A picture of photovoltaic panels in the solar park in the small town of Armstrong, in the Pampa region, the heart of Argentina’s agricultural production. The park belongs to an electric cooperative, which until 2017 only bought energy to distribute, but now generates electricity as well. CREDIT: FARN

By Daniel Gutman
BUENOS AIRES, May 26 2023 (IPS)

When the residents of Armstrong, a town of 15,000 in western Argentina, began to meet to discuss a renewable energy project, they agreed that there could be many positive effects and that it was not just a question of doing their bit in the global effort to mitigate climate change.

“The proposal was to use the rooftops and yards of our houses to install solar panels. And I accepted the idea basically because I was excited by the prospect that one day we would become independent in generating our own electricity,” Adrián Marozzi, who today has six solar panels in the back of the house where he lives in Armstrong with his wife and two children, told IPS.“Community-based projects, which are feasible, have several advantages: they improve local autonomy in the generation of electricity, they allow money to be saved from the energy that is not purchased, which can be reinvested in the city, and they promote the decentralization of decision-making in the energy system.” -- Pablo Bertinat

His home is one of about 50 in Armstrong with solar panels generating power for the community, added to the 880-panel solar farm installed in the town’s industrial park. Together they have contributed part of the electricity consumed by the inhabitants of this town in the western province of Santa Fe since 2017.

This is a pioneering project in Argentina, built with public technical organizations and community participation through a cooperative where decisions are made democratically, which has since been replicated in various parts of the country.

With an extensive area of ​​almost 2.8 million square kilometers, Argentina is a country where most of the electricity generation has been concentrated geographically, which raises the need for large power transmission infrastructure and poses a hurdle for the development of the system.

In this context, and despite the financing obstacles in a country with a severe long-lasting economic crisis, renewable energies are increasingly seen as an alternative for clean electricity generation in power-consuming areas.

Marozzi is a biologist by profession, but is dedicated to agricultural production in Armstrong, almost 400 kilometers northwest of Buenos Aires. The town is located in the pampas grasslands in the productive heart of Argentina, and is surrounded by fields of soybeans, corn and cattle.

How to bring electric power to widely scattered rural residents was the great challenge that the Armstrong Public Works and Services Provision Cooperative, made up of 5,000 members representing the town’s 5,000 households, grappled with for years.

The institution was born in 1958 and in 1966 it marked a milestone, when it created the first rural electrification system in this South American country, with a 70-kilometer medium voltage line that brought the service to numerous farms.

Once again, in 2016, the Armstrong cooperative pointed the way, when it began to discuss in assemblies with community participation the advantages and disadvantages of venturing into renewable energy production by means of solar energy panels.

“Those of us who accepted the installation of panels in our homes today receive no direct benefit, but we are betting on a future in which we can generate all of the electricity we consume. In addition, of course, we care about environmental issues,” Marozzi said in a conversation from his town.

The 880-panel solar park with 200 kW of installed power is currently being expanded to 275 kW thanks to the money that Armstrong saved from energy that was not purchased in recent years from the national grid. The local residents who make up the cooperative decided that the savings from what was generated with solar energy should be invested in the park.

Two workers carry out maintenance tasks at the solar park in Monte Caseros, a town in the Argentine province of Corrientes, in the northeast of the country. The park was inaugurated in 2021 by the local cooperative, which provides electricity to the residents and is also involved in agricultural activity. CREDIT: Monte Caseros Agricultural and Electricity Cooperative

A replicated model

In Argentina there are about 600 electrical cooperatives in small cities and towns in the interior of the country, which were born in the mid-20th century, when the national grid was still quite limited and access to electric power was a problem.

These cooperatives usually buy and distribute energy in towns. But the members of dozens of them realized that they too could generate clean electricity, after visiting Armstrong’s project, and launched their own renewable energy initiatives.

One of the cooperatives that also has a solar park is the Agricultural and Electricity Cooperative of Monte Caseros, a city of about 25,000 inhabitants in the northeastern province of Corrientes.

“The cooperative was born in 1977 out of the need to bring energy to rural residents,” engineer Germán Judiche, the association’s technical manager, told IPS. “Today we have a honey packaging plant and a cluster of silos for rice, the main crop in the area. Since 2018 we have also distributed internet service and in 2020 we partnered with the province’s public electricity company to venture into renewable energy.”

The Monte Caseros solar park has 400 kW of installed capacity thanks to 936 solar panels. It was inaugurated in September 2021 and has provided such good results that a second park, with similar characteristics, is about to begin to be built by the 650-member cooperative, because it supplies only rural residents of the municipality.

“We have done everything with the cooperative’s own labor and the design by engineers from the National University of the Northeast (UNNE), from our province,” said Judiche. “It is definitely a model that can be replicated. Renewable energy is our future,” he added from his town, some 700 kilometers north of Buenos Aires.

Solar panels can be seen in the backyard of Adrián Marozzi, a resident of the town of Armstrong. Neither he nor the other residents who agreed to give up part of their yards or rooftops receive direct advantages, since the energy savings are capitalized by the cooperative, which thus has to buy less electricity from the national grid. CREDIT: FARN

A slow and bumpy road

According to official figures, the distributed or decentralized generation of renewable energy for self-consumption, which allows the surplus to be injected into the grid, has 1,167 generators registered in 13 of Argentina’s 23 provinces, with more than 20 megawatts of installed power.

Electricity cooperatives that have their own renewable energy generation projects operate under this system.

In total, in this country of 44 million people, renewable energies covered almost 14 percent of the demand for electricity in 2022 and have more than 5,000 MW of installed capacity, although there are practically no major new projects to expand their proportion of the energy mix.

Most of the electricity demand is covered by thermal generation, which contributes more than 25,000 MW, mainly from oil but also from natural gas. Hydropower is the next largest source, with more than 10,000 MW from large dams greater than 50 MW, which are not considered renewable.

Pablo Bertinat, director of the Energy and Sustainability Observatory of the National Technological University (UTN) based in the city of Rosario, also in Santa Fe, explained that in a country like Argentina it is impossible to follow a model like Germany’s widespread residential generation of renewable energy, because it requires investments that are not viable.

“Community-based projects, which are feasible, have several advantages: they improve local autonomy in the generation of electricity, they allow money to be saved from the energy that is not purchased, which can be reinvested in the city, and they promote the decentralization of decision-making in the energy system,” added Bertinat, speaking from Rosario.

The UTN Observatory was in charge of the Armstrong project, in a public-private consortium, together with the cooperative and the National Institute of Industrial Technology (Inti).

The expert said that the cooperatives’ renewable energy projects are advancing slowly in Argentina, despite the fact that there is no credit nor favorable policies – an indication that they could have a very strong impact on the entire electrical system and even on the generation of employment, if there were tools to promote renewables.

“Our aim is to demonstrate that not only large companies can advance the agenda of promoting renewable energy and the replacement of fossil fuels. In Argentina, cooperatives are also an important actor on this path,” Bertinat said.

The case of Armstrong also sparked interest from the environmental movement, which is helping to drive the growth of renewable energy in the country.

Jazmín Rocco Predassi, head of Climate Policy at the Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN), told IPS that this is “an illustration that the energy transition does not always come from top-down initiatives, but that communities can organize themselves, together with cooperatives, municipal governments or science and technology institutes, to generate the transformations that the energy system needs.”

By Yasmine Sherif
NEW YORK, May 17 2023 (IPS-Partners)

At this year’s G7 Hiroshima Summit in Japan, world leaders will have a chance to “uphold the international order based on the rule of law and extend outreach to the Global South.” Education, as a binding force that unites us all in our global efforts to protect human rights and ensure sustainable development, should be front and centre on the G7 Agenda.

Through the ground-breaking leadership of Japan, the G7 Summit promises to address a number of interconnected global crises – including nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, economic resilience and security, climate and energy, food, health and development. By investing in education in emergencies and protracted crises through multilateral organizations such as Education Cannot Wait – the UN global fund for education in emergencies and protracted crises – the G7 has an opportunity to make targeted and responsive investments to these interconnected crises.

During my recent high-level mission to Japan, I was impressed and inspired by the Government of Japan’s growing interest in supporting ECW and our partners in delivering on our four-year strategic plan. In lead up to the G7 Summit, we call on Japan and all G7 global leaders to ensure that funding for education in emergencies is prioritized. There is no greater investment in our shared future.

Education is a key driver in building economic resilience, social cohesion and human security. By investing in an educated, skilled workforce, we are investing in greater economic growth, peace and security today and well into the future. Education for girls is especially critical. Every US$1 spent on girls’ rights and education generates US$2.80 in return. This is equivalent to billions of dollars in additional GDP.

By 2050, as many as 140 million people across South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America could be displaced by climate change. By connecting climate action with education action, we have the opportunity to reduce risk, build resilience, and protect our planet from the life-threatening impacts of massive flooding, temperature rises, rising seas and other climate catastrophes.

The war in Ukraine has made the food crisis even more dangerous and painful, especially in places like Africa where recurrent droughts and other climate-related crises are triggering spikes in hunger and displacement. School feeding is essential in responding to famine and achieving our goals for a world without hunger, and good health and well-being for every girl and every boy on the planet. These are their inherent human rights, and this is our international obligation.

In taking a human-centred approach to sustainable development, we must ensure children receive holistic education opportunities, including mental health and psychosocial services, safe and protective learning environments, access to health and hygiene, and other whole-of-child solutions that will nurture the leaders of tomorrow.

By investing in education – especially for the 222 million crisis-affected girls and boys who are left furthest behind in armed conflicts, forced displacement and climate-disasters – the leaders of the G7 have an opportunity to make a mark on history and build a new world order based on universal values and human rights.

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Excerpt:

UAE’s role as COP28 host will be judged on results. Will COP deliver an operational and meaningful loss and damage fund? Will it produce a global stocktake that invigorates international action? How will discussions on a new global finance goal shape up? And will Sultan Al Jaber’s overtures towards the private sector turn the steady trickle of pledges into a giant wave of action? Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IPS

By Felix Dodds and Chris Spence
NEW YORK, May 16 2023 (IPS)

Perhaps one of the least well known among Dubai’s many attractions is surfing. Locals and visitors enjoy the sport at Sunset Beach and elsewhere, especially in winter. There is even an artificial wave pool where surfers can hone their skills. To some, the pool is just another example of the host country’s entrepreneurial outlook.

With COP28 on the horizon, the host government of the United Arab Emirates is once again promoting the virtues of business. In a recent interview with the Guardian media outlet, COP28 president-designate Sultan Al Jaber said the world needs a “business mindset” to tackle the climate crisis. What’s more, he laid out plans to use the COP to promote private sector goals as well as those for governments.

Will this focus on business signal a genuine new green wave, or will it wipe out? This article assesses the state of play and the host’s approach as we head into the official preparatory meetings taking place in Bonn, Germany, in June.

What was achieved at COP27?

To understand the situation, we need first to look at what happened at COP27. This is important not just in terms of the current landscape, but because the COP27 hosts, Egypt, technically continue to hold the presidency until COP28 officially starts on November 30th.

The main source of disappointment at COP27 was the absence of ambition on mitigation. There was a noteworthy lack of new and ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) from governments. What this means is that the critical needle has not shifted when it comes to keeping global warming to less than 1.5 Celsius, or even under 2C

While all incoming presidencies are incredibly active in the months leading up to the event they will host, the outgoing presidency has a role to play, too, and the quality of the relationship between the two governments is important.

For many UN insiders, COP27 exceeded expectations. Admittedly, expectations were not high, particularly since COP27 was viewed by many as an “in-between” COP rather than one with critical milestones of the sort that occur every few years. While all COPs matter, most insiders will tell you not all are equal in importance.

The COP in Sharm El-Sheikh had a menu of issues it was dealing with, but it was not one where, say, a new global agreement was expected (such as COP21 in Paris), or a global stock take was due (as will happen at COP28 later this year). There had been calls for governments to strengthen their Nationally Determined Contributions (pledges and commitments) at COP27, but few did.

The major achievement at COP27—and the reason the meeting exceeded expectations—was an agreement to establish a loss and damage fund to support vulnerable countries. Few anticipated such a positive outcome even a few weeks prior to the meeting.

Although the agreement on loss and damage did not include acceptance of historical responsibility, it was viewed as a big win for the Egyptian Presidency, small islands and other vulnerable states, as well as the Group of 77 developing countries, which in 2022 was under the presidency of Pakistan.

Under the terms of the agreement at COP27, the loss and damage fund will need to be operationalized at COP28 and a transitional committee is already working on this. In the world of multilateral diplomacy, this is an ambitious timeframe.

There was another positive development on a modest scale at COP27 on the Global Goal on Adaptation. Delegates agreed to “initiate the development of a framework” to be available for adoption in 2024. Meanwhile, on agriculture a new four-year process was agreed to carry on the work started under the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture. There is a sense now that agriculture and food security are gaining the attention they deserve in climate negotiations.

Outside the formal negotiations, many projects and alliances were advanced, including plans to accelerate the decarbonization of five major sectors: power, road transport, steel, hydrogen, and agriculture. Noteworthy initiatives included the launch of the Global Renewables Alliance, which brings together leaders from the wind, solar, hydropower, green hydrogen, long duration energy storage, and geothermal sectors.

Research released just before COP27 showed that the Global North is still not delivering on its commitment to provide $100 billion a year to the Global South. One silver lining to this dark cloud is that this goal may finally be reached in time for COP28. Still, that is three years too late. Credit: Shutterstock

What was not achieved at COP27?

The main source of disappointment at COP27 was the absence of ambition on mitigation. There was a noteworthy lack of new and ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) from governments.

What this means is that the critical needle has not shifted when it comes to keeping global warming to less than 1.5 Celsius, or even under 2C. According to the Climate Action Tracker, our long-term scenarios are still well above 2C under most scenarios, and as high as 3.4C under their most pessimistic estimate. This means things have not really improved since COP26.

What’s more, research released just before COP27 showed that the Global North is still not delivering on its commitment to provide $100 billion a year to the Global South. One silver lining to this dark cloud is that this goal may finally be reached in time for COP28. Still, that is three years too late.

Meanwhile, COP27 did less to clarify new rules for the global carbon market than many were hoping to see. While COP26 in Glasgow had provided more details about Paris Agreement Article 6 (which sets out a framework for international cooperation and carbon markets), more granular guidance is still needed.

Some fear that without more details on accountability and measurement, for instance in terms of carbon offsets, we could end up with a “wild west” when it comes to the markets.

There was also little progress in negotiations aimed at encouraging the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. On the private sector side, while many companies have made net-zero targets, research suggests many do not have robust plans to deliver this, and there is uncertainty over how the private sector will use carbon offsets. Without greater clarity, this hyped-up “wave” of pledges from businesses around COP26 and before may end up a damp squib.

Looking to the Bonn climate conference

The political backdrop to the UN Bonn climate conference in June is complex. On the downside, governments are still emerging from the COVID pandemic and many are still focused on, and feeling the impact of, the war in Ukraine.

On the positive side, the cost of solar and wind continues to fall and European countries are moving more quickly because they want to be independent of Russian fossil fuels. Although others are taking advantage of Europe’s reduced demand to increase purchases of Russia’s fossil fuels at reduced prices, the growing focus on renewable energy in many countries should be seen as a positive overall in terms of climate mitigation.

With some major milestones coming up at COP28 later this year, the Bonn conference in June will give us some signals of how close we will be to delivering success in December.

Global Stocktake: UN climate negotiators are expected to take stock of progress on the Paris Agreement every five years. COP28 marks the culmination of the first “stocktake” and will be expected to shape and catalyze future action.

The stocktake has three phases. In the first phase, which started at COP26, information is collected and prepared from various sources to help assess progress. Phase 2, which started last year, includes in-person “technical dialogues” focused on mitigation, adaptation, and implementation. These will conclude in Bonn this June.

Finally, the stocktake will end at COP28 with a presentation of findings and discussions on how to respond. The Bonn meeting will therefore present an opportunity to take the pulse of these discussions. How robust have the technical dialogues been? Is there a surge of support from governments to make COP28 a major milestone for climate action? Bonn should provide clues about this.

Loss and Damage Fund: The transitional committee has been established and had its first meeting in Luxor, Egypt, in April. It will meet again in Bonn. Its role is to make recommendations on how to operationalize both the new funding arrangements and the fund at COP28. How are these discussions proceeding? Bonn should give some indications on progress, as well as potential areas of discord and disagreement.

Global Goal on Adaptation: With significant change already “baked in” to our climate system, effective adaptation will be critical. The Global Goal on Adaptation was agreed under the Paris Agreement and recognizes the need to build adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and limit vulnerability.

Adaptation will be addressed in Bonn under both the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). It also links to the work of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, a related UN initiative which is having its “mid-term review” at UN Headquarters in New York from 18-19 May.

New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance: The goal of providing $100 billion in support annually for the Global South by 2020 was originally set in 2009. Now it is up for review. Since that earlier goal was viewed as a “floor” rather than a ceiling, many are expecting more ambitious targets in future.

A new goal is supposed to be set before 2025, meaning COP29 in 2024 should mark the moment when a new number (or set of numbers) is agreed. Again, Bonn will mark a moment to assess how those conversations are going, especially given the wide differences in the type of dollar figures being bandied about by the Global North and Global South (many of whom are calling for trillions). Those following this topic can look to the 6th Technical Expert Dialogue, which is taking place in Bonn, to get a sense of progress.

Carbon Markets: As mentioned above, in spite of progress many are still hoping for more granular details on the carbon markets. This will be vital to curtail greenwashing with offsets.

Coalitions of the Willing: Sultan Al Jaber, the COP28 president-designate, recently highlighted the private sector’s role in combating climate change. In fact, all stakeholders will need to be fully engaged if we are to have any chance of staying withing 1.5C of warming. Voluntary coalitions of governments, the private sector and many others will be vital, especially when it comes to advancing issues where all 190+ governments that are party to the UN climate treaty and Paris Agreement are not yet ready or willing to agree.

Such voluntary initiatives offer considerable scope for those who want to move ahead. In turn, this has the potential to set precedents and entrench ideas that might be taken up by all governments in future formal UN negotiations. An example of this is the methane pledge, which involved some 50 countries reporting on progress at COP27. More should be looked for at COP28. Likewise, the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, which has reportedly had some teething problems since its launch in 2021, will hopefully use COP28 as a moment to showcase progress and put its early difficulties behind it.

Will COP28 Launch a New Green Wave?

Eyebrows were raised when the United Arab Emirates was first named as host of COP28. Why, people asked, would a climate COP be held in an OPEC state? Furthermore, many wondered publicly whether Sultan Al Jaber, who is likely to preside over the meeting, should do so given his role as chief executive of UAE’s national oil company? Does this represent a conflict of interest?

These are fair questions that will only be fully answered by the COP and what it achieves. However, it is worth noting that the prospects of a fossil fuel-producing country hosting COP28 were always quite high.

As UN insiders know, the climate COPs are typically hosted on a rotating basis in each of the UN’s five “regional groups.” This time around, it was Asia-Pacific’s turn.

Many countries in this region, including more than a dozen small island nations, probably do not have the internal capacity to host an event of this magnitude. Of those that do, many—from Saudi Arabia to India, Indonesia to China, Iran to Australia—are fossil-fuel producers.

Furthermore, while Sultan Al Jaber has a history in the fossil-fuel industry, he has also been prominent in the UAE’s work on renewable energy and is the founding CEO and current Chair of Masdar, a UAE-owned renewable energy company. Depicting him simply as a fossil fuel “dinosaur” does not do justice to a more nuanced and complicated situation.

Ultimately, UAE’s role as COP28 host will be judged on results. Will COP deliver an operational and meaningful loss and damage fund? Will it produce a global stocktake that invigorates international action? How will discussions on a new global finance goal shape up? And will Sultan Al Jaber’s overtures towards the private sector turn the steady trickle of pledges into a giant wave of action?

Finally, will other stakeholders, like non-governmental organizations, be embraced and welcomed? We should also note the significance of appointing Razan Al Mubarak as UN Climate Change High-Level Champion for the COP28 Presidency, given she is also IUCN President and a former head of Abu Dhabi’s Environment Agency.

One early indicator in Bonn will be an expected update on COP28 logistics. This is likely to include more details on the “Blue Zone” (where negotiations are held and many stakeholders usually have pavilions and stalls). Will the Blue Zone offer easy access to all stakeholders? And how will the “Green Zone,” which at past COPs has been open to the public, operate?

Only time will tell if COP28 marks the start of a new green wave or ends in an unfortunate wipe out.

Professor Felix Dodds is Director, Multilateral Affairs. Rob and Melani Walton Sustainable Solutions Service (RMWSSS) at Arizona State University. Adjunct Professor at the Water Institute University of North Carolina and Associate Fellow, Tellus Institute, Boston City of Bonn International Ambassador.

Chris Spence is a consultant and advisor to a range of international organizations on climate change and sustainable development, as well as an award-winning writer.

Spence and Dodds recently co-edited Heroes of Environmental Diplomacy: Profiles in Courage (Routledge, 2022).

Excerpt:

Participants in the 11th Global South-South Development Expo 2022. Credit: ESCAP / Louise Lavaud

By Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake
COLOMBO, Sri Lanka, May 15 2023 (IPS)

Asia is the fastest growing and most dynamic region of the world according to a recent IMF Report; “Recovery Unabated Amid Uncertainty”. ¹

Asia and the Pacific will contribute around 70 percent of global growth this year as expansion accelerates after Covid-19 supply chain disruptions, with ongoing geopolitical turmoil and war in Europe, as well as, various hybrid over the horizon cyber and kinetic attacks targeting Indian Ocean ports and shipping.

Global economic expansion would be significantly powered by the BRICS countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as well as the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), group that includes Indonesia.

A series of Exogenous Economic Shocks over the past four years, from terror attacks to Covid-19, and ‘climate catastrophe’ policy-mistakes, such as an overnight switch to organic fertilizer, temporarily set back the rise of these ‘emerging economies’ of the Global South on the world stage.

They are now increasingly set to lead a rebound in a Multipolar ‘Asian 21st Century’ as Euro-American hegemony wanes.

Asian Giants, China and India, have huge populations, domestic markets, resources and the civilizational weight to lead global expansion. In the West, growth is poised to decelerate as rising interest rates, trillion-dollar deficits and military budgets weigh, with Inflation high, and banking strains in the United States and Europe.

Asia Pacific growth would increase to 4.6 percent despite the somber backdrop of war and economic weakness elsewhere in the world according to the IMF report.

Strategic Sri Lanka, which staged its first sovereign Default, loosing economic policy autonomy to the Washington Twins (IMF and World Bank), ironically on the eve of 75 years of Independence, clearly needs to look to Asia and the BRICS as Cold War and Colonialism once again roil the Indian Ocean World with nuclear submarines and military bases popping up a dime a dozen these days.

Four new US bases in the Philippines were announce just last month. The country after all is a bell weather for more than fifty other Global South countries caught in post-Covid-19 Eurobond debt traps, and the Washington Twins (World Bank and IMF) ‘bailout business’.

BRICS back on Track as Empires Rise and Fall

The BRICS was strengthened with the return of President Lula da Silva to the helm in Brazil in January. These powerhouse economies are increasingly trading in their own national currencies, promoting a trend to de-dollarization that has gathered steam in the context of US debt of $ 31 trillion and sanctions on Russia last year.

The search is on for alternatives to the US dollar as the global reserve currency as the BRICS economies had outstripped the traditional economic heavyweights – the G-7.

The New Development Bank (NDB) or BRICS bank which is a multilateral development bank established by the BRICS in 2014 to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects in the developing world is expanding at this time with Iran and Saudi Arabia set to join amid a recent China brokered peace deal to stabilize Yemen and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

The NDB launched with $50 billion in seed money as an alternative to the IMF and WB. Additionally, a liquidity mechanism called the Contingent Reserve Arrangement to support members struggling with payments was created. In 2021, Egypt the United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Bangladesh took up shares and membership of NDB while Egypt, Algeria, and Argentina, as well as, Mexico and Nigeria are in the pipeline. ²

Nineteen countries including Indonesia had expressed an interest in joining the BRICS group of nations as it prepares to hold an annual summit in June in South Africa, which is now struck by sabotage and power-cuts

De-dollarize to decolonize

Saudi Arabia’s petro-dollar linked oil reserves had stabilized the US dollar as the Global Reserve currency for decades, but this is changing with talk of the Petro Yuan and related geopolitical developments. In the wake of the Iran-Saudi peace agreement, Syria rejoined the Arab League after a 12-year long US led regime change operation failed against Bashar al Assad.

These movements perhaps explain some of the new Cold War proxy wars and turmoil in MENA and South Asia–from Sudan, to Palestine/Israel, to Afghanistan and Pakistan as the Euro-American empire wanes at this time.

Remarkably Argentina, South America’s 2nd largest economy after Brazil, seeking alternatives to the IMF has applied for membership of the NDB. Argentina, victim of the Monroe doctrine for decades is on its 22nd IMF bailout and 9th default, as Buenos Aires was again rocked by anti-IMF protests last month.

The NDB along with the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), increasingly constitute a Global South alternative to the Washington Consensus and colonial Club de Paris dominated Bretton Woods International development and finance architecture.

Bankrupt by what metric? Beyond The myth of TINA to the IMF

Sri Lanka as an Asian country would best leverage the Asian 21st Century and the NDB, but Colombo’s Washington-backed Ranil Rajapakse regime that is responsible for the country’s first sovereign default had promoted two myths, that “Sri Lanka is Bankrupt” and “there is no alternative” (TINA) to the IMF agenda, of austerity and a Firesale of strategic assets!

Last year upon assuming office the President promised Famine and 15-hour power cuts, in a psychological operation to spread fear, and prepare the people for an IMF Firesale and the country’s asset stripping.

However, the famine and 15-hour power cuts did not materialize also given plentiful monsoon rains for hydro-power generation as the weather gods miffed the Cold War gods.

The question is: by what metric and on whose Data was the strategic county that sits on major energy, trade and undersea data cable routes deemed ‘bankrupt’? As one of South Asia’s (SAARC) wealthiest countries in terms of GDP per capita with the best social and human development indicators, Former US Ass. Secretary of South and Central Asia Alice G. Wells termed the lush and fertile tropical island, blessed with two monsoons and extensive marine and mineral resources “valuable real estate”! Others have called it an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier.’

Whether a shortage of exorbitantly privileged US dollars is adequate to measure the ‘wealth of nations’ also given America’s 31 trillion debt is not a rhetorical or philosophical question to elicit yet another theory of value.

Rather, it flags here the failure by the Washington Consensus to make an elementary distinction between ‘illiquidity’ and ‘insolvency’ in determining the purported bankruptcy of Global South countries caught in the World Bank’s Middle Income Country (MIC) trap, to enable a Firesale of strategic assets. Does this not rather reflect great moral and intellectual bankruptcy?

Re-Orient to de-colonize in a Multipolar World

As the Asian 21st Century becomes a reality in a multipolar world where the BRICS economies have overtaken the traditional G-7 countries as the world’s engine of growth, Sri Lanka caught in a Eurobond US dollar denominated debt trap clearly needs to ReOrient as German sociologist and world systems theorist Andre Gunder Frank wrote in his acclaimed book; “ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age” (1998).

Much of Frank’s analysis finds resonance in a more recent book by Kishore Mahbubani, Former President of the United Nations Security Council, titled the Asian 21st Century.

In the context, Sri Lanka would best ban further borrowing on Eurobond markets, and engage bi-lateral lenders India and China to join hand with NDB, also to renew its Independence and sovereignty in its 75th year, and ensure calibrated exit from US dollar denominated Eurobond debt bondage.

Other countries may aid Sri Lanka’s, but only if the county leads in the search for alternatives to the IMF’s bankruptcy narratives– as Dr. Yanis Varoufakis, former Finance Minister of Greece who has extensive experience with IMF debt negotiations had noted.

