Today, the university’s walls are covered with posters: climate maps, the photosynthesis cycle, quotes from the Russian classics. For the first time in Syria, all are in the Kurdish language. The corridors get crammed with students during the breaks between classes, often amid the laughter that comes from a group of students playing volleyball in the courtyard.

In the Department of English Language and Translation, we find Jihan Ayo, a Kurdish woman who has been teaching here for more than three years. Ayo is one of the more than 200,000 displaced (UN figures) who arrived from Serekaniye in 2019, when the Kurdish district was invaded by Islamist militias under Ankara´s wing.

“Turkey’s attacks or those by cells of the Islamic State are still a common currency here,” Ayo tells IPS. When it comes to lessons, she points to a “titanic task.”

Work is still underway to translate teaching materials into Kurdish — to train not only students but also those who will become their teachers. Among other things, Ayo remembers those “very tough” 18 months during which the pandemic forced lessons to be suspended.

“We tried to cope with things online; we got help from volunteer teachers from practically all over the world, but, of course, not everyone here has the means to connect to the Internet…”

She also faces a fight to gain the trust of many local citizens, towards an educational network that has no recognition outside this corner of Syria. Although the Kurdish administration administers the region, the “official” schools -those ran by Damascus- continue to function and, of course, they stick to the pre-war curriculum.

Teaching in the middle of a war has been one of the challenges faced by the Syrian Kurds. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

Recognition

In a comprehensive report published in September 2022 on the university system in northeast Syria, Rojava researchers Information Center (an independent press organization) stress the importance of international recognition that can make the institution more attractive to students.

“While the quality of the education received at these universities in itself is comparable to other institutions’ in the region, the lack of recognition abroad may make it impossible for the students to continue their studies outside of Syria, find employment abroad, or even have their technical knowledge recognized by companies and institutions not tied to the AANES,” the report warns.

It also claimks that the University of Rojava maintains cooperation agreements with at least eight foreign universities, including Washington State University (U.S.), Emden/Leer University of Applied Sciences (Germany) and the University of Parma (Italy)..

It´s just a ten-minute walk from the campus to the headquarters of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the dominant political party among Kurds in Syria. From his office, PYD co-chairman Salih Muslim wanted to highlight the role of universities as “providers of necessary cadres to build and develop the places they belong to and come from.”

“Our universities are ready to cooperate and exchange experiences with all the universities and international institutions to gain more experience and they are welcome to do so,” Muslim told IPS.

Despite the lack of international recognition, academic life goes on in this corner of Syria. Noreldin Hassan arrived from Afrin after the 2018 invasion and today is about to fulfil his dream of graduating in Journalism. The 27-year-old tells IPS that his university is “working in the right direction” to achieve international recognition. However, he has chosen not to wait for a degree to begin his career, and he has been working as a reporter for eight years already .

“Getting a diploma is important, but, at the end of the day, journalists learn by sheer practice while looking for stories and covering those,” stresses the young man.

The last story he covered? One about those women forced to marry mercenaries on a Turkish payroll. The story he´d like to cover the most? No surprises here:

“The day when the Kurds of Afrin can finally go back home.”

Hanadi (far left) and family at her father, Abu Kareem’s, home in Za’atari refugee camp, Jordan. Credit: Toby Fricker / UNICEF

By Toby Fricker
ZA’ATARI REFUGEE CAMP, Jordan, Aug 25 2022 (IPS)

“I think I’m making a difference. I’m really helping,” Hanadi tells me, as she reflects on her work in the Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan.

She is teaching computer skills to a class of Syrian children aged 11 to 16. The students are animated and engaged by Hanadi’s lesson as she walks them through some basics.

“I teach them enough to get a start,” she says.

I first met Hanadi in 2013 – eight months after Za’atari camp opened in response to the huge refugee influx from across the border in Syria. She was 17 years-old and attending a similar vocational training centre in the camp, which is supported by UNICEF.

She had arrived at Za’atari three months before, having fled with her family and whatever they could carry from their home near Damascus. Back then, she told me about her relief that she could return to school and the desire to keep learning.

Fast forward almost a decade, and it’s inspiring to see how Hanadi has gone from student to teacher. Like so many of her peers, Hanadi has experienced things in her young life that no one should. But despite the immense challenges, she persevered and now dedicates her life to creating a better future for the next generation.

Hanadi teaches Syrian children computer skills at a UNICEF Jordan supported Makani centre in Za’atari refugee camp. Credit: UNICEF/Toby Fricker

Unlike many young people in the camp who struggle to find meaningful opportunities as they leave high school, Hanadi completed her education, went to university and earned a degree.

Now she’s married to Tariq, is bringing up two delightful children and is encouraging young Syrians to develop the practical skills needed to help them achieve their full potential.

Still, fleeing war and a decade of life in a refugee camp for 80,000 people inevitably takes a toll. “My hope is to get back [home],” Hanadi told me in 2013, tears in her eyes. That hasn’t happened, and her own children have never lived in a house, let alone set foot in the family home.

A life in limbo

There’s little shade from the brutal midday sun as we approach the home of Abu Kareem, Hanadi’s father. The camp looks much as it did during that first year, when families moved out of tents into large containers, and school compounds sprang up, run by the Ministry of Education with UNICEF support.

Gone are the queues at water points, from which women and children once lugged heavy jerrycans in the extreme heat of the day. Instead, an innovative and environmentally-friendly water and sanitation system has fully replaced the need for the water trucks that used to stir up dust storms as they navigated narrow desert paths across the camp. Now, water flows from a tap into Abu Kareem’s kitchen.

The services on offer for children and young people, from learning support to vocational training and sports, are today largely managed by Syrians themselves, providing much-needed income and ensuring a more sustainable, community-owned operation.

This has been critical as funding has decreased in the wake of multiple global crises that are vying for the world’s attention.

“We’re dealing with young people who have grown up amidst the trauma of war and are now transitioning to adulthood at a very uncertain time when opportunities can seem limited,” Tanya Chapuisat, UNICEF’s Representative in Jordan, tells me.

“In the rush to provide lifesaving services to refugees fleeing the border ten years ago, I’m not sure that any of our UNICEF colleagues could have imagined that we would be here a decade later,” she says.

This uncertainty clearly weighs on Abu Kareem’s mind. His family have transformed their home, watering the courtyard to create some welcome green space and expanding the structure as the family has grown over time.

It’s impressively homely, as it always has been. But the impact on his family of living within the confines of a camp is an ongoing concern.

“Our children have only lived in the camp,” he says. “It’s a wider world out there, [but] they don’t know how it works.” Life beyond the camp’s perimeter remains a distant dream.

Staying afloat

A five minute drive away, on the edge of the camp, we meet Abu Thaer, who is finishing a shift at one of Za’atari’s schools. We first met when the school – the third one in the camp – opened in 2013. Abu Thaer has played a key role in its growth, with some 2,200 children now attending classes.

His daughter, Omaima, now 21, attended the school. Like Hanadi, she is an inspiration to other young people in the camp. Omaima is the only Syrian refugee studying at the Law Department of a nearby university and her sole focus now is ensuring her studies are a success.

“I don’t have time to even make friends. The days at university I’m so tired, I can’t do anything else,” Omaima says. She received a scholarship to help her move into higher education, although Abu Thaer continues to do what he can to support his five children.

“I want to keep my family floating. I want to give the children a start in life,” he says. Over a delicious Majboos (a chicken and rice dish) at the family home, Abu Thaer reflects on a decade in the camp.

“We’re still safe and have adjusted to the circumstances and we are grateful for that,” he says. “The kids have grown up in this set-up and we don’t know what the future holds. That’s the most negative thing.”

The hospitality, generosity and warmth of Abu Kareem, Abu Thaer and their families – indeed of everyone I’ve ever met in Za’atari – never ceases to amaze me. But as the eyes of the world have shifted to other emergencies, a generation of children in Za’atari are transitioning into adulthood and raising their own children.

While I was in Romania and Ukraine a few weeks earlier, I couldn’t help but think of children like Hanadi and Omaima. As another war forces children into refuge and upends young lives, we owe it to them to continue to provide them with the opportunities they need to survive and progress. Especially when a distant home remains out of touch, for now at least.

Toby Fricker is Chief, Communication and Partnerships, UNICEF South Africa.

Source: UNICEF Blog

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A market in Baghdad, Iraq. Credit: UNAMI/Sarmad Al-Safy
 
In a statement issued last month, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres appealed to all relevant actors “to take immediate steps to de-escalate the situation, avoid any further violence, and ensure the protection of peaceful protesters and State institutions”. For the second time in a week, protesters stormed the parliament in Baghdad, breaching the high-security Green Zone and injuring more than 120 people, news media reported. --July 2022

By Sarah Hepp
AMMAN, Jordan, Aug 12 2022 (IPS)

The storming of the Iraqi parliament by supporters of Al-Sadr was motivated by years of political impasse — threatening Iraq’s democracy and peace

Iraq’s stricken democracy is being stress-tested once again and the Iraqi population is paying the price. In the past weeks, supporters of Shi’ite leader Muqtada Al-Sadr have stormed the Iraqi parliament and staged a sit-in twice.

Their protest thwarted the scheduled election of Mohammad Shia Al-Sudani as prime minister. Al-Sudani was nominated by the Shi-ite Coordination Framework, which brings together various groups and militias, with the exception of Al-Sadr’s party.

A political impasse has gripped Iraq since the election in October 2021, as fragmented, mainly Shi’ite forces have vied for influence. The party of Shi’ite cleric Al-Sadr emerged as the winner, with 73 out of the 329 seats, while two established Iran-backed Shia coalitions – the Fatah Alliance and the Al-Nasr Alliance – suffered major losses.

After the election, Al-Sadr wanted to form a majority government in the shape of a triple alliance comprising his movement, the Sunni Taqaddum Coalition and the Kurdish KDP. The Shi’ite Coordination Framework, however, demanded the continuation of a unity government, which is common in Iraq, of which it would form part.

After they had failed to form a government, the Sadr party MPs resigned. This left the ball in the Coordination Framework’s court. However, Sadr’s withdrawal from parliament is regarded as a strategic ploy in an effort to earn credibility as an alleged outsider against a corrupt political elite, enabling it to mobilise popular protests.

Against this background the biggest demonstrations since the mass protests of October 2019, as well as the parliamentary sit-in are scarcely surprising.

Sarah Hepp

The current demonstrations are not personally linked to Al-Sudani. The Sadrists portray Al-Sudani as a puppet of Nouri Al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition and former prime minister from 2006 to 2014, although Iraq experts cast doubt on this.

In any case, Al-Sudani, minister for human rights under Nouri Al-Maliki, would not be a bad choice in comparison with other potential candidates. In the wake of recent events, however, Al-Sudani doesn’t have much chance of assuming the premiership.

There appears to be no route around populist king-maker Al-Sadr. On the one hand, he denounces corruption, mismanagement, and Iran’s sway over Iraq, but he’s hardly Mr Clean himself. His impulsiveness drastically limits Iraq’s options for peaceful and democratic solutions.

This threatens to set in motion a spiral of escalation that has so far not cost any lives, but has already injured over 100 people on the side of the protesters and the security forces.

Potential scenarios range from new elections to the resumption of civil war. Two factors make the civil war scenario unlikely, however, at least for now. First, confronting one another here are groups of Iraqi Shia – Al-Sadr and the Shi’ite Coordination Framework – that, although at odds over Iran’s influence and the form of government, share religious views and are celebrating the holy month of Muḥarram.

This is the first month of the Islamic calendar, in which Shi’ites mourn the family tragedy of Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī. Going to war is forbidden during this period. Secondly, the actors in this power struggle are well aware that a civil war could diminish their share of power and curtail their ability to distribute largesse.

People’s trust in democracy is shaken

The main victims of this political blockade are democracy and the Iraqi people. In any case, the record low turnout of 43.5 per cent undermined parliamentary legitimacy. Even more so with the Sadrist MPs’ withdrawal from parliament, which now represents only a minority of the population.