Debt trapped countries the Global South and humanity are clearly at a turning point in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI), big data mining, deep fakes, and drone surveillance by those with the technologies for global governance and control of populations.

Hence, following Elon Musk, Warren Buffet recently warned that ‘AI is a nuclear bomb’. As a genuinely multipolar world re-emerges after two hundred years of Euro-American hegemony, on the cusp of another World War, it is up to debt-trapped countries of the Global South to promote multi-polarity and respect for genuine cultural diversity.

Dr Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake is a Cultural Anthropologist with expertise in international development and political economic analysis. She was a member of the International Steering Group of the North-South Institute project “Southern Perspectives on Reform of the International Development Architecture.’ She had authored and co-edited several books, the most recent being “Multi-religiosity in Contemporary Sri Lanka: Innovation, Shared Spaces, Contestation’ Routledge (2022).

¹ https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/APAC/Issues/2023/04/11/regional-economic-outlook-for-asia-and-pacific-april-2023
² https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fm_y3w7x1qk
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-24/brics-draws-membership-requests-from-19-nations-before-summit#xj4y7vzkg

IPS UN Bureau

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By Jan Lundius
STOCKHOLM, Sweden, May 8 2023 (IPS)

The World changes, though prejudices and misconceptions remain. In 1996, political scientist Samuel Huntington published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he predicted that people’s cultural and religious identities would become the primary source of conflict in a Post–Cold War World. Huntington’s allegations have been contradicted by a number of critics, among them American Palestinian professor Edward Said, who lamented their extreme cultural determinism, which omitted the dynamic interdependency and interaction of cultures. Said’s own Orientalism depicted a generalised “Western view” of Arab cultures as “static and undeveloped”, while European culture was considered to be “developed, rational, flexible, and superior.” Literature and movies have depicted Arabs as exotic men riding camels and horses through the desert, and their women as dangerously seductive objects of male desire. Eventually, the exotic men turned in to being terrorists, and/or depraved oil-rich magnates, while Muslim women were presented as veiled, enigmatic, and oppressed.

Are there no counter-images to such a one-sided view, for example an Arab film industry? Since the inception of a film industry in Europe and the US it has generally been assumed that local movie production arrived in the Middle East much later than in “the West”. As a matter of fact, already by the beginning of the 20th century both screening and production had been brought into most Arab countries. Eventually, Egyptian film production came to dominate Middle Eastern movie industry, while it established affiliated companies in Lebanon. Iraq, Jordan, Iran, Israel, and more recently the United Arab Emirates and Palestine, followed suit.

Films serve as visual entertainment for huge audiences and in a vivid manner reflect social attitudes. They thus constitute a great medium for inspiring societal change. Of course, films might serve as a means for propaganda and indoctrination, but this does not hinder them from proving helpful in making people inclined to change a status quo. There are now signs that a pervasive socio/economic change is taking place in Saudi Arabia, where a growing film industry has become part of what appears to be an overhaul of hitherto domineering ideologies

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the only nation in the world named after a dynasty. It was founded in 1932 by King Abdul-Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud, though the strength of The House of Saud can be traced back to 1745, when a local leader established a politico-religious alliance with the Wahhabis, a religious affinity honouring a Salafiyya interpretation of Islam, i.e. what is believed to be the faith of the “pious predecessors of the first three generations.” The House of Saud offered obedience to the Wahhabis, while promising to propagate their faith during a fierce struggle against Turkish and foreign influences.

Initially, Saudi Arabia did not refute the idea of movie theatres and allowed improvised cinemas, but all films were heavily censored and supposed to be screened privately. In 1982, Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud became the fifth king of Saudi Arabia. Actively trying to base his authority on Wahhabism, he increased Government support to the conservative religious establishment; spending millions of dollars on religious education, strengthening separation of the sexes and the power of Muatawwa’ūn, a religious branch of the police.

Between 1983 and 2018 the only movie theatre to be found in the country was at a Science and Technology Centre, which only screened “educational” films. If Saudis wished to watch films it had to be via satellite, or DVD. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia grew into the largest economy in the Middle East. Its citizens benefit from free education and health care, along with subsidized food, electricity and housing. However, the economy relies overwhelmingly on oil. The country exports almost nothing else and imports almost everything. A welfare state has been built on the expectation that oil revenues would remain at historic levels, though prices are falling and oil will eventually run out. Furthermore, seventy per cent of the population is under thirty years of age and many demand increased personal freedom.

When King Fahd died in 2005 he was succeeded by King Abdullah Al Saud. Contrary to his predecessor, the new king realised that Saudi youth had to be better educated. As soon as he came to power, Abdullah implemented a scholarship program sending young Saudi men and women abroad for undergraduate and postgraduate studies. More than 70,000 Saudis began studying abroad in more than 25 countries, with the US, Great Britain, and Australia as main destinations. Educated and emancipated women also became considered as an asset for development. The King established a governmental department to promote women’s higher education and in 2011 women were allowed to vote in municipal council elections. The year after, women athletes competed in the Olympics and in 2013 domestic violence became a criminal offence.

However, still no movie production and screening were allowed in the country. The trend towards increased openness, innovation, efforts to limit religious bigotry and enlarged women’s rights continue under the current king, Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud. Its most visible propagator is Mohammed bin Salman, colloquially called MbS. He is Crown Prince, i.e. Salman bin Abdul-Aziz’s heir, though MbS is already the country’s Prime Minister and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia.

Already during King Abdullah’s reign, semi-clandestine initiatives were made by a budding movie industry. Wadja became the first feature-length film made by a female Saudi director. In 2012 it was entirely shot within the Kingdom. Written and directed by US-educated Saudi citizen Haifaa al-Mansour it told the story of a spirited 10-year old living in Riyadh. On her way to school she passed a shop window with a green bike. However, its price was high and girls riding bikes were frowned upon.

Wadja deals with feelings of school girls, though it mirrors a society where grown women are regimented as if they were still in school. Behind closed doors the beauty and wit of Wadjda’s mother were unmasked, though she seemed to be barely aware of it. Her main concern was that her husband intended to take a much younger woman as second wife. Wadjda set about to earn cash to buy the bicycle. Her target was a school prize, awarded to the student expressing most devotion in learning and reciting passages from the Quran. Wadjda feigned orthodox goodness and her efforts at memorization impressed her teacher. She won the competition, though staff and students became shocked when Wadjda announced her intention to use the prize to buy a bicycle. The headmistress was furious and against Wadjda’s will donated the prize money to charity.

Despite an apparent sentimental depiction of a little schoolgirl’s desires, Wadjda emphasized her longing for freedom and self-realization, as well as fear of emotional abandonment when her father took a second wife. It is not only a film about a young person’s awkward relationship with an authoritative society and distressed parents – her longing for a bicycle of her own actually became emblematic of an entire people’s striving for freedom.

Wadjda was shot in a country where zealous clergy forbade cinemas and with a totalitarian regime with zero-tolerance of female film directors. al-Mansour had most of the time to work from the back of a van, as she could not publicly mix with men of her crew. She generally had to communicate via walkie-talkie and watch the actors on a monitor.

Haifaa al-Mansour spent seven years on finding adequate funding. It was the Saudi Arabian billionaire businessman Al Waleed bin Talal Al Saud who finally agreed to contribute. Al Waleed is a grandson of Abdul-Aziz, the first king of Saudi Arabia, and among other altruistic initiatives he financed the training of the first Saudi female commercial airline pilot, declaring that he was disposed to give “full support of Saudi ladies working in all fields.”

In November 2017, Al Waleed and other prominent Saudis were arrested during an “anti-corruption drive”. Some 200 detainees were brought to the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Riyadh and subjected to coercion and abuse. Some, among them Al Waleed, were released after paying heavy fines. MbS not only attacked the old, extremely wealthy oligarchy, but also religious leaders who uphold Wahhabi doctrines. He openly declared that there are no static schools of thought, nor any infallible persons. In another statement MbS acknowledged that the Saudi state had not been “normal” for the past 30 years and that it was his intention to introduce social, religious, economic, political changes and a new educational policy, asserting a “Saudi national identity” within what he called a post-Wahhabi era.

Without interrupting or limiting his totalitarian powers MbS prohibited the Muatawwa’ūn to “stop, follow, arrest, punish, and ask people for their ID.” Muatawwa’ūn had until recently 4,000 officers, assisted by thousands of volunteers, and an additional 10,000 administrative personnel. It imposed strict segregation between the sexes, controlled that women wore the hijab, and forbade the sale of dogs and cats, as well as toys like Barbie dolls and Pokémon items.

Most of these restrictions are now abandoned. Women are allowed to drive cars and can chose not to wear the hijab. Women above 21 years can obtain passports and travel abroad without permission from their male guardians. It has become legally possible for women to independently open their own businesses and bank accounts, while mothers are authorised to retain immediate custody of their children after divorce. Women have now access to operas, concerts, cinemas and sports events.

This is part of the Government’s Saudi Vision 2030, aiming at diversifying the nation’s economy through heavy investments in non-oil sectors, including “green” technology, tourism, local expenditure and entertainment. In Riyadh, construction has begun of The Mukaab, a gigantic structure, which will include an armada of hotels, shopping malls, several cinemas and an “immersive” theatre. In the Northwest, Neom I is under construction – a high-technology megalopolis, with robotic services and even an artificial moon. The Line, a zero-carbon city stretching 170 kilometres across the desert. Qiddiya, a gigantic amusement park just outside of Riyadh. Trojena, a luxury ski resort in the Tabouk Mountains. The Red Sea Project, which is intended to be a string of luxurious hotels along the Red Sea shores.

Saudi Arabia has now 60 high-tech cinemas with approximately 500 screens in operation, as well as an increasing local production of TV entertainment. In accordance with Vision 2030 a General Entertainment Authority has been established. Its current chairman is bin Salman’s old friend Turki Al-Sheikh, known for his lyrics, sung by several Arab artists.

The film The Cello is expected to premiere in Riyadh this year. It is based on a novel by Turki Al-Sheikh that takes place in several locations, foremost in the 18th Century Italian town of Cremona, but also in present time. After being filmed in Prague, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Vienna, the movie stars world famous actor Jeremy Irons, as well as a great number of movie celebrities from Europe, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In The Cello a young man purchases a cursed cello, built by a Cremonese master luthier, builder of string instruments, who butchered and cut up his entire family, using parts of their blood and bones to make a cello.

The cutting up of people in Turki Al-Sheikh’s The Cello might remind viewers of the murder and dismemberment of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi, allegedly carried out by Saudi officials in Turkey. However The Cello may have an intended, or unintentional, so called Boris Bus effect. i.e. changing the subject of the gruesome murder of a journalist into the making of a wondrous instrument. Boris Johnson managed to redirect Google searches from past embarrassing and deceitful bus ads about Brexit into a description of his hobby of making toy buses with painted, happy passengers on board.

Bin Salman’s occasionally brutal and draconic measures might be interpreted as residues from hundreds of years of despotism. They will hopefully mellow, or even disappear, if Arabian society is allowed to continue on its already beaten path towards an open and democratic society, allowing for women’s emancipation, free speech and general wellbeing. A trend already evident within the Saudi Arabian film industry, which does not shy away from controversial subjects and where almost forty per cent of crew and directors currently are women.

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The Toledo Bioenergy Center, in southern Brazil, is under construction, but its biodigesters are already operating with manure and the carcasses of disease-free dead animals from 16 pig farms. The goal is to generate one megawatt of power and for pig farmers to participate in the production of biogas without having to invest in their own plants, so their waste is biodigested and turned into fertilizer, instead of polluting rivers and the soil. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

By Mario Osava
TOLEDO, Brazil , May 8 2023 (IPS)

It is the “best energy,” according to its producers, but biogas from livestock waste still lacks an organized market that would allow it to take off and realize its potential in Brazil, the world’s largest meat exporter.

“There is a lack of steady consumers,” said Cícero Bley Junior, who has been a pioneer in the promotion of biogas in the west of the southern state of Paraná, since he served as superintendent of Renewable Energies at Itaipu Binacional (2004-2016).

Itaipu, a gigantic hydroelectric plant shared by Brazil and Paraguay on the Paraná River which forms part of the border between the two countries, encourages nearby pig farmers to take advantage of manure to produce biogas, avoiding its disposal in the rivers that flow into the reservoir, whose contamination affects electricity generation in the long run.“The animal protein chain must also see itself as a generator of energy, just as the sugarcane sector defines itself as a sugar and energy industry since it began producing ethanol (a biogas) almost 50 years ago.” -- Cícero Bley

The companies that form part of the animal protein chain, in general the meat industry that purchases animals ready for slaughter and offers breeding sows and technical assistance to livestock producers, should also buy biogas and its biomethane derivative from the breeders, Bley said.

“The animal protein chain must also see itself as a generator of energy, just as the sugarcane sector defines itself as a sugar and energy industry since it began producing ethanol (a biogas) almost 50 years ago,” he told IPS.

But the companies do not do so: none of them are affiliated with the Brazilian Biogas Association (Abiogás), he lamented. The dairy industry could greatly reduce the cost of picking up milk from farms if it replaced diesel with biomethane in its trucks, he said, to illustrate.

If no such decision is taken, there will be no large investments in gas-fired engines either, which can use natural gas or biomethane, also called renewable natural gas.

In addition to the environmental benefits, such as the reduction in water pollution and the decarbonization of energy, biogas offers economic advantages by making use of manure that was previously considered waste and converting it into biofertilizer.

It also drives a new equipment industry and local development by decentralizing energy and fertilizer production.

“It’s the best energy, for sure,” said Anelio Thomazzoni, a pig farmer from Vargeão, a small municipality of 3,500 inhabitants in the west of the state of Santa Catarina in southern Brazil. His farm has a 600-kilowatt biogas power plant and a 1-megawatt solar power plant.

“The correct use of crop waste, as fertilizer after biodigestion, made it possible for me to reduce by 100 percent the purchase of potassium chloride and phosphorus,” formerly essential fertilizers, he told IPS by phone from his town.

A visitor in Toledo examines the external controls of the mixer, an essential piece of equipment in the production of biogas and whose absence or mishandling can affect the operation. The complexity of biodigestion, compared to photovoltaic solar energy, is a factor that is slowing down the expected progress of biogas in Brazil, despite its multiple benefits in energy, environmental and economic terms. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

Frustrated potential

Brazil today produces only 0.5 percent of the biogas that could result from agricultural, livestock and industrial waste, urban garbage and sewage, estimated Bley, who founded the International Center for Renewable Energies-Biogás (CIBiogás) in 2013.

Brazil would have the potential to replace 70 percent of the diesel it consumes if it allocated all the biogas to the production of biomethane, according to Abiogás. In terms of electricity, it could reach almost 40 percent, but today it is limited to 353 megawatts – around 0.0018 percent of the total – according to the government’s National Electric Power Agency.

In global terms, Brazil is only ninth in biogas electricity generation, accounting for 2.1 percent of the global total, according to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).

The sugarcane sector joined the effort five years ago in promoting biogas, with larger plants for power generation or biomethane refining in the southern state of São Paulo. New initiatives are attempting to accelerate the development of this energy market in the southern region of Brazil, which concentrates two-thirds of the national production of pork.

Residues from the production of sugar and ethanol from cane represent 48 percent of Brazil’s biogas potential, followed by the animal protein chain, which accounts for 32.2 percent, estimates Abiogás. The rest comes from agricultural waste and sewage.

This large pre-treatment tank uses pig carcasses, an abundant material that is still little employed in the production of biogas, which the Toledo Bioenergy Plant in southern Brazil will process to reach a generation capacity of one megawatt, playing a sanitary role at the same time. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

Innovative initiatives

The Bioenergy Plant under construction by CIBiogás, a nonprofit technology and innovation institution in Toledo, a city of 156,000 people in western Paraná, seeks to “validate a possible business model,” explained Juliana Somer, a construction engineer who is operations manager at the Center.

Pig farmers provide the “substrate” and receive back a part of the “digestate”, as the manure converted into a better fertilizer is called, without the gases that make up the biogas, extracted in the biodigestion process. With that they fertilize their land.

To generate electricity, biogas must have at least 55 percent methane. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is another component, making up about 40 percent. Hydrogen sulfide must be removed to prevent corrosion of the equipment.

“The objectives are environmental, social, energy-related and the dissemination of technologies,” said Rafael Niclevicz, environmental engineer at CIBiogás. To that end, an area of ​​high pig farm density was chosen, with about 120,000 hogs in five square kilometers.

The manure is collected daily, 70 percent by trucks and the pig farmers themselves, and the rest by pipelines from the nearest farms. Currently, 16 pig farmers, whose herds total about 40,000 animals, supply the plant, which also collects carcasses of disease-free dead pigs.

“The model makes sense for pig farmers who do not want to invest in facilities to produce biogas on their own. It solves the problem of waste disposal and there are socio-environmental benefits for everyone,” said Somer.

This Enerdimbo truck is powered by biomethane and is used to collect manure from 40 pig producers that feeds the company’s large biodigesters in southern Brazil. Solar power is added to biogas to provide 2.5 megawatts of energy, enough to supply 5,000 medium-sized households. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

The plant is a joint project between the municipal government, which ceded the land, and Itaipu Binacional, which provided funding. The goal is an installed capacity of one megawatt.

In Ouro Verde, 22 kilometers from Toledo, a similar plant, Enerdinbo, receives the “substrate” from 40 farms within a radius of 15 kilometers, where more than 100,000 pigs are raised, for a total generation capacity of two megawatts, to which are added 500 kilowatts from a solar plant.

It is enough to provide electricity to 5,000 households, estimates EDB Energía do Brasil, the company that offers businesses and residential consumers the possibility of reducing their electricity bills by 10 percent by joining the cooperative that benefits from the electricity generated by Enerdinbo.

The business of EDB, created by businesspeople in Cascavel, 60 kilometers from Ouro Verde, is to implement small renewable energy plants to distribute the benefits of distributed generation among members of the cooperative, with the investment by the consumers themselves to save on energy costs.

Enerdinbo and the Toledo Bioenergy Plant seek to expand biogas by avoiding the difficulty for pig farmers and other small farmers or ranchers to invest in the energy business.

A view of one of the three large biodigesters of Enerdimbo, a plant of the EDB Energía do Brasil company that distributes the benefits of distributed electricity generation to numerous members of the cooperative, whose power bills are thus reduced by 10 percent. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

Demand from animal protein producers

“Small and medium-sized rural producers are true heroes who face various risks when deciding, in isolation, to implement a waste treatment project generated in the animal protein chain for the production of biogas on their properties,” said a manifesto from the producers and bioenergy specialists.

The document, released at the South Brazilian Biogas and Biomethane Forum on Apr. 18 in Foz do Iguaçu, in the far west of Paraná, calls for greater support from the public sector and from companies that link biogas production and the meat industry, for their “strategic value for Brazil’s energy transition.”

Only 333 animal waste biogas plants are suppliers to the national electricity grid, that is, 0.005 percent of Brazil’s 6.5 million livestock farms, the document stressed.

Peak oil was first up, followed by peak gas, gold and others, as if the world was draining natural resources like toilet roll panic buying in a lockdown supermarket. But should we now be worried about Peak Press?

Farhana Haque Rahman

World Press Freedom Day, child of the UN General Assembly, marks its 30th birthday on May 3 – still relatively young, but definitely showing signs of wear and tear.

Measuring the state of its vital organs is not an exact science. The Paris-based non-profit media watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF) compiles an annual and thorough medical bulletin, and the latest check-up, country-by-country, makes for mostly alarming reading.

There are common denominators in all the ailments afflicting press freedom around the world, but with each region or continent seeming to specialise in certain characteristics.

Asia is particularly worrying, with the common theme of muscle-flexing autocrats vying for absolute control of information and exercising what RSF calls a dramatic deterioration of press freedom. Post-coup Myanmar and China are the world’s biggest jailers of journalists. Afghanistan back under the Taliban is brutally repressive. North Korea brings up the rear of the rankings, again.

Hong Kong, under China’s imposition of the draconian national security law, fell 68 places in the RSF league table. Vietnam and Singapore also tightened their grip on the media.

Anuradha Bhasin, executive editor of The Kashmir Times recently wrote in The New York Times that his newspaper “may not survive Mr. Modi. His repressive media policies are destroying Kashmiri journalism, intimidating media outlets into serving as government mouthpieces and creating an information vacuum in our region of about 13 million people.”

This year Pakistan was placed at 157 among 180 countries on RSF’s World Press Freedom Index list. The country has been ruled by the military for more than half of it’s 75 years of independence since 1947. In a report last year, along with a list of global leaders who suppressed opposing voices, RSF named former Prime Minister Imran Khan as one of the “predators of press freedom”.

Repression is dressed up in legislation as seen in Bangladesh’s Digital Security Act, passed in 2018 and applied to journalists, activists and others.Two days after a journalist with Prothom Alo was detained, the UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk called on Bangladesh to suspend application of the DSA immediately.

Where Asia can be ruthless and draconian, it is lawlessness and societal fragmentation that make parts of Latin America the most dangerous place for journalists. Mexico and Haiti lead the way. At least 67 journalists and media workers were killed in 2022, an increase of almost 50 percent on 2021, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. Research published by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism found that 30 to 42 media workers were killed in Latin America in the line of duty.

Rocío Gallegos, a journalist and co-founder of La Verdad Juárez, an investigative journalism outlet in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, was quoted as saying the situation is desperate and complex, not just due to growing conditions for violence, but because there is “less and less support from society towards journalists and journalism.”

Courageous reporters like Gallegos and the underground citizen journalists covering Myanmar’s horrific civil war inspire us, and lend hope to the survival of the ideals of a free press.

But it is in the West, the cradle of a free media, that we can feel most cynicism over the frightening erosion of media credibility led by its very own moguls and conglomerates.

The wanton and deliberate peddling of conspiracy theories over the 2020 US election results by Fox News (among others) was laid bare by the defamation case brought by Dominion Voting Systems. Fox settled out of court for $787 million in damages. Its lies were not trivial as we know. Five people died as a result of the January 2021 storming of the US Capitol by a mob of Donald Trump’s supporters.

Democracies need truth-telling media to flourish, and it was telling that much of the media coverage focused instead on 92-year-old Rupert Murdoch and his family succession machinations.

Fox News was – and quite possibly will remain — the ultimate mainstream player in the theatre of performance media, where facts don’t get in the way of a good conspiracy.

The recent demise of BuzzFeed News and its Pulitzer-prize winning department can also be seen as marking the end of an era. The suggestion by its founder, Jonah Peretti, that there may not be a sustainable business model for high-quality online news should be ringing alarm bells everywhere.

To add to this potentially toxic mix, where social media platforms become a blurry cauldron of conspiracy theories and state-sponsored disinformation, we now have to contend with the new disruptive age of ChatGPT.

The polarisation of the press in the West and its weaponisation in superpower conflicts are highly damaging trends. Russia’s arrest of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and China’s detention of Taiwan publisher Li Yanhe are the most recent examples. A possible Biden-Trump rematch in the 2024 US elections, and the dangerous deterioration in Sino-US relations threaten to exacerbate both polarisation and weaponisation of the media.

As for Peak Oil – the world may have passed that point already, and economists are debating whether 2019 was when overall fossil fuel demand reached its zenith. There are many reasons for this historic shift, not least that the alternatives, such as renewable energy, are becoming cheaper.

But what is the substitute for a free and healthy press – the lifeblood of free and healthy societies? The alternatives are clearly on view all around us and they don’t look good.

Farhana Haque Rahman is Senior Vice President of IPS Inter Press Service and Executive Director IPS Noram; she served as the elected Director General of IPS from 2015-2019. A journalist and communications expert, she is a former senior official of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/world-press-freedom-day-2023

IPS UN Bureau

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A group of drivers push a car at the end of a long line to refuel in Havana. The Cuban authorities say the fundamental cause of the shortage of diesel and gasoline has to do with breaches of contracts by suppliers. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS

By Luis Brizuela
HAVANA, Apr 27 2023 (IPS)

Long lines of vehicles outside of gas stations reflect the acute shortage of diesel and gasoline in Cuba, which has had negative impacts on an economy that is highly dependent on fuel imports and has only a small proportion of renewable sources in its energy mix.

“They don’t sell you enough fuel at the gas stations and the line barely creeps forward because there are also many irregularities and corruption. It’s exhausting,” said engineer Rolando Estupiñán, who was driving an old Soviet Union-made Lada. When he spoke to IPS in Havana, he was still a long way from the pumps at the station and had given up hope of working that day.

Lisbet Brito, an accountant living in the Cuban capital, lamented in a conversation with IPS that “the public buses take a long time. Private cars (that act as taxis) are making shorter trips and charging more. Nobody can afford this. It’s very difficult to get to work or school, or to a medical or any other kind of appointment.”

Brito said another fear “is that food prices will rise further or supplies will decrease, if the shortage of oil makes it difficult to supply the markets.”

External and internal factors, including the fuel shortage, contribute to low levels of agricultural production, which is insufficient to meet the demand of the 11.1 million inhabitants of this Caribbean island nation.

The outlook is made even more complex by the macroeconomic imbalances, marked by partial dollarization, high inflation and depreciation of wages, salaries and pensions which have strangled household budgets.

Asiel Ramos, who uses his vehicle as a private taxi in this city of 2.2 million people, justified the increase in his rates “because the cost of a liter of diesel skyrocketed” on the black market, where it ranges from a little more than a dollar to three dollars, in sharp contrast to the average monthly salary of around 35 dollars.

“I pay taxes and I have to keep the car running so my children and wife can eat. I can’t spend days stocking up on fuel, and when it’s over, go back again. If I buy ‘on the left‘ (a euphemism for buying on the black market) I have to raise my prices,” Ramos told IPS.

To get around, most Cubans depend on the public transport system, based mainly on buses, which are less expensive than private taxis. But the chronic deficit of equipment, spare parts, lubricants and other inputs, added to the fuel shortage, means service is irregular, the most visible expression of which is the packed bus stops.

A group of people try to board a minibus on a central avenue in Havana. Public transport in Cuba faces a chronic deficit of equipment, spare parts, lubricants and other inputs, which, added to fuel shortages, means service is irregular and bus stops are crowded. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS

Measures

The fuel shortage drove the authorities to announce on the night of Apr. 25 the cancellation of the traditional parades for May 1, International Workers’ Day, and other activities such as political rallies or workplace, community or municipal events, as a rationing and austerity measure, and to declare that only essential transportation would be available.

In the capital, instead of the workers’ march through the José Marti Plaza de la Revolución, a rally was called for May 1 along the Havana Malecón or seaside boulevard, which expects some 120,000 people coming on foot from five of the 15 Havana municipalities.

On Apr. 17, the Minister of Energy and Mines Vicente de la O Levy said on television that the fundamental cause of the shortage of diesel and gasoline is related to breaches of contracts by suppliers.

He said the U.S. embargo “makes it very difficult to obtain ships to transport the fuel, to seek financing and to meet the normal requirements of these contracts.”

In November, during President Miguel Díaz-Canel’s tour of Algeria, Russia, Turkey and China, agreements were signed with some of these countries for the stable supply of hydrocarbons, power generation and the modernization of thermoelectric plants.

Venezuela and Russia appear to be the country’s main energy suppliers.

On Apr. 23, the general director of the state company Unión Cuba Petróleo (Cupet), Néstor Pérez, told national media outlets that “one of the closest suppliers despite having innumerable production limitations… has guaranteed the supply of some products (refinable crude and derivatives) that somewhat alleviate the existing situation, but do not cover all the demands of the economy and the population.”

Presumably Pérez was referring to Venezuela, although he did not specifically say so, because that country has been the largest supplier of hydrocarbons this century, although due to its own internal crisis its exports to Cuba have clearly declined.