Popular trust in democracy was already badly shaken. From October to December 2019 the most violent mass protests since 2003 convulsed broad swathes of the country. Young Iraqis expressed their dismay at rampant corruption, paltry government services, high unemployment and the political system.

The protests were violently suppressed by Iraqi security forces, leaving hundreds of protesters dead or injured. The core demands of the Tishreen (October) movement were fundamental reform of the political system (such as abolition of the so-called Muhasasa system, involving ethnic-religious quotas), and a new, non-corrupt government. Both demands remain largely unsatisfied. The Tishreen movement would thus have every reason to take to the streets again.

The movement is more fragmented than ever, however. Radical and religious forces have infiltrated the movement and have tried to impose their aims on it. Some have been co-opted by the government, while others have attached themselves to parties emerging from the protests. We can thus assume that the movement today has less mobilisation potential than hitherto.

The longer the political blockade continues the more what remains of popular trust in democracy will diminish. That reduces the chances of resolving the political crisis peacefully. We have seen over the years that the political elite is unable to manage a transformation of the existing system.

More political participation among Iraqi citizens, such as in free and equal elections and pressure from the street could bring about the change long wished for. But to that end corrupt elites will have to cease clinging to power and pave the way for a democracy that is not just on paper, but is also lived.

Sarah Hepp heads the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s Iraq office, as well as the Climate and Energy Project for the MENA region from Amman in Jordan. Previously she worked at the FES‘s EU office in Brussels and at the FES‘s Baden-Württemberg office.

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Om Ehab, right, with her sisters and children in her home in Beach Camp for Palestine Refugees in Gaza. Credit: UN News/Reem Abaza

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 15 2022 (IPS)

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which dates back to the mid-1940s, is one of the longest military confrontations defying a permanent solution – even as it continues to be on the agenda of the United Nations whose primary mandate is the maintenance of international peace and security.

But regrettably there has been no peace nor security in the long-festering battle for a Palestinian homeland.

The multiple peace plans floating around Middle Eastern and Western capitals included a proposed “one-state solution”, a “two- state solution” and the 1993 “Oslo Accords”, a peace treaty based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 aimed at fulfilling the “right of the Palestinian people to self-determination”.

But none of them really got off the ground.

Alon Ben-Meir, a retired professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (NYU), has a new plan for an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian confederation.

In an interview with IPS, Dr Ben-Meir said after 73 years of conflict, regardless of the many changes on the ground, the political wind that swept the region, and the intermittent violence between Israel and Palestine, the Palestinians will not, under any circumstances give up on their aspiration for statehood.

“Ultimately, the creation of an independent Palestinian state that exists side-by-side with Israel remains the only viable option to end their conflict”, argued Dr Meir, who has taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies for over 20 years.

“Given however the substantive irreversible fact that were created on the ground since 1967, an independent Palestinian state can peacefully coexist with Israel only through the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian confederation that would subsequently be joined by Jordan,” he said.

Mahmoud Abbas, President of the S tate of Palestine, addresses the UN Security Council on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

By definition, a confederation is a “voluntary associations of independent states that, to secure some common purpose, agree to certain limitations on their freedom of action and establish some joint machinery of consultation or deliberation” [emphasis added].

This is necessitated by the facts and the requirement that all sides will have to fully and permanently collaborate on many levels required by the changing conditions on the ground, most of which can no longer be restored to the status quo ante, he explained.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00438200211066350.

Excerpts from the Q&A follows:

Q: What is unique about the proposed confederation—and how different is it from several of the failed peace agreements over the last 75 years?

A: What is unique about the proposed confederation is that the three countries, as independent states, would join together on issues of common interest that cannot be addressed but in full collaboration under the framework of confederation.

It is imperative for the three main players to address the following facts on the ground and their national security collectively, as they can no longer reverse them to the status quo ante. These constitute the foundation of the confederation and include:

The interspersed Israeli and Palestinian populations in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel proper, which can no longer be separated and is the backbone of confederation;

The intrinsic religious connection all three states have to Jerusalem, including the fact that the Palestinians will never give up on East Jerusalem becoming the Palestinian capital; albeit Jerusalem can never be divided physically, and the border between East and West Jerusalem is only political and applicable for administrative purposes;

The intertwined national security concerns of Israelis and Palestinians; the need to continue the current cooperation in this critical area, and the need to further expand their collaboration once a Palestinian state is created: the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, the majority of which will have to remain in place because under no circumstance will Israel ever evacuate all the settlements; the Palestinian refugees who must be resettled and/or compensated, as the right of return has never been considered as a viable option even by the Palestinians, albeit tacitly.

Thus, given the inevitability of coexistence, whether under hostile or peaceful conditions, and the interconnectedness on all the above five levels, the establishment of a confederation as the ultimate goal would allow both sides to jointly resolve and manage their differences.

The above facts must be factored in as they are not subject to a dramatic shift and are central to reaching a sustainable peace agreement.

Q: Has the proposed plan been endorsed or supported by either the Israeli government or the Palestinian Authority? And what about Hamas? Any reactions from any of these warring parties?

A: The proposed Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian confederation plan has been discussed with former and current officials and scholars from all three countries. It has been acknowledged and has largely been received well.

They admit (albeit not officially) that given the prevailing conditions—that is, the inter-connectedness between the three parties from the perspectives of territorial contiguity, national security, and economic development—they have little choice but to fully collaborate without compromising their independence as defined by the concept of confederation.

Although publicly Hamas rejects Israel’s right to exist, privately it admits that Israel is there to stay and has no choice but to cooperate with Israel on many levels.

Under the proposed confederation, the interaction between Hamas and Israel will only increase by virtue of Gaza’s location and the need of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank to connect and transact with one another, which can be done largely through Israel on land.

Q: Do you plan to submit your proposal to the five veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council—the US, UK, France, Russia and China?

A: Our hope is that once the three countries conclude that there is really no other viable option that will bring about an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and recognize the inevitability of co-existence, the proposal will certainly be endorsed by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the US, UK, France, Russia, and China.

We should bear in mind, however, that once the three countries agree to form a confederation, the Security Council need only to recognize Palestinian independence, which will not be vetoed by any of the five veto-wielding powers because they all support the establishment of a Palestinian state under conditions of peace. Beyond that, the UNSC will have no say about the formation of the confederation.

Q: Depending on the reactions of the Israelis and the Palestinians, would you amend or revise the proposal?

A: Any peace proposal, regardless of its merits, will be subject to modifications to meet some specific nuances that are of special concern to the parties involved. That said, the concept of the confederation itself will not change because it takes into consideration the many facts on the ground that are not subject to change and because it is designed to largely meet the needs and the aspirations of the three countries.

Having said that, there are still issues over which there is no consensus. Jerusalem is a case in point; the Israelis vehemently oppose the surrendering of East Jerusalem to the Palestinians and it becoming the capital of the Palestinian state.

The proposal offers a solution whereby the city will remain physically undivided while respecting each other’s inherent affinity and religious connection to the holy sites.

Moreover, both Israeli and Palestinian residents will continue to move freely between the two parts of the city without any restriction, which is exactly the case at the present.

Q: Are you planning to submit the proposal to the UN Secretary-General?

A: I believe that if the UN Secretary General is to look at the proposal, he will more than likely endorse it as it is consistent with his and the majority view of the General Assembly (GA) that the Palestinians are entitled to an independent state of their own.

We are trying now to share it with as many entities—academic and political—to engender greater receptivity. In fact, the entire proposal was published in the Spring issue of World Affairs Journal, and the Journal will have an issue in December dedicated entirely to the proposal.

We will soon seek channels to convey it directly to the Secretary General in the hope that he would formally share it with all the parties involved directly and indirectly.

This includes obviously the Palestinian Authority, Israel, and Jordan, and with the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Germany, who will by playing critical roles in various capacities.

Q: If the proposal is eventually accepted by the parties, do you think it would be prudent to seek ratification by the 193-member General Assembly and the 15-member Security Council, both of which have been involved with the Palestinian issue since its inception?

A: To the best of my knowledge once the proposal is accepted by the three parties it does not need a formal ratification by the General Assembly (GA). Indecently, the GA has already granted Palestine observer status. That said, a full endorsement of the proposal by the GA will enhance both its legitimacy and scope.

As to the UNSC, given that any new application for membership in the UN must be approved by the Security Council, the 15 member states may well have to vote to grant the Palestinians the status of full member state of the UN, which will be a given under the framework of the agreed-upon confederation.

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Excerpt:

Pakistani medics treat Afghan quake survivors on the border of the two countries. More than 1000 were killed and thousands displaced after the 5.9-magnitude quake hit the Paktika and Khost on June 22, 2022. Credit: Ashfaq Yusufzai/IPS

By Ashfaq Yusufzai
PESHAWAR, Jun 24 2022 (IPS)

Survivors of the deadly earthquake that hit Afghanistan’s Paktika and Khost provinces told of their losses while being treated in hospitals in neighboring Pakistan after a 5.9-magnitude quake killed at least 1000 and displaced thousands more in the early hours of June 22, 2022.

The Taliban-led government has appealed for assistance, and its neighbor Pakistan was the first responder, sending aid and treating injured people.

A resident of Khost province Abdur Rahim, a daily wager, brought his nine-year-old daughter, Samia Bibi, to the North Waziristan’s hospital. She has a head injury.

Rahim told IPS that they were asleep when the earthquake started.

“My wife and two sons died on the spot, and my daughter sustained head injuries. I ran out after feeling the tremor, and within seconds the roof of our home collapsed,” he said.

A weeping Rahim said he was able to retrieve his daughter from the debris.

“Now, she is improving after getting medication. Doctors will operate upon her when she improves some more.”

Zahoor Shah, from the same province, said all his family members were still under the debris of his mud house, which fell due to the quake. He miraculously survived.

“We were all sleeping and heard the noise made by our house collapsing. I was sleeping near the door, therefore, received fewer injuries,” he said, lying in hospital with fractured legs and hands.

He lost his 38-year-old wife, his son, aged ten, and two daughters, 17 and 18.

Shah, 45, a prayer leader, said that he was thankful for the Pakistani medics.

Pakistan sent humanitarian aid to the Afghan victims, including blankets, tents, and medicine, the Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s office said in a statement.

Pakistan ambassador to the United Nations, Munir Akram, urged the international community not to link assistance for the disaster-hit nation with political concerns.

“The humanitarian assistance should not become a victim of geopolitics. UN’s humanitarian principles, including the principles of neutrality and impartiality, must be upheld,” said Akram in New York, according to media reports.

Pakistan’s Ministry of Health said about 30 of Pakistan’s tribespeople, who had gone to adjacent Khost province for business, were also among the dead.

“In line with the government’s directives, we have alerted hospitals to receive injured people from Afghanistan in North Waziristan district located on Afghanistan’s border,” he said.

Pakistan received eight injured people on June 23 from the Khost province for treatment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the number of people crossing the border for treatment rose daily.

“We have imposed an emergency in the hospitals in North Waziristan district located close to Khost province, the epicenter of the earthquake, and have called in all medical staff,” Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s health director Dr Ikramullah Khan told IPS.

In addition, Pakistan sent a team of 61 doctors and medical supplies to the affected areas to treat the people.

“Most people required medication for diarrhea, dysentery, and gastroenteritis due to dehydration,” he said. “Ambulances are standing near the border to transport the patients to hospitals. It is an ongoing process as we would provide continuous relief to the needy people.”

Seventeen-year-old Rozina Begum lost her parents and two brothers.

“I was shifted to this hospital by rescue workers. Many say that my parents and brothers are alive, but I don’t believe because I saw their dead bodies with my own eyes,” Begum said.

She said she was to be married in a few months, but now she lay hospitalized at Khalifa Gul Nawaz Hospital, Bannu district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, near North Waziristan. Doctors are expected to operate on her for multiple abdominal injuries within the next few days.

“She is not fit for surgery. We are giving her antibiotics to prevent infection before her surgery,” Dr Kashmala Khan said.

She said that they had already received 30 bags of blood from local donors. Most of the injured people required blood.