De la O Levy noted that, based on negotiations with international suppliers, an improvement is expected in May, although the availability of fuel will not reach the levels seen in 2017 or 2018, when the country was in a more favorable situation.

The priorities in the use of the reserves are the health and funeral services, public transportation and transport of merchandise, as well as the potato harvest, the official said.

The government of Havana, which as a province encompasses the 15 municipalities that make up the capital, limited the sale of diesel to 100 liters per vehicle and 40 liters of gasoline. In the remaining 14 provinces, rationing measures were also ordered.

Several universities postponed the entry of scholarship students until the first week of May, and announced online classes and consultations.

Sales of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) are also affected, used by more than 1.7 million consumers, although the next arrival of a ship with the product should bring back stability to the service, according to officials.

Two men shine a mobile phone flashlight while fixing a car during a blackout in Havana. Breakages and repairs in some of the country’s thermoelectric plants lead to power shortages that trigger blackouts that last several hours in some parts of the country. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS

Electricity generation deficit

This situation coincides with breaks and repairs in some of the 20 thermoelectric generation plants, which have operated for an average of more than 30 years.

These plants process, for the most part, heavy national crude oil, with a sulfur content between seven and 18 degrees API, which requires more frequent repair cycles that are sometimes postponed due to a lack of financing.

Around 95 percent of the electricity generated in Cuba comes from fossil sources.

This country consumes some 8.3 million tons of fuel per year, of which almost 40 percent is nationally produced.

President Díaz-Canel explained on Apr. 14 that due to the number of thermoelectric blocks under repair “we have had to depend more on distributed generation that basically consumes diesel” in the country’s 168 municipalities.

The generation deficits cause blackouts, although of a lesser magnitude than the 10 to 12-hour a day cuts that for a large part of 2022 affected different parts of the country and sparked demonstrations and pot-banging protests in poor neighborhoods of several municipalities.

The rest of the electricity generation comes from gas accompanying national oil, and floating units rented to Turkey, while renewable energy sources account for only five percent of the total.

The current energy situation is occurring as summer looms, when temperatures above 35 degrees Celsius increase the use of fans and air conditioners, while a majority of the 3.9 million homes in Cuba depend on electricity for cooking food.

Members of the Electric Motorcycle Club gather in Havana for recreational activities. Customs measures have facilitated the importation of electric vehicles which reduce carbon emissions. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS

Promoting renewable sources

“We must further promote renewable sources and stimulate a change from fuel-guzzling, polluting vehicles that are more than half a century old to more modern and efficient ones,” computer scientist Alexis Rodríguez told IPS from the eastern city of Holguin, where he lives.

The transformation of the national energy mix is ​​considered by the government a matter of national security, and as part of its plans it aims for 37 percent of electricity to come from clean energy by 2030.

Since 2014, Cuba has had a policy for the prospective development of renewable energy sources and their efficient use, and in 2019 Decree Law 345 established regulations to increase the proportion of renewables in electricity generation and gradually decrease the share of fossil fuels.

Such a significant transformation will require investments of some six billion dollars, authorities in the sector estimate, which constitutes a challenge for a country whose main sources of revenue are dwindling, and which has pending a restart of interest payments on its debt to international creditors.

“It is also important to encourage the use of bicycles and electric vehicles, but they must be sold at reasonable prices, on credit as well, with guarantees of spare parts and the improvement of infrastructure,” Rodríguez added.

In addition to hybrid buses, a hundred light electric vehicles have been added to the capital’s public transport system that contribute to citizen micromobility and to reducing carbon emissions.

In recent years, the customs agency made provisions more flexible for citizens and companies to import solar panels. Although official data are not available, the measure has not had a significant influence.

Measures for the import and assembly on the island of bicycles, motorcycles and three and four-wheel electric vehicles – more than half a million of which circulate in Cuba – also bolster the mobility of people and families.

However, the high prices and sales only in hard currencies curb the expansion and use of more environmentally-friendly vehicles. Another hurdle is the dependence on the national power grid to recharge the batteries and the absence of service stations for electric vehicles.

José Luis Márquez, Yaisema Fabelo and their son Yadir stand around a table holding fruits harvested from their Los Tres Hermanos agroecological farm, in Martí, a municipality in northwestern Cuba. The family of farmers values ​​the final products of biogas technology, rich in nutrients suitable for fertilizing and restoring the soil. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS

By Luis Brizuela
MARTÍ, Cuba , Apr 20 2023 (IPS)

The first five biomethane-fuelled buses in the Cuban municipality of Martí will not only be a milestone in the country but will also represent a solution to the serious problem of transportation, while reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and bolstering local development.

Yaisema Fabelo, a librarian at the local prep school, told IPS that “the buses will boost the quality of life of the residents” of the municipality located in the north of the western province of Matanzas, about 200 kilometers east of Havana.

Fabelo, who is also a farmer from the Los Tres Hermanos agroecological farm, stressed that using biogas on an industrial scale and on individual farms “to produce electricity, cook food and obtain biofertilizers for organic crops” will benefit the 22,000 inhabitants of the municipality and surrounding areas.

The Martí I and nearby Martí II covered lagoon biodigesters will produce around 1,800 and 3,600 cubic meters of biogas per day, respectively, when they come into operation. They will connect through two separate gas pipelines with a biomethane plant where the fuel will be obtained for a group of buses. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS

The project

Turning pig manure and crop waste into biomethane and biogas is the focus of the project “Global Action for Climate Change in Cuba: Municipality of Martí, towards a carbon-neutral sustainable development model.”

The project, carried out by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Ministry of Economy and Planning with 5.5 million dollars in financing disbursed by the European Union, began to be implemented in 2020 and is to be completed in 2024.“[We want] to demonstrate that the biodigesters are economically feasible for Cuba, that connected with large pig farms they can be used to generate electricity and contribute to the economy." -- Anober Aguilar

“The main problem that Martí has ​​in the case of greenhouse gases is waste, responsible for 57 percent of our emissions,” explained Sobeida Reyes, director of territorial development for the town.

In an interview with IPS, the official pointed out that with the project and as part of the local development strategy, the aim is to gradually contribute to decarbonization with the use of renewable energy sources and incorporate biogas to biomethane conversion technology.

Biogas is composed mainly of methane and carbon dioxide, obtained in biodigesters from the decomposition of organic residues such as agricultural or livestock waste by bacteria, through anaerobic digestion, without oxygen.

Biomethane, also known as a renewable gas, is derived from a treatment process that removes carbon dioxide, moisture, ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, among other impurities from biogas, which brings its composition closer to that of fossil natural gas and favors its use to generate electricity and heat and to fuel vehicles.

The plan is to strengthen the public transport system through “16 buses powered by biomethane, the first five of which are to be tested in February 2024, after a bidding process outlined in the project that will facilitate their importation,” Reyes said.

“There is a commitment that these buses will be driven by women,” she added.

The future biomethane plant, which has already been awarded in tender, will provide, according to the plan, about 150 cubic meters per hour of gas suitable for bottling.

It will depend on the Martí I and Martí II covered lagoon biodigesters, which will be the largest in the country and will produce around 1,800 and 3,600 cubic meters of biogas per day, respectively, when they come into operation.

These, in turn, will each be fed by a pig breeding center belonging to the Matanzas Pork Company.

A third of the 14 kilometers of gas pipelines that will connect both biodigesters to the biomethane plant have already been put in place.

The generator is also being installed, while the lagoon is being filled with water to check its operation. The last thing needed is to put in place the membrane that will cover it.

This part is expected to be operational in February of next year, as well as the biomethane plant, so that the first five buses can then be tested, according to the established timeframe.

With the help of an electricity generator, the Martí I biodigester is to provide 100 kilowatts per hour, equivalent to the approximate consumption of 80 to 100 homes. The Martí II will provide even more.

A poster shows what the Martí I covered lagoon biodigester will look like. For Anober Aguilar, a specialist at the Indio Hatuey Pastures and Forages Experimental Station, responsible for the technological assembly, the construction of this type of biodigesters is economically feasible in Cuba. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS

Greater commitment to biogas

A potent greenhouse gas, methane has 80 times the climate-warming power of carbon dioxide, studies show.

Scientists argue that proper management of methane resulting from the decomposition of agricultural waste and livestock manure helps to mitigate water and soil pollution and to combat climate change.

Its extraction and energy use, especially in rural and semi-urban settings, can be a cost-effective solution to reduce the consumption of electricity based on fossil sources. In Cuba there are an estimated 5,000 small-scale (up to 24 cubic meters per day) biodigesters.

In this country of 11.1 million inhabitants, a significant percentage of the 3.9 million households use electricity as the main source of energy for cooking and heating water for bathing.

Renewable energy sources account for only five percent of the national energy mix.

In the case of biogas, “the main obstacle to its expansion is the availability of manure, as there is a low number of pigs and cattle, due to problems with feed and animal nutrition,” Anober Aguilar, an expert with the Indio Hatuey Pasture and Forage Experimental Station, located in Perico, another municipality of Matanzas, told IPS.

This scientific research center for technological management and innovation in the field of livestock production is in charge of the technological assembly of the biodigesters of the covered lagoon in Martí.

In the context of an economic crisis that has lasted for three decades, exacerbated by the tightening of the U.S, embargo, the COVID pandemic, and failed or delayed economic reforms, Cuba has limited imports of animal feed due to the shortage of foreign currency.

Furthermore, insufficient harvests do not guarantee abundant raw material to produce feed, while the scarcity of construction materials and their high cost make it impossible for many farmers to undertake the construction of a biodigester.

Conservative estimates by experts suggest that there is potential to expand the network of biodigesters on the island to up to 20,000 units, at least small-scale ones.

“If we look at the cost of the investment in the short term, it is more feasible to focus on wind or solar energy, because setting up a biodigester requires more financing, more time and specialized personnel,” explained Aguilar.

But seen at a distance of 10 to 15 years, “the investment evens out, because the potential of photovoltaic cells declines, repairs are made difficult by the rapid changes in technology, or the blades of the windmills deteriorate, in addition to the fact that both are more vulnerable to tropical cyclones,” the expert said.

“As long as they have raw material, biodigesters produce 24 hours a day,” he added.

He specified that one of the objectives of the project is “to demonstrate that the biodigesters are economically feasible for Cuba, that connected with large pig farms they can be used to generate electricity and contribute to the economy.”

Ministerial Order 395 of April 2021, of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, stipulated that each of the 168 Cuban municipalities must have a development program and strategy regarding biogas, and coordinate their management and implementation with those of their respective province.

Electrical technician Reinaldo Álvarez shows the electric generator located in the Martí I covered lagoon biodigester, in northwestern Cuba, which will provide about 100 kilowatt hours, equivalent to the electricity consumption of 80 to 100 homes. The nearby Martí II biodigester will produce even more. CREDIT: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS

Promoting agroecology

Martí’s development strategy includes projects to prepare preserves, spices and dehydrated foods with the help of the sun, a biomass gasifier for drying rice and generating electricity, the production of cooking oil, thermal baths, exploiting natural asphalt deposits, and social works, among others.

Reyes reported that 28 farms in the municipality have biodigesters, and that in 12 of them, as part of the project, “a module was delivered that includes a refrigerator, a stove, a rice cooker and a lamp, which use biogas.”

Another urgent objective is to foment agroecology and move towards local self-sufficiency in food, including animal feed.

“In the current harvest we had a yield per hectare of 19 tons of organic potatoes. As with the other crops, we only used biological products, of which more than 80 percent were produced by us,” farmer José Luis Márquez explained to IPS.

The 13-hectare Los Tres Hermanos agroecological teaching farm, dedicated to growing a variety of crops and small livestock using sustainable techniques, was granted in usufruct by the government, forms part of the Ciro Redondo credit and services cooperative, and has been managed by Márquez since 2018, together with his wife Yaisema Fabelo and their son Yadir.

A nationally manufactured PVC (polyvinyl chloride) tubular biodigester is also installed on the farm, with a volume of forty cubic meters.

“Due to the pandemic and the shortage of manure, it is not producing. We want to once again encourage pig and rabbit farming, recycle solid waste and convert it into organic fertilizer for crops and household chores,” said Márquez.

Biogas technology provides biol and biosol, liquid effluent and sludge, respectively, rich in nutrients to fertilize and restore the soil.

The farm is visited by students from different levels of education, up to prep school, who through workshops given by Márquez and Fabelo, learn about good agroecological practices “and the positive impact on the economy, people’s health and the environment,” Fabelo said.

Building renewables plants across the Global South is a preferable alternative to generate fewer emissions — but the international community has to date been unwilling to provide the substantial funding needed to construct this type of additional generation capacity at the level developing countries require. Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IPS

By Philippe Benoit
WASHINGTON DC, Mar 27 2023 (IPS)

This year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP 28, will be hosted by the United Arab Emirates, which, together with its Gulf neighbors, enjoys abundant solar, natural gas and financial resources. At the same time, many poorer countries are struggling to generate the additional affordable electricity they need to power their development — especially as wealthier nations halted their overseas financing for high-emitting coal power plants.

Unfortunately, the UAE and other Gulf states can’t easily export their solar resources to developing countries. However, they can export their natural gas to support affordable low-emissions power production in poorer countries if combined with donor-financed carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS)-equipped gas-fired power plants.

The lead-up to COP 28 provides an opportunity to explore this mechanism to support low-emissions economic growth in poorer countries — a “gas for poverty and climate” power proposal.

The decision to build more coal power plants reflects the difficult dilemma faced by many poorer countries: They are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and yet they do not feel they can afford to forestall investing in affordable power generation and the shorter-term economic benefits it provides, even if this means building high-emitting coal power plants

As I noted in an earlier opinion piece, the decisions by the G-7, China and others to halt overseas financing for coal power plants serve important climate goals but do not eliminate developing countries’ need for more electricity at affordable prices. According to a February Reuters report, the Pakistan government has decided, in the face of high and volatile natural gas prices, to pivot from building gas-fired plants to more affordable coal-fired ones notwithstanding the higher emissions.

This shift is all the more unsettling given the devastation Pakistan suffered last year from massive flooding with an intensity potentially exacerbated by climate change.

The decision to build more coal power plants reflects the difficult dilemma faced by many poorer countries: They are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and yet they do not feel they can afford to forestall investing in affordable power generation and the shorter-term economic benefits it provides, even if this means building high-emitting coal power plants.

The upcoming COP 28 context might provide a way out, one that leverages the hosting of the event in the gas-rich Gulf region, with the stated interest of wealthier countries and multilateral development banks to support poorer countries in the energy transition.

The proposal has two basic elements: an undertaking by a Gulf producer to provide natural gas at a preferential low price to new “low-emitting” gas-fired power plants built with concessional climate finance in partnering developing countries.

The preferential pricing builds off of three interrelated Gulf state dynamics: the abundance in the region of gas resources, Gulf programs to contribute to the economic development of poorer countries and efforts to lower emissions from petroleum, such as the application of carbon capture technologies. The sales price would be fixed at a concessional level — e.g., notionally at (or even potentially below) the cost of production, liquefaction and transport, rather than generating typical market returns.

The subsidy embedded in this structure would be recognized as a financial contribution by the gas-supplying country to both international development and global climate efforts. This structure could potentially also be used by wealthy gas countries from other regions, such as possibly Norway, interested in simultaneously supporting development and tackling climate change.

The second element is the use of this natural gas in gas-fired power plants equipped with “carbon capture, utilization and storage” technologies to produce “low-emissions” electricity.

Many countries have looked to expand the use of gas-fired plants in part because they emit less than half the carbon dioxide (CO2) per kilowatt hour (kWh) of a coal plant. But their emissions are still consequential, potentially in the order of 350 grams of CO2/kWh according to one estimate —  a significant level when considering the “net zero emissions” targets put out by various countries or embedded in the climate modeling of the International Energy Agency.

CCUS is one tool to substantially further reduce these emissions by 90 percent or more. The potential result is CO2 emissions per kWh that are so low they might even be termed “near-zero emissions.”

Although CCUS technologies have been developed and tested for many years on power plants, they have yet to be deployed at a large scale. One reason is that they are expensive per ton of reduced CO2 emissions. Consequently, their cost would undermine a developing country’s electricity affordability objective.

To overcome this hurdle, the CCUS-equipped gas-fired plant would need to be financed in large part through highly concessional climate funding, to be provided notably by the international donor community. There may also be an opportunity to tap into carbon markets to fund both capital and operating expenditures given the lower (i.e., avoided) emissions from the CCUS-equipped plant as compared to the alternative of a new coal-fired power plant or a gas-fired one without CCUS.

There are, of course, additional complexities to explore. For example, the plant would need to be able to access reasonably priced options for CO2 use or storage. In addition, the greenhouse gases (including methane) emitted in producing and delivering the natural gas to the plant would need to be limited to ensure the produced electricity remains “low emissions” when considering the full value chain.

Further analysis would also be needed on the pricing and other terms to make this structure attractive for the natural gas supplier, the donor community funding the CCUS-equipped plant and the developing country’s electricity consumers.

Building renewables plants across the Global South is a preferable alternative to generate fewer emissions — but the international community has to date been unwilling to provide the substantial funding needed to construct this type of additional generation capacity at the level developing countries require. And, as noted earlier, the technologies don’t yet exist for the Gulf states to export their abundant solar power resources, notwithstanding current discussions about green hydrogen.

The hosting of COP 28 in the Gulf provides an opportunity to think creatively about how to mobilize the gas resources of that region (and elsewhere) to better support both the development needs of poorer countries and the global climate effort. This COP 28 “gas for poverty and climate” power proposal might provide some elements.

(First published in The Hill on March 8, 2023)

Philippe Benoit has over 25 years of experience working in international energy and sustainability, including prior management positions at the World Bank and the International Energy Agency.  He is currently adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and  research director at Global Infrastructure Analytics and Sustainability 2050.

Jehyson Guzmán, the governor of the state of Mérida, in the Venezuelan Andes, delivers a solar panel installation to the rural community of El Anís that will benefit dozens of families. Parliament is preparing, meanwhile, new legislation to try to promote these alternative energies in the country. CREDIT: Government of Mérida

By Humberto Márquez
CARACAS, Mar 21 2023 (IPS)

The installation of solar panels in a remote village in ​​the Andes highlands in late February marked a second incursion by the Venezuelan government into the field of solar energy, previously uncharted territory in this country that for a century was a leading global oil producer.

The governor of the Andean state of Mérida, Jehyson Guzmán, inaugurated the 135 solar panels that will initially serve 17 families in the El Anís village near the town of Lagunillas, 600 kilometers southwest of Caracas, and will later provide electricity to a total of 2,500 people, in neighboring communities as well.

“They’re presenting it as something new, but they probably brought materials from a facility they had in the area around PDVSA (the state-owned oil company), where an industrial-scale project failed and was abandoned,” alternative energy expert Alejandro López-González told IPS."Compared to an average cost of 0.20 dollars per kilowatt-hour in other Latin American countries, in Venezuela people pay 0.002 dollars….and a cultural issue is that Venezuelans are not used to saving energy and many people, between 30 and 40 percent of users, simply do not pay for electricity." -- Luis Ramírez

López-González also pointed out that the government program “Sembrando Luz”, developed by Venezuelan and Cuban engineers, installed close to 2,300 small solar power systems, mainly in rural and indigenous communities, between 2005 and 2012.

Venezuela was then governed by the late Hugo Chávez (1999-2013). During his time in office the country went through a cycle of oil wealth, followed by the collapse of the oil industry and numerous infrastructure and service projects, such as alternative electricity, most of which were abandoned half-complete.

There are also wind farms on the peninsulas of Paraguaná and Guajira, in the northwest – where the trade winds are constant, strong and fast – and adding more than 100 wind turbines could contribute up to 150 Mwh to the local grid in one of the areas hardest-hit by blackouts so far this century.

Wind turbines began to be installed starting in 2006 in Paraguaná and 2011 in La Guajira, and more than 400 million dollars were invested, with the idea of ​​supplying numerous indigenous communities mainly of the Wayúu people.

But the installation of more wind turbines and equipment was delayed, the project fell by the wayside, many materials were stolen to be sold as scrap, and by 2018 the then minister of electric power, Luis Motta, gave it up for lost.

A similar fate befell hundreds of small solar energy projects – in some cases accompanied by wind power – in peasant and indigenous communities, which would have “benefited up to 200,000 people throughout the country but were put out of service due to lack of maintenance and attention,” lamented López-González.

Actually, before “Sembrando luz”, there were specific and especially rural initiatives for solar and wind energy – for example, to dig water wells in the plains of the Orinoco – organized by individuals, universities and some public entities.

The green roof of the postgraduate studies building at the Andrés Bello Catholic University blocks excess heat from some of the classrooms and serves as the basis for the installation of solar panels that provide electricity to various parts of campus. In the background can be seen the poor neighborhood of Antímano, in western Caracas. CREDIT: Humberto Márquez/IPS

The universities’ turn

Now the initiatives are reaching urban areas, among individuals in cities hard-hit by long power cuts, such as the hot city of Maracaibo in the northwest, the country’s oil capital, commercial establishments, health centers, and an exemplary installation in the private Andrés Bello Catholic University (UCAB), in Caracas.

UCAB “decided to incorporate ecology and sustainability into programs, practices, the management of its 32-hectare campus where there are some 5,000 students in various disciplines, as an experiment and contribution to environmental science in the country,” Joaquín Benítez, director of Environmental Sustainability, told IPS.

Thus, since 2019, the roof of the postgraduate studies building has been transformed into a green roof, with an 800-square-meter garden of low-lying succulent plants that store water.

Several classrooms under that roof, where temperatures at 3:00 p.m. local time reached 31 degrees Celsius for most of the year in 2013, now have an average temperature of 25 degrees, Benítez said.

The garden was followed by the installation of 30 solar panels along the edge of the roof, plus a backup wind generator, to support research and study projects, provide energy to part of the building and feed the watering device for the plants.

Enough energy is generated to serve a house for five people, with three bedrooms on two floors, two bathrooms and a small garden, Benítez said.

Solar panels were installed at the private Andrés Bello Catholic University, in the capital of Venezuela. While waiting for large projects, installations like these are gaining ground in homes, farms and businesses, sometimes combined with the use of the national power grid or diesel-fueled plants. CREDIT: UCAB

Learning from failures

But a panel installation in a home, farm or small business, even if it is only complementary to the national electrical grid or used to power only a few appliances, costs from 4,000 dollars up to five times that amount. This is a huge sum in a country where the majority of the population is living in poverty and the monthly minimum wage is less than six dollars.

However, hundreds of private solar power installations have sprung up, often in combination with diesel-fired plants – and also small wind turbines – in areas of the west and the central and eastern plains, with a handful of companies dedicated to installation and maintenance.

The electricity crisis has been part of an economic depression and social and political crisis that has pushed more than seven million Venezuelans to leave the country in the last decade under President Nicolás Maduro, reducing the population to an estimated 28 million inhabitants.

The northwestern oil and ranching state of Zulia alone, covering 63,000 square kilometers and home to five million people, suffered 37,000 power failures last year, according to the Committee of People Affected by Blackouts.

Outages across the country totaled 233,000 last year and 196,000 in 2021. Four years ago, in March 2019, a blackout left almost all of Venezuela, including much of Caracas, without power for between 72 and 100 continuous hours.

The country is supplied by the Guri hydroelectric complex in the southeast, with an installed capacity of 12,000 Mwh in three dams, and which covers two thirds of the national demand. Another 30 percent comes from thermal plants, and the rest from small distributed generation plants.

In total, the country’s installed capacity, which should have reached 34,000 Mwh according to the investments made over decades, barely reaches 24,000 Mwh, since much of the infrastructure is rundown, as are the distribution networks.

The supply deficit would be even worse were it not for the collapse of the economy, as the country’s GDP plunged by up to 80 percent between 2013 and 2021, and demand, which stood at around 19,000 Mwh in 2013, had dropped to 11,000 Mwh in 2019.

The Cecosesola central cooperative health center in the western Venezuelan city of Barquisimeto installed solar panels to power some of its services and raise awareness about the importance of clean energy. Years ago solar installations were made in remote rural areas, but recently they are making their way into cities. CREDIT: Cecosesola

Paying little or nothing

Renewable energy expert Luis Ramírez reminded IPS that electricity in Venezuela, in the hands of the State, is subsidized up to 99 percent.

“Compared to an average cost of 0.20 dollars per kilowatt-hour in other Latin American countries, in Venezuela people pay 0.002 dollars,” said Ramírez, who is also director of the graduate program in quality systems at UCAB.

However, since 2022 the rates for public services, such as water, electricity, cooking gas, gasoline, highway use and garbage collection have begun to rise in different regions of the country.

In addition, “a cultural issue is that Venezuelans are not used to saving energy and many people, between 30 and 40 percent of users, simply do not pay for electricity,” Ramírez explained.

The inhabitants of poor neighborhoods and shantytowns in Caracas and other cities connect themselves to the grid freely, and in small towns in the interior small business establishments often do the same.

This discourages investments in the sector and in particular in renewable energies, which often have higher installation and start-up costs than plants powered by fossil energy.

Pending policies, laws, initiatives and financing to establish solar or wind farms, hydroelectric power generated in the gigantic complex of Lake Guri, which feeds the Caroní River in the southeast of the country, remains the source that sustains two thirds of electricity consumption in Venezuela. CREDIT: Corpoelec

From law to potential

Publications from the Ministry of Electric Power indicate that an additional 500 Mwh are expected to be installed in the west of the country, mainly from renewable energies, but without specifying a timeframe, amounts to be invested or sources of financing.

In the legislature, controlled by the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela, the drafting of a renewable energy law was proposed since 2021, to stimulate and organize the sector, but the question has not been given priority by parliament or the government.

The experts consulted by IPS agree that the drafts of that law mainly repeat provisions already present in the current Organic Law on Electricity Service, without adding new aspects such as establishing a renewable energy research institute to help develop the industry, Ramírez said.

According to López-González, the fact that the electricity law enacted in 2010 still lacks regulations to specify policies in measures and technical and operational decisions shows the State’s disdain for ensuring compliance and promoting the development of the sector.

He said the new steps such as the small installation in the Andes and the announcements that a new law is being prepared are “an effort to publicize what is nothing more than a residual development, no more than zombies of abandoned projects.”

Venezuela’s solar potential is one of the highest in Latin America, with an average of 5.35 kilowatt hours per square meter per day (5.35 Kwh/m2), close to the highest in Chile (5.75) and Bolivia (5.42), according to studies by the Department of Sciences of the Universitiy de Los Andes, in the southwest of the country.

In the northern coastal region along the Caribbean Sea, the information collected in meteorological stations shows an even greater potential: between 5.8 and 7.3 Kwh/m2.

In the north, where the most populated and industrialized centers of the country are located, the potential of 12,000 Mwh awaits better times, López-González said. “We can have a wind Guri,” he said, making a comparison with the largest of the dams in the southeastern hydroelectric complex.

Venezuela, a leading oil producer for a century, which still has the largest reserves in the world (300 billion barrels, mostly unconventional), also has the potential to belong to the club of countries that are self-sufficient in renewable energy.

But this membership is still just a spot on the distant horizon.

BP’s recent journey points to the need for instruments that influence profits specifically, and notably reconsideration of the controversial price control tool: a climate-driven price cap on oil. Credit: Bigstock

By Philippe Benoit
WASHINGTON DC, Mar 13 2023 (IPS)

BP, the oil company that previously brought us “Beyond Petroleum” and more recently robust corporate climate goals, has announced a return in emphasis to its traditional business of producing oil. Drawn by the inescapable appeal of oil’s latest high profits, has BP rebranded itself as “Back to Petroleum?”

This type of shift highlights the importance of stronger market incentives for reducing emissions so that companies interested in decarbonizing see their financial interest align with that course. BP’s recent journey points to the need for instruments that influence profits specifically, and notably reconsideration of the controversial price control tool: a climate-driven price cap on oil.

BP has consistently been a forward-leaning company among its peers on climate.  As early as 2002, then CEO Lord Browne rebranded BP as it sought “to reinvent the energy business: to go beyond petroleum.” However, various financial pressures, including the Deepwater Horizon spill, subsequently moved the company away from its non-petroleum businesses.

So long as there are big profits to be made from oil, these companies will continue to be drawn to their petroleum activities, notwithstanding any stated desire to shift to renewables

But in August 2020, BP was back with a strengthened pivot to climate as the company announced a series of ambitious low-carbon targets.”  This included a 40% production decline and a 10-fold increase in low-carbon investment over the next decade.  BP also announced  a groundbreaking target for Scope 3 emissions (namely, emissions from the consumption of its products by industry and other consumers).

Unfortunately, BP has now scaled back its climate ambition.  Notably, rather than a 40% drop in production by 2030, BP now expects only a 25% decrease.  Significantly, this shift has been made at a time of $28 billion in record corporate profits for BP, records also seen by other oil majors, such as ExxonMobil and Shell.

These record profits — driven in part by high gas prices resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — also point to a major vulnerability for any market-driven climate effort.  With the lure of these type of returns from the traditional petroleum business, it is difficult to see or sustain financial motivation to shift away.

Indeed, as BP made clear in announcing its ambitious 2022 climate targets: “bp is committed to delivering attractive returns to shareholders” — and petroleum, with its upside, is uniquely placed to deliver the potential of a high return. So long as there are big profits to be made from oil, these companies will continue to be drawn to their petroleum activities, notwithstanding any stated desire to shift to renewables.

However, this also points to what needs to be a focus of an effective climate policy for oil: reducing its profitability.  Over the years, think tanks, academics and others have put forward carbon pricing as the most efficient emissions reduction instrument, but this discourse has failed to deliver significant results in practice, especially when it comes to oil companies.

As emissions continue to rise and the carbon budget shrinks, the time has come to explore other solutions. One tool that merits consideration — more precisely, reconsideration — is a cap on oil prices.

This “climate oil price cap” would be designed to increase the relative profitability and so financial appeal of renewables by limiting the upside on oil activities specifically (something a customary windfall profits tax set at the corporate level wouldn’t accomplish). It would thereby support and encourage BP and other oil companies to transform themselves from a traditional petroleum company into an “integrated energy company” (BP’s own term), one that can generate significant profits from renewables and other low-carbon products relative to its petroleum activities.

Oil price controls are, of course, not new and have a checkered history (e.g., President Nixon’s effort in the US 50 years ago). But the climate emergency presents a new threat that merits re-examining this instrument. Importantly, a price cap could also help energy-importing developing countries, as well as vulnerable households there and elsewhere, avoid the harmful impact of the high oil prices experienced in 2022 (another potential advantage over a windfall profits tax ).

And there is now a precedent for this type of concerted purchaser action, namely the price cap on Russian oil agreed by the EU and US. It is also a tool that has drawn renewed attention in other contexts, including rethinking the framework governing gas prices to insulate US consumers from the gasoline price surges driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Any effort needs to consider the lessons from the failed efforts of the past.  For example, the cap should be set at a sufficient level to attract the desired supply – including to energy-importing developing countries — even as it precludes the type of record profits the oil industry saw last year. It should also build on the experience with the current Russian price cap.

While, admittedly today there isn’t sufficient support for aggressive climate policies, the prospect for strong action will likely increase over time as heat waves, flooding and other extreme weather events wreak havoc exacerbated by climate change.  This in turn can be expected to increase the willingness of politicians and policymakers to be more ambitious down the road in taking climate action.

In anticipation of this changing landscape, creative options beyond traditional carbon pricing mechanisms should be explored and put before these decision-makers by think tanks, academics and others.

In this regard, the combination of BP’s recent record profits and shift in corporate policy points to the appropriateness of considering a price cap on oil as a possible tool to fight climate change by improving the relative profitability of low-carbon investments.

Philippe Benoit has over 20 years of experience working on international energy, development and sustainability issues.  He is currently research director at Global Infrastructure Analytics and Sustainability 2050.

Map of Eastern Bloc, 1948.

By Jan Lundius
STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Mar 6 2023 (IPS)

Putin’s regime recently suspended Russia’s participation in a nuclear arms agreement with Washington. After the decision Putin declared that the move was a retaliation for the US’s, France’s and Britain’s “targeting” of Russia with nuclear weapons. He was forced to take action to “preserve our country, ensure security and strategic stability”:

“the West lied about peace, but was preparing for aggression, and today it admits it openly, no longer embarrassed. And they cynically use Ukraine and its people to weaken and split Russia.”

Such rhetoric finds fertile ground in Latin America and Africa, which suffer from a long tradition of Western exploitation carried out under the false flag of peace keeping, democratization and progress. On 26 February, Putin added that a:

“new world is taking shape, being built only on the interests of just one country, the United States. […] I do not even know if such an ethnic group as the Russian people will be able to survive in the form in which it exists today.”

The statement is part of a recurrent discourse suggesting that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an act of self-defence, an answer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/NATO’s expansion. In 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were added to NATO; in 2009 they were followed by Albania and Croatia, in 2017 by Montenegro and in 2020 by North Macedonia.

In 2014, after Ukraine’s corrupt president Viktor Yanukovych had been ousted, pro-Russian unrest erupted in eastern and southern parts of the country. Unmarked Russian tanks and troops moved into Crimea, taking over government buildings, strategic sites and infrastructure. Meanwhile, armed pro-Russian separatists seized government buildings in the Donbas region.

In 2014 the Donbas was the industrial heartland of Ukraine with 35 per cent of the country’s mining, 22 per cent of its manufacturing industry, providing 20 per cent of energy supply and 18 per cent of water supply. Recently vast amounts of natural gas have been detected underground.

The separatists received considerable support from Russia and Ukrainian attempts to retake separatist-held areas were unsuccessful. In October 2014, Ukraine’s new government made joining NATO a priority. Putin at once declared that the Russian involvement in Crimea and Donbas was a reaction to NATO’s threatening expansion.

Part of Putin’s discourse, repeated by influencers all over the world, is that during a summit in 1990 when Mikhail Gorbachov accepted the reunification of Germany within the framework of NATO, he was given an assurance that NATO would not expand further. The Historian Mary Elise Sarotte has recently tried to disentangle the thorny issue, underlining that no written document of the promise exists. Gorbachov later declared that:

“the topic of NATO-expansion was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. [What was agreed] was that NATO’s military structures would not advance in the sense that additional armed forces would not be deployed on the territory of the then-GDR, after German reunification. Everything that could have been and needed to be done to solidify that political obligation was done. And fulfilled.”

During a 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin declared himself to be a stout defender of democracy, nuclear disarmament and international solidarity. Contrary to the US, which had “promised” that NATO was not going to expand beyond the borders of Germany. Putin stated that:

“unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension. […] a situation in which countries that forbid the death penalty even for murderers and other, dangerous criminals are airily participating in military operations that are difficult to consider legitimate. And as a matter of fact, these conflicts are killing people – hundreds and thousands of civilians! […] As Franklin D. Roosevelt said during the first few days that the Second World War was breaking out: “When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.” […] I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself, or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: Against whom is this expansion intended?

The answer is beyond doubt. However, as a proverb states “Evil cannot with evil be defended.” Can Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine actually be defended by alluding to the encroachment and support to brutal dictatorships that “democracies” like the US, France and Britain have been guilty of around the globe?

Putin repeatedly refers to “history”. He labels Ukrainian leaders as Nazis, while stating that Ukraine has always been part of Russia. Glaring exaggerations – if not outright lies.

History tells us that Russia’s past, like that of other nations, has its hidden skeletons. In 1939, the Soviet Union annexed more than 50 per cent of Polish territory. From 1939 to 1941 about one million Polish citizens were arrested, or deported; including approximately 200,000 Polish military personnel held as prisoners of war; 100,000 Polish citizens were arrested and imprisoned of whom approximately 30,000 were executed. The total loss of lives was 150 000.

On 30 November 1939 the Soviet army attacked Finland. The war ended after three months. The Soviets suffered severe losses and made little headway. To avoid more bloodshed Finland ceded 9 per cent of its territory. In spite of superior air force and heavy tanks the Soviet losses had been considerable – 168 000 dead or missing. The Finns lost 26 000 dead or missing.

In the previously independent Baltic States the Soviets had during 1940-41 carried out mass deportations. They became even more extensive after Soviet Union finally conquered the area. In March 1949, Soviet authorities organised a mass deportation of 90,000 Baltic nationals. The total number deported from 1944 to 1955 is estimated at over half a million: 124,000 from Estonia, 136,000 from Latvia, and 245,000 from Lithuania. The estimated death toll among Lithuanian deportees had between1945 and 1958 been more than 20,000, including 5,000 children.

When the Soviet Union fell apart and archives were declassified it was revealed that, between 1921 and 1953, 799,455 executions had been officially recorded. Approximately 1.7 million prisoners had died in Gulag camps, some 390,000 were reported dead during forced resettlements in the 1930s, and during the 1940s at least 400,000 persons died during deportations.

After World War II, the Soviet Union subdued several nations in Eastern Europe, introducing a political system aspiring to gain total control of all citizens and backed by an extensive, repressive apparatus.

Opposition was initially essentially liquidated, while steps towards an authoritative communism were enforced. The General Secretary of a nation’s Central Committee became the most powerful figure, while a Politburo held sway over a party machine lacking a popular foundation, since it in accordance to Leninist ideology favoured a group of three to fourteen per cent of a country’s population. Members of this exclusive group enjoyed considerable rewards, like access to shops with a selection of high-quality foreign goods, as well as special schools, holiday facilities, well-equipped housing, pensions, permission to travel abroad, and official cars with distinct license plates.

Suppression of opposition was a prerequisite for retaining power. Citizens were kept under surveillance by political police with raw power and violent persecution of dissidents. In East Germany were Stasi, Volkpolizei, and KdA, in Soviet Union the KGB, in Czechoslovakia STB and LM, in Bulgaria KDS, in Hungary AVH and Munkásörség, in Romania Securitate and GP, in Poland Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, Słuźba, and ZOMO. Nevertheless, people occasionally revolted.

During one day in 1953 an uprising took place in Berlin. It was violently suppressed by tanks and soldiers of the Soviet German forces. More than 150 persons were killed, or missing.

In 1956, a two day protest in Polish Poznan resulted in more than 100 deaths. About 400 tanks and 10,000 soldiers under the command of the Polish-Soviet general Popalavsky suppressed the demonstration. Among the dead was a 13-year-old boy, Romek Strzalakowski, eventually hailed as a patriotic martyr.

During two weeks in November 1956, USSR troops killed 2,500 revolting Hungarians, while 200,000 sought political refuge abroad. Some 26,000 Hungarians were put on trial by the Soviet-installed János Kádár government, of those 13,000 were imprisoned.

During the night between 20 and 21 August 1968, a period of political liberalization in Czechoslovakia came to an abrupt end when Eastern Bloc armies under Soviet command invaded Prague. The invasion comported with the Brezhnev Doctrine, compelling Eastern Bloc states to subordinate national interests to a Soviet right to intervene. A wave of emigration followed, with a total eventually reaching 300,000.

The pattern of Soviet invasions of neighbouring states has continued, for example in Georgia and Moldova. In 1991 Tjetjenia declared itself independent and in 1994, 40 000 Russian soldiers invaded the recently proclaimed Tjetjenien Republic. After a year of harsh fighting the capital Grozny was conquered, but another war erupted in 1999. The rebels were vanquished after an effective but exceedingly brutal war. Tjetjenia is now governed by a Moscow-allied clan leader.

Estimated losses of the two wars are 14 000 Russian and 16 000 Tjetjenien soldiers killed, while at least 25,000 civilians were killed and 5,000 disappeared.

One month before the Russian attack on Ukraine, Kazakhstan plunged into political unrest. At the request of President Tokayev, Russian forces headed an intergovernmental Eurasian military alliance, CSTO, which invaded the country. After “pacifying” the protests, CSTO forces evacuated the country after a month.

Considering this history, paired with the Russian destruction of Syrian and Ukrainian towns, it is somewhat difficult to consider Russia as threatened by NATO’s expansion. It is actually not so strange that Russia is feared by its neighbours and that Finland and Sweden are seeking membership in NATO.

The Swedish government is currently supporting an expansion and restoration of Sweden’s once comprehensive, but now neglected network of nuclear shelters, introducing obligatory conscription of youngsters fit for military service, and strengthening the defence of Gotland, a strategically important island located in the middle of the Baltic Sea.

After World War II, the Soviet Union usurped an enclave which actually ought to have belonged to either Poland or Lithuania – Kaliningrad, situated by the Baltic coast and equipped it with the highest density of military installations in Europe. It became headquarter of the large Russian Baltic fleet. In Kaliningrad, Russia has recently built up a formidable military presence encompassing nuclear weapons and tens of thousands of soldiers.

Not being a supporter of policies and actions United States has exercised in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, cannot overshadow the fear that most Europeans nurture while facing the powerful giant of the East, which, admittedly, does not have an impressive record when it comes to protecting human rights.

Some sources: Putin, Vladimir (2007) Speech delivered at the MSC http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/copy/24034 Sarotte, Mary Elise (2022) Not One Inch: America, Russia and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Pucci, Molly (2020) Security Empire: The Secret Police in Communist Eastern Europe. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Mangroves in Tai O, Hong Kong. Coastal wetland protection and restoration is an example of the kind of multifunctional solution that is needed to address multiple global crises together. Credit: Chunyip Wong / iStock

By Paula Harrison, Pamela McElwee and David Obura
BONN, Mar 2 2023 (IPS)

When global crises are interlinked, they overlap and compound each other. In such cases, the most effective solutions are those that work at the nexus of all these challenges.

In September, almost every Government on Earth will gather at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York to take stock at the halfway mark of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of what has been achieved and what remains to be done.

Despite some progress, global development efforts have been hamstrung by unprecedented environmental, social and economic crises, in particular biodiversity loss and climate change, compounded of course by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Tackling these interlinked challenges separately risks creating situations even more damaging to people and communities around the world, and exacerbates the already high risk of not meeting the goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

This is especially true because the myriad drivers of risk and damage affect many different sectors at once, across scales from local to global, and can result in negative impacts being compounded. For example, when demands for food and timber combine with the effects of pollution and climate change, they can decimate already degraded ecosystems, driving species to extinction and severely reducing nature’s contributions to people.

The global food system offers another example of this negative spiral of interlocking crises – where food that is produced unsustainably leads to water overconsumption and waste, pollution, increased health risks and loss of biodiversity. It also leads to excessive greenhouse gas emissions, contributing to climate change.

Yet policies often treat each of these global threats in isolation, resulting in separate, uncoordinated actions that typically address only one of the root causes and fail to take advantage of the many potential solution synergies. In the worst cases, actions taken on one challenge directly undermine those needed to tackle another because they fail to account for trade-offs, resulting in unintended consequences, or the impacts being externalised, as someone else’s problem.

This is why almost 140 Governments turned to the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) – requesting IPBES to undertake a major multiyear assessment of the interlinkages among biodiversity, water, food and health in the context of the rapidly-changing climate. This ‘Nexus Assessment’ is among the most complex and important expert assessments ever undertaken – crossing key biophysical domains of climate and biodiversity and elements central to human wellbeing like food, water and health. It will also address how interactions are affected by energy, pollution, conflict and other socio-political challenges.

To fully address this ‘nexus’, the assessment is considering interactions across scales, geographic regions and ecosystems. It also covers past, present and future trends in these interlinkages. And, most importantly, it will offer concrete options for responses to the crises that address the interactions of risk and damage jointly and equitably – providing a vital set of possible solutions for the more sustainable future we want for people and our planet.

One example of the mutifunctional solutions that will be explored is nature-based solutions – such as coastal wetland protection and restoration. When coastal wetland ecosystems are healthy – whether conserved or where necessary, restored – they are a refuge and habitat for biodiversity, improving fish stocks for greater food security and contributing to improve human health and wellbeing. They can also sequester carbon, helping to mitigate climate change, and protect adjacent communities and settlements from flooding and sea level rise.

To develop and implement these kinds of multi-functional solutions, responses for dealing with the major global crises need to be better coordinated, integrated, and made more synergistic across sectors, both public and private. Decision-makers at all levels need better evidence and knowledge to implement such solutions.

Work on the nexus assessment began in 2021 – with the final report expected to be considered and adopted by IPBES member States in 2024. A majority of the 170 expert authors and review editors from around the world are meeting in March in the Kruger National Park in South Africa to further strengthen the draft report, responding to the many thousands of comments received during a first external review period.

The assessment will also include evidence and expertise contributed by indigenous peoples and local communities – whose rich and varied direct experiences and knowledge systems that consider humans and nature as an interconnected whole have embodied a nexus approach for generations.

The Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the recently-agreed Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework provide the roadmaps for tackling the climate and biodiversity crises. The IPBES nexus assessment will offer policymakers a practical guide to bridge the vital interlinkages across the two challenges, to other relevant frameworks, and link to the sustainable development agenda.

For more information about IPBES or about the ongoing progress on the nexus assessment, go to www.ipbes.net or follow @ipbes on social media.

Prof. Paula Harrison is a Principal Natural Capital Scientist and Professor of Land and Water Modelling at the UK Centre for Ecology & Hydrology, United Kingdom.

Dr. David Obura is a Founding Director of CORDIO (Coastal Oceans Research and Development – Indian Ocean) East Africa, Kenya.

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Zimbabwe is losing 262 000 hectares of forests destroyed every year. Credit: Jeffrey Moyo/IPS

By Jeffrey Moyo
HARARE, Feb 28 2023 (IPS)

In New Ashdon Park, a medium-density area in the Zimbabwean capital, Harare, at new homes that have replaced a once thriving forest, makeshift fireplaces have become common sights as residents solely depend on firewood for energy.

City dwellers like 34-year-old Neliet Mbariro, a married mother of four, live in a house that has not yet been connected to electricity.

Like many of her neighbors, Mbariro has had to depend on cutting down some trees just across an unpaved road near her home.

“We cut the few remaining trees you see here so we can make fire for cooking every day. We can’t do anything about it because we have no electricity in this area,” Mbariro told IPS.

Hundreds of trees that used to define Mbariro’s area, where homes have fast emerged, have disappeared over the past two years since construction began.

As building structures rise, vast acres of natural forests are falling as construction of dwellings and indigenous industrial facilities gather pace in Zimbabwe.

Arnold Shumba (32), a builder operating in New Ashdon Park, said with his team working in the area, they have had to do away with hundreds of trees to build homes for their clients.

“I remember there were plenty of trees; in fact, there was a huge forest area here, but those trees are no more now because as we worked, we cut them down. You only see houses now,” Shumba told IPS.

According to environmentalists, the impact of deforestation is problematic.

“Very soon, towns and cities will have no more trees left as buildings take their place,” Marylin Mahamba, an independent environmental activist in Harare, told IPS.

For instance, as Mahamba notes, Harare is no longer the same, with scores of open urban spaces taken over for construction and trees uprooted.

Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’s second-largest city, is even worse, with Mahamba claiming the city has been pummeled by deforestation left, right, and center as more residential areas rise.

Yet it is not only the rise of more buildings across towns and cities here that has led to deforestation but electricity deficits, according to climate change experts.

“The Zimbabwe Power Company is also to blame for failing to provide enough electricity. Gas is expensive, and many people can’t afford it. They opt for firewood because it is cheaper, and that’s why more urban trees are now vanishing,” Kudakwashe Makanda, a climate change expert based in Zimbabwe, told IPS.

But Makanda also pinned the blame for urban deforestation on rural-to-urban migration.

“There is now excessive expansion of towns in Zimbabwe. Obviously, this does not spare the forests. By nature, people would want to settle in urban areas, and by virtue of people wanting to settle in towns, people cut down trees establishing homes,” said Makanda.

Makanda also blamed local authorities for fueling urban deforestation, saying, “the town councils are to blame. They allow people to occupy land not suitable for occupation resulting in trees being felled.”

With joblessness affecting as many as 90 percent of Zimbabwe’s population, according to the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Makanda said in towns and cities, many have switched to firewood for livelihood.

“People are making a livelihood out of firewood, meaning more trees are disappearing in towns as dealers sell firewood which has become a source of income for many who are not formally employed,” said Makanda.

But for areas like New Ashdon Park with no electricity and with many residents like Mbariro having to depend on firewood while other areas contend with regular power outages, Makanda also said, “power cuts are causing deforestation in towns, especially in areas with no power connection, people rely on firewood.”

Yet stung by joblessness, Makanda said urban dwellers are clearing unoccupied pieces of land to farm in towns and cities, but at the cost of the trees that must be removed.

To fix the growing menace of urban deforestation in Zimbabwe, climate change experts like Makanda have said, “there is a need for incentivizing alternative power sources like solar so that they become affordable in order to save the remaining urban forests.”

Denis Munangatire, an environmentalist with a degree in environmental studies from the Midlands State University, claimed 4000 trees are getting destroyed annually across Zimbabwe’s towns and cities.

According to this country’s Forestry commission, these are among the 262 000 hectares of forests destroyed every year in Zimbabwe.

Like Makanda, Munangatire heaped the blame on local authorities in towns and cities for fueling deforestation.

“Urban councils are responsible for the disappearance of trees in towns and cities because they are leaving land developers wiping out forests, leaving few or no trees standing in areas they develop,” Munangatire told IPS.

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Farmer using tablet to contact customer/ iStock

By Hsiao Chink Tang and Anne Cortez
BEIJING, The People’s Republic of China, Feb 21 2023 (IPS)

Digitalization is a key driver of competitiveness and development. As the world takes the path to unprecedented digital advancement, Asia continues to be a powerhouse of digital transformations in a wide range of areas from microchip manufacturing to electric vehicles, from digital currency to e-commerce.

Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has accelerated digital transformations, but not all countries have benefitted equally. For example, rural farmers in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were able to take advantage of existing digital mobile network, digital payment, and logistic services to find alternative markets and sell their produce online.

Many turned to established e-commerce platforms, such as, Pinduoduo, Taobao, and JD, and doing so innovatively via live-streaming.

In contrast, rural farmers in some other parts of Asia struggled to keep their livelihoods during the pandemic. Without access to face-to-face trades due to lockdowns, let alone selling online, many had to live with little or no income.

Businesses of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in many parts of Asia also suffered during the pandemic. Even in ordinary circumstances, persistent barriers such as poor and costly infrastructure, poor digital literacy, and limited government support hinder the growth of MSMEs in many developing economies.

Inevitably, during COVID, many MSMEs failed to capitalize on the pandemic-triggered digital transformation.

The above are some of the issues discussed in a dialogue organized by the ADB-PRC Regional Knowledge Sharing Initiatives (RKSI) and the Ministry of Finance, the PRC, on the topic of digital transformation and regional cooperation.

The forum acknowledged that despite the many opportunities presented by the digital economy in Asia, a great part of the region’s digital potential remains untapped, and key regulatory, infrastructural, financial, and capacity challenges remain.

There is also a widening digital divide among countries that are under-connected and those that are digitalized.

Prevailing digital infrastructure and non-infrastructure gaps, specifically in e-commerce across Central Asia, are highlighted in a Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) Institute study. The study shows that e-commerce development among CAREC countries is highly varied and key gaps remain.

These gaps include those in basic digital infrastructure and regulatory policies resulting in a lack of economic opportunities, income inequality and weaknesses in the business environment. A solution to bridge this gap and drive an inclusive digital growth is regional cooperation.

In 2021, ministers from Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) member countries endorsed the Digital Strategy 2030, which identifies areas that can catalyze collaboration and digitalization in the region. Similarly, Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries are considering a proposal to promote and enhance cooperation in the digital economy, leveraging on the GMS cross-border e-commerce cooperation platform.

Region-wide cooperation allows governments and stakeholders to coordinate policies, share costs of building and maintaining infrastructure, and expand markets to advance the digital economy. Regional cooperation mechanisms also help build trust and harmonization that are crucial for digital development among countries.

In turn, digital advancement promotes regional cooperation in trade, finance, transport, energy, and other sectors. To make inclusive digital transformation a reality, cooperation must extend beyond the public sector and encourage collaboration with partners from international organizations, private businesses, MSMEs, civil society, and other stakeholders.

Regional cooperation offers great potential to level the field and ensure that no one is left behind in the digital economy. Regional cooperation also means sharing and learning from country experiences across the region.

There are rich lessons and inspirational stories from not just digital-focused firms, but also individuals with digital skills, who have transformed their lives and that of their families and communities waiting to be heard and shared.

Regional focused platforms such as CAREC, GMS, and RKSI, play a crucial role on this front in facilitating such cross-border knowledge exchanges and partnerships to ensure inclusive and sustainable development, and improve people’s wellbeing.

Hsiao Chink Tang is a Senior Economist and Anne Cortez is a Communication Specialist at the Asian Development Bank-PRC RKSI, a south-south development knowledge sharing platform that draws on the PRC’s experience and facilitates knowledge exchange among ADB’s developing member countries.

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Brazil's then-President Jair Bolsonaro launched the sale of shares of Eletrobras, the largest company in the electricity sector in Brazil, which will be privatized through its capitalization. CREDIT: Alan Santos/PR-Public Photos

By Victoria Barreto Vieira do Prado
NEW YORK, Feb 15 2023 (IPS)

Eletrobras is Latin America’s biggest electricity company, responsible for around 30% of Brazil’s power capacity and 50% of all its transmission lines. In 2021, the Brazilian government announced it would reduce its controlling shares in this state-owned company from 72% to 10%.  Given Eletrobras’ dominant role in Brazil’s power sector, this divestment in the government’s controlling shares merits a more complete understanding of the implications for Brazil’s energy transition and energy security.

This is because the law that was passed to make this happen raises important risks to the decarbonization of the country’s power sector and has the potential to increase electricity tariffs.

How the legal process that open the door for the government’s controlling stake on Eletrobras raised questions about the energy transition

The government’s dilution of its participation as Eletrobras’ major shareholder required legal approval in congress, consolidated through a law now commonly known as Eletrobras’ privatization law (Law 14.182/2021).

Of all the amendments to the Eletrobras’ privatization law, the mandatory installation of 8 GW of additional thermal gas power capacity to be deployed between 2026 and 2030 was perhaps the most troublesome. To understand how massive this is, this provision in theory forces Brazil to expand natural gas installed capacity by 56%

Given how politically charged this law is and the electoral dynamics due to looming presidential elections in the following year (2022), the government decided to fast-track this bill in congress under a mechanism known as a provisional measure (medida provisória), thus expediting its approval process. The deadline for approval of bills using this fast-track provision is of 120 days.

While an effective legislative tool, the use of this fast-track provision in this law was criticized by some institutions in Brazil as not “conducive to the timeframe required to conduct a comprehensive study” that the privatization of a company like Eletrobras would have merited.

The bill was approved on the eve of the fast-track deadline for its approval. However, it contained over 500 amendments, many of which were unrelated to the company’s privatization.

This strategy is known as jabuti, where legislators take advantage of the provisional measure’s fast-paced characteristics to include amendments which may favor their own political interests. By adding amendments to key clauses of the bill, as was done in Eletrobras’ privatization, the likelihood of vetoing the added amendments is close to null.

Of all the amendments to the Eletrobras’ privatization law, the mandatory installation of 8 GW of additional thermal gas power capacity to be deployed between 2026 and 2030 was perhaps the most troublesome. To understand how massive this is, this provision in theory forces Brazil to expand natural gas installed capacity by 56% per cent from around 14.3 GW in 2021.