“Local people are giving cash and serving food and drinks to the patients. They are donating blankets and clothes as well, “Khan said.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted: “The earthquake in Afghanistan is a great tragedy, adding to an already dire humanitarian situation. We grieve for all the lives lost, and the hardships Afghans continue to face. The US is working with our humanitarian partners to send medical teams to help those affected.

The Taliban in Afghanistan has appealed for international support.

Taliban’s spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told IPS from the capital Kabul that they had appealed for international assistance because providing food, shelter, and medicines to those affected by the natural disaster was challenging.

“We welcome UN agencies and international organizations’ donations and help for the people. We have already allocated one billion Afghanis (over 11m USD) (to disaster relief), but we are unable to deal with the situation,” he said.

Rasool Ahmadzai, who works with World Food Programme, said they faced hardships reaching the area because of inclement weather and rain.

“Rescue workers find it extremely difficult to remove the debris and retrieve the bodies. Still, we are re-enforcing efforts to provide food and save the people from starvation,” Ahmadzai said.

Most mud-built homes in southeastern Paktika province were destroyed, and he said it was difficult to reach the victims.

“Displaced population also require shelter, and UNHCR is working to donate the needful, but the task isn’t easy,” he said.

He elaborated that the roads were in shambles, and mobile phones were not working, hampering rescue work.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres said the agency was “fully mobilized” in Afghanistan.

“My heart goes out to the people of Afghanistan who are already reeling from the impact of years of conflict, economic hardship, and hunger. I convey my deep condolences to the families of the victims and wish a speedy recovery to the injured,” Guterres said.

After an Afghan foreign ministry spokesman said the Taliban would welcome international help, US President Joe Biden directed USAID and other federal government entities to assess how they could respond.

Salahuddin Ayubi, a spokesman for the Afghanistan interior ministry, feared the death toll was likely to rise “as some of the villages were in remote areas in the mountains and it will take some time to collect details.”

Ayubi said that most of the houses had been reduced to rubble, and bodies swathed in blankets could be seen lying on the ground.
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By Ghazal Vaisi
NEW YORK, Jun 20 2022 (IPS)

The Islamic Republic of Iran faces widespread anti-government protests amid an economic crisis while doing little to ease tensions with the international community as it becomes a nuclear threshold state.

Iran’s continued lack of cooperation and transparency with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) foreshadows the death of the Iran nuclear deal and poses a potential threat not only to Iran’s future but also to the international community.

Many Iranians fear Tehran’s current course of action exposes the country to a military conflict that would potentially destroy Iran and its economy as it is.

The negotiations to revive the Iran nuclear deal, which would curb Iran’s ability to build an atomic bomb, have floundered since the US refused Iran’s demand to delist the IRGC from the US Foreign Terrorist Organizations‘ list.

The Islamic Republic’s response to the IAEA’s resolution on Wednesday could deal a “fatal blow” to the stalled talks, according to Director-General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi.

In response to the agency’s request for transparency about uranium traces found at three undeclared sites, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi rejected the resolution saying, “The Islamic Republic will not take even a single step backward from its positions.”

The regime removed 27 surveillance cameras used by the agency to monitor its nuclear facilities. The action breaks the IAEA’s “continuity of knowledge” about Iran’s nuclear facilities, inviting escalation of the case to the UN Security Council should Iran not cooperate by September.

Tehran’s lack of cooperation has already impacted Iran’s currency value and puts military confrontation on the table in September, possibly sooner, should the Islamic Republic’s leadership not change its course.

With the death of the Iran nuclear deal, Iran will face new economic challenges as it can no longer count on billions of dollars in sanctions relief, as it did in 2015.

The sanctions relief package would have included over $100 billion in oil revenues that are currently held as frozen assets in Chinese, South Korean, and Indian banks. Iran will also miss out on a flood of trade and investment opportunities and cannot count on oil exports as its primary source of income.

Additionally, over four decades of economic isolation, sanctions, and mismanagement have left Iran’s economy vulnerable to the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. When the war broke out, Iran’s inflation stood unprecedented, at 43.3%.

Russia’s prolonged assault on Ukraine exacerbates Iran’s economic decline. Since the war started, 60% of Iran’s annual grain imports from Russia and Ukraine are now at risk. Many ships carrying millions of tons of grains remain stranded in Ukraine’s Black Sea ports by Russia’s blockade.

The war also jeopardizes Iran’s last economic lifeline, revenues from oil exports, which were already heavily sanctioned. Iran now competes with Russia, the world’s second-largest oil exporter, seeking other buyers for their discounted oil, as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have sanctioned Russian oil imports.

Before the war, China had been Iran’s top oil buyer. However, Iran’s crude oil exports to China have plummeted since Russia launched its offensive in February, along with increased Russian oil exports to China.

The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy and allocation of resources have only hurt Iran’s financial outlook and demonstrate their priorities. Instead of compromising for the betterment of their people, Iranian leaders have cut subsidies for flour-based products amid global wheat shortages to give the IRGC financial room to operate and fund their nuclear, drone, and missile program. The decision to cut subsidies has resulted in a 300% increase in bread prices.

Many Iranians struggled to keep up with soaring prices of essential foodstuffs like cooking oil, chicken, eggs, and rice, even before global food shortages. What frustrates Iranians is that even if Iran changes its foreign policy and gains access to its financial resources, there is still a great deal of doubt that it would improve Iranians’ lives.

The dire economic climate has triggered civil unrest across Iran. Economic protests quickly turned political. Chants like, “Our enemy is here. They are lying that it is the US,” and “clergy, get lost” can be heard amongst other anti-governmental chants.

While lacking the willingness to feed their people, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, and his network of IRGC generals have shown willingness and capability to crush mass protests using the IRGC security forces, police, and intelligence services.

Iranians’ lack of representation, political freedom, free elections, and media coverage of this failure to provide basic human necessities has forced virtually every corner of society, from students to retirees, to take to the streets, knowingly risking their lives. Sanctioned by the US, impacted by war, abandoned by Khamenei, and crushed by the IRGC, Iranians have nowhere to turn for help.