While this measure gave no responsibility to Eletrobras for the deployment of this thermal capacity, it signals the government’s direction and ambition for the power sector. In addition, this amendment included a provision that the new thermal power plants had to function constantly for 70% of the time throughout the next 15 years.

Such mandatory use for thermal in the future, would result if followed through, in an expected 33% increase of greenhouse gas emissions and redraw the country’s electricity matrix which is currently one of the cleanest globally with 82.9% renewables (world average being 28.6%).

The law, as approved today, also disfavors renewable sources, currently the cheapest form of energy in Brazil, which have no additional variable costs of operation to fuel the power grid.

The new law requirements may increase installation costs by up to R$ 6.6 billon (roughly USD 1.3 billion) when compared to the prior Brazilian national energy expansion strategy and thus reflect in price increases for the end-consumer. A requirement to operate the thermal powerplants for 70% of the time has negative implications for the future development of non-hydropower renewables given that it reduces wind and solar power capacity expansion in up to 12 GW and 3.5 GW until 2030, respectively.

The law does not significantly affect hydropower capacity expansion (already projected to slow down), which would increase modestly in about 0.2 GW in the same time frame and remain responsible for one of the largest shares of the Brazilian power mix.

The impact of this build up in thermal power in Brazil

The inclusion of gas-powered plants is supposed to address energy security and support the company’s efficiency in providing reliable energy nationwide as frequent droughts threaten hydropower capacity. While understandable as an objective, as it stands, the current provisions are problematic in many fronts, not only in terms of the GHG emission implications.

According to the law’s provisions, the mandatory regions where these thermal powerplants are to be installed are mostly in water-abundant regions. Second the natural gas infrastructure is lacking. Third, additional infrastructure investments may lead to higher energy prices for the end-consumer.

Gas feeding these power plants will mostly come from Brazil’s southeast region to be transported across the country, which adds to transportation costs and emissions. Through this lens, the government-issued Ten-Year Energy Plan (PDE 2031) acknowledges the difficulty and costs of implementation due to the necessary added infrastructure requirements. The report implies that meeting the mandated targets may be challenging. This was reflected in October 2022 auctions in which 1.17 GW of additional capacity for gas-powered power plants were contracted at a price seven times higher than those bided at similar auctions in previous years.

In addition, the implementation of new powerplants would require decades of on-going operation to ensure full amortization of costs. This may lead to stranded assets as demand for cleaner sources of energies outpace fossil fuels. Although the government has claimed that part of the additional installed capacity will be used to replace existing thermal power plants (to be switched off by 2024), emissions from additional infrastructure and the 70% intermittency requirement outpace the efficiency gains from the new installations.

This is reinforced when added to the additional requirement of developing 721 kilometers of transmission lines in the Amazon Rainforest region, 125 kilometers of which are located in indigenous land. This implies additional infrastructure costs and more emissions (linked to deforestation). Equally difficult is that such buildup of infrastructure in the Amazon Rainforest and disregard to social and environmental licenses infringes on Brazil’s Sustainable Development Goals, thus also going against national energy planning.

Even if it is in the law, will Brazil’s be able to attract capital for natural gas power plants?

While technically enforceable by the Eletrobras’ law, many questions remain on whether companies will be willing to invest in capital-intensive projects which may soon become stranded – especially when penalties for doing otherwise remain unclear.

In addition, it is unlikely that Eletrobras’ new shareholders would be on board with such a massive of buildout in thermal power plants. Singapore’s sovereign fund, GIC; Canadian pension fund, CPPIB; and, Brazilian Investment Management company, 3G Radar, each hold around 11% of Eletrobras.

All of these financial actors have shown considerable interests towards investing in the energy transition and decarbonizing their portfolios. It is thus believed that this could hinder their willingness in investing in high-cost gas power plants which require additional infrastructure investments in order to become profitable, not to mention that Brazil does not produce enough natural gas and thus might need to be imported via very expensive LNG.

Regardless, if the additional capacity of 8 GW of thermal gas power does go through, one should expect these power plants to be running for a considerably long time in order to fully amortize the investments. This could lead to a 33% emission increase which will slow down the Brazilian government’s energy transition strategy.

Lula, Brazil’s new president, has indicated that its government will revise this 8 GW mandate, an attempt to remove the 70% inflexibility requirement. Instead, the new government might make the additional power as back-up for renewable energy intermittence, diminishing the potential environmental hinderance foreseen in the law. In order to do so, a new motion would have to be approved in congress – a usually time-intensive measure. This regulatory uncertainty may in the meantime decrease energy investments and impact the pace of the energy transition.

The Eletrobras law also pushed for renewables

The Eletrobras law did promote measures which favor the energy transition. However, if all these requirements are fulfilled, they may also increase electricity prices for the end consumers.

The law dictated new concessions for hydropower generation for the next 30 years, ensuring dispatchable renewable energy, which contributes to the country’s energy transition. However, it favors hydropower plants which fall under the price quota regime, allowing them to sell the generated electricity under market prices rather than through imposed limits by the national electricity agency (ANEEL). This may lead to higher tariff prices, which could reach R$ 167/MWh in 2051 (compared to R$ 93/MWh today). The government tried to curtail this by mandating that half of the revenue generated through Eletrobras’ privatization shall be directed to diminishing the tariff increase. Despite this measure, this could still represent up to eight times less than the required investment needed to keep prices low.

An additional measure promotes the development of small hydropower plants, to be developed over the next 20 years. While this promotes dispatchable renewable energy and addresses the need to replace existing old hydro powerplants which would soon cease operations, it also favors the most expensive form of renewable energy available, again creating possible cost impacts for the end-consumer. The government addressed this by creating a price cap according to 2019 auction prices adjusted to inflation (R$ 314.55 / MWh). These prices remain 7.7% higher than those found in 2021 auctions.

The government also included the extension of PROINFA by 20 years. PROINFA is a governmental program established between 2002 and 2022 which created subsidies for biomass and small hydro power plants, wind, and solar farm owners in order to incentivize the production of renewable energy sources in the country.

While positive in theory, such extension would only favor previous contracts as opposed to a structural revision of the Brazilian power grid and costs of renewable technologies. Most of these investments have already been amortized and cost of technology has decreased significantly.

Its impact in promoting the energy transition therefore, can be questioned, as it is not necessarily deploying new renewable technologies, but rather favoring outdated contracts at higher costs. A more interesting alternative instead would have been to promote the expansion of new low-cost renewable energy projects through new auctions.

Final thoughts: The Mixed Outcome of Electrobras’ privatization Law

In conclusion, it is unclear what impact will Eletrobras’ privatization truly incur for the country’s energy transition. It is argued that through its privatization, the company will now be freed from bureaucracy, allowing it to speed up investments and increase its ability to invest in new (riskier) clean technologies.

Eletrobras’ CEO, has been known for his inclination towards green technologies and has advocated for green hydrogen investments in several occasions. The same is expected from the new shareholders, who have been seen to adopt decarbonization investment strategies. Eletrobras’ net zero strategies across scope 1, 2, and 3 are also contradictory to exactly the amendments of the law, claiming to decarbonize through the sales of thermal-powered power plants and I-REC purchases.

However, it is important to note that the law does push for thermal gas expansion, which, if occurs, may shift and delay Brazil’s energy transition. The absence of clear penalizations and accountability makes it unclear on whether the additional capacity of 8 GW of thermal gas powerplants will indeed be adopted.

While it is unclear how much the privatization will truly impact the energy transition, increase in tariff prices may be likely. The law and the subsequent auctions since its approval, seem to favor costly renewable contracts, which will likely increase tariffs for the end-consumer. Tariff increases may also happen due to the expansion of PROINFA, promotion of small hydro power plants, and implied cost of necessary added infrastructure for thermal gas-powered plants.

Victoria Barreto Vieira do Prado is a MSc. Sustainability Management student at Columbia University. Prior to her studies, she has worked in the development of the Brazilian Voluntary Carbon Market via her work at Carbonext, and in the decarbonization strategies of major players in the Brazilian hard-to-abate sectors as a consultant

References

ANEEEL. (2022)(A). Três usinas a gás natural são licitadas em Leilão de Reserva de Capacidade. Gov.br. Retrieved October 30th.

ANEEEL. (2022)(B). Resultados do Leilão – LEILÃO DE GERAÇÃO ANEEL Nº 008/2022 – Resumo Vendedor 02° LEILÃO DE RESERVA DE CAPACIDADE – ENERGIA. Epe.br. Retrieved Janyary 7th

CCEE. (2022). Resultados Leilão ANEEL Outubro 2022. CCEE. Retrieved from November 1st

Eletrobras (2022)(A). Apresentação de resultados 2T22. RI Eletrobras. Retrieved October 24th, 2022

Eletrobras (2022)(B). Estretatégica Climática. Portal Eletrobras. Retrieved January 7th, 2023

Empresa de Pesquisa Energética; Ministério de Minas e Energia. (2022). Plano Decenal de Expansão de Energia. Gov.br. Retrieved October 25th

Epbr. (2022). Primeiro leilão de térmicas da MP da Eletrobras não interioriza o gás. PSE Unicamp. Retrieved October, 30th, 2022

Instituto Escolhas; Escopo Energia. (August 2021). Relatório desestatização da Eletrobras: Impactos no planejamento do setor elétrico. Escolhas.org. Retrieved October 24th, 2022

Ministério de Minas e Energia. (2022). Visão do MME sobre os impactos da capitalização da Eletrobras. Gov.br. Retrieved October, 30th, 2022

Pamplona, Nicola. (2022). Eletrobras decide sair de carvão e desmobilizar térmicas mais poluentes. Folha de S. Paulo. Retrieved January, 7th, 2023

Ramalho, André. (2022). Tolmasquim defende térmicas flexíveis e vê renováveis como soft power para o Brasil. Epbr. Retrieved January 7th, 2023

República Federativa do Brasil. (2021). Lei Nº 14.182, de 12 de julho de 2021. Diário Oficial da União. Retrieved October 25th, 2022

Tomalsquim, Mauricio. (2022). Proposta de Privatização da Eletrobras e seus desdobramentos para o Setor Elétrico Brasileiro. PSE Unicamp. Retrieved October, 30th, 2022

An electric bus in downtown Montevideo, Uruguay. Credit: Inés Acosta/IPS

By Brianne Watts
NEW YORK, Feb 10 2023 (IPS)

Latin America’s (LATAM) transportation sector produces the largest share of regional emissions and is a large source of air pollution, making transforming transportation technology systems key to energy transition and decarbonization. In particular, electrifying public transportation systems across the region through a transition to electric bus (e-bus) fleets will reduce fossil fuel demand and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

While there are obstacles in the transition to e-buses, Latin America is well-positioned to address these challenges and take the lead in switching to zero-emissions public transit through innovative financing models, incentives, and public policy, which will contribute to reducing emissions while supporting more sustainable economic growth. Several countries and cities in Latin America are already leaders on this front and the region has innate advantages to expanding these networks.

Why Latin America Is Uniquely Poised to Benefit from Public Transit Electrification

Transforming transportation in LATAM will reduce fossil fuel use, contributing to decarbonization in the region. Unlike most of the world, the majority of Latin America’s electricity comes from renewable energy, while more than 95% of the energy used in its transport sector comes from oil and petroleum products.

Transforming transportation in LATAM will reduce fossil fuel use, contributing to decarbonization in the region. Unlike most of the world, the majority of Latin America’s electricity comes from renewable energy, while more than 95% of the energy used in its transport sector comes from oil and petroleum products.

The LATAM transport sector accounts for 15% of the region’s GHG emissions and was responsible for 8% of total global emissions in 2019. Furthermore, a 2018 UN report estimated that air pollution causes 64,000 premature deaths in the region every year, a figure it predicts could increase by 75% by 2050. These deaths were mainly caused by transportation emissions.

Recognizing the need to change, governments across the region have taken steps to clean up the transportation sector. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in 27 of the region’s countries prioritized transport, though only a handful specified renewables-based transport.

There has been a lot of focus on private electric vehicles (EVs) and raising emissions standards, but electrifying municipal bus fleets allows for less extensive infrastructure development—focusing charging infrastructure in centralized bus depots—and does not rely on consumer demand for cleaner private vehicles.

Latin America already claims the second highest e-bus fleet globally, with estimates of over 3,700 units across at least 10 countries, up from 2,000 e-buses in operation in 2020. While China dominates the electric bus market, several qualities unique to Latin America offer opportunities to expand its fleet.

The region is home to a highly urban population, with 80% of residents living in cities—a figure that is on the rise. These demographics have contributed to LATAM boasting the highest global per capita public transportation use.

Global bus rapid transit system data shows that systems in Latin America carry, on average, 600% more passengers per day than European systems and nearly twice the number of Asian systems.

LATAM also has a history of embracing transit innovation. One report pointed to the early adoption of electric trams, cable cars to serve dense, hard to reach settlements, propane taxis, and other new transportation technology. The region has “relatively sophisticated transit authorities” and some of the developing world’s best transit systems, suggesting data collected from existing networks “can support the efficient deployment of new electric buses.”

Cities Leading the Transition

The significant portion of emissions and pollution generated by transport is strong motivation for national and municipal governments in Latin America to invest heavily in electric buses. Colombia and Chile have committed to making 100% of public transportation system vehicle purchases zero emission by 2035. The capitals of these countries are emerging as leaders in the race to electrify city buses.

Bogotá has a fleet of nearly 1,500 e-buses, the largest outside of China, accounting for over 16% of the city’s entire public bus fleet. Santiago has the second largest e-bus fleet in LATAM. One 2019 analysis forecast that by 2025, over 5,000 electric buses will be delivered to Latin American cities annually.

The region is receiving support from international partnerships to expand electric bus networks. In 2019, the Zero Emission Bus Rapid-deployment Accelerator (ZEBRA) Partnership was launched, financed by P4G – Partnering for Green Growth and the Global Goals 2030, and co-led by C40 and the International Council on Clean Transportation.

ZEBRA’s mission is to work with cities in the region to secure political commitments, develop zero-emission bus fleet deployment strategies and business models, and secure financing for bus projects in order to “accelerate the deployment of zero-emission buses in major Latin American cities.”

Falling Costs, Innovative Financing, and International Support Can Drive Investment

One of the biggest obstacles to scaling up the deployment of e-buses is the high up-front costs of units. As U.S. interest rates continue to rise and the U.S. dollar appreciates, public financing of the units will pose a risk in countries that already have large amounts of U.S. dollar-denominated debt. However, lifetime costs of units are dropping and potential economic slowdowns could increase demand for public transport, while innovative financing solutions can enable LATAM countries to transform their bus systems.

E-buses are quickly becoming a cost-effective alternative to diesel counterparts, as acquisition, operation, and maintenance costs drop, and fossil fuel prices rise. A 2021 report estimated e-buses and associated charging infrastructure have up to two- to three-times, higher up-front costs compared to diesel alternatives. However, lower-cost battery technology, efficiency improvements, and low maintenance costs have already caused the purchase price to plunge.

One estimate found that “‘total cost of ownership’ over a vehicle’s lifetime should soon approach parity with internal combustion engine alternatives.” Santiago’s electric buses cost about one-fourth the cost per kilometer to operate compared to diesel buses. The falling costs and emission reduction benefits these buses bring make them economically advantageous in the long run.

In the meantime, cities throughout the region are using innovative models and public-private financing arrangements to expand e-buses fleets. One popular method is “unbundling” ownership and operation.

This model allows private firms to buy, own, and maintain the fleets and related equipment, while municipalities sign long-term contracts to operate the fleets. The advantage of this model is that it allows each party to perform the task for which it has a comparative advantage, allowing the owners to collateralize their assets and local governments to avoid extensive financing risks and the accumulation of debt. ZEBRA is financing this model of e-bus projects and related infrastructure throughout the region through a commitment of more than $1 billion.

Policies to Promote Change

To spur the inclusion of e-buses in Latin America’s energy transition, local and national governments need to develop and implement cross-cutting policies that incentivize this technology and enable it to thrive.

First, governments should codify goals of switching to 100% zero-emission bus fleets, following the examples of Chile and Colombia. These goals should include clear and ambitious target dates for purchasing and operating e-buses and for infrastructure improvements needed to support this transition.

Second, it is important to specify zero-emission technology (such as electric buses) in these goals, as ambiguous language like “low carbon” and “clean transport” creates loopholes allowing for fuel-efficient combustion technology. Transportation authorities also need to partner with utilities to expand charging infrastructure, ensure the grid can handle the additional load, and ensure that clean sources of electricity are used to charge the e-buses.

At the same time, governments should craft financial incentives for private bus owners and operators to switch to electric buses. The current average age of both public and private transport fleets in many LATAM countries is relatively low, increasing the risk of stranded assets. This cost, along with the upfront costs of a new electric bus, could inhibit the switch away from combustion-engine buses.

When São Paulo adopted a law to make all privately owned buses (which comprise the city’s entire bus fleet) zero-emission by 2037, many operators complained that they did not have the financial and technical resources needed to comply. They feared raising fares to pay for electric buses could hurt ridership.

Targeted subsidies, tax incentives, and insurance schemes that reduce the costs and risk of replacing higher emitting buses with e-buses will not only speed up the transition and contribute to meeting NDC targets, but will also signal the governments’ commitment to this technology.

New Opportunities for Growth

Because LATAM already leads in renewable energy use for electricity generation, transportation sector electrification is key to the energy transition. In a region known for extensive bus use, a switch to e-buses in public transportation will signal that LATAM governments are committed to furthering meaningful decarbonization.

LATAM is already home to several bus-manufacturing powerhouses, including Mexico and Brazil. Chile and Argentina are home to large lithium reserves. The region has the skills and resources to develop production capacity in electric bus manufacturing and battery manufacturing, which could create green jobs, support technological development, and strengthen regional value chains.

While cost and financing present challenges, targeted policies, public-private financing, and financial incentives can turn Latin America into a leader in public transportation electrification, reduce fossil fuel use, and present opportunities for sustainable economic development.

Brianne Watts is a Foreign Service Officer at the U.S. Department of State, currently pursuing a Master of Public Administration in Economic Policy Management at Columbia University.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Government.

Credit: United Nations

By David Ferrari, Sudip Ranjan Basu and Kimberly Roseberry
BANGKOK, Thailand, Feb 9 2023 (IPS)

The last three years have seen the Pacific impacted negatively due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The tourism industry, a key source of national revenue and jobs creation, received a severe blow due to closure of borders and reduced travel.

In April 2020, a major cyclone caused widespread destruction in the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga. In early 2022, a volcanic eruption in Tonga further caused significant damage to domestic physical infrastructure.

Adding to these existing pressures, the food, fuel and finance crises have had a crippling impact on national economies throughout the Pacific. The vulnerabilities to both manmade and natural disasters are all but obvious. There is a need for an acceleration of transformative energy policy actions and ambitions.

Growing costs of fuel imports

A glance at the data shows that most Pacific countries – particularly the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) – remain highly dependent on imported petroleum fuels and are expected to do so for many years.

Outside of Australia and New Zealand, oil makes up about 80 per cent of the Pacific’s total energy supply, of which 52 per cent is used for transport, 37 per cent for electricity generation and 12 per cent for other applications such as process heating. Renewable energy accounts for only 17 per cent of the total energy supply.

Fuel imports cost the region US$6 billion annually, or around 5 to 15 per cent of GDP for each economy. This is an enormous economic burden. With its vast natural resources, a history and culture of independence and subsistence together with its low energy intensity, the Pacific subregion offers great advantages for energy transition leadership. So, there are solutions to alleviate this cost.

ESCAP’s new report – Pacific Perspectives 2022: Accelerating Climate Action – makes the case for a rapid transition of the Pacific’s energy sector away from fossil fuel imports and to increase access to modern energy services to deliver Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7) in harmony with global climate goals.

This strengthens the case for alleviating reliance on imported fossil fuels. A move to locally generated renewable energy sources is supported by both the economic gains and the energy security benefits.

Advancing the implementation of SDG 7

It is widely recognized that the Pacific is not on track to deliver universal access to clean cooking fuels and technology by 2030. In fact, this target may present one of the largest hurdles to achieving SDG 7.

However, experts have recognized that energy access is best achieved through utilization of solar energy, and for many of those who remain without electricity across the Pacific, the best access solution will be the installation of stand-alone solar home systems.

Experts now suggest moving beyond minimum levels of electricity access and employing metrics such as multi-tier frameworks or the “modern energy minimum” of consumption of at least 1,000 kWh per year as a better indicator of access.

On the other hand, the rates of access to clean cooking fuels and technologies are amongst the lowest in the world as depicted in the chart below. In 2020, almost 10 million people across the Pacific lacked access to clean cooking, the bulk of whom (8.1 million people) were in Papua New Guinea. Furthermore, the rate of access to clean cooking in many countries is stagnating and, in some cases, even declining.

Figure 1: Proportion of population with access to clean cooking fuels and technologies (Data source: World Health Organization, via the Asia Pacific Energy Portal. Data was unavailable for New Caledonia, Northern Mariana Is., American Samoa, French Polynesia and Guam.)

Focusing on solution-oriented energy transition policies

A wide range of policy interventions and intergovernmental mechanisms are available to support policymakers to address the issues of over-reliance on fossil fuels and the lack of access to modern energy.

Firstly, renewable energy offers some very low hanging fruit. As imported petroleum accounts for about 72 per cent of the electricity supply and almost 100 per cent of transport energy; renewable sources can in many situations deliver clean energy at a lower cost. Developing infrastructure to support the shift to electric vehicles offers an opportunity to channel renewable energy into the transport sector.

Secondly, the business case for energy efficiency is strong and brings with it the potential[1] to reduce energy demand across multiple sectors. However, a large proportion of these opportunities remain unfulfilled.

Finally, policymakers should collaborate through existing Pacific regional initiatives to support the scaling-up of local capability and capacity through coordinated training and knowledge transfer in the area of energy transition.

Readers will find further details and policy recommendations in the report which is now available on the ESCAP website.

By putting people at the center of policymaking, the ESCAP Commission remains the most agile and vibrant anchor to accelerate energy transition and promote regional solidarity.

[1] While it raises some complex questions, researchers have analysed the relationship between energy efficiency and demand response in various situations and determined that a high degree of complementarity is possible.

David Ferrari is ESCAP Consultant, Sudip Ranjan Basu is Deputy Head and Senior Economic Affairs Officer and Kimberly Roseberry is Economic Affairs Officer

IPS UN Bureau

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Hydrogen (H2) is an essential component of today’s energy and industrial systems. Credit: Shutterstock.

By Adalberto Castañeda Vidal
NEW YORK, Feb 8 2023 (IPS)

Latin America has the potential to become the world’s dominant exporter of hydrocarbon. According to the IEA, Latin America could produce 25 percent of the 12 Million tons (Mt) of low-carbon hydrogen exports expected by 2030.

The region is definitely taking this opportunity seriously. Over the past years, 11 countries in the region have published national hydrogen strategies. While this is an excellent policy signal, it might not be enough to win the race against other regions.

For the region to realize its hydrogen exporting potential, I would argue that governments should move from broad national roadmaps to a more tailored and assertive hub development strategy.

This is because the first movers are going to be the ones securing the offtake contracts and attracting investments. Following are some considerations and proposals to promote low-hydrogen hubs across the region to turn Latin America into a hydrogen success story.

Hydrogen’s potential in Latin America

Hydrogen (H2) is an essential component of today’s energy and industrial systems. Around 90 million tons (Mt) of H2 are produced and used yearly from natural gas and coal, emitting 9-23 kg CO2/kg H2.

Chemicals, refineries, and steel production dominate today’s demand. Recent technological developments that allow the production of low-carbon hydrogen, position it as an alternative to decarbonize hard-to-abate sectors. In optimistic scenarios, hydrogen’s global demand can reach 115 Mt by 2030 and 528 Mt by 2050.

The two most prominent low-carbon hydrogen types are:

1. Green hydrogen, produced through water electrolysis paired with 100% renewable electricity, emits (0 CO2/kg H2).
2. Blue hydrogen, produced from fossil fuels combined with carbon capture and sequestration technologies (CCS), emits 1-3 kg CO2/ kg H2.

The global hydrogen generation market was valued at USD 129.85 billion in 2021 and is expected to expand at a compound annual growth rate of 6.4% from 2022 to 2030. New value chains will be needed to support this upscaling, including installing electrolyzer manufacturing plants in the region, which could create thousands of high-quality jobs.

Latin America has a competitive advantage in the global hydrogen race as it has one of the most abundant endowments of solar and wind resources which are key for the production of green hydrogen.

From 2014 to 2023, it was the most competitive region in terms of cost of production for both solar and wind. Furthermore, fossil fuel producers in the region can build on their existing knowledge and infrastructure to develop the value chains to capture and store CO2 from existing hydrogen production facilities.

Reasons for a hydrogen-hub strategy for Latin America

Some examples of planned hydrogen hubs already exist in Chile and Brazil. However, most hydrogen strategies in the region present broad national targets that lack demarcation and definition of particular incentives directed at the most strategic locations.

Latin America has a competitive advantage in the global hydrogen race as it has one of the most abundant endowments of solar and wind resources which are key for the production of green hydrogen

A hub is a specific geographic location with resources that provide a competitive advantage for developing the hydrogen supply chain. This pathway could facilitate cooperation between public and private stakeholders and community engagement. It also may provide increased visibility to attract first movers.

In this regard, hydrogen hubs are industrial areas with a competitive advantage in developing multiple projects for hydrogen production, distribution, utilization, and export. These hubs also have the presence of potential off-takers and existing infrastructure, which could be repurposed as the base for the hydrogen supply chain.

Hydrogen hubs can also be defined in opposition to its alternative, which is developing stand-alone individual projects. The lack of success of CCS projects over the past decade provide a good example of how stand-alone models face significant technical and commercial risks that can lead to inconsistent policy support and investments.

According to a study by the University of California, 80 percent of CCS projects ended in failure in the US. The projects failed due to a lack of off-takers, poor plant siting, and little support from local coalitions. These conditions impacted the project’s credibility of revenues and continued incentives support, which weakened their financial footing.

It is crucial to learn from these examples to mitigate such risks, considering particular vulnerabilities in Latin America that are hard to control, such as higher capital costs and exchange rate risks.

A hydrogen hub approach as a way to mitigate investments risks

While hydrogen’s potential is huge in the energy transition, as of the end of 2021, investments were still $863 billion short. This is when competition with other regions comes into play. Latin American economies must show more ambitious strategies to generate new opportunities and attract that capital. The key to facilitating the allocation of capital is to mitigate risks with strong market signals and the development of key infrastructure.

The benefits of a more focused hydrogen hubs promotion strategy can be divided into three parts: risk reductions, optimization of resource allocation, and securing policy and social support.

First, hubs can help mitigate market risks by building redundancy of supply and demand. This prevents risks associated with allocating production and demand to individual projects. Furthermore, it can help distribute technical risks among more players for the construction of key infrastructure projects, such as transmission lines, pipelines, and geological storage.

Second, according to experiences obtained from other clean energy projects, hubs are more efficient for optimizing planning and operation. Sole point-to-point projects run the risk of tailoring the technical decisions to the specific needs of one producer and one off-taker. However, with a hub approach, big market players cooperate and can involve smaller players, hence providing more opportunities to take advantage of economies of scale.

Lastly, stakeholders need to generate community acceptance and ensure the support of local authorities. Research from the Inter-American Development Bank found that of 200 conflict-affected infrastructure projects, 36 were canceled, 162 faced delays, and 116 faced cost overruns.

Therefore, community engagement cannot be regarded as a secondary requirement. A transparent hub proposal regarding its benefits, costs, and transition plans for communities and workers could help garner local support and, therefore, ensure consistent policy and social backing.

While clean hydrogen hubs can help reduce risks, optimize resource allocation, and garner local support, key decisions must be made by several actors with different goals. This creates a risk of delaying the projects or failing to reach agreements to get to final investment decisions. In this regard, it is important to consider lessons learned from failures and successes in other regions.

For instance, Europe is at the forefront of clean hydrogen development with a top-down and stakeholder-based approach. Lessons on the role of both national and local authorities in the pioneer hubs in Teesside and Rotterdam need to be taken into consideration.

On the other hand, while the US started following the source-to-sink model for CCUS, in 2021, it experienced a shift towards developing hydrogen hubs, which were revitalized with the recently approved Inflation Reduction Act.

Lessons from Chile’s hydrogen hub experience

In Latin America, Chile provides an excellent example of how to map and market hydrogen hubs at a global scale. In 2020, the Ministry of Energy published its National Green Hydrogen Strategy, outlining national priorities and targets. While the national strategy provided insights for three regions, in 2022, the government published a new report that identified two potential hydrogen hubs in Antofagasta (Atacama desert) and Magallanes. Both regions have well-defined projects and are working to attract investments and secure long-term offtake contracts with international partners.

To reproduce this strategy, the first hypothesis governments need to prove is the availability of natural resources, renewable resources for the development of green hydrogen or suitable geological storage, for blue hydrogen. The regions must ideally have the presence of relevant industries with experience in similar sectors, such as natural gas producers or renewable developers, as well as potential off-takers.

Then the government needs to devise a plan for incentives, such as tax deductions, accelerated depreciation, and customs exemptions, among others. On top of that, policy accelerators need to be implemented to allow faster deployment of technology, such as specialized land tenders and fast-track licensing and permitting.

Companies with international experience can work closely with local governments and federal agencies to ensure regulations do not hinder projects’ development.

Parallelly, hub participants need to engage with local communities. Plans must be outlined diligently to conduct consultations and provide attractive compensation when needed. A poor implementation of this requirement can create a bad reputation for key stakeholders and the industry as a whole.

These efforts can be conducted with international organizations and development banks, which could later provide initial investments to make projects bankable. Governments can also help further mitigate risks through grants, availability-based payments, and credit enhancement tools. Government support is also crucial to secure offtake contracts through signing Memorandums of Understanding or dedicating offices to deploy what some call “hydrogen diplomacy.”

While some international and regional examples show the benefits of following a hub-centered strategy, Latin American countries must face crucial challenges to make it work. First, the recent leftist turn in the region may pose some uncertainties about market-aligned policies.

With so much risk and lower margins, governments must prove they can attract and lay appropriate foundations for private investments.

On the other hand, with the broader land requirements for hydrogen projects, companies must show their commitment to building local support and respecting communities and regulations. A clean energy business cannot be developed with old dirty tactics. The potential for the region is evident. Will Latin America be able to work in teams and win this race?

Adalberto Castañeda Vidal is a second-year student of the Master of Public Administration at Columbia University – School of International and Public Affairs concentrating in Energy. He worked as a research assistant for the Center on Global and Energy Policy, where he participated in research projects about hydrogen and natural gas. He is originally from Tabasco, Mexico, and holds a bachelor’s in International Relations from the National Autonomous University of Mexico.

Energy-efficient solar systems in the UN Compound in Timor-Leste are helping cut down costs and reduce CO2 emissions. Credit: UN

By Ahmed Saleem
DILI, Timor-Leste, Feb 8 2023 (IPS)

Access to energy remains a concerning challenge for many in Timor-Leste. The centralised nature of the local electricity supply chain has traditionally kept consumers reliant on the national grid to overcome chronic energy shortages.

While more than 200,000 households have access to electricity, the distribution network is in poor condition, with excessive voltage drops and persistent service outages. The cost of electricity is also higher than in neighbouring countries, and Timor-Leste has been slow to transition from expensive diesel generation to renewables.

With the new UN reforms, the United Nations in Timor-Leste, under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator (RCO) has now started lighting the way with its solar-powered grid which has begun to give maximum dividends.

A powerful 300 kWp photovoltaic system is producing 400,000 kWh of clean electricity annually, filling critical gaps in energy supply. “It covers 75 per cent of the daytime electricity consumption of the entire UN House, which hosts 14 UN agencies in Dili and has reduced reliance on fossil fuels and generators, leading to 286.000 kg of CO2 emission saved every year,” said Project Coordinator Ulderico Ze Machado.

It took almost a year – from feasibility to completion – to see the solar panel installed at the UN Timor-Leste compound. Credit: RCO Timor-Leste

This move comes with the UN’s revised Business Operations Strategy (BOS) that guides strategic planning, management, monitoring, and reporting of the UN Country Team’s joint support.

The Operations Management Team started weighing the feasibility and working on a cost-efficient alternative energy solution in 2016-2017 when Timor-Leste was facing high electricity costs and increased CO2 emissions.

“In Timor-Leste, our road to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development starts at home. Our solar energy system can be a model for other UN Country Offices to show how we can jointly, sustainably and effectively tackle greenhouse emissions while reducing operational costs, and scale up support across the United Nations System”.

“Greening our business operations can help maximise efficiency, improve productivity, and in turn support the transition of the country to a more sustainable energy future,” noted UN Timor-Leste Resident Coordinator Funmi Balogun.

The project has already substantially reduced electricity costs, which were 40% of the entire Common Premises budget. “We now save USD 90,000 annually on electricity bills and diesel costs with the hope that a 100 per cent return on the investment will be materialised within six to seven years,” added Ulderico Ze Machado.

In line with the UN’s commitment to the ‘Smart UN Facilities and the Sustainable Development Goals’, this solar project shows how a UN Common premises can work in action, and how the the United Nations Sustainable Development Coordination Framework can be coherently implemented in countries.

The infographic outlines the impact of the solar panel operations in the UN Timor-Leste compound. Credit: RCO Timor-Leste

“A project like this goes beyond providing energy. It showcases a value addition to the Government, partners, and stakeholders as to how such initiatives can help create other socio-economic benefits, including employment, greener environment, cheaper energy, and sustainable lifestyles.

So, the more we implement such projects, the more we empower our communities and bring impact.

The project also evidences the skillset and expertise to support the country to transition to a more sustainable energy future and supporting the deployment of renewable energy technologies,” said UNDP Resident Representative Munkhtuya Altangerel, who is also chair of the UN Operations Management Team.

Based on this successful experience, the UN Operations Management Team is now working on upscaling the project and making the UN House, a 100 per cent solar-energy-run compound.

Ahmed Saleem is Communications Officer, Resident Coordinator’s Office, Timor-Leste. Editorial support by UNDCO.

For more information on the UN’s work in Timor-Leste, please visit  Timorleste.un.org

IPS UN Bureau

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By Mario Osava
BOA VISTA, Brazil, Feb 6 2023 (IPS)

Roraima, the northernmost state of Brazil, on the border with Guyana and Venezuela, is undergoing an energy transition that points to the dilemmas and possible solutions for a safe and sustainable supply of electricity in the Amazon rainforest.

As the only state outside the national grid – the National Interconnected Electric System (SIN) – it is dependent on diesel and natural gas thermoelectric plants, which are expensive and polluting sources, that account for 79 percent of Roraima’s electric power.

The financial and environmental cost is exacerbated by the transportation of fossil fuels by truck from Manaus, the capital of the neighboring state of Amazonas, 780 kilometers from Boa Vista, the capital of Roraima.

But the people of Roraima pay one of the lowest prices for electricity in Brazil, thanks to a subsidy paid by consumers in the rest of the country.

These subsidies will cost about 2.3 billion dollars in 2023, benefiting three million people in this country of 214 million people, according to the National Electric Energy Agency regulator.

A fifth of the total goes to Roraima, which from 2001 to 2019 received electricity imported from Venezuela. This meant the state needed less subsidies while it enjoyed a degree of energy security, undermined in recent years by the deterioration of the supplier, the Guri hydroelectric plant, which stopped providing the state with energy two years before the end of the contract.

Fortunately, Roraima has natural gas from deposits in the Amazon, extracted in Silves, 200 kilometers from Manaus, to supply the Jaguatirica II thermoelectric power plant, inaugurated in February 2022, with a capacity of 141 megawatts, two thirds of the state’s demand.

Roraima thus reduced its dependence on diesel, which is more costly and more polluting.

But what several local initiatives are seeking is to replace fossil fuels with clean sources, such as solar, wind and biomass.

This is the path to sustainable energy security, says Ciro Campos, one of the heads of the Roraima Renewable Energy Forum, as a representative of the Socio-Environmental Institute (ISA), a pro-indigenous and environmental non-governmental organization.

The city government in Boa Vista, the state capital, home to two thirds of the population of Roraima, has made progress towards that goal. Solar panels cover the roofs of the city government building, municipal markets and a bus terminal, and form roofs over the parking lots of the municipal theater and the Secretariat of Public Services and the Environment.

In addition, a plant with 15,000 solar panels with the capacity to generate 5,000 kilowatts, the limit for so-called distributed generation in Brazil, was built on the outskirts of the city.

In total there are seven plants with a capacity to generate 6,700 kilowatts, in addition to 74 bus stops equipped with solar panels, some of which have been damaged by theft, lamented Thiago Amorim, the secretary of Public Services and the Environment.

In addition to the environmental objective, solar energy allows the municipality to save the equivalent of 960,000 dollars a year, funds that are used for social spending. Boa Vista describes itself as “the capital of early childhood” and has won national and international recognition for its programs for children.

The Renewable Energies Forum and the Roraima Indigenous Council (CIR), which promote clean sources, say the aim is to reduce the consumption of diesel, a fossil fuel transported from afar whose supply is unstable, and to avoid the construction of the Bem Querer hydroelectric plant.

The project, of which there are still no detailed studies, would dam the Branco River, Roraima’s largest water source, to form a 519-square-kilometer reservoir that would even flood part of Boa Vista. It would affect nine indigenous territories directly and others indirectly, said Edinho Macuxi, general coordinator of the CIR.

Bem Querer would have an installed capacity of 650 megawatts, three times Roraima’s total demand. It has awakened interest because it would also supply Manaus, a metropolis of 2.2 million inhabitants that lacks energy security, and could produce more electricity just as the generation of other hydroelectric plants in the Amazon region is declining.

Almost all of Roraima is in the northern hemisphere, and the rainiest season runs from April to September, when water levels run low in the rest of the Amazon region. The state’s hydroelectricity would therefore be complementary to the entire Brazilian portion of the rainforest.

That is why Bem Querer is a project inextricably connected to the construction of the transmission line between Manaus and Boa Vista, already ready to start, which would integrate Roraima with the national grid, enabling it to import or export electricity.

“We can connect, but we reject dependency, we want a safe and autonomous energy model. We will have ten years to find economically and politically viable solutions,” said Ciro Campos.

Few policymakers ever claim credit for causing stagnation and recessions. Yet, they do so all the time, justifying their actions by some supposedly higher purpose.

Now, that higher purpose is checking inflation as if it is the worst option for people today. Many supposed economists make up tall tales that inflation causes economic contraction which ordinary mortals do not know or understand.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Recent trends since mid-2022 are clear. Inflation is no longer accelerating, but slowing. And for most economists, only accelerating inflation gives cause for concern.

Annualized inflation since has only been slightly above the official, but nonetheless arbitrary 2% inflation target of most Western central banks.

At its peak, the brief inflationary surge, in the second quarter of last year, undoubtedly reached the “highest (price) levels since the early 1980s” because of the way it is measured.

After decades of ‘financialization’, the public and politicians unwittingly support moneyed interests who want to minimize inflation to make the most of their financial assets.

War and price
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine began last February, with retaliatory sanctions following suit. Both have disrupted supplies, especially of fuel and food. The inflation spike in the four months after the Russian invasion was mainly due to ‘supply shocks’.

Price increases were triggered by the war and retaliatory sanctions, especially for fuel, food and fertilizer. Although no longer accelerating, prices remain higher than a year before.

To be sure, price pressures had been building up with other supply disruptions. Also, demand has been changing with the new Cold War against China, the Covid-19 pandemic and ‘recovery’, and credit tightening in the last year.

There is little evidence of any more major accelerating factors. There is no ‘wage-price spiral’ as prices have recently been rising more than wages despite government efforts ensuring full employment since the 2008 global financial crisis.

Despite difficulties due to inflation, tens of millions of Americans are better off than before, e.g., with the ten million jobs created in the last two years. Under Biden, wages for poorly paid workers have risen faster than consumer prices.

Higher borrowing costs have also weakened the lot of working people everywhere. Such adverse consequences would be much less likely if the public better understood recent price increases, available policy options and their consequences.

With the notable exception of the Bank of Japan, most other major central banks have been playing ‘catch-up’ with the US Federal Reserve interest rate hikes. To be sure, inflation has already been falling for many reasons, largely unrelated to them.

Making stagnation
But higher borrowing costs have reduced spending, for both consumption and investment. This has hastened economic slowdown worldwide following more than a decade of largely lackluster growth since the 2008 global financial crisis.

Ill-advised earlier policies now limit what governments can do in response. With the Fed sharply raising interest rates over the last year, developing country central banks have been trying, typically in vain, to stem capital outflows to the US and other ‘safe havens’ raising interest rates.

Having opened their capital accounts following foreign advice, developing country central banks always offer higher raise interest rates, hoping more capital will flow in rather than out.

Interestingly, conservative US economists Milton Friedman and Ben Bernanke have shown the Fed has worsened past US downturns by raising interest rates, instead of supporting enterprises in their time of need.

Four decades ago, increased servicing costs triggered government debt crises in Latin America and Africa, condemning them to ‘lost decades’. Policy conditions were then imposed by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank for access to emergency loans.

Globalization double-edged
Economic globalization policies at the turn of the century are being significantly reversed, with devastating consequences for developing countries after they opened their economies to foreign trade and investment.

Encouraging foreign portfolio investment has increasingly been at the expense of ‘greenfield’ foreign direct investment enhancing new economic capacities and capabilities.

The new Cold War has arguably involved more economic weapons, e.g., sanctions, than the earlier one. Trump’s and Japanese ‘reshoring’ and ‘friend-shoring’ discriminate among investors, remaking ‘value’ or ‘supply chains’.

Arguably, establishing the World Trade Organization in 1995 was the high water mark for multilateral trade liberalization, setting a ‘one size fits all’ approach for all, regardless of means. More recently, Biden has continued Trump’s reversal of earlier trade liberalization, even at the regional level.

1995 also saw strengthening intellectual property rights internationally, limiting technology transfers and progress. Recent ‘trade conflicts’ increasingly involve access to high technology, e.g., in the case of Huawei, TSMC and Samsung.

With declining direct tax rates almost worldwide, governments face more budget constraints. The last year has seen these diminished fiscal means massively diverted for military spending and strategic ends, cutting resources for development, sustainability, equity and humanitarian ends.

In this context, the new international antagonisms conspire to make this a ‘perfect storm’ of economic stagnation and regression. Hence, those striving for international peace and cooperation may well be our best hope against the ‘new barbarism’.

IPS UN Bureau

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A wind energy generation plant located in Loiyangalani in northwestern Kenya. Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IPS

By External Source
WASHINGTON DC, Jan 31 2023 (IPS)

Meeting our climate change goals will require massive investments in clean energy projects, in both advanced economies and across the Global South.  But financing projects in the latter group of countries requires an increase in foreign capital inflows that will be constrained by currency exchange rate risk. Creating an innovative Exchange Rate Coverage Facility can help to overcome this constraint.

Over the coming two decades, annual energy emissions across the Global South (not counting China) are currently projected to grow by 5 Gt.  Analysis by the International Energy Agency, the World Economic Forum and the World Bank shows that reversing this dynamic so as to meet the climate goals of the Paris Agreement, while also supporting the development needs of these countries, will require a four- to seven-fold increase in clean energy investments by 2030 from the current level of $150 billion.

If this currency risk cannot be overcome, it will be impossible to mobilize the level of foreign capital inflows that developing countries require to grow their energy systems with a low-emissions trajectory. This poses risks for both rich and poorer countries in the global effort to lower greenhouse gas emissions

Significantly, most of the needed clean energy projects provide domestic-oriented services (such as power from solar or wind power plants, public transit systems, building efficiency retrofit campaigns, electric vehicle charging stations). These generate local currency revenues.

Although much of the funding for these projects will come from domestic resources, the sheer magnitude of the required investment will necessitate significant amounts of foreign capital, potentially $180 billion or more per year by 2030.

Exchange rate risk (i.e., the potential that the local currency devalues relative to the foreign currency loan or other investment) is a major impediment to mobilizing large foreign capital flows for these projects (albeit, not the only one).

This risk translates into many problematic impacts. Notably, it increases the cost of capital, raises the financial liabilities of domestic stakeholders as their local currency depreciates, and, perhaps most significantly, constrains the level of foreign investment.

While currency hedging and other options exist (including specialized programs for developing countries), they can be expensive and are lacking for many Global South currencies, particularly at the long tenors, low cost and large scale required to support many clean energy investments.

If this currency risk cannot be overcome, it will be impossible to mobilize the level of foreign capital inflows that developing countries require to grow their energy systems with a low-emissions trajectory. This poses risks for both rich and poorer countries in the global effort to lower greenhouse gas emissions.

What to do to address this impediment? We propose an Exchange Rate Coverage Facility (ERCF), a blended-finance vehicle that would be funded by a combination of host country stakeholders, multilateral/bilateral development and climate agencies, and climate-engaged international capital.

The ERCF would be established as an offshore facility to absorb currency exchange risk on its balance sheet. It would issue guarantees protecting international lenders against this risk (see figure 1), while in parallel helping to insulate domestic sponsors from it. The Facility would pay any and all shortfalls between the value of contracted local currency (LC) payments and foreign currency (FC) debt repayments if the local currency (LC)depreciates relative to pre-defined  exchange rate .

Figure 1: Clean Energy Exchange Rate Coverage Facility Model

Under our proposed financing structure, the Facility would be a “blended finance” vehicle funded by the following :

(i) carbon credits generated by the clean energy project that are assigned to the Facility, which would cover “first loss”;

(ii) multilateral development banks (including guarantees counter-guaranteed by host countries), development finance institutions and other development/climate agencies, providing funding for defined subsequent losses; and

(iii) international capital, including philanthropies, sovereign wealth funds, and interested private institutions, covering “third loss”.

A fuller description of this facility is set out in the report: “Scaling Clean Energy Through Climate Finance Innovation: Structure of an Exchange Rate Coverage Facility for Developing Countries.”

Figure 2: The “Ladder” of Coverage for Local Currency Depreciation in the ERCF

The Facility could generate multiple benefits:

(i) catalyzing additional foreign financing for clean energy projects in developing countries;

(ii) lowering exposure of local project stakeholders to currency exchange rate shifts, thereby reducing prospect of tariff increases if the LC depreciates;

(iii) reducing the cost of foreign financing to clean energy projects;

(iv) facilitating scalability of coverage;

(v) supporting the growth of carbon credits projects and markets;

(vi) enabling funders to leverage financial impact through blended-finance structure; and

(vii) flexibility to include specialized windows (e.g., country-specific programs, including under the Just Energy Transition Partnerships being discussed with South Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam and others).

To mobilize international capital flows in the magnitude required to achieve the dual objectives of sustained development and low emissions, there is a need for new financial tools.

The proposed blended-finance ERCF is being incubated as a solution to address currency exchange risk as part of the initiative on Mobilizing Investments for Clean Energy in Emerging Economies. Its proponents welcome interested organizations and individual experts to join forces on the implementation of a pilot Facility to facilitate increased funding for the global clean energy transition.

Authors: Philippe Benoit, Adjunct Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University; Jonathan Elkind, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University; Justine Roche, Energy Initiative Lead, World Economic Forum

This piece was first published by the World Economic Forum

Solar panels with a capacity to generate 30 kilowatts no longer work in the Darora Community of the Macuxi people, an indigenous group from Roraima, a state in the far north of Brazil. The batteries only worked for a month before they were damaged because they could not withstand the charge. CREDIT: Boa Vista City Hall

By Mario Osava
BOA VISTA, Brazil, Jan 25 2023 (IPS)

“Our electric power is of bad quality, it ruins electrical appliances,” complained Jesus Mota, 63. “In other places it works well, not here. Just because we are indigenous,” protested his wife, Adélia Augusto da Silva, of the same age.

“The solar panels were left here, useless. We want to reactivate them, it would be really good. We need more powerful batteries, like the ones they put in the bus terminal in Boa Vista.” -- Lindomar da Silva Homero
The Darora Community of the Macuxi indigenous people illustrates the struggle for electricity by towns and isolated villages in the Amazon rainforest. Most get it from generators that run on diesel, a fuel that is polluting and expensive since it is transported from far away, by boats that travel on rivers for days.

Located 88 kilometers from the city of Boa Vista, capital of the state of Roraima, in the far north of Brazil, Darora celebrated the inauguration of its solar power plant, installed by the municipal government, in March 2017. It represented modernity in the form of a clean, stable source of energy.

A 600-meter network of poles and cables made it possible to light up the “center” of the community and to distribute electricity to its 48 families.

But “it only lasted a month, the batteries broke down,” Tuxaua (chief) Lindomar da Silva Homero, 43, a school bus driver, told IPS during a visit to the community. The village had to go back to the noisy and unreliable diesel generator, which only supplies a few hours of electricity a day.

Fortunately, about four months later, the Boa Vista electricity distribution company laid its cables to Darora, making it part of its grid.

“The solar panels were left here, useless. We want to reactivate them, it would be really good. We need more powerful batteries, like the ones they put in the bus terminal in Boa Vista,” said Homero, referring to one of the many solar plants that the city government installed in the capital.

Tuxaua (chief) Lindomar Homero of the Darora Community is calling for new adequate batteries to reactivate the solar power plant, because the electricity they receive from the national grid is too expensive for the local indigenous people. Behind him stands his predecessor, former tuxaua Jesus Mota. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

Expensive energy

But indigenous people can’t afford the electricity from the distributor Roraima Energía, he said. On average, each family pays between 100 and 150 reais (20 to 30 dollars) a month, he estimated.

Besides, there are unpleasant surprises. “My November bill climbed to 649 reais” (130 dollars), without any explanation,” Homero complained. The solar energy was free.

“If you don’t pay, they cut off your power,” said Mota, who was tuxaua from 1990 to 2020.”In addition, the electricity from the grid fails a lot,” which is why the equipment is damaged.

Apart from the unreliable supply and frequent blackouts, there is not enough energy for the irrigation of agriculture, the community’s main source of income. “We can do it with diesel pumps, but it’s expensive; selling watermelons at the current price does not cover the cost,” he said.

“In 2022, it rained a lot, but there are dry summers that require irrigation for our corn, bean, squash, potato, and cassava crops. The energy we receive is not enough to operate the pump,” said Mota.

A photo of the three water tanks in the village of Darora, one of which holds water that is made potable by chemical treatment. The largest and longest building is the secondary school that serves the Macuxi indigenous community that lives in Roraima, in northern Brazil. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

Achilles’ heel

Batteries still apparently limit the efficiency of solar energy in isolated or autonomous off-grid systems, with which the government and various private initiatives are attempting to make the supply of electricity universal and replace diesel generators.

Homero said that some of the Darora families who live outside the “center” of the village and have solar panels also had problems with the batteries.

Besides the 48 families in the village “center” there are 18 rural families, bringing the community’s total population to 265.

A solar plant was also installed in another community made up of 22 indigenous families of the Warao people, immigrants from Venezuela, called Warao a Janoko, 30 kilometers from Boa Vista.

But of the plant’s eight batteries, two have already stopped working after only a few months of use. And electricity is only guaranteed until 8:00 p.m.

“Batteries have gotten a lot better in the last decade, but they are still the weak link in solar power,” Aurelio Souza, a consultant who specializes in this question, told IPS from the city of São Paulo. “Poor sizing and the low quality of electronic charging control equipment aggravate this situation and reduce the useful life of the batteries.”

The low quality of the electricity supplied to Darora is due to the discrimination suffered by indigenous people, according to Adélia Augusto da Silva. The water they used to drink was also dirty and caused illnesses, especially in children, until the indigenous health service began to chemically treat their drinking water. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

In Brazil’s Amazon jungle, close to a million people live without electricity, according to the Institute of Energy and the Environment, a non-governmental organization based in São Paulo. More precisely, its 2019 study identified 990,103 people in that situation.

Another three million inhabitants of the region, including the 650,000 people in Roraima, are outside the National Interconnected Electricity System. Their energy therefore depends mostly on diesel fuel transported from other regions, at a cost that affects all Brazilians.

The government decided to subsidize this fossil fuel so that the cost of electricity is not prohibitive in the Amazon region.

This subsidy is paid by other consumers, which contributes to making Brazilian electricity one of the most expensive in the world, despite the low cost of its main source, hydropower, which accounts for about 60 of the country’s electricity.

Solar energy became a viable alternative as the parts became cheaper. Initiatives to bring electricity to remote communities and reduce diesel consumption mushroomed.

But in remote plants outside the reach of the grid, good batteries are needed to store energy for the nighttime hours.

Part of the so-called “downtown” in Darora, which has lamp posts, houses, a soccer field and a shed where the community meets. A larger community center is needed, says
the leader of the Macuxi village located near Boa Vista, the capital of the northern Brazilian state of Roraima. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

A unique case

Darora is not a typical case. It is part of the municipality of Boa Vista, which has a population of 437,000 inhabitants and good resources, it is close to a paved road and is within a savannah ecosystem called “lavrado”.

It is at the southern end of the São Marcos indigenous territory, where many Macuxi indigenous people live but fewer than in Raposa Serra do Sol, Roraima’s other large native reserve. According to the Special Secretariat for Indigenous Health (Sesai), there were 33,603 Macuxi Indians living in Roraima in 2014.

The Macuxi people also live in the neighboring country of Guyana, where there are a similar number to that of Roraima. Their language is part of the Karib family.

Although there are no large forests in the surrounding area, Darora takes its name from a tree, which offers “very resistant wood that is good for building houses,” Homero explained.

The community emerged in 1944, founded by a patriarch who lived to be 93 years old and attracted other Macuxi people to the area.

The progress they have made especially stands out in the secondary school in the village “center”, which currently has 89 students and 32 employees, “all from Darora, except for three teachers from outside,” Homero said proudly.

A new, larger elementary and middle school for students in the first to ninth grades was built a few years ago about 500 meters from the community.

Water used to be a serious problem. “We drank dirty, red water, children died of diarrhea. But now we have good, treated water,” said Adélia da Silva.

“We dug three artesian wells, but the water was useless, it was salty. The solution was brought by a Sesai technician, who used a chemical substance to make the water from the lagoon drinkable,” Homero said.

The community has three elevated water tanks, two for water used for bathing and cleaning and one for drinking water. There are no more health problems caused by water, the tuxaua said.

His current concern is to find new sources of income for the community. Tourism is one alternative. “We have the Tacutu river beach 300 meters away, great fruit production, handicrafts and typical local gastronomy based on corn and cassava,” he said, listing attractions for visitors.

A gas flare at installations of the state-owned Pemex oil company in the town of Reforma Escolín, Papantla municipality in the southeastern Mexican state of Veracruz, on Jan. 11, 2023. More than 100 gas wells operate in the area, several of which release gas without controls and put the local population and their property at risk. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

By Emilio Godoy
PAPANTLA, Mexico, Jan 23 2023 (IPS)

A dark mole dots the brown earth, among the green scrub at this spot in southeastern Mexico. A repetitive “glug, glug,” a noise sounding like a thirsty animal, and an intense stench lead to this site, hidden in the undergrowth, where a broken pipe has created a pool of dense oil.

The smell of fuel overpowers the usual aroma of the surrounding vegetation.