In addition to the economic woes Iranians face due to Tehran’s mismanagement, they now face a larger threat, a potential military conflict. On Thursday, after Iran rejected the IAEA’s resolution, the US proposed bipartisan legislation to help Israel and the GCC nations improve their air defense to prepare against an evolving Iranian threat. Israel is already conducting air force exercises over the Mediterranean Sea.

Tehran’s hardliner policies and lack of transparency with the IAEA jeopardize the livelihood of Iranians and the international security at large. Iran’s leadership now holds the future of not just their citizens but that of the entire Middle East and other parts of the world should Iran become a nuclear nation.

Suppose Iran fails to comply with the IAEA resolution in September, and Iran is considered a threat. In that case, Iran’s case might move to the UN Security Council, where harsher punishments, or worse, a military conflict, await Iranians.

Whether Iran remains a threshold nuclear state or decides to build atomic bombs, it will eventually invite military action against itself, which will devastate Iran’s economy beyond repair, and leave Iranians’ livelihoods as collateral damage yet again.

Ghazal Vaisi is an Iranian-born international affairs analyst focusing on the evolution of authoritarianism in the modern world. Her writings have appeared in the Middle East Institute, Inter Press Service, IDN-InDepthNews

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The year 2019 was not just a time before the world saw the global pandemic, but also a time when the world saw mass political uprisings with women at the forefront. The MENA region in a way led this force, in Sudan women played as drivers of the revolution, protesting decades of corruption, socioeconomic grievances and gendered violence. Nubian queen became the symbol of the revolution in Sudan which finally saw the overthrow of the dictatorship in 2019.

In Lebanon, the revolution was called ‘feminist’, due to the participation of women in large numbers, who were “shaping the direction and character of the revolution.” The unwavering courage demonstrated by Lebanese women attracted multiple misinformation, serious sexual objectification, misogynist slurs and mocking on various media platforms. Not that it held the women back, they continued to be at the forefront creating history, as always.

In Syria, the wait has been long, it’s been a decade of the revolution and war, the Syrian feminist movement, despite the roadblocks, ongoing war, crisis and patriarchal norms has continued to become stronger and the women defining figures and symbols of the Syrian revolution. Women such as Razan Zaitouneh, Samira Al-Khalil, Mai Skaf, Fadwa Suleiman, are women who will be remembered for their bravery and courage through the Syrian revolution. A decade later, Syrian women continued to fight not just the remnants of the war, but the continued patriarchy in the country.

Feminist movements have always been challenged, not only because they are reclaiming their spaces and power, but also because ‘proximity to power’ threatens misogynists everywhere. Women, however, as seen through these revolutions, have challenged the very idea of dualism, and demonstrated their desire to stay, fight, and have their voices heard.

Sudanese Women in Media: ‘Press Freedom is my Right’

According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Sudan ranks 151 out of 180 countries in the RSF’s World Press Freedom index. “A military coup d’état on October 25, 2021, signaled a return to information control and censorship. Journalists are working in a worsening climate of violence; threats have intensified in recent years with the emergence of new militias and armed movements. Reporters are systematically attacked and insulted in demonstrations, by both the army and rapid-response forces. The government exploits the private lives of women journalists to intimidate them,” the report stated.

Roya Hassan

Earlier this year, according to this report, three press bodies in Khartoum signed a press code of honour along with other documents for the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate demonstrating their efforts and commitment to restore the organization since the head of the Sudanese Sovereign Council, Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burham, dissolved all the syndicates and professional unions. In 2019, the head of the Sudan’s journalist union was detained by the military, and Media watchdog RSF had recorded at least 100 cases of press freedom violations during the protests that finally led to al-Bashir’s overthrow in April that year.

“The government does not welcome people discussing human rights, feminist issues, political issues, I didn’t get hurt physically, but I know photographers who have been beaten up, jailed, tortured just for doing their jobs. I have been lucky, but it doesn’t make it any easier for any of us in this environment,” says Hassan.

Lebanon: A Feminist Revolution

The first revolution in Lebanon started on 17 October 2019, an incredibly important moment that was the culmination of years of activism. What followed these protests was an economic breakdown that dragged the country to the brink of becoming a failed state, COVID-19 pandemic, Beirut port explosion, and the current ongoing elections. Lebanon’s protest movement, which later became known as the October Revolution or the October 17th Uprising, saw women participating at an unprecedented level.

Alia Awada

“I have been working on campaigns focusing on women’s rights, child rights and refugees, and other campaigns to fight domestic violence and sexual violence, to call for the rights of kids and everyone else”.

Lebanon ranks one of the lowest countries in the world on the Gender Gap Index, 140 out of 149, and its ranking in terms of women’s participation in the labour force is one of the lowest globally. Women protesters, activists and public figures have often faced serious sexual objectification, followed by massive online trolling against them.

Campaigning, Awada says has been very challenging in the country, “We need to do these campaigns to put pressure on the government, who are overlooking certain issues, like we did in Lebanon through the 522 campaign which was against Lebanese rape-marriage law.”

Through her work, Awada continues to “cook potions and experiments with formulas to shake the patriarchal status quo that has been weighing on the lives of women and girls for too long. “I want No2ta to be a safe space, a strong feminist lab, where we spread the knowledge and produce high quality feminist work that would influence social change and behavior towards of the public towards women,” Awada said.

Women in Syria: Empowerment and Resilience

After 10 years of humanitarian crisis, war and displacement, Syrians are still struggling to put food on the table, nearly one-third of all children are chronologically malnourished, and more than 6.5 million children need urgent assistance. The war brought one of the largest education crises in recent history, with a whole generation of Syrian children paying the price of conflict.

The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has reported 13.4 million people need humanitarian and protection assistance in Syria, with 6.7 million internally displaced persons. “Millions of Syrians have been forced to flee their homes since 2011, seeking safety as refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and beyond, or displaced inside Syria. With the devastating impact of the pandemic and increasing poverty, every day is an emergency for Syrians forced to flee. As the crisis continues, hope is fading,” the report said.

Rawan Kahwaji

“However, it is important to remember the role women play, not just in the Syrian society or political level, but also on a social level. Focusing on peace processes, we as NGOs must ensure there are spaces that will be inclusive of women, gender sensitive, we have ensured that when we talk about transitional justice, women and their perspective are included in those discussions, what justice means for a woman and how we can build a more gender sensitive Syria for the future,” says Kahwaji.

One of the big impacts of the war that were thrusted upon women was the role of the provider, which in turn became their source of empowerment, but not easily. According to this report, only 4 percent of Syrian families were headed by women before 2011. That figure has now become 22 percent. Severe economic crisis and not enough food for people to eat has been propelling women into looking for work, but the challenges of human rights faced by women in Syria, whether discriminatory laws, patriarchal culture, exclusionary politics of the regime, continue to a big barrier.

“As someone who has been through this refugee journey, being a refugee is challenging, being a woman refugee even more challenging. We have multiple issues and challenges that we have to face on a regular basis, whether it is legal, economic, social, work or simply places that are unsafe. If you are a widow or lost your partners, or you are the breadwinner of the family, there are difficulties in finding work, in a new country or community. Having no legal rights, or clear legal rights makes it more difficult,” says Kahwaji.

Syrian law abounds with many clauses that are discriminatory on a gender basis, be it law denying Syrian women right to grant citizenship to their children, personal status laws, property laws, the penal code and others. This legal discrimination is thus one of the most “prominent factors that has undermined, and continues to undermine, the status of women as active citizens in society, due to the forms of vulnerability that the law enshrines.”

Within Syria, women are underrepresented both in national government and local councils, because of security concerns, and conservative societal beliefs regarding women’s participation in public life. While efforts to increase women’s participation in peacebuilding and governance have made strides, but only at a local governance level, it still remains stunted overall. This report stated, nationally, women held only 13 percent of seats in parliament in 2016 in Syria, a proportion lower than both the global and regional averages.

Sania Farooqui is a New Delhi based journalist, filmmaker and host of The Sania Farooqui Show where she regularly speaks to women who have made significant contributions to bring about socio economic changes globally. She writes and reports regularly for IPS news wire.

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The economic and political crisis in Lebanon has left most households short on food. Now, the outbreak of war in Ukraine threatens to send food prices skyrocketing and push basic foods out of reach. Lebanon imports more than 50% of its wheat from Ukraine. Credit: UN World Food Programme (WFP)

By Rasha Al Saba
LONDON, May 23 2022 (IPS)

In the midst of what has been an incredibly turbulent period for Lebanon, the conclusion of elections last week ought to be hailed as a chance to focus on the future. This, the first election since the mass uprisings in 2019 against what was seen as a corrupt ruling elite, has shown some signs of the drive for change.

Lebanon’s consociational system – power sharing between the three large religious blocks – is effectively the compromise forged with the backing of the international community to establish peace in the country after a long and bitter civil war.

Despite widespread criticism this sectarian influence forged by the Taif Agreement in 1989, has remained firm, creating an elite ruling class, that in subsequent decades has consistently failed to tackle the major problems the country faces.

In the face of what is believed to be one of the worst economic depressions the world has seen in 150 years, an estimated 80 per cent of the population now live in poverty. The rising prices had already in 2019 led to the mass uprising, and the shortages have only got worse as rising fuel prices have put scarce food and medicines further out of reach of the population.

The devastation of the explosion at Beirut’s port in 2020, and the death toll and economic paralysis caused by the pandemic have only compounded issues.

While the headlines all focus on the waning influence of Hezbollah – and by proxy, of Iran, there are other aspects to the election worth highlighting.

Of course, the loss of the alliance between Hezbollah and the Aounist party is significant, mainly because it is hard to predict how the popular base that sits behind the armed Hezbollah will react. The Lebanese peace has been hard won, but the peace has not come with a growth in stability and prosperity.

As with the drivers of the revolution in Tunisia, it is the lack of opportunities and entrenched inequality that are at the forefront of the frustration of ordinary Lebanese. In this sense the increase in the number of seats claimed by independent and opposition candidates could potentially result in competing blocs, none of which enjoys an absolute majority.

Some of these candidates have derived their sustenance from the anti-elite protests of 2019. The victory of lawyer Firas Hamdan, an independent candidate who won in the south against Marwan Kheireddine, former minister and Chairman of the AM Bank, is demonstrative of this trend.

Hamdan was injured during the 2019 protests, and his victory may signal a weakening of the hold of the traditionalists who have benefitted from the political system themselves, while being unable to create a governance agenda that benefits the whole of the country.

Another change is the modest increase in the number of women in the new parliament, who now account for 8 out of 128 parliamentarians, versus 6 women in the old parliament. However, half of those who succeeded are independent candidates, which can empower the anti-elitist bloc in the parliament.

The anti-refugee sentiment of the Lebanese government has also been clear during the election when the Ministry of Interior imposed a ban on the movement of Palestinian and Syrian refugees.

Syrians have been featured in the election campaigns and agenda throughout the election. There are genuine fears among Syrian refugees that advances for the main parties in this election could result in the approval of laws that may pave the way for the repatriation of Syrian refugees to Syria.

If passed and implemented, such laws increase the risk of torture, detention and killings at the behest of the Syrian regime they previously escaped.

These elections took place in the midst of destitution and desperation that were once unimaginable. The surge of protest in 2019 against those conditions suggested that mass change was possible, but this was dampened by the arrival of the pandemic, which then took a significant toll on a population already rendered vulnerable.

Nearly three years later, this has translated into an election result that is mixed for Lebanon.

In a country of multiple minorities and historic diversities, the creation of a government that can transcend identities and take a countrywide approach to governance is imperative. The arrival of the new independent women candidates, campaigning and winning on a new platform offers a sliver of hope.

But if the ‘old politics’ of Christian versus Muslim, and a separate proxy competition of Iran versus Saudi Arabia continues to hold sway, the road ahead will be tough indeed.

IPS UN Bureau

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Excerpt:

Two boys collect fresh bread for their families at a bakery rehabilitated by WFP in Aleppo. Credit: WFP/Jessica Lawson. May 2022.
 