The oil and natural gas leak runs freely in a well belonging to the state-run oil giant Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) in Reforma Escolín, part of Papantla, a municipality in the southeastern state of Veracruz, in the vicinity of a natural gas flare that illuminates the semi-cloudy environment and warms the already high temperature.“The infrastructure is old, they do not maintain it. When there are leaks, you hear a ‘ssssss’ and the smell is unbearable, you can’t stay in your house.” -- Omar Lázaro

Far from the gaze of Mexico’s Agency for Security, Energy and Environment (ASEA), responsible for monitoring the fossil fuel industry in the country, and Pemex, the gas flares in an area dotted with oil and gas wells.

“The infrastructure is old, they don’t maintain it. When there are leaks, you hear a ‘ssssss’ and the smell is unbearable, you can’t stay in your house,” Omar Lázaro, a delegate to the municipality of the non-governmental National Indigenous Congress, which brings together native peoples and organizations, told IPS.

The local community all too vividly recalls the Jun. 4, 2022 explosion of a Pemex gas pipeline that put residents on edge and confirmed, for the umpteenth time, the potentially catastrophic impacts of fossil fuels.

Lázaro, a local musician, recalled that the leak flowed for two days, there were four fires in the affected area and the fire lasted two weeks, some 300 kilometers from Mexico City, in Papantla, (which means “place of abundant papán” – a local bird – in the Nahuatl language), home to just under 160,000 inhabitants in its extensive rural and semi-urban territory.

“In some places there was a smell of gas before the explosion. The problem was that the scrubland began to burn and there was no water to put it out. Pemex threatened that it would not take responsibility if people went in to put out the fire and something happened to them,” said Lázaro, who is also a member of the Assembly for the Defense of the Territory, which represents some 20 communities and five municipal organizations.

In essence, the gas is methane, 86 times more powerful at trapping heat than carbon dioxide (CO2) over 20 years, even though it spends less time in the atmosphere.

That means it is important to control it to curb the rise in the planet’s temperature to no more than 1.5 degrees C, according to the commitments made by the international community.

In the municipality of Papantla, in the southeastern Mexican state of Veracruz, oil and gas wells abound, emiting polluting gases, such as methane, a major contributor to global warming. The photo shows the “Escolín 238” well in operation. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Massive

The incident in the town of Reforma Escolín is part of a pattern of gas leaks from the extraction and transportation of oil and gas by Pemex and private companies in Mexico, without enforcement by the environmental authorities of the existing regulations.

IPS reviewed Pemex databases on leaks and its prevention plans, obtained through public information requests, which point to underreporting of gas emissions – composed mainly of methane – and confirmed the evidence that leaks devastate an area where gas wells abound.

Historically, Pemex has been the biggest culprit in the gas leaks, due to the size of its infrastructure in Mexico.

After a drop between 2017 and 2019, gas explosions have been on the rise since 2020. Most of the incidents occur at hydrocarbon facilities in the states of Campeche, Tabasco and Veracruz in southeastern Mexico.

In 2020, 78 gas leaks by Pemex and its subsidiaries were registered, 85 by private companies, and 32 by the National Center for Natural Gas Control (CENAGAS), which manages the gas pipelines that belonged to the state oil company, without estimates of the resulting methane emissions, according to ASEA figures.

A year later, Pemex reported 91 leaks, private companies 74, and CENAGAS 28.

These leaks come from gas pipelines, compressor stations and other facilities that transport, store and distribute gas, infrastructure that adds up to some 30,000 facilities and 50,000 kilometers of gas pipelines.

The face of Pastora García, one of the 11 members of the Municipal Council of Papantla, reflects concern about the leaks.

“Things are bad here, there are a lot of risks. This is how Pemex works and we’re screwed. It is worrisome, because people live here,” she told IPS while she was working in Reforma Escolín, a town of some 1,000 people.

García was a municipal councillor in the small town and submitted three requests for pipeline repairs in 2011 and 2020, obtaining no response, and the leaks continued.

In and around the town, local residents grow citrus fruit, beans and corn, and raise cattle, and the pollution harms their activities. In the area, the ground looks like Swiss cheese from which gas frequently emanates, as during the great leak of 2013.

Although ASEA does not record the volumes of leaks, Mexico ranked tenth in the world in methane emissions in 2021, a list led by China, India and the United States, and which also includes Brazil, according to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), an intergovernmental grouping of large oil consumers.

In addition, since 2019 oil and gas infrastructure has released methane into the atmosphere in Mexico, according to satellite images.

In June 2022, a group of European scientists revealed that Pemex released 40,000 tons of methane in December 2021 from an offshore platform in the Gulf of Mexico.

In the case of Pemex, one of the aggravating factors is the deliberate venting or release and flaring of gas, which has been on the rise since 2017 due to the lack of capture technology and economic incentives for its use, since it is more convenient for the oil company to simply release and burn it off.

This practice grew from 3,800 cubic meters (m3) of gas in 2017 to 6,600 in 2021, according to the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction Initiative (GGFR), made up of 20 governments, 12 oil companies and three multilateral organizations. Mexico forms part of the alliance, but Pemex does not.

The IEA measured Mexico’s emissions at 6.33 million tons of methane in 2021, equivalent to 1.8 percent of the world total, to which agriculture contributed 2.53 million, waste 2.28 million, and production and energy consumption 1.47 million. In this segment, venting and flaring represent the main factors, and in gas pipelines, leaks.

Itziar Irakulis, a researcher at the Polytechnic University of Valencia, told IPS from that Spanish city that “from the satellite we see that every time the gas flaring stops (the torch goes out), about 100 tons of methane per hour are vented. This turns the oil platform into what in the literature we call an ultra-emitter.”

The expert, co-author of a study on the release of gas from Pemex platforms, stressed that, in the face of the climate crisis, “the last thing we need is more ultra-emission events of this type.”

In November 2022, Pemex, which ranks 20th in the world in proven crude oil reserves and 41st in gas, produced 1.7 million barrels of oil per day and 4.7 billion cubic feet of gas per day (Bcf/d). Because domestic production is insufficient, it imported 555 million Bcf/d, mainly from the United States.

Pemex resorts to the practice of flaring gas due to the lack of technology for its retention and economic incentives for its use. The photo shows a pipeline in Reforma Escolín, Papantla municipality in the southeastern Mexican state of Veracruz, on Jan. 11, 2023. CREDIT: Emilio Godoy/IPS

Anaid Velasco, research coordinator at the non-governmental Mexican Center for Environmental Law (CEMDA), described the “important challenges” in accounting for and curbing methane emissions.

“There is more talk about methane, but there is still no public policy. This disconnect between what is said and what is done has to do with not creating more responsibilities that could be binding, in order to apply an energy policy based on fossil fuel sources. They don’t want to generate a greater regulatory burden” for the oil industry, especially Pemex, she told IPS.

ASEA partially applies the regulation to control methane emissions, which is why Mexico faces hurdles to meet its Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The regulation was supposed to enter into force in December 2019, after it was drafted in 2018. But in July 2020, under the pretext of the COVID-19 pandemic, ASEA postponed its application for 19 months, until the end of January 2022.

As of August 2022, 18 companies, including the subsidiaries Pemex Exploración y Producción (PEP) and Pemex Logística, had presented to ASEA their program for the prevention and comprehensive control of methane emissions from the hydrocarbons sector, the fundamental component of the regulation.

The state Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) had not delivered its plan.

Between 2017 and October 2022, ASEA imposed 26 fines on state-run and private companies totaling 3.83 million dollars, of which they have paid 3.29 million, without specifying the reason, which means it is not clear if the fines targeted methane emissions.

From 2017 to 2021, it fined Pemex Transformación Industrial three times for undisclosed reasons, which the company appealed.

But ASEA did not investigate the two fires on the surface of the ocean in the Gulf of Mexico, caused by methane leaks in July and August 2021, according to its own records. After the explosion in Reforma Escolín, a group of residents filed a complaint with ASEA, to no avail.

Pemex abandoned its plan to reduce gas flaring in its fields and the ministry of energy blocked the application of regulations in this regard, as reported by the British news agency Reuters throughout 2022.

In August, the state-run National Hydrocarbons Commission, the regulator of the oil industry, fined Pemex about two million dollars for excessive gas flaring at the Ixachi oil and gas field in Veracruz.

Gas deals

In 2021 Mexico signed the Global Methane Pledge, aimed at cutting emissions by 30 percent in 2030, from 2020 levels. But the country has not yet set a specific goal.

Along these lines, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who supports fossil fuel energy over renewables and promotes Pemex, announced in June 2022 that the oil giant would invest two billion dollars, with international aid, to cut methane emissions by 98 percent.

But there is no detailed plan to reach that target, beyond Pemex’s previous program to curb them.

In its methane control plan, obtained by IPS through Mexico’s freedom of information act, the oil company set an annual reduction goal in the Cantarell field, the country’s biggest, in the Gulf of Mexico, of four percent between 2017 and 2022. and calculated that emissions totaled 27,175 tons per year. But it is not known how much progress has been made towards this target.

However, the oil company uses an emission factor – the average amount of a pollutant coming from a specific process, fuel, equipment or source – instead of a measurement at the source site.

For the Ku Maloob Zaap field, the country’s second-largest, there are no measurements. The highest estimate comes from the Macuspana-Muspac deposit, located between the states of Chiapas and Tabasco, which emit 199,222 tons, followed by the Poza Rica Altamira Reynosa deposit – between Veracruz and Tamaulipas – with 73,352 tons; the Nejo Olmos field in Tamaulipas (53,395 tons); and Samaria-Luna in Tabasco (52,669 tons).

These emissions come from equipment, gas pipelines, compressors, leaks and venting. Pemex, which did not include infrastructure in other areas of the country, estimates decreases between four percent and 25 percent over a period of six years.

Throughout 2023, public and private companies must submit their annual reports to ASEA.

For the Cantarell deposit, the oil company ordered a halt to the flaring of 80 million Bcf/d, equivalent to 72.74 tons of methane. In addition, PEP applied measures to reduce flaring by 291 billion Bcf/d.

As natural gas for consumption in Mexico continues to be imported via pipelines and burned in combined-cycle power plants that also use steam, methane emissions will also continue, as occurred in the United States.

In places like Reforma Escolín, people have not gotten used to living among time bombs and are only asking that the leaks be repaired, although opposition by the local community is waning.

Lázaro lamented that “After the accident, some community assemblies were held, but the social mobilization dwindled, undermined by the local authorities.”

Without fighting methane emissions, Mexico will have a hard time reaching its Nationally determined contributions, presented to comply with the Paris Agreement on climate change, signed in 2015.

Velasco the environmentalist doubts that Mexico will meet its commitments. “They set goals because there is a lot of international interest. It is good that they make commitments, because it gives us tools to monitor the situation and demand compliance. If Pemex receives financing, we don’t know how it will execute it. Transparency and traceability are needed,” she said.

Spanish researcher Irakulis said maintenance and continuous flaring prevent ultra-emissions.

“It is true that the flares already have other types of emissions associated with them, and there are more environmentally friendly ways than flaring to treat the excess gas obtained from oil extraction. A significant reduction in emissions can be realistic as long as they invest in improving the maintenance of the facilities,” she stated.

In Reforma Escolín, the only option seems to be the dismantling of the gas infrastructure, which is impossible. “Pemex says there is no money. We have not seen machinery to replace the pipeline, they are not doing anything. Where are we going to go? We live here, and we’re staying here,” said García the town councillor.

Daisaku Ikeda. Credit: Seikyo Shimbun

By Daisaku Ikeda
TOKYO, Japan, Jan 18 2023 (IPS)

The Ukraine crisis that erupted in February last year continues with no prospect for cessation. The intensified hostilities have inflicted great suffering in population centers and destroyed infrastructure facilities, compelling large numbers of civilians, including many children and women, to live in a state of constant peril.

The history of the twentieth century, which witnessed the horrors caused by two global conflicts, should have brought home the lesson that nothing is more cruel or miserable than war.

During World War II, when I was in my teens, I experienced the firebombing of Tokyo. To this day, I remember with great vividness getting separated from family members as we fled desperately through a sea of flames, and not learning that they were safe until the following day.

How many people have lost their lives or livelihoods in the ongoing crisis, how many have found their own and their family’s ways of life suddenly and irrevocably altered?

Many other countries have also been seriously impacted in the form of constrained food supplies, spiking energy prices and disrupted financial markets.

It is crucial that we find a breakthrough in order to prevent any further worsening of the conditions facing people worldwide, to say nothing of the Ukrainian people who are compelled to live with inadequate and uncertain supplies of electricity amidst a deepening winter and intensifying military conflict.

I therefore call for the urgent holding of a meeting, under UN auspices, among the foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine and other key countries in order to reach agreement on a cessation of hostilities. I also urge that earnest discussions be undertaken toward a summit that would bring together the heads of all concerned states in order to find a path to the restoration of peace.

Together with calling for the earliest possible resolution to the Ukraine crisis, I wish to stress the crucial importance of implementing measures to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, both in the current crisis and all future conflicts.

Nuclear rhetoric has ratcheted up, and the risk that these weapons might actually be used stands today at its highest level since the end of the Cold War. Even if no party seeks nuclear war, the reality is that, with nuclear arsenals in a continuing state of high alert, there is a considerably heightened risk of unintentional nuclear weapon use as a result of data error, unforeseen accident or confusion provoked by a cyberattack.

Along with reducing tensions with the goal of resolving the Ukraine crisis, I feel it is of paramount importance that the nuclear-weapon states initiate action to reduce nuclear risks as a means of ensuring that situations do not arise—either now or in the future—in which the possibility of nuclear weapons use looms. It was with this in mind that in July last year I issued a statement to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in which I urged the five nuclear-weapon states to make prompt and unambiguous pledges that they would never be the first to launch a nuclear strike—the principle of “No First Use.”

Regrettably, the August NPT Review Conference was unable to reach consensus on a final document. But this in no way means that the nuclear disarmament obligations set out in Article VI of the treaty no longer pertain. As the various drafts of the final document indicate, there was widespread support for nuclear risk reduction measures such as the adoption of No First Use policies and extending negative security assurances, by which nuclear-weapon states pledge never to use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess them.

The pledge of No First Use is a measure that nuclear-weapon states can take even while maintaining for the present their current nuclear arsenals; nor does it mean that the threat of the some 13,000 nuclear warheads existing in the world today would quickly dissipate. However, what I would like to stress is that should this policy take root among nuclear-armed states, it will create an opening for removing the climate of mutual fear. This, in turn, can enable the world to change course—away from nuclear buildup premised on deterrence and toward nuclear disarmament to avert catastrophe.

Looking back, the global state of affairs during the Cold War era was characterized by a series of seemingly insoluble crises that rattled the world, spreading shockwaves of insecurity and dread. And yet humankind managed to find exit strategies and pull through.

One example of this is the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) held between the United States and the Soviet Union. Intention to hold these was announced on the day of the 1968 signing ceremony for the NPT, which had been negotiated in response to the bitter lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The SALT negotiations were the first steps taken by the US and the USSR to put the brakes on the nuclear arms race based on their nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

For those involved in these talks, to impose constraints on the nuclear policies that had been developed as the exclusive prerogative of the state could not have been easy. Nonetheless, this was a decision indispensable to the survival not only of the citizens of their respective nations, but of all humankind.

Having experienced first-hand the terror of teetering on the brink of nuclear war, the people of that time brought forth historic powers of imagination and creativity. Now is the time for all countries and peoples to come together to once again unleash those creative powers and bring into being a new chapter in human history.

The author is Peace builder and Buddhist leader Daisaku Ikeda, who is President of the Soka Gakkai International (SGI). https://www.daisakuikeda.org/ Read full statement here full statement

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Climate change is a global problem that requires a global solution. However, negotiating a solution has been challenging due to several factors. One of the main reasons that recent COP Climate summits and other international climate talks have not been able to resolve climate change is that there is a lack of consensus among countries on how to address the issue. Developed countries, which have historically been the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, are often unwilling to take on significant emissions reductions or to provide financial assistance to developing countries to help them adapt to the effects of climate change.

The Gabura union, a small island adjacent to the Sundarbans forest, is expected to be submerged in seawater by 2050. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan

Another significant barrier to progress on climate change is the need for more political will among leaders of countries. In some cases, leaders may not see climate change as a priority or may be reluctant to take on the economic and political costs of reducing emissions or investing in clean energy due to political reasons. Some countries may be influenced by powerful fossil fuel lobbies that push against climate action. Developed countries must be willing to take on more significant emissions reductions and provide financial assistance to developing countries to help them adapt to the effects of climate change. Developing countries, in turn, need to be willing to take on emissions reduction measures and invest in clean energy and other climate mitigation measures.This can happen through more effective multilateral negotiations such as United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where all countries agree to set emissions reduction targets and support developing countries.

Bangladesh is located in the low-lying delta region of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna rivers, making the country particularly susceptible to flooding and rising sea levels. Bangladesh is also prone to cyclones and other extreme weather events, which are becoming more frequent and severe due to climate change. The country has a long coastline, much of which is low-lying and vulnerable to flooding. As sea levels continue to rise, the risk of coastal flooding is increasing, devastatingly impacting the lives and livelihoods of the people in these areas. These events are causing widespread damage to homes and infrastructure and affecting the country’s agricultural sector, a significant source of income for many people in Bangladesh. Many people in the coastal areas have lost their homes and livelihoods due to sea level rise and coastal flooding. They face food and water insecurity due to increased soil and water salinity.

Globally, rich countries can assist Bangladesh cope with climate change in several ways. One crucial way is by providing financial assistance to help the country adapt to the impacts of climate change. This may include funding for building sea walls and other flood protection infrastructure and programs to help people in coastal areas relocate to higher ground. Another way rich countries can help is by providing technical assistance to Bangladesh to develop and implement clean energy and other climate mitigation measures. This could include funding and expertise to help the country develop renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power, as well as to improve energy efficiency and to reduce emissions from the industrial and transportation sectors.

The Sundarbans forests, located in the coastal belt of Bangladesh, is one of the most vulnerable areas in the country to the impacts of climate change. The forests span over 10,000 square kilometres and is home to various plant and animal species, including the Royal Bengal tiger. Sea level rise is one of the most significant threats to the Sundarbans forest making it particularly susceptible to flooding and rising sea levels. According to a study by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, sea levels in the Bay of Bengal are projected to increase by up to 1 meter by the end of the century. This would devastate the Sundarban forests, as seawater would submerge large areas.

The impacts of climate change on the Sundarban forests are also likely to have knock-on effects on the people living in the surrounding areas. The forests are a significant source of livelihood for many people in the region, who rely on it for fishing, agriculture, and other activities. As the forests are damaged by sea level rise and extreme weather events, these people will also be affected by food and water insecurity and the loss of their homes and livelihoods. Many people who lost their homes and land to flooding, were forced to relocate to higher grounds.

The health impacts of climate change on people living around the Sundarban are also significant. As a result of sea level rise and increased flooding, many are at risk of waterborne diseases such as cholera and diarrhea. Extreme weather events are accelerating salinity across the coastal belt of Bangladesh. Women are experiencing uterus cancers, infertility, and skin diseases, and men, too, are experiencing fertility problems and other health issues. Due to the loss of livelihoods and displacement, many people face food insecurity and malnutrition. In addition to these immediate impacts, climate change exacerbates the region’s existing social and economic inequalities. People living in poverty and marginalized communities are disproportionately affected by climate change, as they have fewer resources to cope with the impacts and less access to services and support.

Climate change has led to a growing number of people migrating from these areas, searching for better opportunities and escaping the impacts of climate change. Most climate migrants from coastal belt areas of Bangladesh are moving to urban areas, such as the capital city of Dhaka and other major cities. These migrants often seek better job opportunities and access to services and support. However, many migrants face challenges in their new locations, such as a lack of affordable housing, discrimination, and limited access to services and support. The future is uncertain for those still living in coastal areas of Bangladesh and fighting the climate crisis. Many of the people living in these areas are among the country’s most vulnerable and marginalized communities, making them particularly susceptible to the impacts of climate change. Climate conversations worldwide by world leaders and major organizations have been occurring every year. But they must see the severity of the situation for the people suffering and take concrete actions beyond being in a room to converse about the effects of climate change.

Climate conversations by world leaders are occurring worldwide but how much is changing ? Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan

Many indigenous communities across the Sundarbans forest have been experiencing extreme weather conditions. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan

Fishing communities face extreme poverty due to the lack of fish available in the rivers. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan

Women around coastline areas of Bangladesh face increased salinity, a major cause of uterus cancer. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan

Due to climate change, extreme heat and salinity are declining birth rates across the coastal belt in Bangladesh. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan

Climate change is accelerating the displacement of inhabitants across the coastal belt of Bangladesh. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan

Four families are sitting with what remains in their food storage. Due to high salinity, agricultural products cannot grow well anymore. Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan

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By Luis Brizuela and Jorge Luis Baños
HAVANA, Jan 11 2023 (IPS)

Félix Morffi supports the energy needs of his home with the help of the sun, in some cases through handcrafted solutions that make the most of an alternative source that is abundant in Cuba, but still used very little.

With two tanks, glass, aluminum sheets, as well as cinderblocks, sand and cement, the 86-year-old retiree created, in 2006, a solar heater that meets his household needs.

“You build it today and tomorrow you have hot water; anyone can do it, and if they have a bit of advice, all the better,” said the retired mid-level machine and tool repair technician who lives in the municipality of Regla, one of the 15 that make up Havana.

He also designed and made a dryer that uses the heat of the sun to dehydrate fruits, spices and tubers, which he assembled mostly with recycled products such as pieces of wood, nylon, acrylic and aluminum sheets.

On the roof of his house, 16 solar panels imported in 2019 provide five kilowatts of power (kWp) and help run his small automotive repair shop where he works on vehicles for state-owned companies and private individuals, an independent enterprise that he set up next to his house.

The innovator believes that despite the economic conditions, with a little ingenuity people can take advantage of the natural elements, because “the sun shines for everyone; the wind is there and costs you nothing, but your wealth is in your brain”

In addition to covering his household needs, he provides the surplus electricity to the national grid, the National Electric Power System (SEN).

Morffi said more training is needed among personnel involved in several processes, and he cited delays of more than a year between the signing of the contract with Unión Eléctrica and the beginning of payments for the energy surpluses provided to the SEN, as well as “inconsistency with respect to the assembly” of the equipment.

Although Cuba has a national policy on renewable energy sources, “there is still a lot of ignorance and very little desire to do things, and do them well. Awareness-raising is needed,” he argued.

The innovator believes that despite the economic conditions, with a little ingenuity people can take advantage of the natural elements, because “the sun shines for everyone; the wind is there and costs you nothing, but your wealth is in your brain.”

In his backyard, a small solar panel keeps the water flowing from a well for his barnyard fowl and an artificial pond holding a variety of ornamental fish as well as tilapia for family consumption.

The construction of a small biodigester, about four cubic meters in size, is also at an advanced stage on his land, aimed at using methane gas from the decomposition of animal manure and crop waste, for cooking.

Morffi, who manages these activities with the backing of several family members, also plans to import three small wind turbines of 0.5 kWp each and a new batch of 4 kWp solar PV panels.

His vision is to turn his house into a space for the production and promotion of renewable energies in Cuba.

To this end, he has the support of the non-governmental Cuban Society for the Promotion of Renewable Energy Sources and Respect for the Environment (Cubasolar), of which Morffi has been a member since 2004.

Since 2014, Cuba has had a Policy for the Development of Renewable Energy Sources and their Efficient Use. And in 2019, Decree Law 345 established regulations to increase the share of renewables in electricity generation and steadily decrease the proportion represented by fossil fuels.

According to studies, this archipelago of more than 110,800 square kilometers with an annual average of 330 sunny days receives an average solar radiation of more than five kilowatts per square meter per day, considered to be a high level that provides enormous potential in terms of energy.

The solar energy program appears to be the most advanced and with the best opportunities for growth. Over the last decade, several solar parks have been built, providing more than 75 percent of the renewable energy produced locally.

But clean sources account for just five percent of the island’s electricity generation, an outlook that the authorities want to radically transform, setting an ambitious goal of 37 percent by 2030.

Roma community protest in the Serbian city of Nis after dozens of families in a settlement in the city had their electricity cut off. Credit: Opre Roma Srbija

By Ed Holt
BRATISLAVA, Jan 5 2023 (IPS)

As European households brace for energy shortages this winter and leaders draw up support packages to help people heat homes in the coming months, experts fear that the largest minority on the continent, the Roma, will be left behind.

Many of the 12 million Roma in Europe have a low standard of living, and even before the energy crisis, energy poverty was rife among their communities.

Roma leaders and rights organisations say the current crisis has only deepened the problem and are calling for governments to ensure that one of the continent’s most vulnerable groups gets the help they need this winter and beyond.

“EU leaders and policymakers must ensure that energy policies already agreed, or any agreed in future, must be tailored and implemented in such a way that the most vulnerable, including the Roma, can access and benefit from them,” Zeljko Jovanovic, director of the Open Society Roma Initiatives Office at the Open Society Foundations (OSF), told IPS.

Roma living in Europe are among the most discriminated and disadvantaged groups on the continent. In many countries, significant numbers live in segregated settlements where living conditions are often poor, and extreme poverty is widespread.

Energy poverty is also common. It is estimated that at least 10% of the roughly 6 million Roma living in EU countries have no access to electricity at all.

Roma protest after electricity supplies to 24 families in the ‘12 February’ Roma settlement in the southern Serbian city of Nis was cut off over unpaid bills. There are calls for European countries to take into consideration the plight of the Roma during the energy crisis. Credit: Opre Roma Srbija

Meanwhile, where utilities are available, many struggle to afford them.

Rising energy prices this year have exacerbated the problem. But while governments have rolled out help in the form of one-off payments and other support for families and businesses to pay energy bills, this aid is often not filtering through to Roma despite the minority being among those most in need, say rights activists.

Unemployment in Roma communities is often high, with only one in four Roma aged 16 years or older reporting being employed, and many earn money working in the grey or black economies. But because of this, they often struggle with accessing state support schemes. This is especially true for measures approved to provide financial aid during the energy crisis.

“Even before the energy crisis, there was a problem with energy poverty in Europe, and for the Roma, this was even more so because so many were not in the formal system.

“Measures [approved] for the energy crisis are made for those in the formal system. Many Roma are not in that system – they are unemployed, or not formally registered, or earning money and paying into the social welfare system – so they cannot access those measures,” explained Jovanovic.

Roma NGOs working in some countries say they have already seen these problems.

In Romania, which has a Roma population of 1.85 million according to the Council of Europe, a programme to help the vulnerable with energy payments has been launched.

But Alin Banu, Community Organiser at the Aresel civic initiative, told IPS some Roma are unable to access it precisely because “they work in the grey or black economy and don’t have the right documentation of social insurance payments, wages etc.”.

Meanwhile, even those who are eligible for help are often being denied it, he claimed. He said that some municipalities had put conditions on receiving help to pay energy bills – for example, evidence of historical tax debt, or car ownership, makes an individual ineligible for the help.

The group says this is illegal.

“We have solved this problem in some cases, but most Roma will not complain about this because often they simply will not know it is illegal,” Balu said.

There are also concerns that other measures already adopted will actually make things worse for Roma.

Last year European leaders agreed on a non-binding goal for EU countries to reduce overall electricity demand by at least 10% by 31 March 2023, and a mandatory reduction of electricity consumption by 5% for at least 10% of high-demand hours each week.

Jovanovic fears that politicians’ first steps to save on energy consumption could involve simply cutting off power supplies to those not formally connected to the energy grid.

“Countries’ reductions in energy demand might come from cutting energy to those who do not have formal access to it, like the Roma,” said Jovanovic.

Nicu Dumitru, a Community Organiser at Arsesel, agreed – “the Roma would be the first to be cut off in that case,” he told IPS – but said that even if that does not happen, many Roma are already struggling with soaring energy costs.

Information collected by his group suggests that a fifth of all Roma households have had their electricity cut off since the start of the crisis because they cannot afford to pay. They are then connecting informally to the grid – usually through one person in their community who has a connection and who then charges high prices for others for use of that power – often borrowing money to do so, and worsening their already precarious financial situation.

There are an estimated over 400,000 people informally connected to the power grid in Romania, many of them Roma.

“The situation is getting critical for Roma,” Dumitru said.

Meanwhile, Roma activists in other countries are worried that politicians will use the energy crisis as an excuse to ignore long-term problems with energy poverty among the Roma or even as a justification to allow Roma settlements to be cut off from supplies.

In May this year, electricity supplies to 24 families in the ’12 February’ Roma settlement in the southern Serbian city of Nis were cut off over unpaid bills. The families claim this debt pre-dates their time living there, but the local power distributor demanded proof of house ownership from the families before reconnection.

People in many Roma settlements often lack such documents as the process for obtaining them is costly and difficult for many to navigate without expert legal help, and none of these families was able to provide the required proof.

It was only after both local and nationwide protests by members of the community themselves and negotiations between the families, who were represented by the Opre Roma Serbia rights group, local authorities, and the local distributor Elektrodistribucija Nis, that in December, limited supplies of electricity were restored to the families involved.

Jelena Reljic of Opre Roma Serbia said she was pleased those affected could now access electricity again but warned “the situation in this settlement is an example of a much wider systemic problem” which politicians are not doing enough to solve.

“The last cut off in this settlement was because of historic debt, but the problems with electricity [there] have been going on for a decade. Politicians are relying on being able to cut Roma settlements off from electricity during the energy crisis without too much public outrage or resistance. Around 99% of the reaction we have seen to the problem in this settlement has been of the type ‘oh, no one should be getting energy free during this crisis, we pay, so why shouldn’t they?’” she told IPS.

“Politicians are using the energy crisis to cover up the fact that they have never dealt with the problem of energy poverty for years and years,” she added.

The OSF’s Jovanovic wants European policymakers to review their proposed help during the crisis, including not just the approved reductions in energy demand but plans for energy price caps and a solidarity levy on the profits of businesses active in the oil, natural gas, coal, and refinery sectors.

He said the 5% reduction must not lead to electricity cuts for those already in energy poverty and that public revenues from the energy cap and solidarity levy – estimated at €140bn within the EU – should be redistributed along principles that are both morally and macroeconomically justified.

He has been involved in high-level EU committee meetings on energy crisis support policies, but, he told IPS, at those meetings, there seemed to be “little idea of the perspective of Roma and other vulnerable groups and how they would cope in the crisis”.

Now he and other activists are trying to arrange further talks with EU and national policymakers to urge them to address shortcomings in current policies affecting vulnerable groups, including Roma.

“We want to raise these issues,” he said.

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Aerial view of the 5000 square meter roof full of solar panels, in one of the pavilions of La Rural, the busiest fair and exhibition center in Buenos Aires. It is the largest private solar park in the capital of Argentina and required an investment of almost one million dollars. CREDIT: Courtesy of La Rural

By Daniel Gutman
BUENOS AIRES, Dec 23 2022 (IPS)

With large projects held back by the economic crisis and lack of infrastructure, Argentina seems to be looking at an alternative path towards a more sustainable energy mix involving small renewable energy projects, promoted by environmentally aware industries, businesses and private users.

The initiatives are aimed at covering their own consumption, sometimes with the addition of so-called distributed generation, in which user-generators who have a surplus of electricity can inject it into the national power grid and thus generate a tariff credit.

Distributed generation initiatives have just surpassed 1,000 projects already in operation, according to the latest official data.

At the same time, this month saw the inauguration of the largest private solar energy park in the city of Buenos Aires, an initiative of the Argentine Rural Society (SRA), the traditional business chamber of agricultural producers.

The park was installed in the exhibition center the SRA owns in the capital of this South American country, to supply part of its consumption with an investment of almost one million dollars and more than 1,000 solar panels.

“Small private renewable energy projects and distributed generation will be the ones to increase installed capacity in the coming years, because the electricity transmission and distribution system sets strong limits on large projects,” Mariela Beljansky, a specialist in energy and climate change issues, told IPS.

Beljansky, who was national director of Electricity Generation until early 2022, added: “Otherwise there will be no way to meet the growth targets for renewable sources set by Argentina, as part of its climate change mitigation commitments under the Paris Agreement.”

Argentina presented its National Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Plan, which includes 250 measures to be implemented by 2030, at the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) on climate change held by the United Nations in the Egyptian city of Sharm El Sheikh in November.

The National Secretariat for Climate Change estimated the total value of the plan’s implementation at 185.5 billion dollars, four times more than the debt Argentina incurred in 2018 with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has generated a sharp deterioration of the economy since then.

According to the data included in the plan, the energy sector is the largest generator of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the country, generating 51 percent of emissions.

Although renewable sources (with wind projects in first place and solar in second place) reached a record in October, supplying 17.8 percent of total electricity demand, the energy mix continues to be sustained basically by oil, natural gas and large hydroelectric projects.

Furthermore, the country has not decided to slow down the development of fossil fuels. The main reason is that it has large reserves of shale natural gas in the Vaca Muerta field in the south of the country, which has been attracting the interest of international investors for years. The climate change plan sets the goal of using natural gas as a transition fuel to replace oil as much as possible.

The plan also includes the objectives of developing a variety of renewable energy sources (wind, solar, small hydro, biogas and biomass) and also distributed generation, “directly at the points of consumption” and connected to the public power grid, at the residential and commercial levels.

Large renewable projects experienced strong growth between 2016 and 2019, on the back of an official plan that guaranteed the purchase of electricity at attractive prices for investors, but since then there have been virtually no new initiatives.

This truck functions as a mobile health center, travelling through towns in Patagonia, in southern Argentina. The roof of the vehicle is covered with solar panels that provide electricity to the four mobile consulting rooms and diagnostic imaging equipment. CREDIT: Courtesy of Utorak

Consumption subsidies

“In Argentina’s current situation, where there is practically no financing, and there are restrictions on importing equipment, high inflation and economic uncertainty, it is difficult to think about large renewable energy parks, and small projects become more attractive,” Marcelo Alvarez, a member of the board of the Argentine Renewable Energy Chamber (Cader), told IPS.

Alvarez pointed out that what conspires against small private and distributed generation projects are the subsidies that the Argentine government has been providing for years to energy consumption, including those families with high purchasing power that do not need them.

“Artificially cheap electricity rates and the scarcity of credit discourage the growth of renewables,” Alvarez said.

“The proof of this is that more than half of the distributed generation projects in operation are in the province of Cordoba (in the center of the country), where electricity prices are three times more expensive than in Buenos Aires and there is a special line of credit from the local bank (Bancor, which grants ‘eco-sustainable loans’) for renewable equipment,” he said.

Indeed, according to data from the Energy Secretariat, there are 1,051 user undertakings that generate their own electricity and inject their surplus into the grid and 573 of them are in the province of Cordoba.

Argentine state energy subsidies totaled 11 billion dollars in 2021 and this year, up to October, they already exceeded seven billion dollars, according to data from the Argentine Association of Budget and Public Financial Administration (Asap).

As for sources of financing, there is a line of credit endowed with 160 million dollars from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Banco de Inversión y Comercio Exterior (Bice), financed in part by the Green Climate Fund, which is aimed at renewable sources and energy efficiency projects for small and medium-sized businesses. However, most companies are unaware of its existence.

View of photovoltaic panels in a private neighborhood in Pilar, some 50 kilometers from Buenos Aires. Solar panels have become part of the landscape in the suburbs of Argentina’s capital city. CREDIT: Courtesy of Utorak

Private ventures

On Dec. 15, the Rural Society inaugurated the largest private solar park in Buenos Aires, in the 42,000 square meter covered area where the country’s most important fairs and exhibitions are held. The investment reportedly amounted to almost one million dollars.

“We have 42,000 square meters of roofs in our pavilions. It is a very important flat surface for the placement of solar panels, so we had been thinking about it for several years. We had done a pilot project in 2019, but then everything was delayed by the pandemic, which forced us to close the venue,” Claudio Dowdall, general manager of La Rural, told IPS.

“At this stage we used 5,000 square meters of roofs, on which we placed 1,136 photovoltaic panels, with a total power of 619 kW. This is equivalent to the average consumption of 210 family homes and, for us, it is between 30 and 40 percent of the electricity we use,” he added.

Andrés Badino, founder of Utorak, a company that has been dedicated to renewable energy for families and companies for more than five years, confirms that consultations and demand are growing in the sector.

“People’s interest has been growing because of increased environmental awareness and, also, because of what can be saved on electricity bills for residential users and for educational institutions and healthcare centers as well,” Badino said.

“Argentina has a national industry for the production of solar thermal tanks, but not for the manufacture of panels, inverters or batteries, despite the fact that the country has one of the largest reserves in the world, the main component. But we are confident that international prices will go down and drive demand,” he said.

A year that started with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and is ending with famine in Africa, while still spreading death and misery through an enduring pandemic and a deteriorating climate crisis — 2022 has been an apocalyptic warning of the frailty of our planet and the woeful shortcomings of humankind.

Farhana Haque Rahman

Tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians (numbers given by the UN and involved parties vary enormously) have been killed in Ukraine since Russia launched war on February 24. More than 7.8 million Ukrainians have fled the country. Billions of dollars have been spent on armaments.

But the impact of the war has been felt worldwide, driving up prices of basic commodities such as oil, gas, grain, sunflower oil and fertilisers. Somalia, now in the grip of the worst drought to hit the Horn of Africa in 40 years, used to import 90 per cent of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine.

Commodities have been weaponised. Countries slipped back into recession, just as they were slowly recovering from the economic distress of Covid-19 lockdowns. A deepening relationship between sanctioned Russia and an energy- hungry China exacerbated existing tensions with the US over Taiwan. The result? China broke off climate cooperation efforts with the US in the run-up to the COP27 climate conference hosted by Egypt in November with 200 countries and 35,000 people attending.

Against the backdrop of devastating floods in Pakistan and West Africa, and with 2022 on its way to becoming one of the five hottest years on record, agriculture and food security joined the COP27 agenda. Talks ran into extra time, as they tend to, and countries of the global South emerged with the landmark creation of a special fund paid by wealthier countries to address the Loss and Damage caused by climate change in the most vulnerable nations.

“After 30 contentious years, delayed tactics by wealthy countries, a renewed spirit of solidarity, empathy and cooperation prevailed, resulting in the historic establishment of a dedicated fund,” said Yamide Dagnet, director for climate justice at the Open Society Foundations, reflecting a sense of hard fought victory among developing countries.

Still unresolved however is which countries will give money and to whom. China in particular seems uneasy over which category it belongs to. However COP27 joined its 26 forerunners since 1995 in not reaching a binding agreement on cutting fossil fuel burning which has continued to rise globally, except for a brief pandemic dip. For this, many branded it a failure. “Humanity has a choice: cooperate or perish. It is either a Climate Solidarity Pact – or a Collective Suicide Pact,” UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres told the opening plenary session. By the end, many felt the conference had concluded with the latter. Rather than falling, the latest estimates from the Global Carbon Project show that total worldwide CO2 emissions in 2022 have reached near-record levels.

Victims of devastating floods, heatwaves and forest fires, and severe drought in Central Sahel and East Africa surely needed no confirmation from the final decision text of COP27 which recognises “the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger” and the vulnerability of food production to climate change.

In this respect, COP27 recognised the importance of nature-based solutions – a theme driven by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in ringing alarm bells on the degraded soil, water sources and eco-systems caused by intensive agriculture with overuse of fertilisers and pesticides. According to FAO, more than 25 percent of arable soils worldwide are degraded, and the equivalent of a football pitch of soil is eroded every five seconds. The planet’s bio-diversity is being devastated as a result. As highlighted by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) in stressing the vital connections between Nature and people, a landmark report in July found that 50,000 wild species provide food, cosmetics, shelter, clothing, medicine and inspiration. Many face extinction. As international agencies and NGOs (and media outlets) jostled and competed for funding to deal with the fallout from wars and climate emergencies, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) which is active in the Sahel cautioned that only 1.7 per cent of all climate finance reaches small-scale producers in developing countries and as little as 8% of overseas aid goes to projects focused primarily on gender equality. Women’s empowerment has been made a major focus of ASAP+, IFAD’s new climate change financing mechanism.

Women and girls are paying “an unacceptably high price” among communities hit by severe drought in the Horn of Africa, according to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). It launched a $113.7 million appeal to scale-up life-saving reproductive health and protection services, including establishment of mobile and static clinics in displacement sites.

Also overshadowed by wars and pandemics in 2022 were marginalised communities lacking a voice, suffering diseases such as leprosy or exploited in the form of child labour.

Yohei Sasakawa, WHO Goodwill Ambassador for Leprosy Elimination, says many issues have been sidelined because of the Covid-19 pandemic. Society has the knowledge and means to stop and cure leprosy, he says in the ‘Don’t Forget Leprosy’ campaign by the Sasakawa Leprosy Initiative.

“When people are still being discriminated against even after being cured, society has a disease. If we can cure society of this disease—discrimination—it would be truly epoch-making,” he told IPS.

A similar message was delivered by Nobel Laureate Kailash Satyarthi who told the 5th Global Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour that a mere $53 billion per annum – equivalent to 10 days of military spending – would ensure all children in all countries benefit from social protection. International Labour Organisation and UNICEF statistics from 2020 show at least 160 million children are involved in child labour, a surge of 8.4 million in four years. Children denied education became a burning issue in Afghanistan in March when the Taliban declared that girls would be banned from secondary education. The UN said 1.1 million girls were affected. The late-night reversal of a decision by Taliban authorities to allow girls from grades 7 to 12 to return to school was met with outrage and distress, inside and outside Afghanistan. Denial of human rights to girls and women has fuelled the desire of many to get out of Afghanistan and seek a better life elsewhere, adding to the millions around the world forced to flee their homes because of conflict, repression or disaster. The Ukraine conflict has displaced more than 14 million people, about a third of the population.

A UN Office on Drugs and Crime report on trafficking warns that refugees from Ukraine are at risk of including sexual exploitation, forced labour, illegal adoption and surrogacy, forced begging and forced criminality.

As they come over border crossings into Poland, refugees – including victims of rape – are greeted with posters and flyers carrying warnings about jail terms for breaking local abortion laws, images of miscarried foetuses, and a quote from Mother Theresa saying: “Abortion is the greatest threat to peace”.

UNDP, which is assisting the Ukraine government in getting access to public services for IDPs, says in its 2022 report, Turning the tide on internal displacement, that earlier and increased support to development is an essential condition for emerging from crisis in a sustainable way.

“More efforts are needed to end the marginalization of internally displaced people, who must be able to exercise their full rights as citizens including through access to vital services such as health care, education, social protection and job opportunities” said Achim Steiner, UNDP Administrator.

Nearly one million Rohingya refugees languishing in refugee camps in Bangladesh after being driven out of Myanmar in waves since 2016 would surely agree.

Asif Saleh, executive director of BRAC, said to be the world’s largest NGO and founded by Sir Fazle after the independence of Bangladesh in 1972, says work needs to “shift towards a development-like approach from a very short-term humanitarian crisis-focused approach”. But the only solution for the Rohingya refugees is their sustainable and voluntary repatriation to Myanmar. As 2022 closes, that unfortunately looks highly unlikely as the military junta that seized power in 2021 fights ethnic armed organisations on multiple fronts.

There was one seismic milestone event that happened in late 2022 although no one is quite sure exactly where and when. The few people to witness it were not aware either – not that it prevented the UN from declaring it a special day. The birth of the 8 billionth person was celebrated on November 15. The world’s population has doubled from 4 billion in 1974 and UN projections suggest we will be supporting about 9.7 billion people in 2050. Global population is forecast to peak at about 10.4 billion in the 2080s.

Inger Andersen, executive director of the UN environment programme, sent a message to the baby, and the rest of the world, as countries meet in Montreal for the COP15 biodiversity conference this month.

“We’ve just welcomed the 8 billionth member of the human race on this planet. That’s a wonderful birth of a baby, of course. But we need to understand that the more people there are, the more we put the Earth under heavy pressure,” she said.

Farhana Haque Rahman is Senior Vice President of IPS Inter Press Service and Executive Director IPS Noram; she served as the elected Director General of IPS from 2015-2019. A journalist and communications expert, she is a former senior official of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

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A riverside park in Boa Vista, which would probably disappear with the construction of the Bem Querer hydroelectric plant, 120 kilometers downstream on the Branco River. The projection is that the reservoir would flood part of the capital of the state of Roraima, in the extreme north of Brazil. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

By Mario Osava
BOA VISTA, Brazil , Dec 21 2022 (IPS)

“Roraima did not have a Caribbean character; now it does, because of its growing relations with Venezuela and Guyana,” said Haroldo Amoras, a professor of economics at the Federal University of this state in the extreme north of Brazil.

The oil that the U.S. company ExxonMobil discovered off the coast of Guyana since 2015 generates wealth that will cross borders and extend to Roraima, already linked to Venezuela by energy and migration issues, predicted the economist, the former secretary of planning in the local government from 2004 to 2014.

Roraima, Brazil’s northernmost state, which forms part of the Amazon rainforest, is unique for sharing a border with these two South American countries on the Caribbean Sea and because 19 percent of its 224,300 square kilometers of territory is covered by grasslands, in contrast to the image of the lush green Amazon jungle.

It is also the only one of Brazil’s 26 states not connected to the national power grid, SIN, which provides electricity shared by almost the entire country. This energy isolation means the power supply has been unstable and has caused uncertainty in the search for solutions in the face of sometimes clashing interests.

From 2001 to 2019 it relied on imported electricity from Venezuela, from the Guri hydroelectric plant, whose decline led to frequent blackouts until the suspension of the contract two years before it was scheduled to end.

The closure of this source of electricity forced the state to accelerate the operation of old and new diesel, natural gas and biomass thermoelectric power plants. It also helped fuel the proliferation of solar power plants and the debate on cleaner and less expensive alternatives.

Alfredo Cruz would lose the restaurant and home he inherited from his great-grandfather, who registered the property in 1912. The Bem Querer reservoir would lead to the relocation of many riverside dwellers and would even flood part of the capital of the northern Brazilian state of Roraima, Boa Vista, 120 kilometers upriver. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

In search of energy alternatives

Against this backdrop, the Roraima Renewable Energies Forum emerged, promoted by the non-governmental Socio-environmental Institute (ISA) and the Climate and Society Institute (ICS) and involving members of the business community, engineers from the Federal University of Roraima (UFRR) and individuals, indigenous leaders and other stakeholders.

The objectives range from influencing sectoral policies and stimulating renewable sources in the local market to monitoring government decisions for isolated systems, such as the one in Roraima, as well as proposing measures to reduce the costs and environmental damage of such systems.

“Not everyone (in the Forum) is opposed to the construction of the Bem Querer hydroelectric plant, but there is a consensus that there is a lack of information to evaluate its benefits for society and whether they justify the huge investment in the project,” biologist Ciro Campos, an ISA analyst and one of the Forum’s coordinators, told IPS.

Bem Querer, a power plant with the capacity to generate 650 megawatts, three times the demand of Roraima, is the solution advocated by the central government to guarantee a local power supply while providing the surplus to the rest of the country.

For this reason, the project is presented as inseparable from the transmission line between Manaus, capital of the state of Amazonas with a population of 2.2 million, and Boa Vista, the capital of Roraima, population 437,000. The line involves 721 kilometers of cables that would connect Roraima to the national grid.

Indigenous people in the northern Brazilian state of Roraima are striving to install solar plants in their villages and are studying how to take advantage of the winds in their territories, which are considered favorable for wind energy. Their aim is to prevent the construction of Bem Querer and other hydroelectric plants that would affect indigenous lands, according to Edinho Macuxi, coordinator of the Indigenous Council of Roraima. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

“In its design, Bem Querer looks towards Manaus, not Roraima,” Campos complained, ruling out a necessary link between the power plant and the transmission line. “We could connect to the SIN, but with a safe and autonomous model, not dependent on the national system” and subject to negative effects for the environment and development, he argued.

Hydroelectric damage

The plant would dam the Branco River, the state’s main water source, to form a 519-square-kilometer reservoir, according to the governmental Energy Research Company (EPE). It would even flood part of Boa Vista, some 120 kilometers upstream.

The hydropower plant would both meet the goal of covering the state’s entire demand for electricity and abolish the use of fossil fuels, diesel and natural gas, which account for 79 percent of the energy consumed in the state, according to the distribution company, Roraima Energia.

But it would have severe environmental and social impacts. “It would make the riparian forests disappear,” which are almost unique in the extensive savannah area, locally called “lavrado,” of grasses and sparse trees, said Reinaldo Imbrozio, a forestry engineer with the National Institute of Amazonian Research (Inpa).

A view of the Branco River, five kilometers above where its waters would be dammed if the controversial Bem Querer hydroelectric plant is built, which would generate enough electricity to meet the entire demand of the Brazilian state of Roraima as well as a surplus for export, but would have environmental and social impacts magnified by the flatness of the basin that requires a very large reservoir. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

In addition to the flooding of parts of Boa Vista, the flooding of the Branco and Cauamé rivers, which surround the city, will directly affect nine indigenous territories and will have an indirect impact on others, complained Edinho Macuxi, general coordinator of the Indigenous Council of Roraima (CIR), which represents 465 communities of 10 native peoples.

The CIR, together with ISA and the ICS, built two solar energy projects in the villages and carried out studies on the wind potential, already recognized in the indigenous territories of northern Roraima.

“The main objective of our initiatives is to prove to the central government that we don’t need Bem Querer or other hydroelectric projects…that represent less land and more confusion, more energy and less food for us,” he stressed to IPS at CIR headquarters.

“We will have to leave, said the engineers who were here for the studies of the river,” said Alfredo Cruz, owner of a restaurant on the banks of the Branco River, about five kilometers upstream from the site chosen for the dam. At that spot visitors can swim in the dry season, when the water level in the river is low.

Economics Professor Haroldo Amoras says the state of Roraima is becoming more Caribbean, because its economy is increasingly linked to its neighboring countries to the north of Brazil, Guyana and Venezuela, which, in addition to being importers, are the route to the Caribbean for Roraima’s agricultural and agro-industrial products. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

The rapids there show the slight slope of the rocky riverbed. It is a flat river, without waterfalls, which means a larger reservoir. The heavy flow would be used to generate electricity in a run-of-river power plant.

Cruz inherited his restaurant and house from his great-grandfather. The title to the land dates back to 1912, he said. But they will be left under water if the hydroelectric plant is built, even though they are now located several meters above the normal level of the river, he lamented.

Riverside dwellers, fishermen and indigenous people will suffer the effects, Imbozio told IPS. The property of large landowners and people who own mansions will also be flooded, but they have been guaranteed good compensation, he added.

What the Forum’s Campos proposes is the promotion of renewable sources, without giving up diesel and natural gas thermoelectric plants for the time being, but reducing their share in the mix in the long term, and ruling out the Bem Querer dam, which he said is too costly and harmful.

Energy issues will influence the future of Roraima, according to Professor Amoras. The most environmentally viable hydroelectric plants, such as one suggested on the Cotingo River, in the northeast of the state, with a high water fall, including a canyon, are banned because they are located in indigenous territory, he said.

The participation of civil society is important for the Brazilian state of Roraima to make progress towards sustainable energy alternatives that can reduce diesel consumption, offer energy security and avoid the impacts of hydroelectric dams, according to Ciro Campos, an analyst with the non-governmental Socio-environmental Institute. CREDIT: Mario Osava/IPS

Oil wealth, route to the Caribbean

In the neighboring countries, oil wealth opens a market for Brazilian exports and, through their ports, access to the Caribbean. The Guyanese economy will grow 48 percent this year, according to the World Bank.

Roraima’s exports have grown significantly in recent years, although they reached just a few tens of millions of dollars last year.

Guyana’s small population of 790,000, the unpaved road connecting it to Roraima and the fact that the language there is English make doing business with Guyana difficult, but relations are expanding thanks to oil money.

This will pave the way to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), whose scale does not attract transnational corporations, but will interest Roraima companies, said Fabio Martinez, deputy secretary of planning in the Roraima state government.

Venezuela expanded its imports from Roraima, of local products or from other parts of Brazil, because U.S. embargoes restricted trade via ports and thus favored sales across the land border, he said.

“The liberalization of trade with the United States and Colombia will now affect our exports, but a recovery of the Venezuelan economy and the rise of oil can compensate for the losses,” Martinez said.

Roraima is a new agricultural frontier in Brazil and its soybean production is growing rapidly. But “we want to export products with added value, to develop agribusiness,” said Martinez.

That will require more energy, which in Roraima is subsidized, costing consumers in the rest of Brazil two billion reais (380 million dollars) a year. If the state is connected to the national grid through the transmission line from Manaus, there will be “more availability, but electricity will become more expensive in Roraima,” he warned.

By Luis Brizuela
CANDELARIA, Cuba, Dec 20 2022 (IPS)

Mayra Rojas is one of a small but growing number of people in Cuba benefiting from the production of biogas, a renewable energy source still little used in a country highly dependent on fossil fuels.

The biodigester in the back of her house in the rural community of Carambola, Candelaria municipality in the province of Artemisa, 80 kilometers west of Havana, brings Rojas the benefits of not using firewood and electricity for cooking, with the consequent reduction in electric bills and cooking time.

It was built in 2011 with the help of her husband Edegni Puche, who worked in the installation of the gas pipes and other aspects.

Rojas and Puche, who raise pigs and grow fruits and vegetables on their small family farm, were advised by specialists from the Cuban Society for the Promotion of Renewable Energy Sources and Respect for the Environment (Cubasolar) and the Movement of Biogas Users (MUB).

Rojas also received materials from the municipal government and the local pig company to build the small-scale Chinese-type fixed-dome biodigester of about six cubic meters in size.

She estimates that the total cost of the project ranged between 500 and 600 dollars at the exchange rate at the time.

Construction costs depend on the size, type and thickness of the material, as well as the characteristics of the site.

However, experts estimate that the average minimum cost for the construction of a small-scale biodigester – which more than covers the cooking needs of a household – currently stands at around 1,000 dollars in a country with an average monthly salary equivalent to 160 dollars at the official exchange rate.

Rojas says that “before, when we cleaned the pens, the manure, urine and waste from the pigs’ food piled up in the open air, in a corner of the yard. It stank and there were a lot of flies.”

The organic matter is now decomposed anaerobically by bacteria, but in a closed, non-polluting environment that provides methane gas as an energy resource, instead of releasing it into the atmosphere.

Thanks to the alternative energy source Rojas can also keep her nails painted and her hair clean for longer.

It also helped her husband and two young children become more involved in household chores, cleaning the yard and taking care of the animals on the family farm, “and created greater awareness of environmental care.”

In addition, biogas technology provides biol and biosol – liquid effluent and sludge, respectively – which are ideal for fertilizing and restoring soils, “as well as watering and keeping plants green,” says Rojas, who has a lush garden where she grows varieties of exotic orchids.

Her biodigester has also proven useful to the community, because when there are blackouts due to tropical cyclones that frequently affect the island, “neighbors have come to heat up water and cook their food,” she adds.

There are an estimated 5,000 biodigesters in Cuba, with the potential to expand the network to 20,000 units, at least the small-scale ones, according to conservative estimates by experts.

More than 90 percent of Cuba’s electricity comes from burning fossil fuels in aging thermoelectric plants and diesel and fuel oil engines, in a nation where a significant percentage of the 3.9 million homes use electric power as the main energy source for cooking and heating water for bathing.