Syria remains one of the World Food Programme’s biggest emergencies, and the numbers are staggering. A quarter of all refugees in the world are Syrian and they have sought safety in 130 countries. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has made a political solution in Syria even more unlikely. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation is deteriorating dramatically.

By Sinan Hatahet
ISTANBUL, May 20 2022 (IPS)

Moscow’s decision to intervene militarily in Syria in 2015 effectively preserved the Assad regime in Damascus. Russian air power and intelligence support, along with Iranian-backed militias on the ground, allowed the regime to beat the opposition and brutally reassert its control over much of Syria.

Since March 2020, the conflict seems to be entering a new period of stalemate with the delineation of three distinctive territories with static frontlines.

Yet this latest de-escalation phase is inherently volatile and has persisted chiefly thanks to the Russian-Turkish fragile entente in north-western Syria and the US interim but still ongoing presence in north-eastern Syria.

Ultimately, Assad’s endgame is to regain control of all the Syrian territory, and he has shown no signs of commitment toward negotiating a peaceful epilogue to the conflict.

Assad believes he has time on his side. In the West and in the region, there is lagging support for regime change in Damascus and adopting an alternative framework for a gradual transition towards ‘peace’.

Even Assad’s opponents seem to have pragmatically abandoned their initial objective of toppling the regime and are primarily seeking to preserve a form of autonomy instead. Nevertheless, without an agreement with Damascus all forms of autonomous governance in Syria are vulnerable and dependent on temporary arrangements among the foreign backers of the different ‘authorities’ on the ground.

Sinan Hatahet

Assad’s capacity to reclaim undivided authority over Syria depends on the continuous support of his allies, but so does his survival. The precarious state of Syria’s economy, US and EU sanctions, and severely damaged infrastructure constantly threaten the state’s integrity and capacity to maintain its institutions. To prevent a structural collapse of the Syrian state, both Russia and Iran are playing pivotal roles.

Iran provides oil, gas, and funds, while Russia provides security and diplomacy to accelerate Assad’s regional and international rehabilitation, which is synonymous with investments and financial aid. Thus, it is safe to assume that Syria is particularly exposed to the Ukraine war’s fallout as Russia is expected to divert its attention and resources away from the region.

A distracted Russia in Ukraine has several implications on Syria’s current state of affairs – but to varying degrees. Militarily and security-wise, even though Turkey or the US could exploit Russian weaknesses in Syria to challenge the status quo, it is highly doubtful as it would demand further commitment to Syria, and currently there does not seem to be an appetite to engage more.

Geopolitically, the Ukrainian conflict may lead to structural changes in neighbouring security complexes and further strengthen Turkey and Iran as regional powers. Still, the extent of its impact on Syria is also limited. Instead, it is primarily worsening economic and humanitarian conditions from which Syrians are likely to suffer.

Syria’s rising food insecurity

Although Moscow does not back Damascus financially, and Russian exports represent only 3.7 per cent of Syrian imports, the latter depends on critical Russian produces such as wheat and fodder.

Wheat is essential for food security, given the centrality of bread in Syrians’ diets. Syria’s annual need is estimated at around 4.3 million tonnes; in 2021, Syria imported 1.2 million tons and produced only 1.05 million tons resulting in long-hours lines for bread In regime-held areas, and unprecedented hikes in prices.

The deterioration of Syrian food security is not a product of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Still, it is expected to worsen as access to Russian food products is currently interrupted.

Moreover, alternative food supplies are not easy to find as imports from most countries are compromised by sanctions and the lack of Syrian foreign currency reserves to finance such transactions.

For the time being, Damascus seems to rely on India to compensate for the loss of Russian wheat and fodder. Still, in the long run, the sustainability of such a route is questionable, especially given the increasing costs of supply chains and the growing global inflation rates.

The economic effects of the war in Ukraine have already been felt across Syria. Various products related to wheat and flour production have already seen rapid surges in market prices. The impact is not only felt in regime-held territories but also in north-western and north-eastern Syria, which previously did not suffer from a lack of access to international markets.

The prices of basic imported commodities have also risen. Access to adjacent markets also became more difficult as several countries, including Turkey, started imposing bans on exporting grains, cooking oil, and other agricultural commodities to Syria.

The availability problem

The rise in prices has also impacted humanitarian aid. In March, the national average cost of the World Food Programme’s standard food basket increased by 24 per cent over one month. Similarly, the health sector has been affected. Medical facilities in opposition-held areas rely entirely on international funding to provide essential services and medication.

In addition to the disruption in supply chains and increased costs, allocated funds for the sector dropped by more than 40 per cent in the last ten months, resulting in the closure of hospitals and vital services.

Finally, the Russian-Western diplomatic confrontation and the lack of a political venue for de-escalation would potentially threaten the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Syria. The UNSC’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2585 in June 2021 to renew cross-border aid delivery for another 12 months was the result of a US-Russian dialogue that seems improbable as the Ukraine conflict rages on.

The interruption of cross-border aid delivery would demand a quick and effective response to bring relief to the two million civilians and IDPs in need in Idlib and northern Aleppo.

Fundamentally, the Ukrainian conflict will not trigger a paradigm shift in the Syrian conflict. It will instead entrench the status quo, further complicate negotiations over a political transition, and worsen the humanitarian conditions in the country.

The international community believes that food security in Syria is an affordability issue, which justifies the maintenance of sanctions as a lever against Assad. Nevertheless, the most recent dynamics show an increasing availability problem.

To prevent a looming food security catastrophe, humanitarian and donor countries should ensure the continuous flow of humanitarian assistance to Syria, as they should maintain their efforts to compartmentalise aid delivery from political and securities issues.

The Assad regime has shown no signs of relinquishing any of its ‘sovereign rights’ in delivering aid in Syria. However, similar to 2014, desperate times call for desperate measures, and Damascus could be coarse into accepting a new model. But more than ever, Syria needs a different approach to deliver much-needed humanitarian aid.

Sinan Hatahet is a Senior Associate Fellow at Al Sharq Forum and advises a number of think tanks on Syria. Previously, he headed the media office of the Syrian National Coalition.

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS)-Journal published by the International Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin

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